
Qass 
Book 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



Great Commanbcr6 

EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON 



GENERAL JOHNSTON 



Ubc Ovcnt Commanders Series, 


Edited by General James Grant Wilson. 


Admiral Farragut. 

By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. 


2achary Taylor. 

By General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. 


General Jackson. By James Parton. 


General Greene. 

By Captain FRANCIS V. Greene, U. S. A. 


General J. E. Johnston. 

By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia, 


IN- PR EFA RATION. 


General Washington. 

By General Bradley T. Johnson. 


General Sherman. 

By General Manning F. Force. 


General Grant. 

By General James Grant Wilson. 


General Scott. 

By General Marcus J. Wright. 


Admiral Porter. 

By James R. Soley, late Assist. Sec. of Na\y. 


General Lee. 

By General Fitzhugh Lee. 
General Thomas. 

By Henry Coppee, LL. D. 

General Hancock. 

By General Francis A. Walker. 


General Sheridan. 

By General Henry E. Davies. 


New York : D. Appleton & Co., i, 3, Sc 5 Bond St. 





App 



ic.ton f^ i.'O. 



GREAT COMMANDERS 
* • • • 



GENERAL JOHNSTON 



BY 

ROBERT M. HUGHES 





NEW YORK 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1893 



2.X0^ 



.y 



\' 






Copyright, 1893, 
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 



All rhhts reserved. 



I TAKE PRIDE IN DEDICATING TO THE 

ARMY OF TENNESSEE, 

AS A TRIBUTE TO ITS CONSTANCY AND VALOR, 

THIS SKETCH OF THE GREAT CAPTAIN 

WHO LED IT IN ITS PALMY DAYS, 

AND WITH WHOSE RENOWN IT IS INSEPARABLY ASSOCIATED. 



) 



PREFACE. 



Early in the year 1891 General Joseph E. Johnston 
was informed by General James Grant Wilson, the editor 
of the series of " Great Commanders " then in contem- 
plation by Messrs. D. Appleton & Co., that he would 
be included in the series; and he was requested to desig- 
nate the person whom he would prefer as his biographer. 
General Johnston, after communicating with the author 
(on March 12th), did him the honor to devolve upon 
him this highly respon3ibleJ;ask. The death of General 
Johnston within a fortnight thereafter prevented any 
conference as to the details of the work. A year pre- 
vious to this designation the author had, at General 
Johnston's request, undertaken the preparation of a 
more elaborate biography, but the present work super- 
sedes the one originally designed. 

The limited space at disposal has put out of the 
question elaborate controversial dissertations, despite 
the temptation furnished by the fact that three publi- 
cations abounding in criticism of General Johnston — 
namely, General Pierre G. T. Beauregard's Manassas, 
General Gustavus W. Smith's Seven Pines, and the 
Memoir of Jefferson Davis by his wife — appeared, by a 
remarkable coincidence, just at or after his death. 

In the preparation of this biography the main source 
of information has been the Official War Records now 
in process of publication by the Government. Webb's 



\J 1 



viii GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Peninsula, Swinton's Army of the Potomac, McClellan's 
Own Story, and the Memoirs of Generals Grant and 
Sherman have also been freely consulted. General 
Johnston's private papers, now in the possession of the 
author, have also been used ; and in one or two in- 
stances the liberty has been taken of incorporating the 
views of General Johnston embodied in conversations 
which the author has had the privilege of holding with 
the general since the close of the war. General John- 
ston's Narrative, published in 1874, has purposely been 
referred to as little as possible, for fear frequent refer- 
ence to it might impair independence of thought, and 
that impartiality essential to accuracy, and lest this 
biography might degenerate into a mere paraphrase. 

In the preparation of this work much valuable as- 
sistance has been rendered the author by his own and 
General Johnston's friends. Special acknowledgments 
are due to Joseph M. Brown, Esq., of Atlanta ; Colonel 
Benjamin S. Ewell, of Williamsburg ; Colonel Thomas 
L. Preston, of Charlottesville ; Colonel Edwin J. Har- 
vie, of Washington ; Hon. Robert M. McLane and James 
L. McLane, Esq., of Baltimore ; Henry B. Smith, Esq., 
of Williamsburg ; and Charles Sharp, Esq., of Norfolk, 
The author is also indebted to General James Grant 
Wilson, the editor, and Messrs. D. Appleton & Co., the 
publishers, for numerous courtesies ; and to Mr. E. B, 
Treat, the publisher of Edward A. Pollard's Lee and 
his Lieutenants, for permission to use without stint the 
admirable Memoir of General Johnston contained in 
that work. 

Those who may desire to study General Johnston's 
military career critically, and to learn his side of the dif- 
ferences which he was so unfortunate as to have with 
the Confederate Executive, are referred to the following 
of his writings : 



TREFACE. ix 

Narrative of Military Operations. (D. Appleton & 
Co., 1874.) 

Responsibilities of the First Bull Run. (Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War, vol. i, p. 240.) 

Manassas to Seven Pines. (Ibid., vol. ii, p. 202.) 

J eff erson Davis and the Mississippi Campaign. (Ibid., 
vol. iii, p. 472 ; also North American Review, December, 
1886.) 

Opposing Sherman's Advance to Atlanta. (Ibid., vol. 
iv, p, 260.) 

My Negotiations with General Sherman. (North 
American Review, August, 1886.) 

The following treatises of other writers may also be 
consulted : 

Memoir of General Johnston in Pollard's Lee and his 
Lieutenants, published by E. B. Treat & Co., New York, 
1867. (This was written by Judge Robert W. Hughes, 
of Virginia.) 

General Sherman, by John C. Ropes. (Atlantic 
Monthly, August, 1S91.) 

Sherman and Johnston, by Colonel Charles C. Ches- 
ney. (Fortnightly Review, November, 1875 '■> repub- 
lished in Eclectic Magazine, January, 1876.) 

Broken Idols. (Galaxy, August, 1874.) 

Norfolk, Virginia, Api7, 1893. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — Lineage, Parentage, and Youth . . . . i 

II. — Early Military Life 15 

TIL— Mexico to the Civil War 24 

IV. — Resignation — The Valley Campaign . . .36 

V. — Manassas 53 

VI.— In Sight of Washington 69 

VII. — On Guard in Northern Virginia . . . .91 

VIII. — Yorktown 112 

IX. — Williamsburg 123 

X. — Seven Pines 136 

XL— Tennessee 153 

XII. — Investment of Vicksburg 172 

XIII. — Fall of Vicksburg 194 

XIV. — Dalton 210 

XV. — To the Chattahoochee 222 

XVI. — Atlanta 244 

XVII. — North Carolina 260 

XVIII. — A Private Citizen 281 

XIX. — Conclusion 290 

' Appendix 509 

Index 345 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



Portrait of General Johnston .... 
Richmond and the Peninsula .... 

Campaign in Mississippi 

Campaign in North Georgia. No. i (Dalton) . 
Campaign in North Georgia. No. 2 (Adairsville) 
Campaign in North Georgia. No. 3 (Marietta) . 
Atlanta and Vicinity 



FACING PAGE 

Frontispiece 



118 
180 

215 
231 
236 
250 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



CHAPTER I. 

LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. 

The shire of Dumfries, one of the border counties of 
Scotland, is traversed by three considerable streams, 
which rise in the hills that form its northern boundary, 
and, pursuing a general southerly course, empty their 
waters into Solway Firth. Each of these has its own 
narrow " dale," and receives from the watershed which 
divides it from its neighboring stream many smaller 
branches to swell its volume as it courses to the Firth. 
The hills which form these watersheds attain altitude 
almost sufficient to dignify them with the name of moun- 
tains, and make the region quite rugged in character. 

The eastern of these streams is the Esk, and from it 
the valley which it waters is called Eskdale. The next,, 
to the west, is the Annan, and on its banks is situated 
the district which is called Annandale. This stream rises 
in the hills above Moffat, in the same vicinity as the 
head waters of the Tweed and Clyde. Its total length 
is about forty miles, and into it drain as tributaries the 
Moffat, Wamphray, Dryfe, and Ae, besides others of less 
magnitude. 

The western of these three water courses is the Nith, 
which, following the example of the others, bestows its 
name upon its bordering vale. At its mouth is the town 



2 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

of Dumfries, which needs no introduction to the lover 
of Burns. 

Each of these districts is rich in tradition and fa- 
mous in Scottish song and story. Here was waged con- 
stant warfare, not only between the men of the two 
nations whose boundary was so near, but between differ- 
ent Scotch families or clans as well. On the Esk was 
the *' Debatable Land," which alternately belonged to 
England and Scotland, according to the relative prowess 
and good fortune of the English or Scotch who con- 
tended for its possession. The Graemes, Forsters, Fen- 
wicks, and Musgraves, who pursued the fair Ellen and 
young' Lochinvar over Cannobie Lee, but whose steeds 
were distanced by the runaways, here found a field for 
their combats. Here, too, was Gretna Green, the favorite 
resort of English lovers fleeing on the wings of love 
from irate parents. 

In Nithsdale dwelt the powerful family of Maxwells, 
whose retainers were spread along the Nith, and whose 
sway extended over the lower valley. In Annandale 
dwelt the Johnstone clan, mainly in the region which 
stretches from the town of Lockerby to the Wamphray. 
Their original family name was Jeanville, the equivalent 
of the present French name Joinville. The Norman 
chronicler names " Le Seigneur de Jeanville," along with 
Robert de Bruis, Pierre de Balleul, and other names of 
Scottish families subsequently eminent, among those 
who took part in the battle of Hastings. Partly Saxon- 
ized into Janvil, it appears in that form on the roll of 
Battle Abbey. Thence it was anglicized into Johne- 
stoun, and appears in that form as witness to a grant to 
Sir Robert Bruce in 1249. It next became Johnstone, 
and is to this day indifferently Johnstone or Johnston, 
according as the scholastic or phonetic taste predomi- 
nates with the individual bearer. In Johnstone church- 



LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. 3 

yard these two fashions of spelling it — Johnstone or 
Johnston — are found side by side, even on the tombs of 
father and son. 

Being so near the border, the Johnstones were often 
'summoned on short notice to aid their compatriots of 
the vicinity in repelling English raids ; and, always re- 
sponding promptly, they assumed for their crest the 
device of a winged spur, and for their motto the words 
Nimquam 7ion paratus, which they rendered " Ready, aye 
ready." Though friendly with their eastern neighbors, 
probably from the mutual esteem formed and fostered 
by constant armed association in battle against their 
national foes, the English, they carried on continual 
warfare with the Maxwells on the west, and with vari- 
ous alternations of fortune. So bitter was the enmity, 
that when, in one of the mutations of royal favor, Lord 
Maxwell was declared a rebel, the King knew no better 
means of apprehending him than by authorizing the 
Laird of Johnstone to do it. In this, however, the laird 
was unsuccessful, though supported by strong detach- 
ments of Government troops. The Maxwells defeated 
them, and captured the Castle of Loughwood or Loch- 
wood, the abode of the Johnstones. The captors com- 
mitted it to the flames, one of them saying exultantly 
that they would " give Lady Johnstone light enough to 
show her to set her silken hood." 

The contest was maintained with all the ferocity 
of hereditary hatred, the military operations consisting 
mainly of forays upon each other when least expected, 
with the usual concomitants of-butchering the party sur- 
prised and carrymg off all the live stock on which they 
could lay their hands. 

Not long after the above-named occurrence a peace 
was patched up between the clans, in which Maxwell 
and Johnstone mutually covenanted to " freely remit 



4 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

and forgive all rancors of mind, grudge, malice, and 
feuds that had passed or fallen between them in any 
time bygone." After this the Johnstones, supposing 
that they had nothing to fear from the Maxwells, in- 
dulged in raids against their neighbors in the upper part 
of Nithsdale, with the result of greatly reducing the cat- 
tle and horses of that region. One of the Johnstones, 
however, made the serious mistake, if the old ballad of 
The Lads of Wamphray may be accepted as authori- 
ty, of taking a blind horse, instead of " Sim Crichton's 
winsome dun." He was, in consequence, soon overtaken 
and unceremoniously suspended to a convenient tree. 
The Johnstones in revenge raided the region with a yet 
larger party, and on their return, laden with spoil, de- 
feated their pursuers in the fight of Biddesburne, where- 
upon the vanquished went to Lord Maxwell and offered 
to become his liegemen if he would break with the 
Johnstones and side with them. The opportunity to 
form a strong alliance against his hereditary foes was 
too strong to resist ; and Lord Maxwell, regardless of 
his late compact with the Johnstones, accepted their of- 
fer, reasoning, perhaps, that though the treaty covered 
everything in " times bygone," it did not commit him as 
to the present or future. To resist this combination, the 
Johnstones sought the aid of their eastern neighbors, the 
Buccleughs, Elliotts, Armstrongs, Scotts, and Grahams. 
The two little armies met near the confluence of the 
Dryfe and Annan, which, being in the heart of the John- 
stone settlement, showed the Maxwells to have been the 
invaders. Here they fought the battle of Dryfe Sands. 
In this Sir James Johnstone displayed the military skill 
which seems to have been innate in the family. Placing 
his main body in ambush, he sent forward a small party 
of horsemen, with instructions to make a weak attack 
and then flee as if in rout. When the Maxwells pursued 



LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. 5 

in disorder, confident of victory, his main body attacked 
them, and the result was decisive. The Maxwells were 
put to flight and pursued with the relentlessness of men 
burning to avenge murdered kindred and desolated 
homesteads. Many of the vanquished were overtaken 
in the streets of Locherby and dispatched by a slash in 
the face, a kind of blow that is still called in that part 
of Scotland a " Locherby lick." The feud was only 
ended by the execution of Lord Maxwell, son of him 
who commanded at Dryfe Sands. He invited Sir James 
Johnstone, the opposing commander in that combat, to 
a conference ; and when the attention of the latter was 
attracted by an altercation between their two retainers, 
Maxwell shot him in the back with a pistol loaded with 
poisoned bullets. Johnstone's tomb in the ancient family 
churchyard records that " he was cruelly murthered by 
a pistolet." 

The name of the first emigrant of the Virginia John- 
stones was Peter, which was the family name of the old- 
est son as far back as can be traced. He was born in 
Annan in 1710, but emigrated from Edinburgh in 1727, 
settling on James River at Osborne's Landing, then the 
chief place in the colony for the inspection of tobacco, 
and an important shipping point. He engaged in mer- 
cantile pursuits, passing through all the stages of the 
business before he became independent. His business 
apparently so absorbed his attention as to leave no room 
for sentiment until his fifty-first year, when, having been 
measurably successful, he bethought himself that it was 
time to marry ; and he accordingly paid his devotions 
to a widow, Mrs. Martha Rogers, daughter of Mr. John 
Butler, himself a merchant, whose dwelling was on the 
Appomattox a short distance below Petersburg. His 
affection was reciprocated, and on March 19, 1761, they 
were married. They lived at Osborne's until 1765, 



6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

when they removed to the county of Prince Edward, in 
the Piedmont region of Virginia, and settled on an es- 
tate near Farmville, which they called Cherry Grove, in 
accordance with the custom of dignifying family home- 
steads by appropriate names. They were people of 
cultivation and learning. Mr. Johnston was a member 
of the Episcopal Church, and all his predilections and 
opinions were conservative in their tendency and in 
favor of the crown. 

The first child of this union was born at Osborne's, 
on January 6, 1763. He was therefore but two years 
old when the family removed to Prince Edward. The 
family name of Peter was bestowed upon him. 

Although Mr. Johnston was a staunch churchman, 
he was so warm a friend of learning that he did not 
hesitate to contribute liberally toward securing greater 
facilities for education than the colony then enjoyed. 
At that time the only mode of obtaining a finished edu- 
cation was at the college of William and Mary, at Wil- 
liamsburg, which in those days of bad roads was quite 
a journey. Accordingly, when the Presbytery of Han- 
over interested itself in furthering a move for the founda- 
tion of a college under its control in Prince Edward, Mr. 
Johnston offered to donate one hundred acres of land 
for the purpose. His offer was accepted on February 2, 
1775, and an institution of learning was erected thereon, 
which has ever since been under the auspices of the 
Presbyterian Church. It was first called Prince Edward 
i^cademy, but in May, 1777, its name was changed to 
Hampden Sidney, which name it still retains. 

Three other sons were born to Mr. and Mrs. John- 
ston. Determined to give them the best possible educa- 
tion, their father provided private tutors for his sons 
until they attained sufficient maturity, when he entered 
them as students at Hampden Sidney. The eldest. 



LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. 7 

Peter, was in attendance there during one of its earliest 
sessions. Association at college with the zealous youths 
whose ears were ringing with the stories and a^^ploits of 
friends or relations in the Continental army, ana orob- 
ably, most of all, a desire to emulate the students 0/ ^ 
previous term, who in 1777, under their president as 
captain, had formed a company sixty-five strong and 
marched to Williamsburg to aid in the defense of the 
colony, soon effaced the paternal instructions and made 
of him an ardent patriot. So earnest was he in his opin- 
ions, that at the age of seventeen, knowing his father's 
views too well to dare consult him, he and a young 
friend as much of a Hotspur as himself (Clement Carring- 
ton, of Charlotte) ran away from college, and in 1780 en- 
listed in the legion of Light Horse Harry Lee, which 
was then on its way south to take part with Greene in 
the ensuing campaign. As they were both provided 
by the indulgence of their parents with horses while at 
college, they needed little preparation for their escapade. 
Peter Johnston served with Lee's legion throughout 
the remainder of the Revolution. Having the hereditary 
turn for the profession of arms, highly ambitious, and 
endowed with dauntless courage, he soon made himself 
known ; and, despite his tender age, had risen by the 
end of the war to the rank of lieutenant, and had be- 
come a favorite with his commander. Colonel Lee, and 
with the entire legion. This grade in the little armies of 
the Revolution meant much more than it did later ; and 
for a boy of eighteen to rise to it from the ranks in the 
space of a year was specially remarkable. In the quaint 
Anecdotes of the American Revolution, compiled by 
Alexander Garden, Lieutenant Johnston is frequently 
mentioned. Thus the basis of the friendship between 
the families of Lee and Johnston was laid in the last 
century by the fathers of the two great Southern cap- 



8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

tains of the civil war — a friendship which, as will here- 
after appeafy'was yet closer between their sons. So well 
had Liei.::^tenant Johnston borne himself during his mili- 
^^O'' service, that on his return to the paternal roof at 
^\ie close of hostilities his father forgave the truancy and 
received him with pride and affection ; and, on dying, 
left him the family homestead, in accordance with his 
English sehtiment in favor of the law of primogeniture. 
At the end of the Revolution Lieutenant Johnston 
was not twenty years of age, and it became his next care 
to select a profession. He chose that of the law, and 
applied himself to its mastery as assiduously as he had 
devoted himself to the profession of arms. The result 
was that he soon rose to prominence both in law and 
politics, for at that period the two were almost insepa- 
rable. His political affiliations were with the Repub- 
lican party, as the adherents of the Jeffersonian school 
were then called ; and he was a member of the committee 
which reported the Virginia resolutions of i798-'99 on 
the question of State rights. In 1788 Lieutenant Peter 
Johnston married Mary Wood, daughter of Colonel 
Valentine Wood, of Goochland County. He had formed 
her acquaintance and won her love while attending on 
circuit the court of which her father was clerk. The 
wife of Colonel Wood was Lucy Henry, a sister of 
Patrick Henry. She was a lady of the highest accom- 
plishments, and is said to have equaled her distinguished 
brother in mental force. Her uncommon conversational 
powers made her in the family circle as much admired 
as her brother was on the hustings. The Henry family 
also was of Scotch origin, being nearly related to Rob- 
ertson, the historian, and to the eloquent Lord Brougham. 
Its ramifications in the United States were extensive.* 



* Another sister of Patrick Henry married General Wiliiani Camp- 
bell, of King's Mountain fame. He died in 1781 on his way to join 



LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. g 

Mrs. Johnston inherited her mother's talents and at- 
tainments. She was so highly educated as to be compe- 
tent to fit her sons for college not only in the elements 
of learning, but in the ancient classics as well. 

Peter Johnston and his wife resided at the family 
homestead in Prince Edward for some time after their 
marriage. They had a large family, consisting of nine 
sons and one daughter. The eldest, John, was the father 
of John W. Johnston, who represented Virginia for two 
terms in the United States Senate subsequent to the 
civil war. The next, Peter, was a well-known practi- 
tioner of law in southwestern Virginia. The third, 
\ Charles Clement, named after his father's companion in 
arms, was a man of great popularity and of a very high 
order of eloquence. When quite young he was sent to 
Congress from the southwest Virginia district, and, as 
an ardent advocate of State rights, took a prominent 
; part in the exciting debates of the period of i83i-'32 on 
i the nullification question. He was accidentally drowned 
! in attempting to cross, during the night, from Alexandria 
)to Washington. His wife was Eliza Madison Preston, 
I of the extensive Virginia family of Prestons. She had 
' predeceased him, so that at his death his two children — a 
son of about nine and a daughter of about seven — were 
left orphans. The son adopted the military profession, 

the American army at Yorktown, and left an only child, a daughter, 
who married Francis Preston, of Abingdon. They left a large family, 
all of whom attained distinction. The sons who reached mature age 
were William C. Preston and John S. Preston, the orators, and Colonel 
Thomas L. Preston, who served on the staff of General Joseph E. 
Johnston during the first part of the civil war. The daughters were 
Eliza, the wife of General E. C. Carrington ; Susan, the wife of 
Governor James McDowell ; Sally, the wife of Governor John B. 
Floyd, who was Secretary of War under Buchanan ; Sophonisba, the 
wife of Robert J. Breckinridge ; and Margaret, the first wife of Gen- 
eral Wade Hampton. 



lO 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



was educated at West Point, and was killed in battle at 
Contreras in Mexico. The daughter married Judge 
Robert \V. Hughes, now the United States District 
Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia. 

Another son of Peter and Mary Johnston was Bev- 
erly Randolph, who attained high eminence at the bar 
of southwest Virginia. Still another, Edward W., was a 
well-known writer and editor, who for a time edited the 
National Intelligencer. His contributions to the press, 
under the name of " II Secretario," were specially ad- 
mired. At one time intimate with John M. Daniel, who 
became afterward so well known as the great war editor 
of Virginia, they lost their temper in a newspaper discus- 
sion over the merits of Powers's Greek Slave, and fought 
a duel, the usual mode of settling such controversies at 
that time. Fortunately, its result was as bare as the 
statue which caused the quarrel. Another son,, Alger- 
non Sidney, was also an editor, and the author of a book 
called Memoirs of a Nullifier, which made something 
of a sensation in the exciting times of nullification. The 
eighth son of this marriage was Joseph Eggleston John- 
ston, who was born at Cherry Grove, in Prince Edward, 
on February 3, 1807. He was named after Joseph 
Eggleston, another military associate of his father, and 
the captain of the company in Lee's legion of which his 
father was lieutenant. 

In 181 1 Peter Johnston, who had been appointed a 
judge of the General Court of Virginia, was assigned to 
the Abingdon circuit, and removed to his new field of 
labor. He settled at a place which he named Panecillo, 
in the edge of the town of Abingdon. At that period 
the country in that section of the State was thinly set- 
tled, and the conditions of life exceedingly primitive. 
The town of Abingdon was then in the heart of the for- 
est, having been first called the Wolf Hills, from the 



LINEAGE. TARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. n 

number of wolves which made their den in a cavern at 
that place. The country is mountainous and rugged ; 
at that time the woods were dense in their primeval 
growth, and the roads, or " trails," few and difficult. 
The region included in Judge Johnston's circuit was ex- 
tensive, and the most convenient mode of travel in at- 
tending their courts was on horseback. 

The country had then been but recently explored, and 
was only in process of settlement. Its inhabitants were 
men whose youth had been spent in contending with the 
savages for its possession, and who in 1780, under their 
countryman and leader, General William Campbell, fur- 
nished the largest contingent to that suddenly impro- 
vised army of mountaineers which annihilated Ferguson's 
force at King's Mountain, and disappeared as mysteri- 
ously as they had come, after having in that fight given 
the first check to the career of victory which till then 
the British had pursued in the Southern States. Numer- 
ous participants in the battle then resided in the neigh- 
borhood. The traditions of that wonderful combat 
which still ring through that country as tradition only 
were then related by the actors as matters of personal 
experience and observation. They gave the name of 
the battle to one of the hills on which the town of 
Abingdon is built, and fired the minds of the youths 
with anecdotes of their experience in the campaign and 
fight, and of their not less thrilling encounters with the 
Indians. The effect of such narrations on a boy natu- 
rally addicted to military matters, especially when re- 
enforced by not less daring exploits of his father, may 
well be imagined. Young Johnston soon had the boys 
of the neighborhood, hardly less zealous than himself, 
organized into an " army," as he termed it; and he was 
chosen as their "general," with one of his brothers as 
"colonel." The combined strength of the general and 



12 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

colonel was sufficient to insure and enforce that obedi- 
ence which is the foundation of discipline. 

At that time the country abounded in all sorts of 
game. Judge Johnston was passionately devoted to the 
chase, and was accustomed to take his sons with him on 
his hunting expeditions, which usually extended over 
great distances and continued for many days. They 
accompanied him even before they were large enough 
to handle the long rifie which was the favorite arm of 
the pioneer, ancj which in the hands of its hardy owners 
had proved so efficacious against the enemies of the 
young republic. As soon as, under his tuition, they had 
learned to balance it and accurately aim it, they were 
permitted to take an equal part in the hunt. While the 
bear was not infrequently the object of their quest, the 
usual sport was chasing the deer, then very abundant. 
Joseph also was passionately fond of this amusement, 
and always preferred to be one of the drivers, as it kept 
him in motion, instead of fastening him for hours on a 
stand. In that mountainous region the drivers rode 
their steeds over places which would strike dismay into 
an ordinary pedestrian ; and such experiences were the 
best possible training in inuring him to fatigue and 
hardship, and in accustoming him to danger. To this 
early experience he owed the constitution which he re- 
tained through life, despite numerous wounds and long- 
continued exposure. It also made of him a fine horse- 
man. Striking as was his bearing afoot, he underwent 
a complete change when he mounted a horse. Perhaps 
the most vivid recollection of him among those who have 
seen him was his magnificent bearing when mounted. 

He had his first experience in the dangers of mili- 
tary life when he was but ten years of age ; and it was 
brought upon him by his fondness for it. He had 
gone out with his father and brothers on a hunt a few 



LINEAGE, PARENTAGE, AND YOUTH. 13 

miles west of Abingdon. He was on horseback, with 
a colored boy about his own age riding behind him. 
When they became separated from the others, the con- 
versation turned on warlike themes, and Joseph was de- 
scribing to the darkey (named Robert) the mode in 
which cavalry charged infantry and the latter received 
the shock. Nothing would satisfy him but a practical 
illustration ; so he made Robert dismount, take the gun 
and place himself in position to receive the assault, 
kneeling with gun presented. Joseph thereupon with- 
drew the horse to a sufficient distance to obtain the 
necessary impetus, and thundered down upon the sta- 
tionary square. The horse, however, not being equally 
interested in the experiment, sheered off just before 
reaching the infantry, and did it so suddenly that his 
rider was thrown forward. Of course he was wounded — 
he always was on every available occasion. In the fall 
his leg was broken, the ends of the bone coming through 
the flesh ; yet he quietly lay down till Robert went for 
aid and returned with it. The first doctor who came 
was something of an amateur; he set the limb, however, 
and sewed up the wound as well as he could. Soon 
afterward a skillful surgeon arrived, who, on examina- 
tion, found that the leg had been set crooked. He there- 
fore cut out the stitches and reset it. The manner in 
which the boy of ten, in a time when anaesthetics were 
not known, endured the operation without a tear or 
groan, and his patience under the three months of suffer- 
ing which followed, showed his fortitude. 

His education was begun by his parents, both of 
whom were amply competent to give it, and carried on 
by them until he became old enough to enter the 
Academy at Abingdon, which was a fair classical school. 
He was a good student, and made the most of his 
opportunities. He retained through life a taste for the 



14 ■ GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

classics, as is evidenced by the large number of works of 
that character in his library. Homer was his special 
favorite. 

Increase of years only strengthened his determina- 
tion to be a soldier, and he adhered to it with a con- 
stancy which showed it to be the natural bent of his 
mind and not a mere boyish fancy. He burned to 
emulate his father's revolutionary record and the deeds 
of his neighbors and relatives of the King's Mountain 
campaign. His father did not discourage this predilec- 
tion, but, on the contrary, presented him, though he was 
next to the youngest son, with his revolutionary sword. 
Though he owned this sword from his youth, he did not 
wear it during his earlier military life, but drew it for 
the first time in defense of his native State at the out- 
break of the civil war. 

In 1825, at the age of eighteen, he secured, through 
the influence of James Barbour, United States Senator 
from Virginia and Secretary of War under President 
John Q. Adams, an appointment to the Military Academy 
as a cadet, thus obtaining an entrance into the field of 
his cherished ambition. 



CHAPTER II. 

EARLY MILITARY LIFE. 

In 1825, Joseph E. Johnston, having successfully- 
passed the necessary examination, was admitted as a 
cadet at West Point. He was one of one hundred and 
five who were so fortunate as to enter in that year. The 
institution had then attained a high stand, it was flour- 
ishing, its course of study comprehensive and practical, 
its professors able and zealous. The number of matricu- 
lates who received their military education at that epoch 
iof its history, and who subsequently rose to rank and 
jlistinction during the Mexican and civil wars, is the 
strongest testimony to the thorough and judicious na- 
ture of its training. The astonishing achievements of 
the American army during the Mexican War, against 
largely superior numbers fighting on their own soil to 
.•^epel foreign invasion, were due as much to the excep- 
tional courage and ability of the young officers of infe- 
rior rank as to the talents of the commanding generals. 
Johnston was one of nine Virginians who then entered 
the Academy. Another was Robert E. Lee. Slightly 
older, .son of the commander of Johnston's father in the 
Revolutionary War, and endowed with tastes and habits 
of the same nature, they soon became fast friends. They 
were bothjmbued with that intense State pride which is 
a prominent element in the Virginia character ; and as 
the other Virginians, one by one, lagged behind the class, 
and finally dropped out, their intimacy increased. In 



l5 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

their graduating year they were the only remaining rep- 
resentatives of the Old Dominion — a striking instance of 
the survival of the fittest. There is nothing specially 
noteworthy in the career of Johnston at West Point. 
He made the most of his opportunities, and was unremit- 
ting in his studies. But during his cadetship a very seri- 
ous obstacle supervened in an affection of the eyes, which 
totally debarred him from using them at night, and prob- 
ably made his graduation mark lower than it would oth- 
erwise have been. He completed his course in 1829, be- 
ing number thirteen in a class of forty-six. Lee was 
second in the same class, Charles Mason, of New York, 
standing at the head. 

It was at West Point that he imbibed that special 
fondness for French and astronomy which he retained 
through life. He was always ready to converse on sub- 
jects cognate to these studies with the same relish as or, 
military matters; and his library reflected this predilec, 
tion, containing valuable treatises on astronomy, Frencl(j 
biographies of nearly all the great soldiers of that war- 
like nation, and French dissertations on all the tcchniqui' 
of the military art. These works show by internal evi- 
dence that they had been thoroughly mastered, and tha': 
he had made himself familiar with the campaigns of the 
leading generals of history — a strong proof that in the 
military, as well as in the other departments of human 
art, application and study are aids that may justly claim 
a place upon the staff of genius.* 

Johnston's first military service was as second lieu- 
tenant in the Fourth Artillery; the next, in garrison at 
New York, followed by similar service at Fortress Mon- 

* Colonel J. F. Maurice, in an able article on War, in the Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica, says : " It is an unanswerable assertion, that only by 
study of the past experience of war has any great soldier ever prepared 
himself for commanding armies." 



EARLY MILITARY LIFE. 



17 



roe. This period, extending from 1829 to 1832, was un- 
eventful, being mainly utilized by him in acquiring that 
knowledge of the soldier's duty which is essential to 
success. His first experience in actual campaigning was 
in the Black Hawk expedition of 1832, under General 
Scott, in which he participated, though without any op- 
portunity for distinction. 

In the fall of this same year the nullification troubles 
in South Carolina were at their height, and Johnston was 
with the small body of United States troops stationed at 
Charleston by President Jackson for the purpose of pre- 
serving order. Here the contingencies of civil war were 
forcibly impressed upon his mind, for three of his broth- 
ers resided in Columbia and belonged to the South Caro- 
lina minutemen then drilling for the conflict with the 
United States which every one expected, and they 
would have been the first to come into collision with the 
national forces if matters had proceeded to extremities. 
Fortunately, events took a turn which prevented them 
from being confronted in fratricidal strife. From this 
period till the beginning of 1836 he was on duty at Fort- 
ress Monroe and at Fort Macon, North Carolina ; and he 
was also assigned to topographical duty. 

In the beginning of 1836 General Scott was ordered 
to Florida to take charge of operations against the Indi- 
ans, and Johnston accompanied him as a member of his 
staff. These operations against the Florida Indians are 
the least creditable in the history of the Union, and were 
the grave of many a military reputation. Their long 
duration and the heavy expenditures of life and treasure 
necessary to reduce the Indians to submission and to 
transport them to their reservations west of the Missis- 
sippi are well known. At the outset the difficulties were 
little appreciated, and, as campaign after campaign failed 
to attain the object desired, disappointment occasioned 



l8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

many feuds among the officers of rank who were con- 
nected with the war. But no one, after an actual experi- 
ence however brief, felt disposed to criticise any one 
else, lavish as his strictures may have been beforehand.* 

The expedition led by General Scott suffered just as 
those which preceded and those which followed it. The 
difficulty was not so much to defeat the foe as to find 
him. The Indians, on the approach of a strong hostile 
force, scattered to the swamps, in whose inaccessible re- 
cesses they defied discovery. The only fights were be- 
tween small parties on each side, almost invariably com- 
mencing with a volley poured into the troops from an 
unseen foe, and ending by the disappearance of the 
enemy into morasses yet more impenetrable. The scene 
of operations was wild and totally unknown, and an ad- 
vancing column had perforce to open its own roads. 
This rendered transportation of supplies and ammuni- 
tion so difficult, that the excursions of the troops were 
generally limited to a length of time measured by the 
subsistence which they could carry on their backs. Offi- 
cers and men alike were required to convey their suj)- 
plies in this manner, and even the weight which could 
thus be carried was limited by the character of the coun- 
try to be traversed ; for it was so swampy, that the mud 
and water were frequently up to the waists of the sol- 
diers, whose amphibious campaigning was the harder to 
endure as it did not even promise the soldier's reward 
of being confronted with his adversary. 

In this region the summer is so unhealthy and fatal 

* This is well illustrated by General Jesup's report of February 7, 
1837, which he thus concludes: " If I have at any time said aught in 
disparagement of the operations of others in Florida, either verbally or 
in writing, officially or unofficially, knowing the country as I no 
know it, I consider myself bound, as a man of honor, solemnly t^ 
retract it." — Sprague's Florida War, p. 173. 



EARLY MILITARY LIFE. Iq 

to men from more northern latitudes that the campaign- 
ing was necessarily carried on in the winter and early 
sprmg. General Scott's expedition lost much of the 
available season by its late departure, which rendered it 
of short duration. It accomplished nothing except to 
gain experience which might be useful in future. No 
battle marked its path, and but few captives were led 
back in tangible proof of prowess. General Scott, on 
his return, reported that the only means of ending the 
war would be to send a force sufficiently strong to 
stretch across the peninsula and sweep it gradually 
down, thus surrounding the troublesome enemy as in a 
tinchell. General Scott's failure to achieve any substan- 
tial result caused much unfavorable comment and vio- 
lent recrimination, the result of which was that a court 
of inquiry was convened to report upon his operations. 
This court met at Frederick, Maryland, and Johnston 
was one of the witnesses summoned before it, which 
brought him back from Florida. The result of the in- 
vestigation was a complete vindication of General Scott. 

In this same spring a large number of Indians sur- 
rendered to General Jesup, and the war was generally 
supposed to be at an end ; indeed, this was announced 
as a settled fact by Jesup in his official report, John- 
ston, who during the seven years succeeding his gradua- 
tion had attained only the rank of first lieutenant, 
and whose military ardor had probably been chilled by 
observing these dissensions among his superiors, saw 
no prospect of active service, and determined to leave 
the army. Accordingly, on May 31st he tendered his 
resignation, which was accepted. He selected the pro- 
fession of engineer, and found ample work in this line 
under the Government. 

It was soon realized that the flattering hopes of 
peace were doomed to disappointment. One night Jes- 
3 



20 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

up's prisoners mysteriously disappeared, and fled to their 
marshy fastnesses to resume the life of murder and ra- 
pine. It was evident that the work was to be done all 
over again. By this time Johnston had thought better 
of his resignation, and volunteered for service. An ex- 
pedition under Lieutenant Powell was then being organ- 
ized. It was a mixed command of soldiers and sailors, 
its object being as much exploration as warfare. John- 
ston, on offering for duty, was attached to this command 
as a topographical engineer, and accompanied it to 
Florida. The command landed at Jupiter Inlet, with 
the intention of exploring the lagoons on the eastern 
coast and their tributaries. In a few days it moved 
southward in boats, and consisted of about eighty men, 
of whom twenty-five were regulars and the remainder 
were sailors. It had moved but a few miles when the 
smoke of an Indian village was observed, whereupon 
Powell landed from his boats and pushed toward the 
village. He was met by a superior force of Indians, 
who vigorously attacked him, with the result of soon 
stampeding the sailors of his command. All the officers 
were disabled, and the men made a disorderly and pre- 
cipitate retreat to the boats. Johnston succeeded in 
collecting a small number, mainly regulars, and covered 
the retreat by interposing between the pursuers and 
the boats. He held them at bay until all had embarked 
and departed, leaving him and his gallant little rear 
guard to escape as best they could. Covered by the 
darkness, they retreated through the woods, and suc- 
ceeded in intercepting the last of the retiring boats, in 
which was the guide Hagan, who recognized Johnsto,p's 
voice and took him and his party aboard just in time to 
rescue thjem from their pursuers, who by this time were 
close upon them. 

Johnston's escape on this occasion was almost mi- 



EARLY MILITARY LIFE. 21 

raculous. He was wounded twice in the forehead, and 
carried the marks of these, the first of his numerous 
v^ounds, to the day of his death. His clothing had 
^lirty bullet holes in it, his hat had two, while a red 
"ish which he wore, and which attracted the Indian aim 
Jn account of its conspicuous color, as it streamed in 
><^e breeze, was literally riddled. Such gallantry was 
tb''2 theme of universal commendation, and won him 
g(''lden opinions throughout the country. He was gen- 
erally regarded as the saviour of the expedition, and 
Li^utenaiU Powell in his official report attributed to him 
the safety of the command. 

But his conduct was worth something more than 
mere applause. It gained for him an appointment as 
first lieutenant in the topographical engineers, thus re- 
storing him to his former rank and preventing him from 
losing anything by his resignation. It gained him also 
the brevet of captain, which was conferred upon him 
*' for gallantry on several occasions in the war with the 
Florida Indians." These were conferred upon him on 
July 7, 1838, the fight having occurred on January 15, 
1838. Johnston remained with this party till its return. 
After a short service in Florida in the fall, he was as- 
signed to various duties devolving on the corps of topo- 
graphical engineers — first in river improvements, then 
with the party marking the boundary between Texas 
and the United States, afterward with the party making 
a survey of the Great Lakes. In 1842 he was ordered to 
report to General Worth, who then commanded in Florida 
and was fighting the Seminoles, for they still persisted in 
considering the war as not closed, despite the repeated 
proclamations of the different commanders announcing 
the fact. It was the good fortune of General Worth to 
end it. By his summer campaign he broke up the crops 
and encampments of the Indians and reduced them to 



22 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

submission, so that his announcement of the close of the 
war, in 1843, was justified by the fact. In hardships and 
the lack of any considerable combats his operations wer'^- 
like those of his predecessors ; but they finally term'^t\ 
nated this annoying and expensive war, which is est^'s.- 
mated to have cost the United States two thousand Viv&i 
and twenty millions of dollars.* On his final return fro% 
Florida, Johnston was attached to the topographical ex- 
pedition which had in charge the survey of the boundary 
between the United States and the British provinces; and 
on its completion he was attached to the coast survey, 
in which he was engaged until the outbreak of the Mexi- 
can War. 

During this period of comparative rest he had formed 
the acquaintance of Lydia McLane, daughter of Louis 
McLane and sister of Robert M. McLane, whose inti- 
macy with Johnston, great even at that early period, 
continued without interruption during his long life. She 
was a lady of great personal beauty, and none the less 
attractive were her qualities of mind and heart. Amid 
her host of admirers Lieutenant Johnston was so fortu- 
nate as to be the favored suitor, and on July 10, 1845, 
they were married. Their union was a specially happy 
one. The absence of offspring but served to draw them 
closer together and make their lives more nearly one. 
Throughout his distinguished career she was a worthy 
helpmate, whether in the circles of society or the more 
sacred one of private life. 

The family to which Mrs. Johnston belonged is dis- 
tinguished in the annals of Delaware and Maryland. 
Her father was often honored with high ofiice, having 
served in the House of Representatives, the Senate, also 
as Minister to England, and as Secretary of the Treas- 

* Mansfield's Life of Scott, p. 273. 



EARLY MILITARY LIFE. 



23 



ury under Jackson. In consequence of his refusal to 
consent to the removal of the bank deposits, he was 
transferred by Jackson, whose friendship for him re- 
mained unabated, to the Department of State, For 
many years he was president of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad Company. Her brother Robert is also an emi- 
nent citizen, having been Governor of Maryland, mem- 
ber of the House of Representatives, and Minister to 
France, the latter during the administration of President 
Cleveland. 



/ 

CHAPTER III. 

MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 

Johnston, for more than a year after his marriagp, 
enjoyed a period of rest from active service. On Sep- 
tember 21, 1846, he became captain of topographical en- 
gineers. By this time the differences between the United 
States and Mexico had reached a crisis, their armies had 
come into collision on the fields of Palo Alto and Resaca 
de la Palma, and victory had on each occasion remained 
on the side of the United States. In the fall the Gov- 
ernment decided upon sending an expedition v/a the 
Gulf coast of Mexico against the Mexican capital, under 
the command of General Scott, and was proceeding to 
make the necessary arrangements to carry this plan into 
effect. This was considered as destined to be the line 
of the principal operations for the remainder of the war; 
and Johnston, who was not the man to let slip an oppor- 
tunity for active duty, succeeded in securing an assign- 
ment to this army, which was the easier to accomplish 
as he was already favorably known to Scott from their 
joint service in Florida. At the outset he accompanied 
the expedition as captain of topographical engineers. 

The point selected for debarking was on the beach 
immediately south of Vera Cruz, and under the distant 
fire of its guns. The landing was successfully accom- 
plished from surf boats without the loss of a single life; 
and the army, about twelve thousand strong, proceeded 
to occupy the lines of investment which it had been the 



MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 25 

duty of the engineers and topographical engineers to« 
locate. This work was accomplished with such precision 
that confusion was unknown. Though but a small part 
of the necessary transportation and siege artillery had 
arrived, the disposable guns were placed in position, in- 
creased gradually by others as they came, and fire was 
opened upon the city. The landing had taken place on 
March 12, 1847; on the 27th of the same month the city 
and castle surrendered, thus securing to the American 
army a safe base for its projected operations. 

Scott at once prepared for his advance into the in- 
terior. He was delayed by the slowness with which the 
immense number of wagons necessary for the transpor- 
tation of supplies and ammunition through a hostile 
country arrived; but by April 6th he was able to send 
off the first division under Twiggs, and this was at once 
followed by the others. On April 9th Johnston was ap- 
pointed lieutenant colonel of voltigeurs, a new regiment 
of regulars raised for the war and forming a part of 
Cadwalader's brigade of Pillow's division. This, how- 
ever, did not prevent him from rendering freely his serv- 
ices as topographical engineer whenever there was 
need of them. He accompanied the division of Twiggs, 
and is mentioned by that officer as in the advance in the 
latter's dispatch to Scott of April nth. By this date 
Twiggs, with his division, had reached the pass of Cerro 
Gordo, where the road from Vera Cruz to Mexico passes 
through the mountains, and which was found to be for- 
tified and held by the Mexicans in strong force. The 
next day, in endeavoring to ascertain by actual and close 
observation whether this apparently impregnable posi- 
tion had any weak points, Johnston pushed his recon- 
noissances so far that he was twice severely wounded 
under the very works of the Mexicans. This misfortune 
prevented his participation in the brilliant action of 



26 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Cerro Gordo, which was fought six days afterward, 
though it gained him favorable mention in the reports of 
Scott and Twiggs. It gained him also the brevet of 
major, and subsequently that of colonel, in the regular 
military establishment. 

The victory of Cerro Gordo opened the road to the 
capital, and the American army continued its advance, 
occupying in succession La Hoya, Perote, and Puebla. 
At the latter place it remained for some time, recruiting 
its strength from the re-enforcements which were sent 
forward, and awaiting the result of the peace negotia- 
tions. These finally proving abortive, the march upon 
the city of Mexico was resumed in the early part of Au- 
gust. Notwithstanding its re-enforcements, the total 
fighting force which was to capture the city and to dic- 
tate a peace from its plaza was less than eleven thou- 
sand men ; and this small army was subject to a con- 
stant drain from casualties and necessary detachments. 

On approaching the city by the road from the east, 
the difficulties were found to be so great as to suggest 
the choice of another line of offensive operations. The 
enemy was expecting the attack by this route, and had 
lavished upon it his means of defense. It was blocked 
by El Penon, a mound so fortified as to be impregna- 
ble ; and, even if that was masked, the^sole approach 
was over narrow causeways, which furnished the only 
practicable crossings over the bog in which the city was 
situated. Scott therefore determined to move around 
Lake Chalco and to gain the Acapulco road to the city 
about San Augustin, with the view of operating by it, or 
by one farther to the west, as might be found most con- 
venient. Here he had reason to believe that the de- 
fenses would not be as formidable, and that the ground 
was firmer, though more broken. 

The transfer of the army to this line was completed 



MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 



27 



on the i8th. Directly in front, on the Acapulco road, 
was San Antonio, and still nearer to the city, on the 
same road, was Churubusco, guarding the crossing of a 
canal, or river, and strongly fortified. To the left, and 
separated from San Augustin by the Pedrigal, or lava 
field, and it apparently impassable, was Contreras, guard- 
ing another road to the city ; and still nearer the city, 
on this road, was Chapultepec, with Molino del Rey 
and Casa Mata at its foot. A cross-road passing by 
Coyahacen connected the Contreras and Acapulco roads, 
coming into the latter in the rear of San Antonio. At 
Contreras was General Valencia with seven thousand of 
the best Mexican troops, and in its rear was Santa Anna 
with a reserve of twelve thousand more. 

After reconnoissances Scott decided to cross the 
Pedrigal and attack Contreras, designing to capture this 
road and thus to turn San Antonio. Accordingly, the 
division of Pillow was ordered to open a road through 
the Pedrigal, with that of Twiggs covering it. As stated 
above, the voltigeurs were a part of Pillow's command. 
The division of Twiggs moved first, accompanied by 
Magruder's battery and some howitzers. On emerging 
from the Pedrigal in front of Contreras, these batteries 
were placed in the best position that could be found. 
Magruder could bring but three pieces into play, and 
found himself opposed to twenty-two pieces, with all the 
advantage of position, numbers, and caliber. In this 
unequal contest the American artillery suffered severely ; 
among the killed was Lieutenant J. Preston Johnstone, 
Colonel Johnston's nephew, who commanded a gun in 
Magruder's battery. He was a young officer of great 
promise, and the reports of his superiors show the esti- 
mation in which he was held. 

While this artillery duel was in progress, the Ameri- 
can infantry was forming and striving to work around 



28 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the left of the Mexicans to interpose between them and 
the city. The}^ remained for hours under a heavy fire 
of infantry and artillery, resolutely facing immensely 
superior forces with their weak brigades. Night found 
them in this position, backed up against the Pedrigal, 
and confronted by hosts of enemies.* 

Before morning additional troops had come up; the 
Americans had worked their way around to the left, until 
they occupied the village of Contreras, between Valen- 
cia's intrenched camp and the city ; and it was resolved 
that Shields should hold this point, charged with the 
double duty of cutting off Valencia's retreat and pre- 
venting him from being re-enforced, while the brigades 
of Riley, Persifer F. Smith, and Cadwalader should avail 
themselves of a ravine to get in the rear of Valencia, 
and storm his lines from that direction. The plan was 
completely successful ; the brigade of Riley rushed pell- 
mell into the Mexican works, closely accompanied by 
Cadwalader and Smith, and the victory was complete. 
The forces engaged on the American side amounted to 
only forty-five hundred men, opposed to fivefold odds.f 

* Mr. A. R. Shacklett, who belonged to the voltigeurs, and subse- 
quently served under Johnston in the civil vi'ar, says about their situ- 
ation : " Without leading off into old soldiers' habits (fighting them 
over), when viewed by subsequent events (fifty battles), I consider that 
at Contreras, after crossing the Pedrigal, when forming to meet the 
twelve thousand Mexicans advancing from San Angel, five hundred 
yards off, with Valencia six thousand strong one mile in our rear, cut 
off from support or retreat by darkness and the Pedrigal, the most 
perilous in my history without disaster." 

f Johnston, up to the time of this assault, .had not heard of the 
death of his nephew the evening before. His friends, knowing his 
devotion, had selected Lee, as his most intimate associate, to break the 
information to him. While Johnston, flushed with pride at the suc- 
cess of the assault, was standing on the captured intrenchments, Lee 
joined him and communicated to him the sad intelligence. The shock 



MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 29 

The effect of this victory was to cause the evacuation 
of San Antonio, and to bring the Americans without fur- 
ther resistance to Churubusco. The troops moved by 
the cross-road to Coyahacen until near the convent which 
stood to the west of Churubusco. This and the works at 
Churubusco were soon successfully assaulted. The vol- 
tigeurs took no part in this action, being on the ground 
but held in reserve. 

These successes brought the Americans to the very 
gates of Mexico on the Acapulco road, and to the castle 
of Chapultepec on the Contreras road. They brought 
about a proposition for an armistice from the Mexicans, 
which was concluded; and hostilities in consequence 
were suspended till September 7th. By that time Scott 
had become satisfied that the Mexicans, contrary to the 
provisions of the truce, had been conveying arms and 
munitions of war into Chapultepec, and he thereupon 
gave notice of the resumption of hostilities. The first 
operation was directed against Molino del Rey, with the 
object of its destruction. General Worth, with a force 
of about three thousand men, was intrusted with the en- 
terprise. The Mexican line extended from Molino del 
Rey on the left to Casa Mata on the right. Worth as- 
saulted the position near, its center, and, after a severe 
contest, carried it. Cadwalader's brigade acted as the 
reserve in this fight, and did not take part in the first 
assault, though part of his force was soon called into 
action to support the charge at a critical period when 

was so great that he fell prostrate upon the works. Lieutenant John- 
stone had been left an orphan at an early age, and, adopting the military 
profession, had been accustomed to look up to Colonel Johnston as to 
a father. Their attachment was not less than that between father and 
son. Up to the day of his death, forty-four years later, Johnston kept 
a likeness of his nephew in his room, and never failed to look at it im- 
mediately after rising. 



30 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the line was wavering. While the assault was raging, a 
large body of Mexicans was seen approaching the Ameri- 
can left flank, whereupon the voltigeurs were moved in 
that direction to support Duncan's battery and to re- 
pulse the attack, which, with the aid of Sumner's cavalry, 
they gallantly and successfully accomplished. In Worth's 
report of the action the part taken by Cadwalader's 
brigade is particularly signalized, and Johnston is men- 
tioned by name with other officers of the brigade. The 
best proof of the share of the voltigeurs in the glory of 
this fight is the fact that they carried three hundred and 
forty-one men into the battle, and that their loss was 
ninety-eight out of this number. 

The next step in the scheme of the American com- 
mander for the capture of the city was an assault upon 
Chapultepec. This was situated upon a mound of com- 
manding elevation, strongly fortified, and held by a nu- 
merous garrison. Scott first placed four heavy batteries 
in position to bear upon it; all day on the 12th they 
poured their iron hail upon the castle. The next day 
was fixed for the attack. Pillow's division was to ad- 
vance upon the left from the west and Quitman's from 
the southeast, each to be preceded by a storming party. 
In this charge the voltigeurs were divided into two 
detachments, one under the immediate command of 
Andrews, their colonel, the other under the lead of 
Johnston. The force pressed up the slope under the 
command of Cadwalader, Pillow having been wounded 
early in the action. In the language of Scott's official 
report: ''The broken acclivity was still to be ascended, 
and a strong redoubt midway to be carried, before reach- 
ing the castle on the heights. The advance of our brave 
men, led by brave officers, though necessarily slow, was 
unwavering, over rocks, chasms, and mines, and under 
the hottest fire of cannon and musketry. The redoubt 



MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 



31 



now yielded to resistless valor, and the shouts that fol- 
lowed announced to the castle the fate that impended. 
The enemy were steadily driven from shelter to shelter. 
The retreat allowed not time to fire a single mine with- 
out the certainty of blowing up friend and foe. Those 
who at a distance attempted to apply matches to the 
long trains were shot down by our men. There was 
death below as well as above ground. At length the 
ditch and wall of the main work were reached; the scal- 
ing ladders were brought up and planted by the storm- 
ing parties ; some of the daring spirits first in the assault 
were cast down, killed or wounded ; but a lodgment was 
soon made; streams of heroes followed; all opposition 
was overcome, and several of the regimental colors flung 
out from the upper works, amid long-continued shouts 
and cheers, which sent dismay into the capital. No 
scene could have been more animating or glorious." 

In this assault the voltigeurs took a most prominent 
part. They are mentioned in Scott's report as being in the 
lead, and it was their standard which first waved from the 
captured ramparts. The report of Pillow, the division com- 
mander, describes their behavior as follows: "The vol- 
tigeur regiment, which was ordered forward in advance 
as skirmishers to clear the intrenchments and large trees 
of the large force of the enemy, who were directing a 
most galling fire into the command — the right wing un- 
der the very gallant and accomplished Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Johnston, and the left under the brave Colonel An- 
drews himself, assisted by his gallant Major Caldwell 
— having united, cleared the woods and pursued the' 
enemy so hotly that he was not able to ignite his mines, 
drove him inside the parapet itself, and occupied the 
broken ground around the ditch of the fortifications, all 
in the face of a most heavy fire from the enemy's small 
arms and heavy guns. The ladders arrived, and several 



32 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

efforts were made by both officers and men to scale the 
walls. But many of the gallant spirits who first at- 
tempted it fell, killed or wounded. Colonel Andrews, 
whose regiment so distinguished itself and commander 
by this brilliant charge, as also Lieutenant-Colonel John- 
ston and Major Caldwell, whose activity enabled them 
to lead this assault, have greatly distinguished them- 
selves by their gallantry and daring. Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Johnston received three wounds, but they were all 
slight, and did not at all arrest his daring and onward 
movements." 

Johnston's bearing on this occasion won something 
more than words of compliment ; he was brevetted Lieu- 
tenant Colonel, to date from September 13, 1847, ''for 
gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of Chapul- 
tepec," and it increased the estimation in which he was 
held by Scott, who said of him: "Johnston is a great 
soldier, but he has an unfortunate knack of getting him- 
self shot in nearly every engagement." 

On this same day Worth was sent forward in the 
direction of the city, and Cadwalader's brigade was or- 
dered to support him. There was some skirmishing in 
the suburbs, and the next day Worth and Quitman en- 
tered and took possession. 

The fall of the capital closed this wonderful war, in 
which a powerful republic was conquered by a force 
hardly equal to a division of a modern army. The 
American numbers on entering the city were barely six 
thousand. 

After the cessation of active operations there was 
little of importance in Johnston's Mexican career, though 
tlie fact of his being placed in charge of expeditions to 
the coast to bring up re-enforcements and supplies bears 
strong testimony to the reputation which he had made 
by his conduct in the war. Though his rank in the per- 



MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 



33 



manent military establishment was simply that of cap- 
tain, he had acted throughout as lieutenant colonel of 
the regiment of voltigeurs. In the summer of 1848 this 
regiment was mustered out of service. It being doubt- 
ful whether this did not have the effect of retiring him 
along with his regiment, Congress, unwilling that silch 
a result should be the reward of five wounds and inde- 
fatigable services, passed a special act, approved July 19, 
1848, remstating him in his rank as Captain of Topo- 
graphical Engineers from September 21, 1846. 

After the close of the war he was engaged for some 
time in topographical service in Texas and on the West- 
ern river improvements. In 1855 Congress added to the 
army two regiments of cavalry, and he was commissioned 
lieutenant colonel of one of them (the first). Colonel E. 
V. Sumner being its commander. With this regiment he 
served in the West in various unimportant though labori- 
ous duties, and in 1858 acted as inspector general of the 
Utah expedition. 

In the summer of i860. General Jesup, Quartermas- 
ter General of the United States, died. As he was next 
in rank to General Scott, the question as to the proper 
man to fill this vacancy was of great importance, since, 
owing to the advanced age of General Scott, the ap- 
pointee might be called at any moment to the chief 
command of the national army. Scott was requested 
to name to the War Department the officer who was, in 
his judgment, best fitted for the trust. He declined to 
limit himself to a single name, but suggested that the 
selection should be made from one of four : Joseph E. 
Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Albert Sidney Johnston, and 
Charles F. Smith. The career of these officers justified 
the accuracy of Scott's judgment, all having attained 
high distinction. The contest for the appointment soon 
narrowed down to the two Johnstons. John B. Floyd, 



34 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Secretary of War, was warmly in favor of J. E. John- 
ston, while Jefferson Davis, his predecessor in office, was 
equally earnest in advocacy of A. S. Johnston. Mr. 
Davis was then Senator from Mississippi, and chairman 
of the Committee on Military Affairs, so that the con- 
test for a while was doubtful. It was finally settled by 
the appointment of J. E. Johnston, who was promptly 
confirmed by the Senate, and commissioned on June 28, 
i860. Upon his appointment, Lee, with his usual mag- 
nanimity, addressed him the following letter: 

San Antonio, T-exas, July jo, i860. 
My dear General : I am delighted at accosting 
you by your present title, and feel my heart exult within 
me at your high position. I hope the old State may al- 
ways be able to furnish worthy successors to the first 
chief of your new department ; and that in your admin- 
istration the country and army will have cause to rejoice 
that it has fallen upon you. Please present my cordial 
congratulations to Mrs. J., and say that I fear, now that 
she will have you constantly with her, she will never 
want to see me again. May happiness and prosperity 
always attend you, is the sincere wish of 

Very truly yours, R. E. Lee. 

General J. E. Johnston, Quartermaster General, U. S. Army* 

* Mrs. Davis, in a note to vol. ii, p. 150, of her Memoirs of Jef- 
ferson Davis, states that the confirmation of General Johnston's nomi- 
nation as quartermaster general was violently opposed in the Senate, 
and that Mr. Davis spoke for two hours to carry the point, and did so. 
On page 158 of the same volume she quotes from a letter of Mr. Davis 
to Mr. James Lyons, of Richmond, written August 30, 1878 (long after 
their estrangement), in which he says : " It [the nomination] met seri- 
ous opposition ; and all my power and influence were required to pre- 
vent its rejection." The records of the Senate show that the nomina- 
tion was sent to that body on June 27th, and at once referred to the 
Committee on Military Affairs. Mr. Davis, on behalf of the commit- 
tee, reported the nomination, and on June 28th, the very next day, it 



MEXICO TO THE CIVIL WAR. 35 

This appointment made Johnston a brigadier general, 
and in attendance on its duties he remained in Washing- 
ton until the crisis which brought on the civil war, an 
event which allowed him to enjoy his new dignity only a 
few months. Personally he was opposed to secession, 
though he held it to be the duty of a soldier to take no 
part in such debates. He saw with grief the successive 
withdrawals of the Southern States from the Union, but 
awaited the action of Virginia, to whom he felt that he 
owed his first allegiance. His brother, Peter C. John- 
ston, was a member of the convention, and kept him 
informed as to the possible action of the State. In a 
letter of March 10, 1861, he wrote that there was no 
probability of the passage of an ordinance of secession 
at that time, and that the conservatives had a decided 
majority in the convention. It is a well-known historical 
fact that this convention w^as opposed to secession, and 
that the ordinance was only carried when Mr. Lincoln's 
call for volunteers forced Virginia from neutrality and 
compelled her to choose her side in the coming contest. 
When her choice was made, Johnston considered that 
her lot was his, and that no honorable course remained 
to him but to follow her fortunes. 

was confirmed by a vote of thirty-one to three. The only adverse 
votes were those of Messrs. Hale, King, and Trumbull, and they were 
evidently on political and not personal grounds. This does not indi- 
cate any " violent " or " serious " opposition. Mr. Davis is undoubt- 
edly entitled to credit for his generosity in supporting the nomination 
after his zealous advocacy of another, but this claim of having saved it 
from rejection is refuted by the Senate records. The author is in- 
formed by relatives of General Johnston, who then resided in Wash- 
ington and were watching the proceedings with interest, that there was 
no opposition. 



CHAPTER IV. 

RESIGNATION THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 

Though Johnston was opposed to secession as a 
question of expediency, he did not doubt it as a matter 
of right. A grandnephew of Patrick Henry, son of one 
of the draughtsmen of the resolutions of i798-'99, and 
brother of Charles C. Johnston, he believed that his first 
duty was to his home and kindred. After the failure of 
the Peace Conference called by Virginia as a last expedi- 
ent to avoid internecine strife, the convention — impelled 
by the attack on Sumter, the call for volunteers, and the 
irresistible current of events — became almost a unit in 
favor of secession, and on April 17th passed the ordi- 
nance to that effect. Johnston, immediately on receipt of 
this information, decided to hand in his resignation. He 
received the intelligence late on Friday, the 19th. The 
next day his resignation was written, and he applied 
himself to the duty of winding up his accounts as quar- 
termaster general. This occupied him until Monday, 
the 22d, on which day the resignation was presented to 
the Secretary of War,' with the request for an order an- 
nouncing its immediate acceptance — a request which was 
granted, though, as the Secretary stated, with great re- 
gret. His letter of resignation was as follows : 

Washington, April 22, j8bi. 
Sir : With feelings of deep regret I respectfully ten- 
der the resignation of my commission in the army of the 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



37 



United States. The feelings which impel me to this act 
are, I believe, understood by the Honorable Secretary of 
War. I hope that long service, with some labor, hard- 
ship, danger, and loss of blood, may give me some claim 
to ask the early consideration of this communication. 
Most respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. E. Johnston, Quai-tennaster General. 

On Tuesday, the 23d, he left for Richmond, accom- 
panied by Mrs. Johnston. He arrived on the morning 
of the 25th and reported to Governor Letcher, who at 
once made him major general in the State service. On 
the following day he was appointed to the command 
of all the State forces about Richmond. Lee, having no 
accounts to settle, had reached Richmond earlier, so 
that his commission antedated Johnston's by two days. 

It was at great personal sacrifice that Johnston gave 
up his commission in the army of the United States. He 
was the officer of highest rank in that army who resigned, 
the only general who came South. He stood high in 
the estimation of Scott, on whose staff he had served, 
and who had recently shown his estimate of Johnston 
by recommending him as one of the four upon whom the 
office of quartermaster general could most fitly be con- 
ferred. The rank which he held by his tenure of that 
office, considered in connection with the advanced age 
of Scott, would soon have made him the senior officer of 
the national armies. His services in the Seminole and 
Mexican wars were well known and, in that day of small 
combats, were looked upon as much more important than 
they would now be considered by readers accustomed to 
studying the campaigns of armies tenfold as numerous. 
It can not be doubted that rapid preferment would have 
been his reward had he remained in the old army. In 
fact, it was the common supposition at the time that, if 



38 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

either he or Lee had espoused the Northern cause, the 
one who remained would have been chosen for the chief 
command of the national forces. However this may be, 
it is undoubtedly the fact that, when Johnston presented 
his resignation, Scott earnestly endeavored to persuade 
him to withdraw it, adding his personal solicitations to 
the arguments which he adduced. 

But allurements of rank and position had no effect 
upon Johnston, whose intense love of State outweighed 
all other considerations. His feeling is well illustrated 
by the expression which he gave to it in a conversation 
with one of his nearest relations at the time when he 
tendered his resignation. Lie had with him the sword 
which his father had worn during the Revolution, and 
which he himself had never used in his previous military 
service. When this fact was noticed and commented 
upon, he replied that he had promised his father, when 
the sword was given him, never to draw it except in de- 
fense of Virginia, and that the occasion had now arisen 
when he could draw it in defense of his native State. It 
was, in fact, the only property which he took with him 
when he left the city of Washington for Virginia, his 
departure being so hurried that his remaining effects 
had to follow at a later date. 

Johnston was not of those who believed that the 
coming war would be of short duration. On the con- 
trary, his opinion was freely expressed that it would be 
protracted and bloody ; and that the South should pre- 
pare for it as promptly as possible by extensive pur- 
chases of arms and munitions of war, and by incessant 
education and discipline of the fine material which she 
had available for armies. Nor was he of those who in- 
dulged the foolish conceit that "one Southerner could 
whip five Yankees." While believing that, at the outset, 
the greater familiarity of the Southern people with fire- 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 39 

arms, and the fact that they were acting on the defensive 
as guardians of home and kindred, would give them the 
advantage, he knew as a soldier of experience that dis- 
cipline would in time remove this inequality, and that 
the Northern troops only needed education and good 
officers to make fine soldiers. 

This unwillingness to underrate his foe, and respect 
for the soldierly qualities of those arrayed against him, 
extended throughout the war, and was one cause of his 
unpopularity with the Confederate Executive. His re- 
fusal to make such an idea the basis of his plans, and 
throw his army in wild assaults upon a veteran foe supe- 
rior in numbers, was, in fact, the explanation of his re- 
moval at a subsequent critical epoch of his military career. 
Impressed thus with the importance of prompt prepara- 
tion, Johnston zealously co-operated with Lee in the 
task of instructing and organizing the Virginia levies 
which had been called out by Governor Letcher, and 
were in want of everything but courage and enthusiasm. 
He was actively engaged in this work till near the mid- 
dle of May. 

Meanwhile, the State of Virginia had entered into 
a convention with the Southern Confederacy, and the 
conduct of military affairs had been turned over to the 
latter. The Confederate Congress had passed an act 
authorizing the appointment of five brigadier generals 
in its armies. This was then their highest grade. The 
first name sent in for one of these appointments was 
that of Samuel Cooper, whose experience and knowledge 
of the details of the adjutant general's duties promised 
to be, and was, of immense advantage to the new na- 
tion. On the accession of Virginia to the Confederacy, 
Mr. Davis offered two of these appointments to Lee and 
Johnston, They both accepted, and on May 13th their 
names were sent to the Confederate Congress and the 



40 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

nomination promptly confirmed. At the telegraphic re- 
quest of Jefferson Davis, Johnston went to Montgomery 
for an interview, that city being then the Confederate 
seat of Government. On his arrival, elaborate confer- 
ences were held with the President and military authori- 
ties, after which he was assigned to the command of 
the troops near Harper's Ferry, and instructed to pro- 
ceed to that point via Lynchburg, at which latter place 
he was to make arrangements for sending forward to 
Harper's Ferry such force as he might deem necessary 
to strengthen his command. 

After stopping, on his return, at Abingdon for a day 
to recuperate, his labors and journeys having been very 
arduous, he proceeded to Lynchburg, where he was 
disappointed in any expectation of strengthening his 
command, as he found no troops there ; and he con- 
tinued his journey to Harper's Ferry, where he arrived 
on the 23d, accompanied by Colonel E. Kirby Smith, 
Major W. H. C. Whiting, Major E. McLean, and Cap- 
tain Thomas L. Preston. He found Colonel Thomas J. 
Jackson in command of the post and the troops assem- 
bled there, and, after some explanations, assumed com- 
mand and issued orders to that effect. Harper's Ferry 
had been first seized by Virginia troops at the order of 
Governor Letcher, the prime motive of the seizure being 
to secure the arms and machinery for their manufacture, 
both of which were essential to the South. Though 
the arms were unfortunately destroyed by the foresight 
and activity of the Federal commander on his evacua- 
tion of the place, the machinery was secured. 

The troops occupying this point at the time of 
Johnston's assumption of command consisted of nine 
regiments and two battalions of infantry, of which six 
regiments were Virginians, four companies or sixteen 
pieces of artillery, all from Virginia, and a small regi- 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



41 



merit of Virginia cavalry. Their effective total was 
slightly in excess of five thousand men, their strength 
being greatly reduced by the large numbers of sick, who 
were suffering from the contagious diseases inevitable 
among new troops raised in the rural districts, like those 
from the South. The gifted Jackson, who had com- 
manded them until Johnston's arrival, had not had suf- 
ficient opportunity to instruct them, though their dis- 
cipline was improving every day under his efforts and 
those of his subordinates. Their armament and equip- 
ment were also very incomplete. The artillery had 
neither caissons, harness, nor horses, the cavalry were 
short both of sabers and carbines, the infantry of serv- 
iceable muskets, and all of ammunition. This latter 
deficiency was especially serious. It was among the 
very first things that arrested Johnston's attention ; for 
on the 26th, only three days after liis arrival, the pub- 
lished correspondence shows him writing to Richmond 
that there were on hand only twelve or fifteen rounds 
for his force of fifty-two hundred men — a quantity 
"scarcely half enough for an action." Colonel Jackson 
had been equally impressed with the necessity for in- 
creasing the stock of ammunition, and had inaugurated 
the manufacture of cartridges in the neighborhood as 
far as he could with the means at his disposal. Johnston 
increased the force so employed, though much hampered 
by the want of bullet molds and cartridge paper. By 
the 6th of June this supply had only increased to forty 
rounds ; and the arrival of new regiments without am- 
munition and accouterments, for this reason, gave him 
no additional strength. As late as June 17th, when Gen- 
eral Robert Patterson was on the eve of an advance, 
the amount of ammunition on hand was only thirty 
rounds; and Johnston is writing to Richmond that "the 
want of ammunition has rendered me very timid," and 



42 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

again on the following day that " these troops have not 
a supply for half an hour's fighting." Percussion caps 
were even more difficult to procure than cartridges, on 
account of the lack of facilities for their manufacture. 

The artillery and cavalry were equally lacking in 
necessary equipment. Caissons could only be procured 
by fastening roughly-made ammunition chests to the 
running parts of farm wagons, and sabers could hardly 
be procured at all. The necessary transportation for 
the army was not less scarce. These difficulties were 
inherent to the absence of manufactures in the South. 
The imperfect armament of the Southern troops added 
largely to the odds against which they contended. In 
the important branch of artillery the Northern pieces 
throughout the war were far superior to the Southern, 
both in caliber and range, and many of the Southern 
cavalry, even in the later campaigns, were armed with 
shot-guns. It was a long time before they secured suf- 
ficient sabers. The inability to arm the cavalry long 
kept the numbers of that arm below the requirements. 
As late as February 9, 1862, Johnston wrote to the Con- 
federate Government suggesting their increase by the 
organization of a large body of lancers. The sugges- 
tion was not adopted. This paucity of resource added 
greatly to the anxiety of Johnston, who was daily ex- 
pecting an advance of his enemy and the possibility of 
an engagement, and who was yet without half enough 
ammunition to fight a general action. 

General Johnston had received from Mr. Davis and 
General Lee the impression that they regarded Harper's 
Ferry as a stronghold commanding the approaches to 
the valley of Virginia, and that it was an important 
strategic point which should be held. His examination 
of the place soon satisfied him that it was untenable 
as a military position, and that troops stationed there 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 43 

would be out of position to meet an invasion of the 
valley, and would be liable to be cut off. The place 
itself was completely commanded by the heights which 
surrounded it, and could be turned either above or be- 
low. The main road from the north enters Virginia at 
Williamsport, twenty miles above Harper's Ferry, and 
by that road an invading force could march direct upon 
Winchester via Martinsburg, thus isolating any force 
that would remain at Harper's Ferry. As Johnston's 
command was the only body available for the defense 
of the valley, it was necessary to so place it as not only 
to check any invasion by Williamsport and Martinsburg, 
but also an advance via Romney of the Federal army 
under McClellan in northwest Virginia. And it was im- 
portant also that it should be so stationed as to be in 
position to unite with the troops at Manassas in case of 
need. Harper's Ferry was not suited for either of these 
objects. It interposed no barrier to the advance of Pat- 
terson by Williamsport, or of McClellan by Romney ; 
and the route from Harper's Ferry to Manassas Junction 
followed the course of the Potomac for a short distance, 
and would have been commanded by artillery on the 
north bank. 

On the other hand, Winchester fulfilled all three con- 
ditions. An army stationed there not only blocked inva- 
sion by Martinsburg, but was in position to meet a force 
advancing from Romney. In addition, it gave a short 
line by which to form a junction by way of Snicker's 
Gap and Aldie with an army at Centreville, or by way 
of Ashby's Gap and Piedmont Station with an army at 
Manassas. These views were explained to Lee in letters 
of May 26th, 28th, and 31st, and June 6th, and instruc- 
tions asked. Lee, on behalf of the Government, wrote 
on June ist, expressing apprehensions of the difficulty 
of holding Harper's Ferry, but giving no permission to 



44 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

evacuate it. On June 3d he again wrote, saying that its 
abandonment would be depressing to the cause of the 
South ; to which Johnston replied by inquiring whether 
the loss of five or six thousand men would not be more 
so. Lee Vv'rote again on June 7th, saying that the Presi- 
dent regarded the position at Harper's Ferry as an im- 
portant one, and that its evacuation would interrupt the 
communication with Maryland. It was not until June 
13th that the requisite authority to abandon Harper's 
Ferry was granted. Johnston, however, confident that 
this would be the final decision of the War Department 
as soon as a thorough understanding of the region was 
obtained, proceeded to make all necessary preparations 
for the evacuation of the place. He continued the work 
of removing the machinery of the armory, and sent off 
also the baggage of the troops (for there was one period 
of the war when Confederate troops had baggage) and 
the various army supplies to Winchester. Everything 
that was worth transporting was carried away, and on 
June 15th the place itself was evacuated, the army reach- 
ing that evening a point a few miles south of Charles- 
town, where it encamped for the night. This was before 
the receipt of General Cooper's letter of the 13th grant- 
ing the requisite permission for withdrawing from the 
place. This letter was received on the morning of the 
i6th, while the troops were on the march to Bunker's 
Hill to meet Patterson's advance.* 

When Johnston assumed command at Harper's Ferry 
his nearest antagonist was General Robert Patterson, 
an old comrade in arms of the Mexican War, who was 
then collecting an army at Chambersburg and organiz- 
ing it for an advance into the valley of Virginia. John- 

* The best proof of the untenability of Harper's Ferry as a military 
position was the easy capture of its large garrison in September, 1862, 
by Jackson, approaching from Maryland. 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



45 



ston, on taking charge of operations, had continued the 
judicious arrangements of his predecessor, Colonel Jack- 
son, for observing this force. The Potomac River was 
watched by the Confederate cavalry from Point of 
Rocks for many miles up the river. It was under the 
command of " the indefatigable Stuart," as Johnston 
termed in his report the young and promising J. E. B. 
Stuart, and the gallant Ashby. All the intelligence ob- 
tainable represented Patterson's army as greatly out- 
numbering Johnston's. On June loth Patterson ad- 
vanced from Chambersburg to Hagerstown, which in- 
dicated an intention to cross into Virginia. He did 
cross the Potomac on the i6th, with a force stated by 
him to be ten thousand men, exclusive of cavalry and 
artillery, and after deducting certain troops which 
were withdrawn from him by order of General Scott 
just after he crossed. Johnston's army then numbered 
about seven thousand effectives, all told; but on the 
13th, in consequence of a report that McClellan with 
his armv had entered Romney, he detached two regi- 
ments, under Colonel A. P. Hill, to meet this new foe. 

It was in consequence of this move of Patterson 
(which was promptly reported to Johnston) that the 
evacuation of Harper's Ferry had been decided on and 
effected by the Confederate commander. In order to 
place himself in position to check it, he directed his 
march on Bunker's Hill, which he reached the after- 
noon of the i6th. Next morning he placed his army in 
line of battle. They were disappointed, however, in 
their anxiety for a fight, for on that day Patterson re- 
crossed the Potomac. His information had magnified 
Johnston's force of sixty-five hundred into "fifteen thou- 
sand trained infantry "; and the withdrawal of a Rhode 
Island regiment and his regulars under orders from 
Washington had served as an effectual damper to his 



46 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

aggressive aspirations. The moral effect of this with- 
drawal on the Confederate army was highly beneficial, 
for they were ignorant of his reduction of force and 
naturally attributed it to a fear on his part to meet them. 
The next day the army, having no enemy to oppose, 
marched to Winchester, and was stationed to the north of 
the town. In the meantime the detachment under Colonel 
A. P. Hill, consisting of the two Virginia regiments sent 
from Harper's Ferry and the Third Tennessee Regiment, 
which had joined them at Winchester, had proceeded to 
Romney, only to find that the report of McClellan's 
advance was false. A. P. Hill, however, was not a man 
to take a long march for nothing. It was throughout 
the war a cardinal object of Confederate strategy to 
break the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at as many 
points as possible, and thereby impede communication 
between Washington and the West. Colonel Hill there- 
fore sent a detachment from Romney of four companies, 
under Colonel Vaughan, of the Tennessee regiment, to 
destroy the railroad bridge over New Creek. The 
bridge was defended by a detachment of two hundred 
men, with two guns. Colonel Vaughan advanced upon 
them, but did not overtake any of them. He, how- 
ever, captured their colors and cannon and burned 
the bridge. The detachment then returned to Win- 
chester. 

Johnston improved the leisure which the withdrawal 
of Patterson gave him by assiduous attention to drill 
and organization, and by endeavoring to increase his 
supply of ammunition, which still gave him great solici- 
tude. He was a strict disciplinarian, and in all the 
armies which he commanded this was his first care. By 
this time additional regiments had joined him, and their 
training and grouping into larger units for certain 
mobility in action had become of the highest impor- 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



47 



tance. This opportunity was therefore taken to form 
the army into brigades. He had already recognized 
the marvelous talents of Colonel Jackson, and he placed 
Jackson in command of the First Brigade, which was 
composed of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Twenty- 
seventh Virginia Regiments, with Pendleton's Battery. 
This was the origin of the famous '' Stonewall " Brigade, 
which subsequently on many fields reflected such honor 
upon its commanders and its founder. The Second 
Brigade was composed of the Seventh, Eighth, and 
Ninth Georgia Regiments, a battalion of Kentuckians, 
and Alburtis's Battery ; and Colonel Bartow was ap- 
pointed its commander. The Second and Eleventh 
Mississippi, the Fourth Alabama, and the Second Ten- 
nessee Regiments and Imboden's Battery were formed 
into the Third Brigade, and placed under the command 
of General Bee, who had just joined the army of the 
valley. The Fourth Brigade was formed of the Tenth 
and Eleventh Virginia, the Third Tennessee and Mary- 
land Regiments, and Groves's Battery, and placed under 
the charge of Colonel Elzey. 

Under this arrangement the troops from the same 
State were grouped, as far as possible, into the same 
brigade. Their different degrees of efficiency and the 
desire to have the brigades as nearly the same strength 
as possible rendered it impracticable to carry out this 
arrangement perfectly. This brigading by States pro- 
duced the natural emulation which is so great an incen- 
tive tQ gallantry, and added greatly to their efficiency. 
The troops were in the highest spirits, and eager to 
measure their strength with the enemy. Their fighting 
^force was not quite nine thousand effectives. The 
official return of Patterson's army for June 28th shows 
his strength to have consisted on that day of 14,344 
of all arms present for duty. The return of Johnston's 



48 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

army for June 30th showed his total force present for 
duty to have been 10,654; but this includes some troops 
which, though assigned to his army, did not join him 
till after July 3d. 

It was not long before the newly formed Stonewall 
Brigade had an opportunity to show its mettle. John- 
ston had placed it nearer the Potomac, to support the 
cavalry and impede an advance of Patterson which was 
daily expected, but with instructions to avoid a general 
engagement. On July 2d Patterson again crossed the 
Potomac and advanced upon Jackson, driving Stuart's 
cavalry before him. Jackson, in obedience to his orders, 
sent the mass of his brigade to the rear, retaining with 
him as a rear guard the Fifth Virginia and one piece of 
artillery. With this and Stuart's cavalry he took a 
position near Falling Waters and fought Patterson for 
several hours, only retiring when he was about to be 
surrounded. When he did withdraw he carried with 
him forty-five prisoners, captured by Stuart's cavalry. 
He reported a loss of twenty men. The enemy's loss 
in killed and wounded was not known. Jackson retired 
skirmishing till he met Johnston with the main army at 
Darksville, six miles south of Martinsburg. 

In transmitting the reports of this engagement, 
Johnston, whose good opinion of Jackson and Stuart 
increased with each day of association, warmly urged 
the promotion of the former to the grade of brigadier 
general and the promotion of the latter to the grade of 
colonel. Patterson's report of this affair represents 
Jackson's small force of three hundred and eighty men 
as a body of thirty-five hundred, and their loss at sixty 
killed. He omits to mention his own loss, but his ac- 
count shows that he had two brigades engaged — those 
of Thomas and Abercrombie. Yet he terms Jackson's 
rear guard a " foe superior in number." He character- 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMrAIGN. ^g 

izes his leisurely occupation of Martinsburg as a " hot 
pursuit." 

At Darkesville, Johnston encamped in order of bat- 
tle, expecting and hoping that Patterson would ad- 
vance and attack him. His force was only nine thou- 
sand men, while that of Patterson, who had been largely 
re-enforced, consisted, according to his own estimate, 
of eighteen thousand two hundred. Johnston remained 
at Darkesville for four days, awaiting and desiring an 
attack. But by this time Patterson had received in- 
formation which caused him to estimate Johnston's army 
at forty thousand men ! A Mr. McDowell, who was a 
reporter and therefore incapable of exaggeration, calcu- 
lated his strength at forty-two thousand men, and stated 
that Winchester was strongly garrisoned and fortified, 
among the garrison being a regiment of Kentucky rifle- 
men armed with heavy bowie knives, who refused to 
take more than one round of cartridges, and who were 
placed in the bushes in readiness for assault.* 

An attack upon such a force so desperately armed 
was not to be thought of, and therefore Patterson re- 
mained at Martinsburg. It would have been madness 
with such inferior forces to attack him in Martinsburg, 
with its houses and stone inclosures ; so that Johnston, 
after awaiting an attack till he saw there was no like- 
lihood of one, withdrew to Winchester, so as to be in 
better position for the other contingencies which it was 
his duty to keep constantly before his mind. The with- 
drawal was a great disappointment to the troops, who 
were anxious for a figTit, and had not as yet seen enough 
service to cure them of the desire. After the withdrawal 
Patterson advanced to Bunker's Hill, where he rested, 
on July i6th, and the next day he moved easterly to 
Smithfield. 

* Patterson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign, p. 60. 



50 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

As has been seen, a prime object of Johnston in 
taking post at Winchester was, that he might be enabled 
to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June 
2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's 
Ferry, Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed 
command. He and Johnston at once communicated 
with each other, and agreed in their views of the im- 
portance of mutual support. Beauregard, in his mili- 
tary writings, claims to have originated this idea of a 
junction of the two armies. He may have been the first 
to suggest it in writing, but its importance was so ob- 
vious that it had occurred to all concerned (the enemy 
included) as a matter of course. The importance of 
Patterson's detaining Johnston in the valley, and there- 
by preventing him from re -enforcing Manassas, was 
fully appreciated in Washington, and is reiterated by 
Scott in his communications to Patterson, thus showing 
that Beauregard was not alone in the opinion. In fact, 
as early as May 30th, before Beauregard's arrival at 
Manassas, Lee had suggested to Johnston a joint move- 
ment with Bonham (Beauregard's predecessor) against 
any Federal advance by Leesburg. There was nothing 
brilliant or original in the idea. The only question was 
as to its feasibility. 

As soon as Johnston ascertained from Hill's expe- 
dition that McClellan was not moving on Romney and 
Winchester, the feasibility of this movement to Manas- 
sas at the right time became greater. The only problem 
then remaining was to so time it as to arrive just long 
enouo^h before the impending battle to take part in it, 
and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, 
a corresponding transfer of Patterson, which latter re- 
sult, in view of Patterson's superior force, would have 
been worse than useless. It was for the purpose of 
gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that 



RESIGNATION— THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN. 



51 



Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remain- 
ing opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He 
kept his cavalry well out, in order to be informed as 
promptly as possible of the slightest change in Patter- 
son's position. 

Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manas- 
sas had commenced. Their army of thirty-five thousand 
men under McDowell had moved out from Washington 
with the cry of '' On to Richmond ! " on its lips, confident 
that they would reach in a few days the goal which 
proved a four years' journey. On July i8th a portion 
of it had fought with Beauregard's troops the action of 
Blackburn's Ford, and had been repulsed. Early that 
morning the Confederate War Department telegraphed 
Johnston as follows : " General Beauregard is attacked ; 
to strike the enemy a decisive blow, a junction of all 
your effective force will be needed. If practicable, make 
the movement, sending your sick and baggage to Cul- 
peper Court House, either by railroad or by Warren- 
ton. In all the arrangements exercise your discre- 
tion." 

The question of practicability depended entirely on 
the possibility of giving Patterson the slip. As a recon- 
noissance by Stuart's cavalry showed him to have merely 
moved laterally from Smithfield to Charlestown, evinc- 
ing no inclination to advance, Johnston, who thus had a 
start of a day's march, made his arrangements to move 
at once. He could not send his sick to Culpeper Court 
House, as it would have required all his meager transpor- 
tation and defeated the movement. He therefore left 
them in Winchester (they were about seventeen hundred 
in number), guarded by a strong body of militia, which 
was sufficient for the purpose, as the chances were that 
Patterson, on discovering his movement, would at once 
attempt a similar one, and move to the support of Mc- 
5 



52 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Dowell. Johnston covered the movement by a curtain 
of cavalry under Stuart. 

The success of the operation is best shown by Pat- 
terson's dispatches. On July i8th he telegraphed 'Scott : 
" The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have 
kept him actively employed, and caused him to be re- 
enforced." And again on the 19th : "The enemy, from 
last information, are still at Winchester, and being re- 
enforced every night." He did not discover that the 
Confederates had departed till the next day, when it was 
too late to redeem Scott's promise to McDowell, that if 
Johnston moved for Manassas he would have Patterson 
upon his heels.* 

* It should be stated, in justice to General Patterson, that he dis- 
approved of the line by which he was operating, and favored a move- 
ment to Leesburg with his army, in which position he would have been 
as near McDowell as Johnston was to Beauregard. If he had made 
this advance, Johnston would have been greatly perplexed how to meet 
it and at the same time confront McClellan advancing from West Vir- 
ginia via Romney. It would have been still more difficult for him to 
have joined Beauregard quicker than Patterson could join McDowell. 
Scott, however, did not adopt this plan of Patterson, but kept him 
in the valley, rendering Johnston's strategy practicable. — See General 
Patterson's testimony in the Report of the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War to the third session of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Part 
II, pp. 80 ct scq. 



CHAPTER V. 

MANASSAS. 

When the troops first moved out from Winchester in 
a direction leading away from the position of Patter- 
son's army, they interpreted the march as a retreat, and, 
in consequence, were much downcast. But they had 
proceeded a few miles only on their way when John- 
ston decided to make his entire army his confidant, 
and communicated to them the intelligence that they 
were in motion to take part in a decisive battle in con- 
junction with their comrades at Manassas. He exhorted 
them to make a forced march in order to share in its 
dangers and glories. 

They left their camping grounds around Winchester 
about noon of the i8th of July, Jackson's brigade being 
in the lead. He had shown even at that early period 
the talent for celerity of movement which subsequently 
gained for his troops the sobriquet of *' foot cavalry," 
and it was certain that he would by his example stimu- 
late the others to a generous rivalry. 

The announcement of the proposed destination and 
its object was received by the men with cheers and exul- 
tation, and they manifested their eagerness by a some- 
what quickened speed. But the volunteer's idea of rapid 
marching is quite different from that of trained soldiers. 
In consequence, their pace, as compared with that of 
regulars, was snail-like. They could not understand, 
when they came to a rivulet crossing their road, why 



54 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

they could not stop and walk across single file on a 
sapling, or jump across on stepping-stones, instead of 
wetting their feet, thereby compelling a visit to their 
trunks. They were still Southern gentlemen with bag- 
gage and body servants, blissfully unsuspicious of that 
time in the near future when their scant apparel and 
equipment enabled them to make those marches which 
astonished the world. 

As Johnston had to bear constantly in mind the con- 
tingency of Patterson's attempting to follow his example 
by moving along a more northern line to unite with Mc- 
Dowell — thus imitating the parallel march of the Eng- 
lish and French to Salamanca — and as promptness was 
of the last importance, he was so disturbed by the slow 
progress of his troops that he hurried one of his staff 
forward to Piedmont Station on the Manassas Gap Rail- 
road, with instructions to arrange for sufficient trans- 
portation by rail to convey them from that station to 
Manassas more expeditiously than they could march. 
Major Whiting, the officer designated, on returning 
from his errand, met Johnston at Paris and reported 
that he had executed his mission, and had received as- 
surances from the railroad officials that ample transpor- 
tation would be provided for the infantry, and that 
promptly. 

A little after nightfall Jackson's brigade had reached 
Paris, a village in Ashby's Gap, seventeen miles from 
Winchester, and encamped there for the night. The re- 
mainder of the army reached the Shenandoah, where 
their road crossed it east of Millwood, and bivouacked 
there. The next morning Jackson's brigade was early 
in motion, and by eight o'clock had reached Piedmont, 
which is about six miles from Paris. Trains sufficient 
for them were soon in readiness, and they at once 
moved off to Manassas, being: the first to arrive. The 



MANASSAS. 



55 



only other troops for whom transportation was furnished 
that day were the Seventh and Eighth Georgia, of Bar- 
tow's brigade. The remaining infantry were compelled 
to wait at Piedmont, while the cavalry under Stuart and 
the artillery under Pendleton pursued their journey by 
the country road. 

Johnston passed the night at Paris. While there a 
member of Beauregard's staff arrived, bringing one of 
those plans which Beauregard was always ready to fur- 
nish to his associates. It was that Johnston, instead of 
moving straight to Manassas, should march by Aldie and 
attack the Federal right rear at Centreville, his guns to 
be the signal for Beauregard to attack them in front. 
Such an attempt to unite two armies on a field of battle 
during the progress of the fight itself is difficult and 
hazardous even with veteran troops. With new troops 
the risk and difficulty are of course much greater. The 
operation involves voluntarily placing an enemy between 
the two bodies — a position which is itself frequently 
the object of a battle. Nothing would have suited Mc- 
Dowell better than such a manoeuvre. He had left 
Washington with thirty-five thousand men. Johnston, 
even if he could have calculated the rate of marching 
of his raw troops with sufficient precision to have con- 
centrated them in condition for battle in the proper po- 
sition and unsuspected by his foe, had but eleven thou- 
sand. Had he madly rushed into such a position, Mc- 
Dowell could have turned upon him and crushed him 
long before Beauregard could have collected his army 
from the different fords of Bull Run, along which he 
had placed them, and come to his relief. It is evident 
from Beauregard's arrangement of his forces that he 
expected McDowell's advance to be against his right.* 

* " In reality, McDowell had at first intended to move on the Con- 
federate right, in anticipation of which, as the most J>rohable operation^ 



56 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

McDowell's real plan was to turn Beauregard's left, 
for the purpose of cutting the communication between 
him and Johnston. The move by Aldie would have 
secured for McDowell the very thing which he vainly 
fought a battle to obtain. Johnston, deeming the ma- 
noeuvre too uncertain and hazardous, declined to accede 
to the suggestion, and preferred the safer one of utiliz- 
ing the railroad for a prompt junction of the two armies, 
leaving the plan of action to be selected when such 
junction was accomplished. 

On the 2oth, Johnston succeeded in procuring enough 
transportation for two additional regiments, and sent off 
the Fourth Alabama and Second Mississippi and a part 
of the Eleventh Mississippi. These were all a part of 
Bee's brigade, and Bee accompanied them. Johnston 
was so disappointed at the tardiness of the railroad 
officials, and so fearful of arriving too late for the im- 
pending battle, that he decided to go along with these 
troops. He left General E. Kirby Smith to superintend 
the shipment of the remainder. Elzey's entire brigade, 
half of Bee's and half of Bartow's, numbering altogether 
more than half of the army, were left behind at Pied- 
mont Station. Johnston reached Beauregard's army 
about midday on the 20th. As the Seventh and Eighth 
Georgia, of Bartow's brigade, had reached the field the 
previous day, and as part of Bee's brigade had also been 
left behind, these two regiments were for the moment 
attached to Bee's, thus giving him the strength of a full 
brigade. 

Johnston's first care on arrival was to confer with 
Beauregard and inform himself as thoroughly as pos- 
sible, in the limited time at his disposal, of the disposi- 
tion of the troops and the character of the country. 

the strongest Confederate bjigades were posted in that quarter" — Ro- 
man's Beauregard, vol. i, p. 98. The Italics are the author's. 



MANASSAS. 



57 



He had come fully impressed with the opinion that 
Patterson would, as General Scott expressed it, be on 
his heels, and bring to McDowell a greater accession of 
strength than he had brought to Beauregard. He there- 
fore considered it essential that, in order to reap any 
fruit from his movement, the Confederates should, with 
their united forces, at once assume the offensive against 
McDowell and decide the event before the possibility of 
such a mighty re-enforcement to their opponents. He 
found Beauregard equally impressed with the same idea, 
and the two at once proceeded to discuss the best means 
of carrying this determination into effect. 

Though Johnston was the ranking officer, his late 
arrival and ignorance of the topography of the region 
made him largely dependent on Beauregard for neces- 
sary information. The latter indicated to him on a map 
the disposition of his own army. It was ranged along 
the line of Bull Run, and its distribution was predicated 
on the supposition that McDowell's main effort would be 
against the Confederate right flank, for the purpose of 
seizing Manassas Junction, which was Beauregard's base 
of supplies. Accordingly, Beauregard's army was ar- 
ranged with its '' strongest brigades " (to borrow Colo- 
nel Roman's expression) down the stream. Ewell's 
brigade guarded the approaches to Union Mills; D. R. 
Jones's brigade guarded McLean's ford ; Longstreet's, 
Blackburn's ford ; Bonham's, Mitchell's ford ; and 
Cocke's, Ball's ford. Colonel Evans, with fourteen com- 
panies and a battery of the latter brigade, was the only 
guard' to the Stone Bridge, by which the Warrenton 
pike crossed the stream, and to a private ford still far- 
ther above. Holmes's brigade was supporting Ewell, 
and Early's was supporting Jones. Jackson, on arrival, 
had been ordered by Beauregard to support Bonham, 
and Bee to support Longstreet. Johnston, on learning 



58 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the details of this formation, was apprehensive of the 
comparative weakness of the left, and transferred Jack- 
son and Bee in that direction. General Beauregard gave 
a similar direction to Hampton's legion, which had just 
arrived. 

The result of the conference between the two gen- 
erals was a determination to take the offensive and 
attack McDowell the next morning. To put this into 
effect a plan suggested by Beauregard was adopted. It 
was, in substance, to make available the several roads 
leading to Centreville through the different fords guard- 
ed by the Confederates, for the purpose of an advance 
against McDowell's left flank and rear. As soon as this 
plan was decided upon, instructions were given for its 
reduction to writing and for the preparation of the 
proper number of copies which were to be furnished to 
the different subordinate commanders ; and Johnston 
lay down to secure some rest, having had none the 
three previous nights. 

The momentous morning of the first great contest 
between the North and South broke clear, and the battle 
order was brought to Johnston at early daylight and 
signed. On the operations of this day depended the 
fate of the new Confederacy. A Federal victory, fol- 
lowing so closely McClellan's recent success in western 
Virginia, would have ended the war then and there, and 
severed the new nation with the sword. The Federal 
army under its promising young general numbered, in- 
cluding its detachments, 35,732 men present for duty. 
The combined Confederate armies that morning con- 
sisted of 29,188 men present for duty, which included its 
garrison at Manassas, but did not include those troops 
of Johnston's army which arrived later in the day.* 

* Roman's Beauregard, vol. i, p. 98. 



MANASSAS. 



59 



The number actually brought into action on each 
side was of course much less. Each army was equally 
confident. The Northerners — basing thefr hopes on the 
immense superiority of their artillery, conscious of the 
better armament of all their troops, trustful of their 
commander, and thinking themselves directed by the 
sagacious counsels of the veteran Scott — scouted the 
possibility of a reverse, and considered themselves so 
invincible, that civilians and ladies followed in their 
path to witness their exploits and celebrate their vic- 
tory. The Southerners — elated by their first slight suc- 
cess, standing as the defenders of their firesides from 
invasion, and firm believers in the superior manhood of 
the South, often asserted — were burning with a desire to 
vindicate it on the battle field. 

When McDowell formed his plan of battle he was 
not aware of the arrival of Johnston upon the field, 
though he knew that the move from Winchester was in 
contemplation, if not actually begun. The difficulty of 
crossing Bull Run and the ruggedness of the vicinity 
were not so great above the Stone Bridge as below it. 
McDowell had decided to take the offensive himself, in 
order to anticipate the arrival of Johnston's army. No 
double-trumpet signals or consular standards betrayed 
to him the arrival of another foe, as Hasdrubal at the 
Metaurus discovered the success of a similar march of 
the Roman consul Nero. Ignorant of the successful 
junction of Johnston and Beauregard, he determined to 
take advantage of the easier character of the country 
up the stream and turn the Confederate left and rear 
with the object of interposing himself between John- 
ston and Beauregard, and destroying Beauregard before 
Johnston could arrive. Instead of moving directly on 
the Stone Bridge, which at first was guarded by only 
fourteen companies, he instructed Tyler with his divi- 



6o GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

sion, except Richardson's brigade, to make a demonstra- 
tion against the Stone Bridge while he formed a strong 
flanking column, consisting of Hunter's division of 2,648 
men and Heintzelman's division of 9,777 men, and sent 
them on a long detour around by Sudley ford, which 
was unguarded. As soon as they cleared the way 
Tyler was to cross at the Stone Bridge and join in 
the attack. Tyler's division consisted of four brigades 
and was 9,936 strong, but one of these — Richardson's 
— was attached to Miles's division at Centreville, and 
with it constituted the reserve. Assuming his bri- 
gades to be of equal numbers, Tyler's division, ex- 
clusive of Richardson, was 7,500 strong. Thus Evans 
with his fourteen companies was soon to deal wMth 
19,925 men. 

After some delay Tyler proceeded toward the Stone 
Bridge for the purpose of holding Evans there by dem- 
onstrations, while Hunter and Heintzelman made their 
circuit. But Tyler was not sufficiently demonstrative to 
deceive Evans, who soon penetrated his design, and, 
leaving three companies to watch him and sending word 
to Colonel Cocke of the appearance of affairs, he led his 
remaining force across the valley of Young's branch to 
meet the flanking column. Here he formed his handful of 
men. Just before ten o'clock Burnside's brigade, which 
was leading the Federal body, deployed and attacked 
him, supported by its fine battery of six rifled guns. 
Evans repulsed two assaults and held his ground until 
another brigade joined Burnside, when, being hard 
pressed, he called on Bee, whom he saw approaching, to 
support him. Bee's brigade consisted of four regiments, 
two of which belonged regularly to Bartow's brigade and 
were only temporarily attached to Bee, for the reason 
heretofore explained. From this fact it is spoken of as 
two brigades in some Federal accounts of the battle. 



MANASSAS. 6 1 

Its strength was only twenty-seven hundred and thirty- 
two men, and the eleven companies of Evans numbered 
only nine hundred men. 

Bee moved his force forward in accordance with the 
request of Evans, and this small force held in check the 
flanking column until near noon. By this time it was 
forced back, which enabled Sherman's and Keyes's bri- 
gades of Tyler's division to cross the stream and join in 
the offensive movements of the Federals. Thus the 
thirty-six hundred men of Evans and Bee were fighting 
Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, aggregating 12,- 
425 men, re-enforced by half of Tyler's division, or about 
five thousand men. 

This heavy movement against the Confederate left, 
which gave by its mighty voice full notice of its serious 
nature, and the difficulty of having orders properly de- 
livered, destroyed all hope of carrying out Beauregard's 
plan, or a subsequent modification of it which he pro- 
posed. It was evident that up to this time McDowell was 
the domtnus litis, and that the only remaining hope of the 
Confederates was, by rapid hurrying forward of their re- 
serves to the point of danger, to frustrate his plan with- 
out attempting to execute their own. Accordingly, 
Johnston, attended by Beauregard — both of whom, on 
an eminence in rear of Mitchell's ford, about the center 
of the line, had been awaiting the sounds of battle from 
their own advance — convinced by the noise of the con- 
flict and the indications of mere defense in the front 
that the main battle was to be fought on the left, decided 
to repair in that direction and fight it out there, and 
hastened to make the necessary arrangements. Orders 
were sent to Holmes and Early to push rapidly for the 
sound of the firing, to Bonham to send a part of his 
force in the same direction, and to Bonham, Longstreet, 
and Jones to make demonstrations in their front. The 



62 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

two generals then galloped to the point of danger, about 
four miles distant.* 

When Bee and Evans were forced back across the 
valley, Bee attempted to make a stand and rally his 
troops on the Henry hill. Hampton's legion, which was 

* The following quotation, from a graphic account of the battle 
by Colonel Thomas L. Preston, a member of Johnston's staff, de- 
scribes the reconnoissance by means of which General Johnston, 
attended by General Beauregard, decided that the main Federal move- 
ment was against his left, and the orders issued by him in conse- 
quence : 

" As I left the [adjutant general's] office I heard the cannon on 
the extreme left of the Confederate lines. ... As soon as the cavalry 
escort reported as ready, the generals — Johnston and Beauregard — fol- 
lowed by their staffs and escort, started on the road leading to Mc- 
Lean's ford of Bull Run. Before reaching the open flat on the south 
of the stream the generals were halted by a man on the side of the 
road, who told them that a battery on the opposite hill was firing at 
every one who entered the open field at that point. General Johnston 
ordered the staffs and escort to scatter in the timber, so as not to at- 
tract attention. After a brief delay we were called together, and pro- 
ceeded through the woods on a narrow road up toward Blackburn's 
ford and in rear of General Longstreet's command. By this time the 
firing on the left had increased, and the rattle of musketry could be 
heard in the brief intervals. The approaches to the several fords of 
Bull Run from McLean's to the Stone Bridge were shelled, and there 
was almost a continuous roar of cannon. The cortege was again halt- 
ed, ordered to dismount and scatter among the trees. The two gen- 
erals went alone and on foot to the top of a hill which commanded an 
extended view of the country on both sides of Bull Run. Some time 
was spent in observation, and, as General Johnston walked back 
briskly to where his horse was held and gave the order * Mount and 
follow,' I saw that he was excited, and inferred that an important 
movement was promptly to be made. The generals, riding abreast, 
dashed off at a brisk canter, closely followed by their staffs without 
reference to rank, nor did they pull rein until opposite Pendleton's 
battery, when General Johnston suddenly stopped his horse, and, turn- 
ing in the saddle, asked, 'Whose battery is that?' He was an- 
swered, ' It is Pendleton's.' 'Order him to go in a gallop to the left 



MANASSAS. 6^ 

just arriving, had joined him in the withdrawal, and 
as he reached the Henry plateau he met Jackson with 
his brigade in the act of forming. This made an aggre- 
gate of about six thousand men on the Confederate side 
who so far had been brought into action. Bee's troops 
had lost heavily in their retreat, and were in great con- 
fusion. He attempted to rally them on Jackson's bri- 
gade, exhorting them to imitate the firm attitude of the 

of where the firing is heaviest.' Similar orders were given to Albur- 
tis's battery, which passed soon afterward. As we reached an open 
field in rear of the fighting a dispirited-looking body of men were seen 
standing along an old fence. General Johnston turned his horse 
toward the center of the line, and, approaching the color bearer, asked, 
* What regiment is this, and what are you doing here ? ' He was an- 
swered, ' It is the Fourth Alabama. Our officers have been disabled 
or killed, and there is no one left to command us.' General Johnston 
put his hand upon the staff, and said, ' I will lead you. Follow me.' 
The standard bearer retained his hold upon the staff, and, looking up 
to the general as he walked quickly by the side of his horse, said, 
'General, don't take my colors from me. Tell me where to carry 
them, and I will place them there.* The general relinquished his 
hold upon the staff, and, turning aside, put Colonel S. R. Gist in com- 
mand, who led them back into the fight. The regiment had barely 
passed beyond General Johnston and myself when General Bee rode 
up, and as he faced General Johnston he dropped the reins of his 
bridle, and in a voice tremulous with emotion and tears rolling down 
his cheeks he said, * General, my command is scattered and I am 
alone.' General Johnston replied, * I know it was not your fault, Gen- 
eral Bee. But don't despair ; the day is not lost yet.' . . . Not long 
after the incidents related I was sent to the rear to bring up re-enforce- 
ments, with instructions to direct them to positions on the left of the 
heavy firing. . . . When I returned to report to General Johnston I 
found him unattended near the Lewis house. The cloud of anxiety 
had passed from his face, and his orders were given in so cheerful a 
tone that all who received them seemed to catch the confident spirit 
in which they were issued. ... As aid-de-camp I not only executed 
orders, as did other staff officers of both generals, given by General 
Johnston, but had opportunity of knowing that he alone directed the 
manoeuvres of the Confederate troops. ..." 



64 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

latter by telling them, " Look at Jackson's brigade I it 
stands there like a stone wall " — a name that has gone 
down into history with the brigade and its great com- 
mander. 

While Bee was attempting to rally his shattered com- 
mand, Johnston and Beauregard arrived upon the field, 
and, reckless of their own danger, rode forward with the 
color bearers. Johnston, on the way, had found the 
Fourth Alabama with all its officers struck down, and, 
seizing their colors and placing Colonel S. R. Gist in 
charge, he had marched it back to its place in the line. 
The gallant example of the two generals, and the con- 
sciousness of their presence, revived the wearied and 
disheartened men, and resulted in the restoration of the 
line of battle. The efficient handling of Imboden's bat- 
tery from the time that it was first placed in position by 
Bee, and its support for hours of a contest with twice its 
number of rifled guns, contributed greatly to delay the 
Federal advance and to enable the Confederates to de- 
ploy and form. 

The question now was simply whether the Confeder- 
ates could endure the pressure until their re-enforce- 
ments should arrive from other parts of the field. After 
a hurried conversation, Johnston placed Beauregard in 
charge of the troops at the point of conflict and retained 
the main command, repairing to the elevated locality of 
the Lewis house to direct and hurry forward the re- 
enforcements. 

Beauregard brought up a part of Cocke's brigade, 
and by this time some additional Confederate artillery 
had also come upon the field. His preparations being 
complete, he awaited the shock, his line being on the 
southern part of the plateau. He did not have to wait 
long. The Federal array came pouring over the slope, 
accompanied by its rifled artillery, which at once went 



MANASSAS. 



65 



into battery. The Confederates greeted them with a 
deadly fire. Stuart watched his opportunity, and, by a 
well-timed charge in flank, created considerable confu- 
sion. Beauregard, at the critical moment, ordered a 
charge of the entire line, and the enemy was swept from 
the plateau. But they were not content with their re- 
pulse. They reformed, bringing Howard's fresh troops 
into action, and again pressed the Confederates back to 
the southern edge. Here, re-enforced by an additional 
regiment of Johnston's army (the Sixth North Carolina), 
which had just arrived by train from Piedmont and had 
been sent to the spot by Johnston, and by another of 
Cocke's regiments, Beauregard once more hurled his 
entire array forward, with the result of again repulsing 
the enemy and capturing their batteries. But it was at 
the cost of two of Johnston's brigadiers, Bee and Bar- 
tow, who fell in the charge. Soon after this Cash's and 
Kershaw's South Carolinians and Preston's Twenty- 
eighth Virginia came up, as also Elzey's brigade, under 
the command of General E. Kirby Smith, which had just 
arrived from the valley. Closely following them came 
Early from down the stream, all having been urged for- 
ward by Johnston. Early was arranged to flank the 
Federals, who had again rallied and were advancing to 
another assault. But, attacked in front by Beauregard 
and in flank by Early, they at last gave up the contest 
and abandoned the field in utter rout. Many fled by the 
long detour of Sudley ford, others by the Stone Bridge 
and fords just above. Both the Confederate armies 
were very weak in cavalry, but such as were on hand 
were at once sent forward in pursuit, with the result of 
capturing many prisoners. Johnston at once sent orders 
to Bonham to take his own troops and Longstreet's, and, 
crossmg Bull Run, to seize the turnpike at some conven- 
ient point and cut off the Federal retreat. Owing to a 



66 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

false rumor that a hostile force was advancing on Ma- 
nassas — which might have been Patterson's — Ewell and 
Holmes were sent in that direction. Bonham, on cross- 
ing Bull Run and seeing the apparently unshaken condi- 
tion of Richardson and Davies, did not venture to at- 
tack. By this time it was dark, and the wearied troops, 
of whom some had fought through that entire summer 
day, and others had been not less fatigued by marching 
and countermarching, were ordered to encamp. 

When the victory was seen to be complete. Colonel 
Thomas L. Preston, of his staff, rode up to General John- 
ston and congratulated him upon his triumph. Johnston 
braced himself in his seat, deliberately raised his hat, and 
said, in tones of the deepest reverence, " The credit is 
due to God and our brave Southern soldiers, not to 
me."* 

The aggregate loss of the Confederates in the battle 
was eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, of which twelve 
hundred and sixty-seven fell upon Johnston's army. Of 
his brigade commanders two were killed, and the other 
two were wounded. The total force of Johnston's army 
engaged was about eighty-three hundred and thirty- 
four. 

The loss of the Federal army, according to their 
returns, was twenty-eight hundred and ninety-six. In 
addition, they abandoned in their retreat twenty-eight 
pieces of artillery, five thousand muskets, and immense 
quantities of ammunition and army supplies — acquisitions 
which were invaluable to the poorly armed and equipped 
forces of the South, and worth far more than long files 
of prisoners. The captured artillery, from its quantity 
and yet more from its quality, was a specially valuable 
prize. Not less so were the captured muskets, for every 

* From Captain T. L. Preston's manuscript account of the battle. 



MANASSAS. (y-j 

one meant an additional soldier to the armies of the 
South, whose strength at that period of the war was 
only limited by the number of arms to put into their 
hands. 

It is difficult to ascertain the exact numbers actually 
engaged on each side. According to McDowell's report, 
he crossed Bull Run with about eighteen thousand men 
of all arms. This corresponds nearly with the official 
report heretofore quoted, which would make the divi- 
sions of Hunter, Heintzelman, and Tyler (excluding 
Richardson) aggregate about 19,925. 

Beauregard's army contributed to the battle ninety- 
nine hundred and seventy-seven men, which includes 
eleven hundred and forty-seven cavalry, of which latter 
force only five hundred were engaged. Therefore Beau- 
regard's strength in the fight was ninety-three hundred 
and thirty. The troops of Johnston's army engaged, 
according to Beauregard's official report, were, as has 
been seen, eighty-three hundred and thirty-four in num- 
ber. This made a grand aggregate on the Southern side 
of 17,664. But, of these, more than half came up near 
the close of the day, while the Federal troops were 
throughout massed in easy supporting distance of each 
other. 

An analysis of the Confederate casualties shows that 
Johnston's army lost fifteen per cent of those actually 
engaged, while Beauregard's army lost seven per cent. 
This fact tells which general fought the battle. With 
Johnston still at Winchester and Beauregard ranged as 
he was on the i8th, before he knew positively that a 
junction was feasible — and as his force continued to be 
ranged on the 21st — having his " strongest brigades " on 
the right, facing fords across which no foe was destined 
to advance, having nothing but a demi-brigade to guard 
the line actually selected by his adversary, where would 
6 



68 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

he and his army have been on the night of the 21st ? In 
other words, what would have been the story of Manas- 
sas without Bee, Bartow, and Jackson to illumine its 
page ? It is a historical fact that all of Johnston's troops 
who reached Manassas, except one regiment, took part 
in the battle ; and equally true that less than one half of 
Beauregard's were in position to be available. 



CHAPTER VI. 

IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 

The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after 
the battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has 
caused much acrimonious discussion. General John- 
ston, however, never hesitated to assume his share of 
the responsibility for the action taken, though insisting 
that the course pursued was proper, and the only prac- 
ticable one under the circumstances. 

Mr. Davis arrived upon the field just as the battle 
ended. Before his arrival Bonham had been ordered to 
pursue, with the result mentioned in the preceding chap- 
ter. Ewell and Holmes had been sent to meet a rumored 
advance of another Federal force. The troops who had 
been actually engaged all day, in the hot summer sea- 
son, were in no condition to follow up the enemy. But 
the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the weak- 
ness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire 
strength was considerably under two thousand men, and 
a large proportion of these were not in call. Many of 
those within reach had been fighting for hours, and were 
in little better condition than the infantry. All who were 
available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the 
result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and 
captured guns. But by the time the captors turned 
their prizes over to proper guards, the Northern army 
had covered a sufficient distance to be out of danger, 
being protected in their retreat by large bodies of troops 



70 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

that had not been engaged. This was all that could be 
accomplished ; for it is a well-known fact that infantry 
can not overtake flying infantry. If Napoleon, when 
short of cavalry, could not convert a Lutzen into an 
Austerlitz, it is a hard requirement to impose on other 
commanders. When the reader is convinced that men 
in orderly array, handicapped with heavy muskets and 
necessary ammunition, can outrun scattered individuals 
shedding their accoutrements as they flee, he can wonder 
at the lack of larger bodies of captives at Manassas. 

The fact that the condition of the Confederate troops 
put any active pursuit out of the question is established 
by the official reports. General Johnston's report says : 
" Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry 
and artillery can be. An adequate force of cavalry 
would have made it decisive." General Beauregard says 
in his report: "It is proper, and doubtless expected, 
that through this report my countrymen should be made 
acquainted with some of the causes that prevented the 
advance of our forces, and prolonged vigorous pursuit of 
the enemy to and beyond the Potomac. The War De- 
partment has been fully advised long since of all those 
causes, some of which only are proper here to be com- 
municated. An army which had fought as ours on that 
day against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of 
the time without water and without food, except a has- 
tily snatched scanty meal at dawn, was not in condition 
for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy 
immediately after the battle. On the following day an 
unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain inter- 
vened to obstruct our advance with reasonable pros- 
pect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a 
cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient 
pursuit a military impossibility." These views are 
confirmed by the reports of the subordinate generals, 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 



71 



which show beyond controversy the condition of the 
troops. 

The same reasons apply with equal force to any 
attempted advance during the few days succeeding the 
battle. The army was not in a condition to make the 
movement, being itself much demoralized by the engage- 
ment. Many thought the war over and went home ; 
many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes; 
for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a 
veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an ad- 
vance was the lack of necessary transportation. In a 
letter written by General Beauregard on July 29, 1861, 
published in vol. i, page 121, of Roman's work, the 
former says, " The want of food and transportation 
has made us lose all the fruits of our victory." In 
another letter, published on page 208 of the same work, 
Beauregard says : " The necessary transportation even 
for the ammunition essential to such a movement had 
not been provided for my forces, notwithstanding my 
application for it more than a month beforehand ; nor 
was there twenty-four hours* food at Manassas for the 
troops brought together for that battle." On July 28, 
1861, General Johnston had written General Cooper as 
follows : '' This army — both General Beauregard's troops 
and mine — is without adequate means of transportation. 
It would be impossible to manoeuvre for want of it. . . . 
This need is urgent." 

But even if the Southern army had been in perfect 
condition and amply provided with all things needful, it 
m.ust be remembered that the Federal army was not en- 
tirely dissolved. Though the troops which had been 
actually engaged were, with a few exceptions, little bet- 
ter than a mob, and McDowell, judging from his tele- 
grams, was almost as demoralized as they, there were 
plenty of Northern troops which had not been in action, 



72 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

and still presented a firm front. Runyon's division, 5,752 
strong; Miles's division, 6,207 strong; and Richardson's 
brigade of Tyler's division, probably 2,500 strong, were 
fresh, and protected the retreat. In addition to these, 
Mansfield had at least as many more in Washington, so 
that superior numbers would have met the Confederates 
on the advance, or in the intrenchments with which 
Washington was covered. The officials at the capital 
anticipated no danger. On the day after the battle Sec- 
retary Cameron telegraphed to New York, " The capital 
is safe." And again, ''A number of regiments have ar- 
rived since last evening. There is no danger of the 
capital or of the republic." 

The additional fact that McClellan brought no troops 
from his army, and that it was not thought necessary to 
bring up Patterson's command, which might easily and 
rapidly have been done by rail, is conclusive proof that 
no danger was apprehended. 

Even if the Confederates had advanced and cap- 
tured the intrenchments opposite Washington, they could 
have accomplished nothing. They could not have crossed 
the river on the bridge under the fire of the Federal ves- 
sels of war. They had no artillery of sufficient range to 
bombard Washington from the southern side, even if 
they had been disposed to wage war in that manner. 
They had no sufficient supply of ammunition. The 
movement would necessarily have resulted in a fiasco, 
and the morale of the victory would have been lost. 
General Early, in a communication to the New Orleans 
Times-Democrat of April 13, 1884, places this matter in 
a very clear light. He says : 

"A large river — the Potomac — intervened, and there 
was no ford on it practicable for infantry nearer than 
White's ford, more than forty miles above Washington 
and sixty miles from Manassas. That ford was but an 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 



n 



obscure crossing in a farm. It was at all times a very 
deep ford, and before we could have reached it, if we 
had moved early on the morning of the 22d of July, 
1861, the heavy rains had rendered the Potomac un- 
fordable at all points. . . . There was another ford 
lower down, at or about Seneca Falls, at which Stuart 
crossed in 1863, but that was too deep for infantry at 
all times. . . . The bridges on the upper Potomac, at 
Harper's Ferry, above and below, had been burned ; 
and in the vicinity of Washington there were three 
modes of crossing, the one being the Long Bridge, 
which had two draws in it, both opening toward Wash- 
ington ; another, the aqueduct of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Canal, with the water running in from the north side, 
the only passway being a narrow towpath ; and the 
other the chain bridge at Georgetown, which is a wood- 
en structure. The hoisting of the draws on the Long 
Bridge, and a torch applied to the chain bridge, would 
have rendered a crossing over them impossible ; while 
one piece of artillery could have effectually defended 
the towpath of the aqueduct, which is more than a mile 
and a half long, against any force, even if a span or two 
of the aqueduct had not been blown up. The Potomac 
in front of Washington is more than a mile wide, and we 
had no artillery at the time of the battle which would 
have reached across that river into Washington. We had 
no pontoons at that point, and no means of making them. 
Moreover, there were then two or three war vessels, 
notably the Pawnee, at the navy yard near Washington, 
with long-range guns. If, therefore, we had advanced 
to the Potomac, we could have accomplished nothing, 
even if all the enemy on the south bank had retreated 
into Washington. ... If all the citizens and politicians 
had been frightened out of their wits, and incontinently 
fled on the approach of our army. Generals Scott and 



74 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Mansfield, who were old soldiers, would have retained 
presence of mind enough to take the necessary steps to 
prevent our crossing. In fact, on the 23d of July, 1861, 
in a note to an officer who had command of the chain 
bridge, General Mansfield said, * We are amply able to 
whip the enemy if he will give us a chance here.' " 

President Davis has contended since the war that on 
the night of the battle he ordered a pursuit and dictated 
an order to that effect. He sets out the order, which is 
as follows : 

" I. General Bonham will send as early as practicable 
in the morning a command of two of his regiments of 
infantry, a strong force of cavalry, and one field battery, 
to scour the country and roads to his front toward Cen- 
treville. He will carry with him abundant means of 
transportation for the collection of our wounded ; all 
the arms, ammunition, and abandoned hospital stores, 
subsistence and baggage, which will be sent immediately 
to these headquarters. General Bonham will advance 
with caution, throwing out an advanced guard and skir- 
mishers on his right and left, and the utmost caution 
must be taken to prevent firing into our own men." 

Then follows a similar direction to Colonel Cocke. 

This shows on its face that it was a mere order for 
the collection of the wounded and the spoils of victory. 
It was no order for pursuit. How rapid would have 
been a pursuit which paused to pick up wounded and 
hospital stores and send them back to headquarters ! 

That President Davis did not then approve of pursuit 
is evident from his letter of August 10, 1861, to General 
Beauregard (published in vol. i, page 122, of Roman's 
work), in which he says : " So far from knowing that 
the enemy was routed, a large part of our forces was 
moved by you in the night of the 21st, to repel a sup- 
posed attack on our right, and that the next day's oper- 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 



75 



ations did not fully reveal what has since been reported 
of the enemy's panic. Enough was done for glory, and 
the measure of duty was full." 

The day after the battle the troops were assigned 
new positions, partly to remove them from the unpleas- 
ant proximity of the battlefield and partly to give them 
better encampments. The advance, consisting of Bon- 
ham's troops, was at Centreville. Soon afterward the 
army was advanced still farther, and distributed in po- 
sitions around Fairfax Court House, with strong outposts 
at Mason's and Munson's Hills, from which the Confed- 
erate flag, as it floated in the breeze, could be seen in 
Washington, and from which they could gaze upon the 
capital as the Mecca of their aspirations. 

The effect of the victory upon the contending sec- 
tions was very different. About the only thing done by 
the Confederate Government was to pass the following 
handsome resolution of thanks to the officers and troops 
engaged : 

" Resolutions of thanks to Generals Joseph E. John- 
ston and Gustave T. Beauregard, and the officers and 
troops under their command at the battle of Ma- 
nassas. 

" Resolved by the Cofigress of the Confederate States of 
America, That the thanks of Congress are eminently 
due, and are hereby cordially given, to Generals Joseph 
E. Johnston and Gustave T. Beauregard, and to the 
officers and troops under their command, for the great 
and signal victory obtained by them over forces of the 
United S'tates far exceeding them in number, in the bat- 
tle of the 2ist of July at Manassas; and for the gal- 
lantry, courage, and endurance evinced by them in a 
protracted and continuous struggle of more than ten 
hours — a victory the great results of which will be 
realized in the future successes of the war, and which, 



^5 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

in the judgment of Congress, entitles all who contrib- 
uted to it to the gratitude of their country. 

^'' Resolved^ further^ That the foregoing resolution be 
made known in appropriate general orders by the gen- 
erarts in command to the officers and troops to whom 
they are addressed." 

But it did not have the effect of materially increasing 
the numbers or equipment of the army, except so far as 
the spoils of victory themselves brought about this re- 
sult. These had been specially valuable in the artillery. 
In this arm the North at the outset of the war had a 
very great advantage, having had all the regular artil- 
lery as a nucleus ; and this was not only heavier, but 
more modern than the antiquated pieces which the Con- 
federacy had secured, mainly by capture. The intelli- 
gent efforts of Colonel Pendleton went far toward in- 
creasing the efficiency of this branch of the service, and 
of his success its subsequent history is the best evidence. 

The effect at the North was only to make that sec- 
tion more earnest in its determination to conquer. Mc- 
Clellan, then flushed with his successes in the Northwest, 
and commonly reputed their ablest leader, had taken 
charge at Washington, in response to a summons sent 
him the day after the battle. He at once set about or- 
ganizing a new army of invasion. He found over fifty 
thousand men on his arrival, and new troops were pour- 
ing in every day. With his marvelous talents for organi- 
zation, backed by the limitless resources of the North, 
he patiently went to work to discipline them and restore 
their confidence. Every week his army grew stronger by 
thousands, and its efficiency in like proportion. By No- 
vember 12, 1861, he had under his orders and in call of 
Washington an army of over 130,000 men. At the same 
date the effective total of the Confederate army was 
44,131- 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON.' 77 

The time allowed the Southern commander by the 
comparative cessation of active operations was also im- 
proved in organization and instruction. The two great 
wants which had been painfully emphasized by the ex- 
perience of the battle were additional cavalry and a 
divisional organization. From weakness in the former, 
the victory had been comparatively barren of fruits on 
the field. From lack of a grouping of the army into 
divisions, and the consequent necessity of delivering 
orders to each brigadier, the instructions of the Confed- 
erate chiefs had either arrived too late for the success 
of their plans, or had not arrived at all. Not the least 
of Johnston's qualities as a commander was his talent in 
recognizing the merits of those who served under him. 
It was he who first recognized and urged for promotion 
the gifted subordinates whose names have become so 
linked to the Army of Northern Virginia. In the valley 
he had recommended Jackson for promotion to briga- 
dier, and Stuart for promotion to colonel. The efficient 
services of the latter on outpost duty in the meanwhile 
had gained still more General Johnston's admiration, 
and induced him on August loth to write the President 
as follows : 

" May I remind you that I have more than once men- 
tioned our deficiency in cavalry ? We have not half 
enough for mere outpost duty. If it had been greater, 
our results on the 21st of July would have been better. 
. . . For the last two months I have had one regiment 
of Virginia cavalry under Stuart, in the presence of supe- 
rior forces of regular cavalry, who have never appeared 
in front of their infantry. Our men are good horsemen, 
well mounted. We can find thousands more like them. 
Can you not give them to us, and with Stuart to com- 
mand them ? He is a rare man, wonderfully endowed 
by Nature with the qualities necessary for an officer of 



78 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

light cavalry. Calm, firm, acute, and enterprising, I 
know no one more competent than he to estimate the 
occurrences before him at their true value. If you add 
to this army a real brigade of cavalry, you can find no 
better brigadier general to command it." 

Soon afterward occurred the affair of Lewinsville, in 
which Stuart, with a regiment of infantry three hundred 
and five strong, a company of cavalry, and a section of 
Rosser's battery, attacked a Federal detachment eight- 
een hundred strong, which had advanced to Lewinsville, 
and caused it to return to its intrenchments. The Con- 
federates suffered no loss whatever, and that of the Fed- 
erals was slight. In his report of the affair, Johnston 
repeated his recommendation that Stuart should be pro- 
moted, and also spoke of another rising young officer 
of cavalry, Captain Fitzhugh Lee, in the following hand- 
some terms : " For the lieutenant colonelcy I recom- 
mend Captain Fitzhugh Lee. He belongs to a family 
in which military genius seems an heirloom. He is an 
officer of rare merit, capacity, and courage." 

At this time occurred the first serious estrangement 
between Mr. Davis and General Johnston. Under the 
enactments of the Confederate Congress a distinct 
pledge was given that in the case of officers of the old 
army who "have resigned, or who may within six months 
tender their resignations from the army of the United 
States, and who have been or may be appointed to origi- 
nal vacancies in the army of the Confederate States, the 
commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so 
that the relative rank of officers of each grade shall be 
determined by their former commissions in the United 
States army, held anterior to the secession of these Con- 
federate States." The relations between Mr. Davis and 
General A. S. Johnston were most intimate. Immedi- 
ately after the arrival of the latter in the Confederacy, 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 



79 



Mr. Davis sent in the nominations of five generals : ist, 
S. Cooper, to rank from May i6th ; 2d, A. S. Johnston, 
to rank from May 28th ; 3d, R. E. Lee, to rank from 
June 14th ; 4th, J. E. Johnston, to rank from July 4th ; 
and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, to rank from July 21st. 
Their relative rank in the old army had been : ist, J. 
E. Johnston, brigadier general ; 2d, S. Cooper, colonel ; 
3d, A. S. Johnston, colonel ; 4th, R. E. Lee, lieutenant 
colonel ; and 5th, G. T. Beauregard, major. The effect 
of this nomination was, by the legerdemain of giving 
different dates to the commissions — positively forbidden 
by the express terms of the law — to transpose General 
Johnston from the first to the fourth place. On hearing 
of this action he wrote President Davis the following 
letter : 

*' Headquarters, Manassas, September 12, 1S61. 
" Sir : I have had the honor to receive through the 
War Department a copy of the proceedings of Congress 
on August 31, 1861, confirming the nominations made 
by the President of the Confederate States of five gen- 
erals of the Confederate army, and fixing their relative 
rank. I will not affect to disguise the surprise and mor- 
tification produced in my mind by the action taken in 
this matter by the President and by Congress. I beg to 
state further, with the most profound respect for both 
branches of the Government, that these proceedings are 
in violation of my rights as an officer, of the plighted 
faith of the Confederacy, and of the Constitution and 
laws of the land. Such being my views, lest my silence 
should be deemed significant of acquiescence, it is a 
duty as well as a right on my part at once to enter my 
earnest protest against the wrong which I conceive has 
been done me. I now and here declare my claim that, 
notwithstanding the nominations made by the President, 
and their confirmation by Congress, I still rightfully hold 



8o GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the rank of first general in the armies of the Southern 
Confederacy. I will proceed briefly to state the grounds 
upon which I rest this claim. 

"The act of the Confederate Congress of March 6, 
1861, section 8, amended by that of March 14, 1861, 
section 2, creates the grade of brigadier general as the 
highest rank in their service, and provides that there 
shall be five officers of that grade. The fifth section of 
the last-named act enacts * that in all cases of officers 
who have resigned, or who may within six months ten- 
der their resignation from the army of the United States, 
and who have been or may be appointed to original va- 
cancies in the army of the Confederate States, the com- 
missions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that 
the relative rank of officers shall be determined by their 
former commissions in the United States army, held an- 
terior to the secession of the Confederate States from 
the United States.' 

" Under these laws, on May 13, 1861, R. E. Lee and 
myself were nominated as brigadier generals in the Con- 
federate States army. Samuel Cooper had been nomi- 
nated to the same grade and confirmed a few weeks 
previously. The nominations of myself and R. E. Lee 
were confirmed by Congress promptly. Each of the 
three had resigned his commission in the United States 
army in accordance with the terms of the law. The 
other two had resigned colonelcies, but the commission 
which I had resigned was that of a brigadier general. 
It is plain, then, that under these laws I was the officer 
first in rank in the Confederate army. Two or three 
days afterward, on May i6th, Congress, by the second 
section of its act of that date enacted, 'that the five 
general officers provided by existing laws for the Con- 
federate States shall have the rank and denomination of 
"general" instead of "brigadier general," which shall 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. gl 

be the highest military grade known to the Confederate 
States. They shall be assigned to such commands and 
duties as the President may specially direct, and shall 
be entitled to the same pay, etc' 

" I conceive, and I submit to the careful consideration 
of the Government, that this section of the act last cited 
operated in two ways : i. It abolished the grade of brig- 
adier general in the Confederate army. 2. It at once, 
by the mere force of law, raised the three officers already 
named to the rank and denomination of general in the 
army of the Confederate States. The right, therefore, 
which I claim to my rank is founded on this act. Con- 
gress by its act, the President by his approval, at once 
made us generals. It is clear that such, likewise, was the 
construction of both branches of the Government, else 
why were not nominations made then ? It was a time of 
flagrant war. Either we were generals, or the country 
and army were left without such officers. Our former 
grade had been abolished. We were not brigadier gen- 
erals ; we were nothing, and could perform no military 
duty, exercise no command. I think it clear that I was 
a general by the plain terms of the law. It is plain, from 
the action of the President and Congress, that such was 
their construction, as I was at once ordered to Harper's 
Ferry to take command in the Valley of Virginia, and 
the President soon after placed three brigadier generals 
under my orders. In hurrying to assume the command 
in the Valley of Virginia, I did not wait for my commis- 
sion to be sent to me. I did not doubt that it would be 
made out, for I was persuaded that it was my right, and 
had no idea that there was any purpose of withholding 
it. I remained two months in the valley, too earnestly 
engaged in the public service to busy myself particularly 
in my personal interests. But when the emergencies of 
the campaign required me to march to Manassas, and to 



82 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

act with another general officer, I appreciated the im- 
portance and the indispensable necessity of not leaving 
the question of rank open or doubtful between us. With 
this view I transmitted a telegraphic dispatch to the 
President on July 20th, inquiring in the simplest and 
most direct terms what my rank was. He replied that 
I was a general. The battle of Manassas ensued on the 
next day. The President came in person to participate 
in it, but reached the scene of action soon after the close 
of the struggle. The morning after the battle he an- 
nounced his purpose to elevate General Beauregard to 
the rank of general. He returned to Richmond the 
ensuing day. The nomination was made immediately 
after his return, and was promptly confirmed by Con- 
gress. General Beauregard then became a general, and 
ranked me unless I was such by virtue of the act of Con- 
gress on May i6th, already referred to. Yet from the 
time of General Beauregard's appointment to the day of 
the renewed nominations I continued to act as the com- 
manding general of the Army of the Potomac, under the 
authority of the President and the Department of War. 
Thus it appears that I have the sanction of the Presi- 
dent to my claim of rank under the act of Congress. In 
addition to this, my rank was expressly recognized by 
Congress also, in the resolutions adopted by that body 
returning the thanks of Congress to General Johnston, 
to General Beauregard, and to the officers and soldiers 
of the army for the victory of Manassas. 

" Thus stood matters when the recent nominations 
were made. But one additional name was offered — that 
of A. S. Johnston. His commission in the army of the 
United States had been that of colonel. I, as resigning 
the higher rank in that army, was, by the provisions of 
the act of Congress of March 14, 1861, and the plighted 
faith of the Government of the Confederate States, the 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. g3 

general first in rank in their armies. By that act and 
that of May i6, 1861, the rank would stand thus: J. E. 
Johnston, S. Cooper, A. S. Johnston, R. E. Lee, G. T. 
Beauregard. 

" I held and claim to hold my rank as general under 
the act of May 16, 1861. I was a general thenceforth 
or never. I had the full authority of the constitutional 
Government of the Confederate States to sustain me. 
Heretofore those who disputed my authority as general 
have done so because they denied the existence of the 
Government whose officer I claimed to be. Now that 
Government joins the hostile power in denying my au- 
thority. When I sent back the missives of the Govern- 
ment of the United States, because they ignored the 
Government which I served and acknowledged, I little 
thought that one of the acts of that Government would 
be to ignore me as its officer by trampling upon its own 
solemn legislative and executive action. The nomina- 
tion seeks to annul the irrevocable part, and to make me 
such only from the 4th day of July. The present, and, 
so far as human legislation may operate, the future, may 
be controlled by Congress. Human power can not affect 
the past. Congress may vacate my commission and re- 
duce me to the ranks. It can not make it true that I was 
not a general before July 4, 1861. 

" The effect of the course pursued is this : It trans- 
fers me from the position first in rank to that of fourth. 
The relative rank of the others, among themselves, is 
unaltered. It is plain that this is a blow aimed at me 
only. It reduces my rank in the grade I hold. This 
has never been done heretofore in the regular service in 
America but by the sentence of a court-martial as a pun- 
ishment and as a disgrace for some military offense. It 
seeks to tarnish my fair fame as a soldier and as a man, 
earned by more than thirty years of laborious and peril- 
7 



84 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

ous service. I had but this — the scars of many wounds, 
all honestly taken in my front and in the front of battle, 
and my father's revolutionary sword. It was delivered 
to me from his venerable hand without a stain of dis- 
honor. Its blade is still unblemished as when it passed 
from his hand to mine. I drew it in the war not for 
rank or fame, but to defend the sacred soil, the homes 
and hearths, the women and children, aye, and the men 
of my mother, Virginia — my native South. It may here- 
after be the sword of a general leading armies or of 
a private volunteer. But while I live and have an arm 
to wield it, it shall never be sheathed until the freedom, 
independence, and full rights of the South are achieved. 
When that is done, it may well be a matter of small con- 
cern to the Government, to Congress, or to the country, 
what my rank or lot may be. 

" I shall be satisfied if my country stands among the 
powers of the world free, powerful, and victorious, and 
that I, as a general, a lieutenant, or a volunteer soldier, 
have borne my part in the glorious strife, and contrib- 
uted to the final blessed consummation. 

** What has the aspect of a studied indignity is offered 
me. My noble associate with me in the battle has his 
preferment connected with the victory won by our com- 
mon trials and dangers. His commission bears the date 
of July 21, 1861, but care seems to be taken to exclude 
the idea that I had any part in winning our triumph. 

*' My commission is made to bear such a date that 
my once inferiors in the service of the United States 
and of the Confederate States shall be above me. But 
it must not be dated as of July 21st, nor be suggestive 
of the victory of Manassas. 

" I return to my first position. I repeat that my 
rank as general is established by the acts of Congress 
of March 14, 1861, and May 16, 1861. To deprive me 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 85 

of that rank, it was necessary for Congress to repeal 
those laws. That could be done by express legislative 
act alone. It was not done, it could not be done, by a 
mere vote in secret session upon a list of nominations. 

" If the action against which I have protested is legal, 
it is not for me to question the expediency of degrading 
one who has served laboriously from the commencement 
of the war on this frontier, and borne a prominent part 
in the only great event of that war, for the benefit of 
persons neither of whom has yet struck a blow for the 
Confederacy. 

" These views and the freedom with which they are 
presented may be unusual ; so likewise is the occasion 
which calls them forth. I have the honor to be, most 
respectfully, your obedient servant, 

** J. E. Johnston, General^ 

The terms in which this letter is expressed show how 
deeply General Johnston felt this action of the Presi- 
dent. His compositions, as a rule, were the extreme of 
simplicity, rarely indulging in sentiment. He would 
never have shown so much feeling as is evinced in this 
letter had he not considered himself deeply wronged. 

The letter is itself the best statement possible of his 
position. It would be idle to attempt to add to it. 
Whether he was right or wrong in his contention, his 
statement of it was certainly entirely respectful. There 
was nothing in it to which just exception could be taken, 
unless the mere fact of differing with the President was 
an offense. Not a line was couched in words of disre- 
spect or insult. After writing it and before mailing it 
he laid it aside for two days, in order to allow himself 
an opportunity to review it calmly and dispassionately. 
He did not write for the purpose of giving offense, and 
it did not occur to him that it would have that effect. 



86 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

When he heard through friends at Richmond that the 
President, instead of treating it as a legitimate protest 
of an officer who deemed himself illegally deprived of 
his rank, resented it as a personal insult, he was greatly 
grieved at the information ; not that he regretted writing 
the letter, for he looked upon it as his right and duty, 
but he was concerned that it should be so misconstrued. 
President Davis did not attempt to answer the rea- 
soning of the letter. He merely sent the following curt 

reply : 

" Richmond, Va., September 14, 1S61. 

" General J. E. Johnston. 

" Sir : 1 have received and read your letter of the 
12th instant. Its language is, as you say, unusual; its 
arguments and statements utterly one-sided, and its in- 
sinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming. 

" I am, etc., Jefferson Davis." 

The only explanation ever vouchsafed by any one 
authorized to speak for President Davis is contained in 
a note to volume ii, page 150, of the Memoir of Presi- 
dent Davis lately published by his widow, and also in 
the few pages of the same work immediately succeeding 
it. The note contains a quotation from a private letter 
of Mr. Davis to his wife, as follows : 

" General Johnston does not remember that he did 
not leave the United States army to enter the Confed- 
erate States army, but that he entered the Army of Vir- 
ginia, and when Virginia joined the Confederacy he 
came to the Confederate States ; also, that in the Vir- 
ginia army he was the subordinate of Lee, and that they 
were nominated to our Provisional Congress at the same 
time and with the same relative rank they had in Vir- 
ginia. The quartermaster general had only assimilated 
or protective rank, and from it derived no right to com- 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 



87 



mand, but by law was prohibited from exercising com- 
mand of troops." 

The reason assigned in this letter is evidently not 
a sufficient reply to General Johnston's position. The 
fact that he was for a short time in the Virginia service, 
and that Lee's commission in that service antedated his 
by three days, is entirely immaterial. The sole question 
is one of statutory construction. The language of the 
Confederate law did not require that the resignation 
from the old service should be with the intent to enter 
the Confederate service. Nor did it put upon those who 
resigned the election whether at once to enter the Con- 
federate service or the service of their respective States. 
If this was the meaning of the law, and the reason which 
really actuated Mr. Davis at the time, Beauregard, whose 
entry into the Confederate army preceded both that of 
Lee and Johnston, should have been made to rank them 
both. Under the terms of the statute, any one who 
within six months after its date resigned from the old 
service and was appointed to an original vacancy in 
the Confederate service, came within its provisions, and 
ranked as he had ranked in the old army, no matter 
what temporary State service he had performed in the 
meanwhile. This reason is a mere excuse. It is insuf- 
ficient to explain the direct infraction of the positive 
terms of the law, which required that the commissions 
should bear one and the same date, and therefore for- 
bade any such indirect means as antedating commissions 
for the purpose of affecting the relative rank prescribed 
by law. 

Mrs. Davis, in her Memoir, also states that another 
reason for the President's action in the matter was this: 
" Near the close of President Buchanan's administra- 
tion, in i860, died General Jesup, Quartermaster Gen- 
eral of the United States army, and J. E. Johnston, 



83 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

then lieutenant colonel of cavalry, was appointed to the 
vacancy. Now, the quartermaster general had the rank, 
pay, and emoluments of the brigadier general ; but the 
rank was staff, and by law this officer could not exercise 
command over the troops unless by special assignment. 
When, in the spring of 1861, the officers in question en- 
tered the service of the Confederacy, Cooper had been 
adjutant general of the United States army, with the 
rank of colonel ; Albert Sidney Johnston, colonel and 
brigadier general by brevet, and on duty as such ; Lee, 
lieutenant colonel of cavalry, senior to J. E. Johnston 
in the line before the latter's appointment above men- 
tioned ; Beauregard, major of engineers." 

This ground for his action is taken by Mrs. Davis 
from General Richard Taylor's work on the war, entitled 
Destruction and Reconstruction. It is merely saying 
in other language that Mr. Davis, in making these 
nominations, chose to ignore Johnston's recent appoint- 
ment as quartermaster general, which he had opposed, 
and treated him as if it had not been conferred. This 
was in direct contravention of the terms of the law, 
which expressly said that the relative rank should be 
preserved, and drew no distinction between staff and 
line rank. The right of the quartermaster general to 
command troops is entirely irrelevant. General John- 
ston was entitled to his rank whether the President 
chose to assign him to active command or not. He 
did not lose it in later periods of the war, when the 
President chose to leave him unemployed, and gave to 
acknowledged juniors the armies which he had led. It 
was the President's right to assign him to armies or not, 
as he chose. That was a matter in the province of the 
Executive. It was not the President's right to violate 
the express language of a legislative act, and degrade 
him in rank by the fiction of antedating the commissions 



IN SIGHT OF WASHINGTON. 89 

of others. This distinction between staff and line rank, 
drawn by General Taylor in his anxiety to excuse the 
President's partiality, x^felo de se^ and inconsistent with 
the order of nominations as made. If it was the Presi- 
dent's real reason, why was General Cooper put at the 
head of the list instead of at the foot ? His grade of 
"adjutant general with the rank of colonel" was ex- 
clusively a staff rank. He had never commanded any 
troops, either by special assignment or otherwise. He 
was never assigned to active duty during the war. Even 
admitting the justice of this distinction between staff 
and line, Johnston certainly ranked him. The fact that 
Cooper was made to head the list shows that no such 
idea actuated the President at the time of his action, 
and that it is the afterthought of an admirer attempting 
to justify unfairness to an officer who deserved better 
treatment. 

The real reason of President Davis was never avowed 
It was not so much an intention to slight J. E. Johnston 
as to advance A. S. Johnston. The latter and President 
Davis had during all their lives been on terms of the 
closest intimacy. He was one of those whose names 
had been urged for appointment as quartermaster gen- 
eral, as has been seen, and Mr. Davis was his earnest 
advocate. The appointment of the Confederate gener- 
als was delayed till his arrival within the lines, and was 
then made immediately. Mr. Davis here saw an oppor- 
tunity to effect what he had failed to accomplish when 
he urged his friend for the place of quartermaster 
general'. He thought he had the power, and he availed 
himself of it. It is notorious that throughout the war 
he had his favorites. Happy had it been for the Con- 
federacy if his other favorites had been men of the char- 
acter and talents of A. S. Johnston. His action in the 
matter was prompted by friendship — a very commend- 



go GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

able trait where another's rights are not infringed. It is 
clear that in this matter Mr. Davis wronged General 
Johnston. The latter always felt it, and to the day of 
his death looked upon it as second only to the greater 
wrong inflicted by his removal in front of Atlanta, at 
the very juncture when he was preparing to reap the 
fruits of his strategy. 

Soon after this correspondence the improvement and 
increase of the Federal army became so patent that the 
outposts at Mason's and Munson's Hills were thought 
to be exposed to too much hazard, and they were with- 
drawn. 



CHAPTER VII. 

ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRCxINIA. 

Johnston's attention was now devoted to the nu- 
merous matters connected with the improvement of the 
army and the increase of its efficiency. The difficulties 
with which it had to struggle in the matter of food and 
transportation were apparently chronic with the Gov- 
ernment. It was evidently useless to waste time in dis- 
cussing this subject with the Richmond authorities. 
The subject of the organization of the army into larger 
units, so as to facilitate its handling in battle, was then 
taken up. Johnston, with the concurrence of Beaure- 
gard, recommended its formation into divisions and 
corps, and the appointment of proper general officers 
to command them. Van Dorn and G. W. Smith had 
just been made major generals and sent to the army, 
and the Secretary of War called upon Johnston and 
Beauregard for additional recommendations. On the 
28th of September a list was made out and sent to the 
Department, in accordance with this request. Among 
the recommendations for the grade of major general 
were Jackson and Longstreet ; among those recom- 
mended for brigadier general were Evans, the break- 
water of the flood-tide of enemies at Manassas, Cocke, 
A. P. Hill, and Wilcox. The Department did not adopt 
all the recommendations, but appointed one major gen- 
eral for each of the two bodies which had been united 



92 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

at Manassas, selecting Jackson from Johnston's army, 
and Longstreet from that of Beauregard. The troops 
at this time were exceptionally well officered, even the 
colonels being men who made a name in later periods 
of the conflict ; indeed, some of them, like A. P. Hill and 
Evans, had already made their mark. 

In order to annoy the enemy as much as possible, 
the establishment of batteries at Evansport, to com- 
mand the navigation of the Potomac, was now begun, 
causing a partial blockade of Washington, which was a 
great mortification to the Federal Government. 

At this time the Confederate lines covered a front 
of about six miles — from Flint Hill to Sangster's Cross 
Roads, with outposts from Falls Church by Munson's 
and Mason's Hills to Springfield Station. This was not 
selected as a good position for defense, since it was 
easily turned, but in order that the army might be in 
position for offensive operations. If these were to be 
undertaken, the quicker the better ; for McClellan was 
daily growing in strength, and might be expected to 
continue to do so, while on the other hand the re- 
enforcements at the disposal of the Confederates were 
limited by the difficulty of procuring arms. The con- 
stantly growing numbers of the Federal army made it 
necessary to decide this question at once ; and accord- 
ingly, on September 26th, Johnston wrote to the Sec- 
retary of War explaining the situation, and suggesting 
that either he, the President, or some one authorized to 
act for them, should come to the army and confer on 
this important subject. He received a reply stating 
that the President himself would visit the army as soon 
as possible for the purpose of conference. President 
Davis arrived about the ist of October, and held a coun- 
cil of war, at which Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. 
Smith were present. A memorandum of this council 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. g^ 

was made by the latter, and best explains the plans dis- 
cussed. Its material parts are as follows: 

'* Finally I said : ' Mr. President, is it not possible to 
put this army in condition to assume the active offen- 
sive?' adding that this was a question of vital impor- 
tance, upon which the success or failure of our cause 
might depend. . . . There seemed to be little difference 
of opinion among us in regard to general views and prin- 
ciples. It was clearly stated and agreed to that the 
military force of the Confederate States was at the high- 
est point it could attain without arms from abroad; that 
the portion of this particular army present for duty was 
in the finest fighting condition ; that if kept inactive it 
must retrograde in every respect during the winter, the 
effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all. The 
enemy were daily increasing in number, arms, discipline, 
and efficiency. We looked forward to a sad state of 
things at the opening of a spring campaign. 

'' These and other points being agreed upon without 
argument, it was again asked : * Mr. President, is it not 
possible to increase the effective strength of this army 
and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry 
the v/ar into the enemy's country ? Can you not, by 
stripping other points to the last they will bear, and even 
risking defeat at all other places, put us in condition 
to move forward ? Success here at this time saves every- 
thing ; defeat here loses all.' In explanation and as an 
illustration of this, the unqualified opinion was advanced 
that if, for want of adequate strength on our part in Ken- 
tucky, the Federal forces should take military possession 
of that whole State, and even enter and occupy a por- 
tion of Tennessee, a victory gained by this army beyond 
the Potomac would, by threatening the heart of the 
Northern States, compel their armies to fall back, free 
Kentucky, and give us the line of the Ohio within ten 



94 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

days thereafter. On the other hand, should our forces 
in Tennessee and southern Kentucky be strengthened, 
so as to enable us to take and hold the Ohio River as a 
boundary, a disastrous defeat of this army would at once 
be followed by an overwhelming wave of Northern in- 
vaders that would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, 
extending to the northern part of the cotton States, if 
not to New Orleans. ... It seemed to be conceded by 
all that our force at that time here was not sufficient for 
assuming the offensive beyond the Potomac, and that 
even with a much larger force an attack upon their army 
under the guns of their fortifications on this side of the 
river was out of the question. 

" The President asked me what number of men were 
necessary, in my opinion, to warrant an offensive cam- 
paign to cross the Potomac, cut off the communications 
of the enemy with their fortified capital, and carry the 
war into their country. I answered, * Fifty thousand 
effective seasoned soldiers,' explaining that by seasoned 
soldiers I meant such men as we had there present for 
duty, and added that they would have to be drawn from 
the Peninsula, about Yorktown, Norfolk, from western 
Virginia, Pensacola, or wherever might be most expe- 
dient. 

" General Johnston and General Beauregard both 
thought that a force of sixty thousand men would be 
necessary, and that this force would require large addi- 
tional transportation and munitions of war, the supplies 
here being entirely inadequate for an active campaign 
in the enemy's country, even with our present force. 
. . . The President, I think, gave no definite opinion in 
regard to the number of men necessary for the purpose, 
and I am sure that no one present considered this a 
question to be finally decided by any other person than 
the commanding general of this army. . . . The Presi- 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. gt^ 

dent expressed surprise and regret that the number of 
surplus arms was so small. He then stated that at that 
time no re-enforcements could be furnished to this army 
of the character asked for, and that the most that could 
be done would be to furnish recruits to take the surplus 
arms in store here (say twenty-five hundred stand). . . . 
He expressed regret, and seemed to feel deeply, as did 
every one present. ... It was felt that there was no 
other course left but to take a defensive position and 
await the enemy. If they did not advance, we had but 
to await the winter and its results. . . ." 

The effect of drill and re-enforcements upon the 
spirits of McClellan's army was such that they resolved 
to attempt an offensive movement, and a large body 
crossed the Potomac with the intention of attacking the 
Confederate force at Leesburg. Four regiments crossed 
at Edwards Ferry, and were held in check by Barks- 
dale's Mississippi regiment. Five others crossed at 
Ball's Bluff, commanded by Colonel Baker, of Oregon. 
But they made an unfortunate selection of an antagonist 
upon whom to experiment. They were met by Evans 
with his force of about seventeen hundred men, and 
after a sharp fight were driven pell-mell into the river. 
General Evans reported their loss at thirteen hundred 
killed, drowned, and wounded, and seven hundred and 
ten prisoners. The Confederate loss was one hundred 
and fifty-five.* The Northern troops also lost fifteen 
hundred stand of arms, three pieces of artillery, and 
various-Other military property. 

* Official War Records, vol. v, p. 353. The same volume, on p. 
308, gives the Federal loss at nine hundred and twenty-one ; but this 
is evidently incomplete, as it reports no loss in the Nineteenth Massa- 
chusetts, the Second Massachusetts, or the California battalion. The 
latter alone lost two hundred and sixty men (p. 329 of the same 
volume). 



^6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

This success had an important result beyond the 
mere loss inflicted. McClellan's army by this time had 
become so strong that an advance by him was daily ex- 
pected. His own Government was urging it on him, 
impelled by the political pressure, the increasing strain 
on the finances, and the desire to utilize the fine autumn 
weather. The effect of the Ball's Bluff engagement was 
to carry to an extreme his natural caution, and bring 
him to the decision to attempt nothing that season. To 
quote from one of his admirers : " This disaster, of com- 
paratively little moment by itself, led to the most acri- 
monious recriminations. It proved, above all, how slight 
and imperfect were the connections between the head of 
the army and the parts he was called on to manoeuvre. 
On that day a fatal hesitation took possession of Mc- 
Clellan. If he did not then decide to postpone the cam- 
paign till the following spring, his conduct of affairs was 
soon to leave him no alternative but recourse to this 
lamentable necessity."* 

As the position about Fairfax Court House had been 
held only as a point from which to inaugurate an ad- 
vance, the result of the council of war rendered its 
retention unnecessary, and the forces were drawn back 
to Centreville, which, being farther from the Potomac, 
rendered it less liable to be turned. Here the army, 
about forty-four thousand strong, continued to show a 
defiant front to McClellan's mighty host of one hundred 
and thirty thousand, which was daily increasing.! 

* The Comte de Paris, in vol. ii, p. 114, Battles and Leaders of the 
Civil War. 

f Those who persist in the assertion that the battle of Manassas 
was barren of results seem to overlook the fact that without the pres- 
tige of that victory, re-enforced by that of Ball's Bluff, it would never 
have been possible for this comparatively small body to have held its 
position so long in the near presence of so superior an antagonist. The 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



97 



On October 22d, under General Orders No. 15, the 
Department of Northern Virginia was established, be- 
ing composed of three districts — the Valley district, the 
Potomac district, and the Aquia district. Jackson was 
placed in command of the first, Beauregard of the sec- 
ond, and Holmes of the third. Johnston was placed in 
command of the Department, thus enlarging his powers 
from those of mere commander of an army to that of 
general of a department. But as the point of greatest 
danger was the vicinity of McClellan's grand army, 
Johnston remained with the Army of the Potomac. 

The order founding this Department directed the 
brigading of the troops by States as soon as, in the 
judgment of the commander, it could be safely done. 
Johnston was in favor of this mode of brigading as an 
abstract proposition, having adopted it in the Valley be- 
fore the march to Manassas ; but the exigencies of the 
service had heretofore rendered it impracticable at Cen- 
treville. Regiments, on arrival, had necessarily been 
attached to brigades which then had most need of them, 
so as to equalize their strength. By this time the senti- 
ment of fraternity in arms had rendered them fond of 
the brigade to which they belonged, and proud of its 
glories. The Southern lines were many miles in length, 
and a vastly superior force, whose advance was momen- 
tarily expected, was in its immediate vicinity — nearer, in 
fact, to its center than were its two wings. The regi- 
ments from different States were scattered along this 
entire front, and Johnston considered it hazardous in 
the extreme to attempt such a reorganization with its 

fact that Johnston did this is also a complete refutation of the charge 
that he was always on the retreat. The Anny of Northern Virginia 
never at any later period of the war passed the winter in a position so 
near Washington ; and yet it was never afterward so weak numerically, 
compared to its adversary, as during this winter at Centreville. 



q8 general JOHNSTON. 

consequent shifting of positions, for fear that a forward 
movement of the enemy might occur just as it was in 
progress. He therefore postponed the step from time 
to time, though not without constant letters of censure 
from Richmond. 

One effect of this division into districts was to de- 
prive him of Jackson and his brigade. The assignment 
of the latter to the Valley district was eminently 
agreeable to him, as Jackson possessed his full con- 
fidence and relieved him of anxiety in that quarter; 
but he thought that the troops for this district should 
be drawn from Loring's command and other bodies in 
western Virginia, and not from the outnumbered Army 
of the Potomac. Thus early was he taught that he was 
department commander only in name, without the power 
to control the troops in his department. How he felt 
this interference of the Secretary of War with his pre- 
rogative appears by an unofficial letter to General Whit- 
ing, in which he says : " I am mournmg over the loss of 
Jackson's brigade, ordered to Winchester against my re- 
monstrance. The Secretary of War will probably estab- 
lish his headquarters within this Department soon." 

To this arrangement of districts the Federal Govern- 
ment at once replied by an order placing McClellan in 
command not merely of the forces around Washington, 
but of all the armies of the United States, in place of 
Scott, who was retired at his own request. It had not 
occurred to President Davis that it would be advan- 
tageous to make a similar arrangement ; and it was not 
till the close of the war that the Confederate Congress 
passed the law under which Lee became the general 
officer in charge of military operations. 

On December 20th occurred the affair of Dranesville. 
Stuart had been sent with a mixed force of twelve hun- 
dred men to protect a foraging party which had been 



I 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



99 



sent to Loudoun. He encountered Ord's brigade, re- 
enforced by the First Pennsylvania Reserve Rifles. In 
order to save the wagons, Stuart attacked, but was driven 
off. His loss was one hundred and ninety-four, while 
the Northern loss was sixty-eight. 

Meanwhile Jackson had proceeded to the Valley, ar- 
riving at Winchester on November 5th, and busied him- 
self in recruiting his force. He came to the conclusion 
that it would be better to occupy his troops in an expe- 
dition against Romney than to put them into winter 
quarters. Though Johnston expected no great results 
from the expedition, he did not interfere.* Jackson 
made the expedition, but with inconsiderable results and 
with great suffering and discontent to the troops. 

Nothing noteworthy occurred in the other districts 
during the remainder of the year. At its close the total 
force in the Department was 62,112, of which 44,563 were 
with the Army of the Potomac. McClellan's strength 
at the same time was 183,507. Thus the close of 1861 
found Johnston's forces facing near the frontier a foe of 
triple numbers. 

Jackson's troops, after his fruitless expedition, went 
into winter quarters, Loring's command being placed 
at Romney. This command was in a state of discon- 
tent bordering almost on insubordination, and com- 
plaints against Jackson were poured into Richmond. 
They had for their object the removal of the malcon- 
tents from Romney, and took the shape not merely of 
grumbling at their discomfort, but also the propagation 
of rumors that a body stationed there was liable to 
be cut off. The War Department, without taking the 

* This is evident from his letter of November 22d to Cooper, in 
which he says : " It seems to me that he [General Jackson] proposes 
more than can well be accomplished in that high mountainous country 
at this season." 



lOO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

trouble to consult either Johnston, the Department com- 
mander, or Jackson, their immediate chief, sent an un- 
qualified instruction to the latter to move them back to 
Winchester. The order was at once obeyed ; but Jack- 
son was so aggrieved that he sent to Johnston a letter 
directed to the Secretary of War tendering his resigna- 
tion, with a request that he be ordered to report for 
duty to the Superintendent of the Virginia Military In- 
stitute. Johnston indorsed on the letter : "Respectfully 
forwarded, with great regret. I don't know how the loss 
of this officer can be supplied. General officers are much 
wanted in this Department." He did not forward the 
letter until he wrote Jackson as follows : 

" My dear Friend : I have just read, and with pro- 
found regret, your letter to the Secretary of War asking 
to be relieved from your present command, either by an 
order to the Virginia Military Institute or the accept- 
ance of your resignation. Let me beg you to recon- 
sider this matter. Under ordinary circumstances a due 
sense of one's own dignity, as well as care for profes- 
sional character and official rights, would demand such 
a course as yours ; but the character of this war, the 
great energy exhibited by the Government of the United 
States, the danger in which our very existence as an in- 
dependent people lies, requires sacrifices from us all who 
have been educated as soldiers. I receive my informa- 
tion of the order of which you have cause to complain 
from your letter. Is not that as great an official wrong 
to me as the order itself to you ? Let us dispassionately 
reason with the Government on this subject of com- 
mand, and if we fail to influence its practice, then ask to 
be relieved from positions the authority of which is ex- 
ercised by the War Department while the responsibilities 
are left to us. I have taken the liberty to detain your 
letter to make this appeal to your patriotism, not merely 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. iqi 

from warm feelings of personal regard, but from the 
official opinion which makes me regard you as necessary 
to the service of the country in your present position." 

The result of this letter, re-enforced by the entreaties 
of Governor Letcher, was, that the services of Jackson 
were saved to the Confederacy. 

While the army was in winter quarters Johnston 
found it frequently necessary to remonstrate with the 
War Department on the subject of interference in its 
internal administration. Secretary Benjamin did not 
scruple to grant furloughs direct from Richmond on 
the most lavish scale ; and the first information which 
the commander would receive of such action would be 
their arrival in the mail. In addition, authority was 
granted to almost any applicant to raise companies of 
other arms out of the infantry, usually with the result 
of turning veteran Infantry into raw artillerymen. The 
effect of such intermeddling on the discipline and num- 
bers of the army may well be imagined. Johnston pro- 
tested repeatedly against these practices, and pointed 
out their inevitable result. 

The Department even ordered him to send to Rich- 
mond six thousand muskets reported as not in use. 
They belonged to the men who were absent on account 
of sickness, and of course could not be obtained to put 
in their hands on their recovery. The forces in the De- 
partment, so far from being increased, suffered a dimi- 
nution, partly from the above causes and partly by 
detachments. As late as February the total effective 
strength of the Department was only 47,617, as against 
62,112 at the end of 1861. During January the Depart- 
ment also lost the services of Beauregard and Van Dorn, 
who were transferred to the West. 

This period is notable for the effort made by John- 
ston, under the sanction of the Confederate Government, 



102 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

to arrange a cartel of exchange. Such a proposition 
was made to McClellan on February 2d, but was not 
noticed. 

During the first part of 1862 the state of the roads 
rendered military operations utterly impracticable, and 
enabled the weak Southern army to hold its ground at 
Centreville in the near front of McClellan's mighty 
Torce. But it was thoroughly realized by the Southern 
commander that this could not continue, after the fine 
weather of spring should restore mobility to the masses 
now floundering in the mud, and firmness to the high- 
ways which they were to follow. The opposing gen- 
erals, therefore, were now revolving in their minds their 
best course for the coming campaign. In view of the 
large odds against them, and the fact that they were 
resisting invasion, the Confederate plan necessarily de- 
pended largely upon the schemes in contemplation by 
the enemy. It was important to divine these schemes 
as nearly as possible, and to so place the defending 
army as to be in position to meet an advance from any 
quarter. Johnston had no intention of remaining at 
Centreville until his foe, protected by the trend of the 
Potomac, and rich in facilities for water transportation, 
should steal a march on him, as he himself had done on 
Patterson, and disembark far south of his right flank, 
in a position to interpose between him and Richmond. 
His suppositions were as follows : 

"We had to regard four routes to Richmond as prac- 
ticable for the Federal army : that chosen in the pre- 
vious July; another, east of the Potomac to the mouth 
of Potomac Creek, and thence by Fredericksburg ; the 
third and fourth by water, the one to the lower Rappa- 
hannock, the other to Fort Monroe ; and from those 
points respectively by direct roads. As the Confederate 
troops in Virginia were distributed, it seemed to me that 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 103 

invasion by the second route would be the most difficult 
to meet ; for, as the march in Maryland would be cov- 
ered by the Potomac, the Federal general might hope to 
conceal it from us until the passage of the river was 
begun, and so place himself at least two days' march 
nearer to Richmond than the Army of Northern Virginia 
on Bull Run. I did not doubt, therefore, that this route 
would be taken by General McClellan. The opinion 
was first suggested by the location of a division of the 
United States army on it opposite to Dumfries."* 

It is now important to ascertain how nearly these 
surmises were correct. McClellan, from the time of his 
assumption of command, had not been reposing on a 
bed of roses. The Federal rulers and people had borne 
with restlessness the loss of the fall season. Their ad- 
miration for him, born of his successes in West Virginia, 
had enabled him to draw thus largely on their faith ; 
but they had now become sated with his reviews and 
parades, and looked with impatience to the time when 
this holiday soldiering would give way to the stern 
realities of war. President Lincoln was specially eager to 
inaugurate a forward movement on the earliest day pos- 
sible, and many were the interviews between McClellan 
and himself as to its practicability and the best line by 
which it should be conducted. Lincoln favored an ad- 
vance straight on Centreville, and so by the overland 
route to Richmond. But this was not at all to McClel- 
lan's taste. With that propensity to exaggerate the dif- 
ficulties in his way, which was a promment trait, he had 
come to the conclusion that the numbers opposed to 
him were equal to his own. Proposing to make the 
active army which he was to take with him on an ad- 
vance number from 110,000 to 140,000 men, he esti- 

* Johnston's Narrative, pp. loi, 102. 



104 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

mated the Confederate strength at 115,500. He was 
"by no means certain" that he could beat the Confed- 
erates at Centreville, and it was his aim to adopt some 
plan by which he could land his army near Richmond 
a*nd transfer to that vicinity the theatre of the war. 
The plan upon which he at last settled as the most 
promising was a move by water to Urbana, on the lower 
Rappahannock, and thence by a rapid march to West 
Point, at the head of York River, whence he could oper- 
ate against Richmond, his hope being to throw himself 
in this manner between Richmond and the Southern 
army at Centreville. Lincoln, whose impatience had 
become extreme, on January 31st issued a special order 
directing all the disposable force of the Federal Army 
of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense 
of Washington, to move forward, in order to seize and 
occupy a point on the railroad southwestward of Manas- 
sas Junction, and fixing the following 22d of February 
as the day for the commencement of the expedition, 
as also for a general advance of all the armies of the 
United States. Thereupon McClellan, after first secur- 
ing a suspension of this order, submitted in writing his 
views to the President in favor of a movement by the 
lower Chesapeake to Urbana. After many conferences 
the President agreed to McClellan's plan, but annexed 
the condition among others that a sufficient force should 
be left to render Washington entirely secure. His nerv- 
ousness for the safety of Washington was the main rea- 
son for his personal preference for the overland route, 
and was so great that the Confederates were able during 
the war, on more than one occasion, to relieve the press- 
ure on Richmond by menaces against the capital. 

This consent of the President to the adoption of Mc- 
Clellan's plan was not given till the 8th of March, and 
did not require its execution to commence till the i8th, 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



lOS 



thus granting an extension of near a month on the en- 
gagement to advance. And thus at last the Federal 
general had his own way, and was at liberty to move 
upon Urbana and cut Johnston off at Centreville. 

The latter was alive to the possibility of such an 
event, and had intended from the outset to evacuate 
Centreville as soon as the condition of the roads would 
permit. On February 20th he had attended a council of 
war in Richmond, at which it had been resolved to with- 
draw as soon as feasible, and he had at once inaugurated 
the removal of stores of all sorts by rail as fast as 
the poor service of Confederate railways rendered it 
possible. In this task he was much impeded by the 
action of the Commissary Department, which had per- 
sisted against his expressed wishes in accumulating an 
unnecessary amount of provisions at Manassas, and had 
even established a large meat-curing plant at Thorough- 
fare Gap and filled it with meat cured or in process of 
curing. Such activity just after the battle of Manassas, 
when want of supplies was a potent factor in preventing 
an advance, would have been commendable. But it was 
always a feast or a famine with the commissary general, 
though it seemed to be his idea that the famine should 
occur just after a victory had paved the way for an ad- 
vance ; and the feast, just at the moment when the 
growing strength of the enemy rendered it obvious that 
a retrograde movement was a mere question of time. 
The plan of locating a large meat-curing establishment 
in time of war so near the hostile frontier, instead of se- 
lecting the interior of the country, was certainly unique. 
This had been done without consulting Johnston, and 
indeed without his knowledge ; and its necessary con- 
sequence was the loss of large quantities of the meat 
there collected — a consequence unavoidable, unless it 
is a principle of war that an army is organized to pro- 



I06 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

tect commissary stores, and should make such object 
the prime aim of its strategy ; and not that commissary 
stores are for the benefit of the army. 

In addition to the measures taken to remove the 
stores, which had commenced promptly after the deci- 
sion to retire farther south had been reached, orders 
had been given to fortify the line of the Rappahannock, 
and a stock of provisions had been collected at Culpep- 
er Court House for the supply of the army when occu- 
pying that line. Everything being ready, the movement 
commenced on the 7th of Mapch, and the last troops left 
Centreville on the 9th. In the march Smith's and Long- 
street's divisions followed the \Aj^rrenton turnpike, and 
Ewell's and Early's the railroad and the road by Brents- 
ville. Whiting, with his brigades and those of Hampton 
and Wigfall, moved to Fredericksburg ; and D. H. Hill 
was ordered to withdraw the troops commanded by him 
(formerly Evans's) to the south bank of the Rappahan- 
nock. In two days the army was in its new position, 
Ewell and Early being on each side of the railroad, and 
Smith and Longstreet at Culpeper Court House. This 
was the first occupation of this line, subsequently a 
favorite one with the Confederates. Near its banks 
were fought the greatest battles of the war, as waged in 
Virginia. 

This movement, successfully consummated just at 
the time when McClellan, after great difficulty, had ob- 
tained the consent of his constitutional superiors to the 
Urbana project, over which he had so long been incu- 
bating, was in results equivalent to a victory. It placed 
the Confederate army in a position from which it could 
easily meet an advance by Centreville or Fredericks- 
burg, while it was also sufficiently near Richmond to 
throw itself in front of an invader approaching by Ur- 
bana or the Peninsula. In other words, it effectually 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 



107 



frustrated the Urbana move ; or, to adopt McClellan's 
mild way of expressing the same idea : " The Urbana 
movement lost much of its promise, as the enemy was 
now in position to reach Richmond before we could 
do so."* 

The line of the Rappahannock had been occupied 
under the conjecture that the Federal advance would 
most probably be by Fredericksburg, the second route 
enumerated by Johnston. But the inactivity of the Fed- 
eral division opposite Dumfries satisfied him that the 

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii, p. 167. The effect 
of this move upon McClellan's plans is well described by the Comte de 
Paris, in his article commencing at page 112 of the same volume. On 
page 121 he says : 

" At the very moment when all seemed ready for the realization of 
his grand design, two unforeseen circumstances arose to thwart the cal- 
culations of McClellan. The first was the sudden evacuation of Ma- 
nassas by the Confederates. I do not believe that this could be attrib- 
uted to indiscretions following the councils of war at Washington. I 
prefer rather to ascribe it to the military sagacity of the great soldier 
who then commanded the Army of Northern Virginia. His positions 
at Manassas were protected only by the snow and ice, which paralyzed 
the Federals. With the opening of the season he would be obliged to 
withdraw behind the Rappahannock. This movement brought the 
Southern army nearer to Richmond, at the same time placing it on the 
Urbana route, thus making a landing there impossible for us, and per- 
mitting Lee to anticipate McClellan on the Virginia Peninsula." 

The Comte is right in attributing this move to the sagacity of the 
Southern commander. General McClellan claimed, in his testimony 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the Confederate 
withdrawal had been caused by secret intelligence of the order issued 
by President Lincoln on March 8th. The fact is that the withdrawal 
had been determined on at the council held February 20th, that 
the removal of stores had commenced at once, and that the march of 
the troops themselves began on March 7th, the day before the Presi- 
dent's order. It was dictated, not by the untrustworthy reports of 
spies, but by that power of divination of an adversary's plans which is 
the chief trait of a great general. 



I08 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

real purpose was to select one of the routes by the low- 
er Chesapeake ; and therefore, about a week after the 
march from Centreville, the army was withdrawn be- 
hind the Rapidan to the neighborhood of Orange Court 
House, except Ewell's division, which, with Stuart's 
cavalry, was left in observation near the Rappahan- 
nock, and in easier position to unite with Jackson in the 
Valley, if expedient. This manoeuvre gave a still better 
situation from which to protect Richmond and meet an 
invasion from the Peninsula. 

What were McClellan's movements to be now ? 
With his favorite scheme thwarted, what was to be 
done *' which would give the out-generaled army a 
chance to gain either reputation or increase of spirit ? ''* 

The first thing which occurred to McClellan was to 
go out and "shut the stable door after the horse had 
gone." On receiving information of the Confederate 
retreat, he at once assembled his troops and marched 
them out on a grand excursion to Manassas. He did 
not have any definite military object in view in making 
this march. According to his official report, its object 
was to enable " the troops to gain some experience on 
the march and bivouac preparatory to the campaign, and 
to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other ijupcdi- 
nienta which accumulates so easily around an army en- 
camped for a long time in one locality." 

Not having had time, since the previous July, to 
practice his troops in marching, he started out on this 
important military movement, gave his troops a look at 
the Confederate intrenchments, allowed them to examine 
the Quaker guns which peered out formidably from the 
embrasures, and then, like the King of France on a simi- 
lar occasion, marched back again. 

* Webb's Peninsula : McClellan's Campaign of 1S62, p. 27. 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 109 

While at Fairfax Court House, on this picnic, a coun- 
cil of war assembled to take into consideration the next 
best plan of campaign, now that the first had been prac- 
tically disposed of by the Confederate withdrawal. It 
was composed of the corps commanders Sumner, Heint- 
zelman, Keyes, and McDowell. 

McClellan, in his communication to the Secretary of 
War advocating the Urbana scheme as against the over- 
land route, had said : " Should circumstances render it 
not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mobjack 
Bay ; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take 
Fort Monroe as a base and operate with complete se- 
curity, although with less celerity and brilliancy of 
results, up the Peninsula." 

Driven from his Urbana project, and unalterably op- 
posed to the overland line, he submitted to this council 
the proposition of a campaign up the Peninsula from 
Fort Monroe, forced to this dertiier ressort at the very 
outset by the strategy of his opponent, though he had 
only contemplated it in the first instance "the worst 
coming to the worst." The council recommended its 
adoption upon certain conditions, the principal of which 
were that a naval force should co-operate, and that 
Washington be made perfectly safe, three of them nam- 
ing a force of twenty-five thousand men as a sufficient 
protection, the other (Sumner) naming forty thousand. 
This plan was submitted to President Lincoln, who ap- 
proved it, with a reiteration of the condition as to Wash- 
ington, at the same time evincing his chagrin at the un- 
interrupted retreat of Johnston and the long inaction of 
McClellan, by adding : " Move the remainder of the force 
down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress 
Monroe, or anywhere between here and there ; or, at all 
events, move such remainder of the army at once in pur- 
suit of the enemy by some route." 



no GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Thus it was settled that the line by which the South- 
ern capital was to be approached was by that portion of 
Virginia lying between the James and York Rivers, and 
known as the Peninsula — a territory already historic as 
having witnessed the heated discussions which gave rise 
to the American Revolution, and the final triumph of 
the patriot cause. 

During these operations Jackson was in the Valley 
district recruiting his little force, and in correspondence 
with Johnston, who impressed on him the importance of 
so manoeuvring as not to permit the communications 
between the two to be interrupted, indicating that the 
general plan soon to be brilliantly executed by Jackson, 
of so operating in the Valley as to cause the largest pos- 
sible force of the enemy to be assembled there, and then 
for Jackson to elude them and take part in the crisis of 
the campaign at Richmond, was in Johnston's mind from 
the outset. As early as January 28th he had written 
from Centreville to Jackson : '' The enemy might not 
only prevent your concentrating, but interpose himself 
between us, which we must never permit." 

His letter of May 17th to Jackson and Ewell also 
indicates that the Valley operations should have in view 
the prevention of a junction of the different Federal 
forces there, and that all troops who were not " employ- 
ing a greatly superior force of the enemy" should be 
gathered at Richmond.* 

It may indeed be safely asserted that, though the 
matchless execution of this famous campaign is due to 
Jackson alone, Johnston, his chief, may justly claim some 
of its glories — at least that of its conception. In pursu- 

* This is also evident from Jackson's letter of June 6th to John- 
ston, in which he outlines a certain line of march, " should my com- 
mand be required at Richmond." 



ON GUARD IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA. m 

ance of this design, Jackson determined to attack Shields 
at Kernstown, in order to prevent detachments to Mc- 
Clellan. With a force three thousand strong he attacked 
Shields's command of seven thousand on March 26th, but 
was repulsed with a loss of seven hundred and eighteen, 
the Federal loss being five hundred and ninety. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

YORKTOWN. 

The Peninsula is that portion of Virginia lying be- 
tween the James and York Rivers, Fortress Monroe 
being at its eastern extremity. From the fort to Rich- 
mond the distance is a little less than one hundred miles. 
The width of the Peninsula varies greatly, its narrowest 
point being just east of Williamsburg, where it is about 
seven miles. A prominent feature is its abundance of 
swamps, which make up from the rivers on either side, 
or from the creeks or estuaries emptying into them. 
These swamps are practically impassable, except at oc- 
casional points, where corduroyed roads or embank- 
ments of earth for mill ponds form a crossing. The 
region is so level that such an embankment will make 
a mill pond miles in length, while every cove or hollow 
that drains into it will become a swamp more difficult 
of passage than the pond itself, as it is at once too 
soft for the pedestrian and too solid for the boatman. 
Streams of small volume, but with marshes of great ex- 
tent on either side, take their rise and flow into one or 
the other of these rivers. The ebb and flow of the tide 
make these tributaries for long distances above their 
mouth quite deep and extensive, while the swamps and 
ponds nearer their heads are equally difficult of passage. 
This region, therefore, is very defensible, provided the 
defenders have command of the rivers and are equipped 
with artillery of sufficient caliber and range to cope with 



YORKTOWN. 



113 



the artillery of the invading force. Without this the 
Peninsula is a mere trap ; for the invader, having ob- 
tained command of the rivers, can by means of trans- 
ports land far in rear of the defending army and easily 
cut it off. This danger is enhanced by the fact that 
without a co-operating naval force it is difficult to com- 
mand the rivers by guns on shore. The channel of the 
York is nearest its northern bank, the only point where 
it approaches the southern side being at Yorktown itself, 
where the river is less than a mile in width, and is com- 
manded by guns on the bluff at Yorktown, supported by 
batteries at Gloucester Point, directly opposite on the 
northern bank. As long as these could hold their own, 
the control of the York, at least as against the passage 
of transports, would be complete. 

The control of the James by shore batteries was 
more problematical. This river is very wide, and there 
is no commanding point on it to correspond to York- 
town. The nearest approach to such a requisite was 
Mulberry Point, or possibly Jamestown Island ; but 
even at those points the channel was too wide to be 
closed by such guns as were then possessed by the Con- 
federates, and there was no Gloucester Point on the 
other side to cross its fire with Mulberry Point or James- 
town in defending the water way. The Confederate re- 
liance for the defense of the James was the ironclad 
Virginia (or Merrimac, as she is termed by Northern 
writers), which had just electrified the world by her ex- 
ploits in Hampton Roads. Formidable as she was, her 
great draught confined her to a narrow channel and to a 
few hours of flood tide each day; and the imperfections 
of her machinery rendered her movements snail-like and 
cumbrous. 

Assuming that she could be trusted with the defense 
of the Confederate right against a turning movement by 



114 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the James, the critical point was evidently Yorktown. 
As long as the navigation of the York was sealed there, 
an army of sufficient strength could not be driven from 
the Peninsula, even by greatly superior forces. As soon 
as it fell, the defending army would necessarily fall back 
or be cut off by enemies debarking far in its rear, be- 
tween it and Richmond ; and this would necessarily 
compel the evacuation of Norfolk, as a body landing 
on the south of the James w^ould be in position to 
isolate and capture any troops who might attempt to 
hold it. It would involve also the destruction of the 
Virginia, as her draught was too great for her to ascend 
the James any considerable distance. This latter fact, 
however, was not known till the time for action came, it 
being supposed that she could be lightened. 

The Peninsula had been held by the Confederates 
with a small force from the outbreak of hostilities. The 
first action of any moment in the struggle had taken 
place at Bethel, in its eastern portion, and had resulted 
in the repulse of the Federals under Butler by the Con- 
federates under Magruder. The latter was still in com- 
mand of the little army stationed there. He had im- 
proved the time which the inaction of the previous year 
had given him by intelligently mastering the details of 
the topography, and by strengthening as far as possible 
with his slender means the natural features of his lines 
of defense. That line which he preferred extended from 
Young's to Harwood's Mills, with fortifications on the 
two rivers to protect the flanks. He estimated, how- 
ever, that it would require at least twenty thousand 
men to hold this line, and, as he had nothing like that 
number, he decided to make his stand behind Warwick 
River. This stream rises not far from Yorktown, and 
flows across the Peninsula into the James east of Mul- 
berry Island. By making dams along its course, and 



YORKTOWN. 1 1 5 

fortifications along the space intervening between its 
head and Yorktown, it was greatly strengthened. At 
the beginning of April his force was only eleven thou- 
sand men, which left him but five thousand with which to 
hold this line, since garrisons were necessary at Glouces- 
ter Point, Mulberry Island, and Yorktown. He also 
had a third line farther up the Peninsula near Williams- 
burg, which will come into prominence in the next 
chapter 

After the abandonment of the Urbana scheme and 
the decision in favor of the Peninsula route, the Federal 
authorities, with marvelous energy, collected their trans- 
ports and shipped their mammoth host to Fort Monroe. 
This occupied the latter part of March and the first few 
days of April. By the 7th, McClellan had under his com- 
mand on the Peninsula an army of over one hundred 
thousand men.* 

* Wool's letter to Stanton, Official War Records, vol. xi, pt. 3, p. 
76. This tallies well with the return of his strength for April 13th 
(p. 97 of the same volume), which shows the force present for duty to 
be 100,970, and this is evidently exclusive of Franklin, whose strength 
was 11,392 ; and the return of April 30th, which includes his division, 
shows 112,392. In addition to this, Wool's command, over 12,000 
strong, was practically part of his army ; for, in the language of Wool 
himself, it " occupied the stations abandoned by the rebels as the gen- 
eral advanced, thereby protecting his left flank and rear" (p. 66 of the 
same volume) ; or, in the language of President Lincoln in his letter to 
McClellan of April 9th, " It is doing for you precisely what a like num- 
ber of your own would have to do if that command was away." 

McClellan was always better at counting his foes than his own 
army. In spite of the official returns given above, he stated then, 
and has reiterated the statement frequently since the war, that his 
strength was 85,000 ; and even this he figures down to 68,000 by de- 
ducting camp, depot and train guards, escorts and noncombatants, as 
if this were a deduction specially peculiar to him. No wonder that 
President Lincoln, who had kept account of the troops as shipped and 
found them to amount to 108,000, should have said in the same letter, 
9 



Il6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Of this number, fifty-eight thousand men and one 
hundred guns were ready to move on April 3d, adopting 
the figures of McClellan's official report, which was ex- 
clusive of the troops on hand for whom transportation 
had not yet been provided. With these he determined 
to push on up the Peninsula at once, and commenced 
his march on the morning of the 4th, his army moving 
in two columns, of which one was directed to the right 
upon Yorktown by Howard's Bridge and Cockletown, 
and the other by Young's Mill and in the direction of 
Lee's Mill. They made some progress that day, and 
the next morning the Yorktown column was ordered to 
continue its march to a point about three miles from 
Yorktown, while Keyes, in command of the other column, 
was ordered to march to the Halfway House, on the 
Yorktown and Williamsburg road, midway between the 
two places, and to hold the ridge at that point, thus 
hemming in the garrison. The Yorktown column ar- 
rived at its destination without serious opposition ; but 
rather too large a task had been assigned to Keyes. His 
column, after a journey of a few miles, reached Lee's 
Mill, and there found itself confronted with the alter- 
native of halting or of making an assault upon the for- 
midable works which there barred their w^ay. The former 
was chosen, and thus McClellan found himself stopped 
by the Confederate line and its resolute defenders. 

Until this forward movement of McClellan, the Con- 
federate Government was in the dark as to his inten- 
tions. The published correspondence of Lee with Ma- 
gruder and Huger shows that the Government was un- 
decided whether Richmond or Norfolk was the Federal 

" There is a curious mystery about your figures." Not understanding 
how there could be much opportunity for desertion in coming down 
the Bay, and having heard of no foundering of so large a body, he natu- 
rally was inquisitive as to the other 23,000. 



YORKTOWN. 



117 



objective. But this put the matter at rest, and brought 
about the decision to re-enforce Magruder with the 
Army of Northern Virginia. In anticipation of this, all 
practicable arrangements had been made to transfer the 
divisions of that army to join Magruder, and by the 5th 
four of them were already on the way. Ewell was left 
on the Rappahannock, with instructions to obey Jack- 
son, and a small force was left in front of Fredericks- 
burg. By the loth the remainder of the army was either 
with Magruder or on the march to join him. Johnston 
repaired to Richmond for conference, and by an order 
of the 1 2th his department was enlarged so as to include 
the old departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula, thus 
placing him in comrriand of the expected theatre of op- 
erations. 

Before assuming command, he went to Yorktown and 
made a thorough examination of the position and of its 
means of defense. The quantity of the Federal artillery 
and its very superior range were well known to the Con- 
federates, and he at once penetrated McClellan's design. 
He saw that the fall of Yorktown was but a question of 
time, and that he could make no successful resistance ; 
for McClellan, with his rifled pieces placed in easy range 
for them but beyond the reach of the Southern smooth- 
bores, could batter their defenses and slaughter their 
defenders with perfect impunity to himself, after which 
he could turn the army defending the Peninsula, if it at- 
tempted to make a stand, by pushing a force up York 
River. Johnston at once returned to Richmond and 
had an interview with -the Confederate President, in 
which he recommended that a large army be formed, by 
drawing all available forces from Norfolk and the South 
and concentrating them in front of Richmond, to be 
joined by Magruder's troops and that part of the Army 
of Northern Virginia which had not then reached the 



IlS GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Peninsula ; the army so formed to fall on McClellan as 
soon as he reached the vicinity of Richmond in his pur- 
suit of Magruder, in which event he would probably be 
defeated, and, being so far from his base, he might be 
destroyed. The President called a council of war to 
consider the matter, at which, in addition to himself 
and Johnston, Secretary Randolph and Generals Lee, 
G. W. Smith, and Longstreet were present. The plan 
was opposed by Secretary Randolph because it involved 
the abandonment of Norfolk and the navy yard, and by 
Lee because he feared that to take any troops in con- 
siderable numbers from the Southern States would result 
in the capture of their important seaports. To these 
objections Johnston replied that the destruction of Mc- 
Clellan would be so "decisive in its consequences as to 
insure the prompt recovery of everything abandoned to 
win it, thus illustrating his settled views of the policy of 
concentration for great results, even at the risk of some 
points. After a lengthy conference, lasting, with a brief 
interval, far into the night, the President decided against 
Johnston's plan and in favor of defending the Penin- 
sula. The course of subsequent events, the necessary 
evacuation of Yorktown, and the fact that such a con- 
centration was forced on the Confederacy, but not till 
McClellan had arranged a safe refuge for his army when 
beaten, are the best vindication of the plan. His trouble 
was that he was too far-sighted. Had the Executive 
done for him what he recommended at the time he urged 
it, instead of putting it off till driven to it, the Seven 
Days might have been unnecessary, and the change of 
base impracticable. 

Johnston, confident that his plan would soon be a 
necessity, acquiesced in the decision and repaired to 
Yorktown, where he assumed command, firmly resolved 
not to expose his men to the terrific fire of artillery 



YORKTOWN. 



119 



which was being prepared for them. He issued an 
order placing Magruder in charge of the right, Long- 
street of the center, D. H. Hill of the left, including 
Yorktown, and G. W. Smith of the reserve. This order 
was issued on the iSth. The army had been gradually 
arriving until it was ail on hand, and, adopting its figures 
of April 30th, was about fifty-five thousand strong. 

When the Federal army first felt the Confederate 
lines it was on April 5th, at which time they were manned 
by only eleven thousand men, including the garrisons. 
Magruder presented a dauntless front, and skirmishing 
ensued along their entire extent ; but McClellan, instead 
of picking out the weakest point and carrying it by a 
rush, which he could easily have done with his numbers, 
resorted to siege operations. The only semblance of an 
assault was made on April i6th, at a point near the cen- 
ter of the Confederate position opposite Dam No. i. On 
that day General W. F. Smith advanced with Brooks's 
Vermont brigade, well supported by artillery, and pushed 
a part across the stream for the purpose of making a 
lodgment. The assailants attempted to seize the rifle 
pits occupied by the Fifteenth North Carolina, who hap- 
pened at the time to be a few hundred yards in the rear 
fortifying their camp. This regiment, supported by two 
Georgia regiments and a portion of the Second Louisiana, 
soon recovered the lost ground and drove the Federals 
back. Later in the day Smith advanced again with three 
regiments, but the Confederates were now on their guard 
and quickly repulsed this second attempt. The Federal 
loss in the action was one hundred and sixty-five, and 
that of the Confederates seventy-five.* 

* McClellan could not have intended this as an attempt to break 
through, judging from the instructions to General Smith, as set out in 
the report of the latter. In it Smith says : " The moment I found re- 



120 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Johnston, on the 20th, again advised the Government 
of the weakness of Yorktown, and on the 22d repeated 
his suggestion to concentrate a large army near Rich- 
mond and fight McClellan before McDowell, whose ad- 
vance was daily expected, should join him. Meanwhile 
McClellan was erecting his batteries, out of range of the 
Yorktown guns, and the Confederates could see them 
growing daily under their eyes without the power to 
prevent or interrupt their erection. By the 27th they 
were so far advanced that it was evidently a question 
of a few days only, and Johnston wrote to Lee stating 
that his guns would soon be dismounted and York River 
open to the enemy, and that it would then be necessary 
to evacuate Norfolk and transfer the troops there to 
Richmond. On the 29th he again wrote, saying : 
'' Should the attack on Yorktown be made earnestly, 
we can not prevent its fall, nor can it hold out more 
than a few hours. We must abandon the Peninsula 
soon. . . . Should the enemy approach Richmond in 
this manner, I apprehend we should have there concen- 
trated the largest force you can collect." 

By the 3d of May it was evident that McClellan's 

sistance serious and the numbers opposed great, I acted in obedience 
to the warning instructions of the general in chief, and withdrew the 
troops from under fire." 

McClellan telegraphed to Stanton after this affair : " Smith has 
gained an important position, which will, I hope, enable us to control 
a passage of the Warwick. I am re-enforcing the position, and will 
to-night erect batteries which will give us full control." To which 
Stanton exultantly replied : " Good for the first lick. Hurrah for 
Smith and the one-gun battery. Let us have Yorktown with Magru- 
dcr and his gang before the ist of May, and the job will be over." 

The job was not over quite so soon. The Federal army did not 
cross the Warwick at that point the next morning and resume its 
march to Richmond, with " Magruder and his gang " following in 
chains. 



YORKTOWN. 121 

batteries were ready to open. Three days before, one of 
them, near the Moore house, had been completed, and 
had shown by experiment that it was in easy range. 
He flattered himself with the expectation of pouring on 
Yorktown such a fire as had never been known in war- 
fare. But he made the mistake of assuming that his 
enemy would remain quiescent till the toils were spread. 
Johnston, who had only looked on the tenure of York- 
town as a means of gaining time, rightly judging that 
the batteries were about to open, withdrew in the night, 
indefinitely postponing McClellan's pyrotechnics. Noth- 
ing of consequence was left except the heavy guns. 
Their abandonment was a necessity, as they could not 
be transported up the Peninsula. Their capture was a 
poor solace to McClellan for his disappointment at being 
cheated out of a scientific bombardment, and to Stanton 
at the failure to catch " Magruder and his gang." 

Information of the evacuation was sent to Huger at 
Norfolk, and he was ordered to march to Richmond. 
This was successfully accomplished, and as much of the 
valuable property at the navy yard was removed as pos- 
sible. 

The evacuation of Norfolk sounded the knell of the 
Virginia. After the withdrawal from Norfolk she had 
no base from which to obtain fuel and ammunition. Her 
commander had been led by the pilots to suppose that she 
could be taken up James River by lightening her draught, 
which was twenty-three feet. On this supposition he 
threw .overboard the pig iron which was her ballast, 
until, by thus raising her, the wooden hull where it was 
unprotected by her armor arose out of the water. There- 
upon the pilots stated that on account of the low water, 
due to the westerly winds, she could not be taken above 
Jamestown flats. But she was now an unarmored ves- 
sel, and up to that point the river banks were in posses- 



122 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

sion of the enemy. Her crew was therefore marched to 
Richmond, and the ship which had revolutionized the 
navies of the world and guarded the James River avenue 
to the Southern capital was committed to the flames 
near Crany Island. Thus the Confederacy was deprived 
of its *' iron diadem." 



CHAPTER IX. 

WILLIAMSBURG. 

The withdrawal from Yorktown opened the York to 
McClellan as an avenue of approach to Richmond, for 
there was no other point above it where batteries on the 
southern shore could command the river. It was im- 
portant that the army should move up the Peninsula as 
rapidly as possible, since there was danger that the 
Northern commander might endeavor, by means of 
transports, to interpose his army between the Confeder- 
ates and Richmond. This was, in fact, McClellan's in- 
tention. To further it he had kept Franklin's division 
on transports for the purpose of celerity in moving it, 
and when he occupied Yorktown he himself remained 
there to expedite this operation, which he regarded as 
of the first importance, intrusting the pursuit by land to 
his lieutenants. The dreadful state of the roads ren- 
dered his plan easier of execution, as it retarded the 
overland retreat of the Southern army, while it did not 
affect the Federal journey by water. It was, on this ac- 
count, against the interest of the Southern commander 
to allo,w himself to be delayed in his retreat by demon- 
strations ; and it was not his intention to be drawn into 
an engagement of magnitude unless it became necessary 
to gain time for the onward progress of the trains. 

The breaking up of camp incident to the discovery 
of the retreat and the preparations for pursuit gave the 
Confederates a start of several hours, so that it was not 



124 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

until the evening of May 4th that the pursuers came in 
sight. This was at Fort Magruder, which was about a 
mile east of Williamsburg, and formed part of Ma- 
gruder's third line of defense. At this point the Pen- 
insula narrows greatly, and the firm land is still further 
contracted by two creeks which make up from the rivers 
— namely. Queen's or Capital Creek from the York, and 
Archer's Hope or College Creek from the James. From 
Queen's Creek lateral swamps or ravines extend toward 
the center of the Peninsula, the lower part of these 
ravines being so marshy as to be impassable, and the 
upper part being grown up so thickly with timber and 
undergrowth as to be almost as great an obstacle as a 
swamp. One of these ravines is the course of Cub Dam 
Creek, which runs from Queen's Creek almost to the 
Yorktown road, at a point just east of Fort Magruder. 
West of this is a table-land extending from the creek 
immediately to Fort Magruder, and west of this table- 
land is another ravine making up from Queen's Creek 
and heavily grown up with brush. The fort itself is sit- 
uated very near the junction of the road from York- 
town and that from Warwick Court House, which here 
come together, making a single road up the Peninsula. 
It completely commands this junction. To the right of 
the fort was a redoubt which commanded the narrow 
strip of land between the fort and the head of Tutter's 
Neck, a large pond which gives source to one of the 
branches of Halfway Creek, a tributary of College 
Creek. At the lower end of this pond the road from 
Allen's wharf on the James River and from King's Mill 
crosses this stream on a dam-head, and this crossing 
was defended by a strong redoubt. Except at this 
point the stream can not be crossed. This road, unlike 
the road from the table-land on the left, joins the main 
road at least half a mile in rear of the fort. 



WILLIAMSBURG. I25 

This description shows how admirably Fort Ma- 
gruder was located to resist an advancing army. The 
fort itself commanded any approach by the left, unless 
the advancing force, after crossing the plateau in sight 
of the fort, had taken to an unexplored and difficult 
jungle. To the right the redoubts prevented any flank- 
ing movement. If McClellan could have been induced 
to agree to use the overland route alone and throw away 
the advantage of his shipping, no better spot for arrest- 
ing his progress could have been found. 

The Confederate army was concentrated at AVilliams- 
burg about midday of the 4th. That evening it moved 
on, with Magruder's division in the lead, followed by 
G. W. Smith. Next to these came the trains, and Long- 
street's and D. H. Hill's divisions were to follow. Thus it 
was prepared to protect its trains, either from a column 
thrown forward between the advance and Richmond, 
or from an enemy in pursuit. In the afternoon Stone- 
man's cavalry was reported as approachmg, where- 
upon Johnston ordered McLaws to reoccupy the fort 
and redoubts and to resist any eager pressure from the 
enemy. He at once proceeded to execute the order, 
taking with him Semmes's and Kershaw's brigades, and 
reoccupied the fort and the redoubts on each side. 
Skirmishing ensued, and continued for the balance of 
the day. At first the only force engaged was Stoneman 
on the Federal side, but by evening Hooker's and 
Smith's divisions had come up and taken position in 
front,, with the woods intervening between the com- 
batants. It was too late to attempt anything that day, 
so that, after a fruitless endeavor of Smith to advance, 
the troops went into bivouac. That night the command 
of McLaws moved on, and was replaced by Longstreet's 
division. 

On the morning of the 5th the battle began. It was 



126 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

opened by an attack from the impatient Hooker, who 
was opposite the fort and the redoubts on its right. He 
advanced Grover's brigade, with Webber's and Bram- 
hall's batteries. The Confederates, who were acting 
simply as a rear guard and were not desirous of bring- 
ing on an unnecessary engagement, stood during the 
first part of the day strictly on the defensive. The 
attack by Hooker was not sufficiently positive to in- 
dicate more than a mere intention to delay the retreat ; 
so that Johnston, under this idea, had ridden forward to 
join the main body. This left Longstreet in command, 
who, finding that the progress of the trains was so slow 
as to put his withdrawal out of the question for the 
day, resolved about midday to assume the offensive. 
He ordered Anderson, with the brigades of Wilcox and 
A. P. Hill, to attack. The order was executed and the 
enemy driven back. Here the main battle raged between 
Hooker and Longstreet, but Hooker was re-enforced 
about one o'clock by Kearney and by Peck's brigade of 
Couch's division, which did not prevent him from losing 
his artillery, though from want of horses the Confederates 
could only bring off five pieces. Later in the day this 
part of the Federal line was re-enforced by the Second 
Rhode Island and Seventh Massachusetts of Devens's 
brigade, the Ninety-second and Ninety-third New York 
of Palmer, and the Eighty-fifth, One Hundred and First, 
and One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania of Keim. 
But these re-enforcements did not alter the aspect of 
that portion of the battle, nor prevent the Confederates 
from holding their ground, with the prisoners and 
cannon captured and brought off. This accomplished 
the object for which the battle was fought, by giving 
the trains a day's start, so that nothing remained to the 
Confederates but to withdraw under cover of darkness 
and rejoin their trains. 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



127 



The delight at the very positive success which was 
achieved on the right was, however, marred by a re- 
verse on the left, which, though it had no consequences 
beyond an increase in the Confederate loss, was on that 
account saddening. Cub Dam Creek contained in its 
course a large mill pond known as Saunders's Pond. 
There was a crossing over this pond which was a mere 
path, and which came out opposite a redoubt placed to 
command it about a mile and a half from the fort. This 
redoubt was situated on the plateau which stretched 
from the fort between the two ravines northward to 
Queen's Creek. The road or path which crossed the pond 
at this point came into the main road within a few yards 
of the fort, and was commanded by its guns. No road 
led from that redoubt into Williamsburg far in rear of 
the fort, as some writers have asserted. While a body 
of troops unopposed might have worked their way 
through the ravine and undergrowth and come out on 
another table-land which would have led them to the 
road in rear of the fort, it would have been a hazardous 
undertaking in a strange country without intelligent 
guides, and, unless it was a strong column, might have 
resulted in its destruction, as retreat through such a 
jungle would have been more difficult than advance. 
Hence the only effect of the occupation of this redoubt 
by a hostile force was to give an enfilading though 
distant fire on the fort. Such a force could easily be 
held in check, or, if they evinced any eagerness to 
advance through the woods in a flanking movement, 
might have been met with an attack as they emerged in 
disorder. While it might perhaps have been prudent to 
occupy that redoubt in case the line had been held by an 
army, it would have been unnecessary and perilous in a 
weak rear guard to endeavor to hold it. A force there 
might have been cut off in case the line had been broken 



128 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

nearer the fort, as its only retreat was through the 
thicket. Probably for this reason the redoubt was not 
occupied by Longstreet when he distributed his men for 
the battle. He needed all his available troops to meet 
the Federals at the point where the main fighting took 
place, and he could not afford to scatter them 

While Hooker was hammering away at the Con- 
federate right, Sumner, who commanded in McClellan's 
absence, and who was at Whittaker's house on the 
Yorktown road with the main Federal army, was in- 
formed that this redoubt which commanded the cross- 
ing was not occupied. He sent a reconnoitering party, 
and as early as ten o'clock in the morning received a 
report from them that it was empty of defenders. He 
thereupon sent Hancock, with his brigade and one regi- 
ment of Davidson's, to occupy it, which was done by 
twelve o'clock. Hancock also advanced to seize an- 
other redoubt nearer to the fort, but, not receiving the 
re-enforcements which he had asked, and seeing that it 
was manned (by Bratten's regiment), he withdrew to the 
first redoubt, whence he opened an artillery fire on the 
fort. This demonstration caused Longstreet to ask 
that the division of D. H. Hill be sent back to re- 
enforce him, which was done by Johnston, he himself 
riding back to the field at the same time. These troops 
were directed to Longstreet's left, so as to hold in check 
the threatened movement of Hancock. This object 
was really accomplished by merely taking position, as 
Hancock had already been there for hours without 
advancing or doing any other damage, and it was then 
too late for him to accomplish anything even if he had 
advanced. But Early, who was not of a nature to be a 
mere spectator while others were fighting, coveted Han- 
cock's fine battery, and sent to Longstreet asking per- 
mission to attempt its capture, which was given. Early 



WILLIAMSBURG. 1 29 

and Hill at once formed a line of four regiments, con- 
sisting of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, Thirty-eighth 
Virginia, Twenty-third North Carolina, and Fifth North 
Carolina, and moved through the woods to attack the 
battery. Not knowing exactly where it was, the Twenty- 
fourth Virginia, or extreme left, came out opposite to it, 
instead of the center, and advanced upon it so closely 
that it and its infantry support fell back to the redoubt. 
The two center regiments did not emerge from the woods, 
but the Fifth North Carolina gallantly moved forward 
to the support of the Virginians, and secured a position 
equally near the enemy. Not being supported by the 
other regiments, they could make no impression on the 
six regiments of Hancock, and. Early having been 
severely wounded, they were ordered by Hill to with- 
draw, which they did, though with great loss. Thus 
the only result of this unnecessary attack was to cause 
a grievous sacrifice of life and to reflect undying fame 
upon the two regiments who had so gallantly attacked 
triple numbers. Hancock made no attempt to follow 
up his success or to get into the rear of the Confeder- 
ates. Night found the latter in possession of the main 
battlefield, captors of five pieces of artillery, eight flags, 
and four hundred prisoners. According to Longstreet's 
report, the total Confederate loss was fifteen hundred 
and sixty. The Federal loss as given in the official 
reports was twenty-two hundred and thirty-nine. The 
numbers engaged on the Confederate side amounted to 
about nine thousand, consisting of the brigades of 
Anderson, Wilcox, A. P. Hill, Pickett, Colston, Early, 
and a small portion of Pryor. Counting the seven hun- 
dred men of the latter as one regiment, and including 
only the two regiments of Early which were engaged, 
this made twenty-two regiments. On the Federal side 
were Hooker's division, five regiments of Kearney's di- 



130 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

vision, Peck's brigade and a part of Devens's, of Couch's 
division, Hancock and one regiment of Davidson, of 
Smith's division, two of Palmer's regiments, and three 
of Keim's, of Casey's division, or thirty-six regiments in 
all. This excludes all troops not actually engaged. On 
the Federal side there were in easy reach the divisions 
of Couch, Casey, and Richardson, and the portions of 
the other divisions that had not been engaged. On the 
Confederate side there was the balance of D. H. Hill's 
division. 

Heintzelman in his report stated that Hooker car- 
ried nine thousand men of his division into action, and 
Hancock in his report states that the strength of his 
command was twenty-five hundred and forty-seven. A 
like proportion for the five regiments of Kearney, the 
seven of Couch, and the five of Casey would make their 
total numbers at least twenty thousand, which is proba- 
bly an underestimate. Late that night the Confederates 
withdrew from their breastworks, unmolested and un- 
pursued. 

McClellan did not hesitate to claim Williamsburg as 
a victory, just as he had claimed a"n important success 
at Dam No. i. It was not a general action, but a mere 
affair of the rear guard, intended to check pursuit; and 
this object was accomplished. The Confederates were 
not driven from a single position, but, on the contrary, 
assumed the offensive, at times held possession of all of 
Hooker's artillery, being only prevented from bringing 
it off by want of horses, and actually bringing off five 
pieces. They did not lose a single piece of artillery in 
the action. In addition to this, they captured a large 
number of prisoners, losing few themselves, unless the 
wounded who were left in Williamsburg from want of 
ambulances are counted. The poverty of the Southern 
equipment was the cause of their loss. With the ex- 



WILLIAMSBURG. I3I 

ception of the attack on Hancock, the fighting was all 
in favor of the Confederates. That reverse had no 
effect beyond the increase in the butcher's bill. It left 
Hancock exactly where he was before he was assaulted, 
in a position where he could not have advanced without 
marching right by the fort, or scrambling through a 
thicket, to emerge in disorder at a point where the un- 
engaged brigades of Hill, burning to avenge the defeat 
of their comrades, might have overwhelmed him. 

The failure to occupy and hold this redoubt which 
Hancock seized has been made the subject of criticism 
by some writers on this engagement. If the battle had 
been intended as a general action, the criticism would be 
just. If a fair one, it would fall primarily on Long- 
street, who placed the troops in position, and was in 
command until late in the evening and until long after 
Hancock had taken the redoubt. But it is not a just 
criticism, for the reason that the engagement was not 
general. Johnston was aware of the fact that Mc- 
Clellan was hurrying troops up York River. It was not 
his policy to allow the remainder of McClellan's army to 
detain and amuse him while this attempt to intercept 
him by water was in progress. As McClellan was at 
Yorktown superintending this water movement which 
he regarded as the most important, so Johnston was in 
the van expediting the march of his army to meet it. 
He did not intend to fight at Williamsburg until he was 
forced into it, and when forced into it he only de- 
tained a^ much of his army as was necessary. He was 
using a mere rear guard, and to have spread it out over 
a line intended for an army would have made it too 
weak at all points. His force was properly held well in 
hand at the fort, which was the decisive point, and the 
mistake, if any, was in attacking Hancock at all. When 
he was attacked it was late in the evening, and he could 
10 



132 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

do no damage. The Confederate evacuation was not 
caused by his possession of this fortification, for they 
held their position for twelve hours after he secured 
this supposed vantage ground, and they finally retreated, 
not because he was there, but because they had no rea- 
son for remaining longer. If not a Federal soldier had 
crossed Saunders's Pond, the Confederates would have 
done the same thing. To speak of this as the key to 
the battlefield, is to show an ignorance of the ground 
and to overlook the lesson of the actual occurrences. 

This was, in fact, not the really weak flank of the 
Southern line. If the Northern generals had been ac- 
quainted with the ground and had had competent 
guides, they would have attempted to turn the Confed- 
erate right. By moving from the Warwick road, along 
the road to Allen's wharf, until they reached the road 
leading from that wharf to Williamsburg, and forcing 
a passage at Tutter's Neck, they could either have fol- 
lowed that road to its junction with the Yorktown road, 
a good half mile to the rear of the fort, or they could 
have turned still farther west and come into the main 
road by way of the lunatic asylum, near the center of 
the town, with the result of completely cutting off the 
defenders of the fort. Such a manoeuvre would have 
been entirely masked by woods, and, if undertaken with 
a sufficiently strong force, much more decisive in re- 
sults than an attempt to flank the Confederate left. 
Emery, in fact, was sent in this direction, but with a 
force which he did not regard as sufficiently strong, and 
the official reports would seem to indicate that he was 
ignorant of the course of this road and not aware of its 
importance. According to Heintzelman's report, Averill 
at one time of the day had possession of the redoubt 
commanding the crossing at Tutter's Neck, and Emery 
had three thousand men under him. Such a demon- 



WILLIAMSBURG. I33 

stration would have compelled the immediate evacua- 
tion of the fort, though such was the spirit of the South- 
ern troops, and so well in hand were they, that it is not 
probable that either it or Hancock's demonstration 
would have done more. 

However much McClellan's admirers may strive to 
swell his meager list of victories by adding Williamsburg 
to the number, it is not so classed by the fairest of the 
Northern writers. Swinton, in his Army of the Poto- 
mac, speaks of it as " very unfortunate " ; and Webb, in 
his admirable monograph on the Peninsular Campaign, 
says that " the battle was fought by piecemeal, and 
ended in disappointment." No pursuit was ordered, 
and the retreat up the Peninsula was leisurely and un- 
interrupted. It was Franklin's move upon Eltham, not 
McClellan's on Williamsburg, which made retreat neces- 
sary.* 

While this action was in progress the remainder of 
the army was pursuing its course up the Peninsula, with 
Magruder's division in the lead. By night it had reached 
Diascund Bridge, and the division of G. W. Smith, the 
next behind, had reached Barhamsville. The day after 

* The reader, in following the Peninsular campaign, will derive 
much assistance from the map in vol. ii, p. 188, of the Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War. It indicates very well the situation on the 
Confederate right, but is inaccurate in representing Hancock as on a 
road passing Queen's Creek and leading into Williamsburg. There 
was no such road. Queen's Creek is marshy and impassable, with the 
tide ebbing and flowing in it, to a point due north of Williamsburg. 
Nor docs the map show the woods and ravines. The author is per- 
sonally well acquainted with the battlefield of Williamsburg, having 
in his youth been a student of William and Mary College, and having 
frequently hunted over it. No one, who has not had a similar experi- 
ence, can appreciate the obstacles which are offered by the woods and 
marshes. The former are almost impenetrable, and even a dog can 
not cross the latter, much less a man. 



1^4 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the battle the men of Hill and Longstreet marched 
twelve miles west from Williamsburg, which apparently 
indicated no very hot pursuit. They encamped at 
Burnt Ordinary, the commander in chief being with 
these troops. The next day they also marched to Bar- 
hamsville, which had the effect of uniting the army. 
The object of this was to be prepared for the flanking 
movement of Franklin, who, during these operations, 
had reached West Point with his division, and had de- 
barked at Eltham's Landing on the south bank, ready 
to move across and to create havoc among the trains. 
The duty of holding him in check until they had passed 
was intrusted to G. W. Smith. Taking Hood's brigade, 
together with the Hampton Legion and the Nineteenth 
Georgia of Hampton's brigade. Whiting, who was in 
immediate charge, moved upon the enemy and fell upon 
him, with the result of causing him to seek the shelter of 
his gunboats. The brunt of the fight fell on Hood's 
brigade. Later in the day Anderson's Tennessee bri- 
gade was so placed as to support the Texans. The 
Confederate loss was forty-eight, while the Federal loss 
was one hundred and eighty-six. In this affair the 
Southern troops engaged were the brigades of Hood 
and Anderson and a part of Hampton's brigade ; while 
the Federals had the brigades of Newton, Taylor, Dana, 
and Slocum, in addition to their strong artillery force 
and their gunboats. The result of the fight was that 
the Southern army pursued its way without further in- 
terruption from Franklin's flanking movement. It re- 
sumed the march with Smith and Magruder following 
the road by New Kent Court House, and Longstreet 
and D. H. Hill taking the road by the Long Bridge. 
When the two former divisions reached the Baltimore 
Cross-roads and the two latter the Long Bridge, they 
halted and took position to resist any further hostile 



WILLIAMSBURG. 



135 



advance, for the Southern army now possessed, in the 
York River Railroad, the means of supplying its wants; 
and it was at length so placed that it could not be 
turned by way of the York. 

Meanwhile events on the James showed that the 
army must be in position to protect Richmond against a 
menace from that direction. The evacuation of Nor- 
folk had been quickly followed by its surrender to 
Wool, who took possession on the nth of May, which 
resulted in the destruction of the Virginia, whereupon 
the Federal naval officers sent the Galena, Monitor, 
Naugatuck, Port Royal, and Aroostook up James River, 
which at that time had not been strongly fortified. 
They came as far as Drury's Bluff, where they encoun- 
tered obstructions in the river, and were repulsed by 
artillery supported by riflemen, who, from their com- 
manding position, could fire almost doAvn upon the ves- 
sels. In this action the Galena showed special gal- 
lantry on the Northern side, and suffered most. This 
demonstration was far around the Confederate right at 
Long Bridge, and proved the necessity of guarding any 
approach by the James. Johnston thereupon ordered the 
army to cross the Chickahominy and to take a position 
nearer Richmond, so selected as to enable it to meet a 
hostile approach, whether by the James or the York. By 
the 17th this position had been occupied, Longstreet be- 
ing on the right and covering the river road — that is, the 
road nearest the James; Hill in the center, covering the 
Williamsburg road ; and Magruder on the left, covering 
the Nine Miles road, with Smith in reserve. Here it 
awaited the approach of its adversary. These manoeu- 
vres show that thus early in the campaign Johnston had 
divined McClellan's scheme of a possible change of 
base, and was prepared to meet him on either line. 



CHAPTER X. 

SEVEN PINES. 

The near approach of the adversaries showed a great 
battle to be now imminent. Johnston, already confront- 
ing the double numbers of McClellan, and threatened 
from the direction of Fredericksburg by McDowell with 
an army of nearly forty thousand men, and by other 
large bodies in the Valley converging on Jackson's 
weak force, incessantly urged on the Confederate Gov- 
ernment the necessity of a concentration of all avail- 
able troops at Richmond, as the decisive theatre of the 
struggle. In this he was zealously and ably supported 
by Lee ; but the near advent of McClellan was, after all, 
the most potent argument, and the Government, at 
length awaking to the necessity, gave orders in all di- 
rections to hurry forward re-enforcements from other 
parts of the South. This was but carrying out at last 
the views of Johnston, expressed on his first trip to the 
Peninsula, with the difference that their tardy action 
gave McClellan time to intrench and arrange for his 
change of base, thus causing the final attack upon him 
to have the result of merely repulsing instead of crush- 
ing him. Only a portion of the re-enforcements arrived 
in time for the battle. The major portion re-enforced 
the army under Lee, not the army under Johnston. At 
tliis time the strength of the latter (according to his 
memorandum of May 21, 1862) was 53,688 effectives, in 
addition to which Huger's division of seven thousand 



SEVEN PINES. 



m 



men joined from Norfolk. Anderson's division, about 
ten thousand strong, which was watching McDowell, and 
Branch's brigade, about five thousand strong, which was 
at Gordonsville, were also under his orders. McClellan's 
strength (according to his report of May 20, 1862) was 
102,236. The most threatening of the other forces 
operating against Richmond was McDowell, upon whom 
McClellan had constantly reckoned, and who hung like 
a cloud upon the Southern left, necessitating a large 
detachment from their meager array to observe him. 
Apparently arranging his movements in concert with 
the Federal forces in the Valley, it looked as if Rich- 
mond was doomed to fall, if not by the hand of McClel- 
lan, then under the attack of a body scarcely less numer- 
ous than his army, to be made up of these various auxil- 
iary forces. Johnston, alive to this danger, had deter- 
mined to attack, even with his inferior numbers, at the 
first opportunity, so as to settle the campaign before the 
arrival of McDowell. 

But it was from the scene of these collateral opera- 
tions that the first good fortune of the Southern cause 
was to come. It was Jackson who was, by his genius 
in executing the design for which Johnston had first sent 
him to the Valley, to derange the plans of McClellan, 
and neutralize the various armies of Banks, Shields, 
Milroy, and McDowell. 

It is not within the purview of this biography to de- 
scribe the wonderful Valley campaign by which Jack- 
son accomplished this result. Though he was still a 
department commander under Johnston and subject to 
his orders, the distance which separated them was such 
as to render possible only the most general suggestions; 
and such was the confidence of the superior in his sub- 
ordinate that even these were rarely given. The mas- 
terly way in which Jackson attacked Milroy at Mc- 



138 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Dovvell, sending him off on a double-quick, and Banks at 
Winchester, hurling him across the Potomac at a speed 
well illustrating the law of accelerated motion, and 
causing terror in Washington itself; the manner in 
which he interposed himself between Shields and Fre- 
mont, defeating each in sight of the other, and drawing 
toward him in a bootless chase the main body of Mc- 
Dowell's corps, must be told by his biographer, if any 
other account of that immortal campaign is needed. 
When the head of McDowell's column turned to the 
west instead of the south, the commander of the Con- 
federate army at Richmond could breathe more freely, 
and think that his able lieutenant had relieved him of 
half his work. 

But before this result was fully known, the opposing 
leaders were planning, the one to prevent and the other 
to insure the junction of McDowell with the Army of 
the Potomac. McClellan, to facilitate it and clear the 
way for McDowell, gradually extended his right, and 
at length sent Porter with a mixed force (stated by 
Webb, in his Peninsula, to have been twelve thousand 
strong) in the direction of Hanover Court House. The 
brigade of Branch had been brought down to this vicin- 
ity from Gordonsville by the Confederates. Its strength 
was five thousand — not twelve thousand, as stated by 
Webb. Porter attacked this force, and after a severe 
fight drove it back in disorder, inflicting a loss of nearly 
three hundred men, though losing three hundred and 
fifty-five himself. Immediately after this affair the force 
of Anderson was brought up and united to this brigade, 
forming a new division, under the command of the 
knightly A. P. Hill, who had just received his richly 
earned promotion to the grade of major general. 

The next few days passed with nothing but armed 
reconnoissances to vary their monotony. These re- 



SEVEN PINES. 



139 



suited on the part of the Federals in the establishment 
of the corps of Keyes and Heintzelman on the right 
bank of the Chickahominy, in a position near Seven 
Pines and to the west of it, while the remainder of the 
Federal army was on the other side. Johnston did not 
seriously contest the advance of these corps to this 
point, for he had decided upon the plan of falling upon 
them and crushing them at the first opportunity, and he 
wished them to place as wide an interval as possible 
between themselves and their companions across the 
stream. At this point the Federals were within five 
miles of Richmond — almost near enough to enable Mc- 
Clellan to carry out Lincoln's desire to "throw shells 
into the city."* 

While the Federal chief was, in his dispatches to his 
Government, representing his foe as possessed of fabu- 
lous strength, far outnumbering his army, and was daily 
begging re-enforcements, on the plea that he would 
have a great battle to fight, his recently published let- 
ters to his wife would seem to indicate that he was not 
anticipating an attack. Thus, on May 23d, he writes : 

"The intentions of the enemy are still doubtful. I 
go on prepared to fight a hard battle, but I confess that 
the indications are not now that he will fight. Unless 
he has some deep-laid scheme that I do not fathom, he 
is giving up great advantages in not opposing me on 
the line of the Chickahominy." And again on the 27th: 
" We are getting on splendidly. I am quietly clearing 
out everything that could threaten my rear and com- 
munications, providing against the contingency of dis- 
aster, and so arranging as to make my whole force 
available in the approaching battle. The only fear is 
that Joe's heart may fail him." 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 368. 



140 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Evidently he had not penetrated Johnston's design 
of using the Chickahominy, not as a wet ditch in front 
of his own position, but as an ally in insuring the de- 
struction of the two corps which had crossed it, and 
which would have to withdraw over it in case of dis- 
aster ; in pursuance of which Johnston, so far from op- 
posing their advance, was enticing them on. If he 
thought that *' Joe's heart would fail him," he was 
quickly undeceived. Johnston had expected to fight 
at this juncture from the very outset of the campaign, 
and from the time of the Federal advance by Bottom's 
Bridge he had formed the purpose of assailing the 
troops who might cross and place themselves in a posi- 
tion sufficiently isolated. From this he was only diverted 
for a time by news of McDowell's advance, on account 
of which he at one time entertained the thought of 
attacking the Federal right, and made his dispositions 
for the manoeuvre, but on information from Stuart that 
McDowell had retrograded, he reverted to his original 
plan and awaited the advance of Heintzelman and 
Keyes. 

On the 30th of May he sent out military reconnois- 
sances under D. H. Hill — one on the Charles City road 
under Rodes, and one on the Williamsburg road under 
Garland. The former discovered no foe, but Garland 
found pickets about two miles west of Seven Pines 
which were strong enough to indicate the presence of a 
large force. On this information Johnston determined 
to attack the next morning. His general plan was a 
concentration of the bulk of his army against Keyes 
and Heintzelman. Leaving six brigades to watch the 
Chickahominy from Meadow Bridge down to New 
Bridge, he collected the others in positions for attack. 
D. H. Hill was to lead the advance along the Williams- 
burg road with his division ; Huger, with his division, 



SEVEN PINES. 



141 



was to move by the Charles City road and turn the 
Federal left ; and Longstreet's division was to support 
Hill. Longstreet, as ranking officer, had command of 
the entire force on that side. G. W. Smith's division 
was to move to the junction of the New Bridge and 
Nine-Mile roads and to keep the remainder of the Fed- 
eral army off Longstreet, if it attempted to take a hand, 
and, if not, to attack the Federal right. The Federal 
corps were in positions peculiarly favorable for assault. 
Casey's division of Keyes was about a mile west of 
Seven Pines, with a picket line half a mile still farther 
west ; Couch's division of the same corps extended 
from Seven Pines to Fair Oaks station, being thus sepa- 
rated from Casey by an interval of a mile. Kearney's 
division of Heintzelman was near Savage's station, and 
Hooker's division of the same corps was still farther 
east, nearer the river, and so placed as to guard a cross- 
ing of White Oak swamp. During the night an ex- 
tremely heavy rain-storm came up, converting the 
streams into torrents. While its effect was necessarily 
to impede the advance of the Confederates, it rendered 
their success more probable by swelling the river and 
increasing the difficulty of communication between the 
two fractions of the Northern army. This dangerous 
arrangement of his forces so that two fifths might be 
crushed by a united foe could only have been made by 
McClellan on the theory that ** Joe's heart would fail 
him." Johnston determined to accompany the division 
of G. ,W. Smith, as he would thus be better enabled to 
detect the approach of re-enforcements across the river, 
and to handle the army so as to head them off. He 
left the management of the main attack to Longstreet, 
confident that he would be able to defeat the enemy at 
Seven Pines and vicinity when formed with intervals just 
too far for effective support, and just close enough for 



142 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the contagion of a panic in the first division to spread 
to the next. 

Vexatious delays in the arrival of the troops at the 
stations assigned them occurred when the movement 
commenced. Huger did not make the attack on the 
Federal left, and it was not until more than half the 
day had passed that Longstreet decided to begin the 
affray without waitinjj for him any longer. About one 
o'clock he moved to a direct front attack with Hill's 
division along the Williamsburg road, Rodes's brigade 
being on the right of the road, supported by Rains, and 
Garland on the left, supported by G. B. Anderson. Wet 
weather had made the roads and country so soft that 
the Confederates brought but few pieces of artillery into 
action, and in this respect were greatly overmatched. 
The first enemy encountered was Casey's picket line, 
which he had re-enforced with a regiment almost as the 
combat opened. These were soon swept away, and his 
main line, partly protected by intrenchments, was en- 
countered. Here the resistance was more obstinate, for 
this division, though maligned by McClellan in his offi- 
cial report, held its ground with tenacity, and only 
yielded when attacked in front by Garland, Anderson, 
and Rodes, and threatened in flank by Rains. This, 
with the gallant handling of Carter's and Bondurant's 
batteries, started them on the run, and resulted in the 
capture of their artillery, which was turned upon them 
to quicken their speed. By this time Couch had sent 
from his line as many re-enforcements as he thought he 
could spare, and vigorous efforts were made to recap- 
ture their position, but without success. In this contest 
Hill's division, re-enforced by R. H. Anderson's brigade 
from Longstreet, successively met and defeated Casey's, 
Couch's, and Kearney's divisions, and drove them back, 
until at nightfall they were in their third line of defense 



SEVEN PINES. 



143 



near Savage's station. A portion of Couch's division 
retired in a northerly direction, being cut off from this 
third line by the advance of the Confederates across the 
Nine-Mile road. Another portion of the Federals re- 
treated toward White Oak swamp. Thus the only 
troops employed by Longstreet in this operation were 
the four brigades of Hill and one of Itas own. By night- 
fall he had at hand his other four brigades and Huger's 
division, all of whom were fresh. 

Meanwhile Johnston, from his position with Smith's 
division, which was under the immediate command of 
Whiting, had been awaiting impatiently the sounds of bat- 
tle. It was not until late in the evening that a staff offi- 
cer sent to ascertain the cause of the delay returned and 
informed him that he was not hearing merely an artillery 
duel, but that Longstreet was engaged and driving the 
enemy. As his scouts and pickets reported no advance 
of re-enforcements across the river, he decided, about 
four o'clock, to attack the right flank of Longstreet's 
enemies, regardless of any re-enforcements that might 
approach. Holding Magruder's division in reserve, he 
moved along the Nine-Mile road with this object in view. 
The leading troops soon became engaged, Johnston sup- 
posing that merely a small body of a few regiments whose 
camps he had just seen were opposing him. With this 
idea he ordered Hood's brigade to move to the support 
of Longstreet, reasoning that the remainder of Smith's 
division would be able to take care of this force. It 
was, however, no small brigade that he was attacking, 
but Sumner's corps, which had crossed and formed a 
junction with the part of Couch's division that had re- 
tired in this direction. Sumner, at the outbreak of the 
battle, had been lying, with his corps of two divisions, 
on the left bank of the river, with a bridge opposite 
each one of his divisions. Receiving from McClellan 



144 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

orders to hold himself in readiness to move at a mo- 
ment's notice, and construing the order liberally, like 
the true fighter that he was, he not only placed his men 
under arms, but marched them down to the bridges with 
the heads of his two columns almost on them. Conse- 
quently, when marching orders came, he had nothing to 
delay him in immediately commencing the passage of 
the bridges. This was a difficult and dangerous under- 
taking of itself, for the flood in the river was running 
over them, and they were apparently impassable. But, 
nothing daunted, he made the attempt, and succeeded 
in crossing with his corps, accompanied by Kirby's bat- 
tery. It was Richardson's division and Kirby's battery 
upon whom the Confederates had fallen in the march to 
join Longstreet. Richardson held his ground against 
all attacks until near dark and until Johnston saw that, 
in spite of the success on the right, it would take an- 
other day to complete the work, and issued orders that 
each regiment should sleep in the position it occupied 
at dark, ready to renew the fight on the morrow. Thus 
on the right the Confederates had driven their enemy to 
the field works near the river, and on the left near Fair 
Oaks the fight had been indecisive, each side holding its 
own. About the close of the fight at P^air Oaks, John- 
ston was wounded by a musket shot in the shoulder, 
and almost immediately thereafter was struck on the 
breast by a large fragment of shell with such violence 
as to be unhorsed and to incapacitate him for further 
command. He was borne from the field to the house 
of a friend in Richmond; and thus ended his connection 
with the battle of Seven Pines and the Army of North- 
ern Virgmia. After Johnston's wound thf chief com- 
mand devolved on G. W. Smith, who made no serious 
attempt the next day to follow up the fight of the first 
day. The Federals, re-enforced by the troops which 



SEVEN PINES. 



145 



had not been actually engaged, attacked Pickett's bri- 
gade, but without success ; and the Confederates were 
so unmolested as to be able to pick up from the exten- 
sive field over which the fight had raged sixty-seven 
hundred muskets and large quantities of camp equipage 
and other property. In the fight of the first day they 
had captured and secured ten pieces of artillery. As 
there were no wagons available, these small arms were 
carried away by cavalry on their horses, which indicates 
the leisurely manner in which it was done. The South- 
ern troops withdrew to their camps, not by reason of 
any pressure from the enemy, but because there was 
no reason for remaining longer after the omission of 
G. W. Smith to renew the battle and the collection of 
their trophies. The contemporaneous report of Pickett 
shows the deliberate manner in which they withdrew. 
He says : 

" General Hill gave me special orders to cover the 
withdrawal of the troops with my brigade, which, by the 
way, proved a much easier task than I anticipated. I 
had formed my line of battle — two regiments on each 
side of the road — some little distance in our rear of the 
redoubt. The whole of our force filed past by half an 
hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a 
Yankee in sight, or even a puff of smoke." 

This is corroborated by the statement of General 
Casey. In his testimony before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War he says: "The enemy retained pos- 
session of my works until Monday morning, and then 
evacuated them and retreated. No one drove them out." 

General Johnston always firmly believed that, if he 
had not been wounded, he would have been able on the 
next day to make Seven Pines a decisive victory. On 
his right, but five of the thirteen brigades of Hill, Huger, 
and Longstreet had been engaged, and these had driven 



146 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

three Federal divisions to their third line. On the left, 
but four of the ten brigades of Smith and Magruder had 
been in action. In addition, the Confederates had ad- 
vanced so far under Longstreet that they had separated 
the troops of Sumner from those of Keyesand Heintzel- 
man, so that they were in position to hold the former in 
check and fall upon the latter, or vice versa^ as was 
thought best. Though the Federals on the Confederate 
right had not all been engaged, those who had been in 
action had gotten enough of it. Casey was completely 
used up, and the testimony of Heintzelman before the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War indicates that 
the division of Couch was not to be trusted. He says 
(page 352): 

" That day, after the enemy gave way, I gave orders 
to pursue them. Casey's division was utterly broken up. 
Some of the regiments behaved very gallantly, but after 
they gave way none of them could be rallied ; and 
Couch's division was a little shaky. When Kearney 
found out that I had ordered the troops to advance he 
came to me and begged me to stop. He asked me 
where my supports were, and I pointed to them. He 
asked me if I had full confidence in them. I said ' No.' 
He said I had better let well enough alone." 

An advance against these troops by the fresh bri- 
gades of Johnston would in all probability have been 
successful. That they were not in communication with 
Sumner is shown by the following extract from the 
Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War 
(page 22) : *' There was no communication (on June ist) 
between the forces under General Sumner and those un- 
der General Heintzelman (Hooker's), but each fought as 
he deemed best under the circumstances." 

General Sumner testifies (as to June ist) on page 
363 : " There was fighting on the same day on my left 



SEVEN PINES. 147 

by a portion of General Heintzelman's troops; but that 
was at such a distance that I have myself no knowledge 
of the circumstances. There was no communication at 
that time between us." 

General G. W. Smith, who occupies toward Seven 
Pines the same position which General Beauregard holds 
to Shiloh — being responsible for the failure to reap the 
legitimate fruits of the first day's operations — has in 
various late writings contended that nothing more could 
have been done on the second day if Johnston had been 
in command ; and that the Northern forces were united 
on the morning of June ist, instead of being divided, 
as claimed by Johnston. The above quotations from 
Northern authorities ought to settle this latter question, 
and it needs but little fancy to predict how such an ad- 
vantage would have resulted if properly utilized. General 
Pickett says in his official report, speaking of June ist : 

"About this time I learned that General Pryor's 
brigade was being withdrawn from my right. I had in 
the meantime sent all my staff and couriers back to 
General Hill, the last message being that if he would 
send more troops and some ammunition to me we would 
drive the enemy across the Chickahominy ; and I have 
always believed this would have been done but for the 
misfortune which happened to our general on the pre- 
vious evening. Had he not been wounded and been on 
the field with us, the result would have been entirely dif- 
ferent. I do not mean to cast any blame on the brave 
and heroic Hill, for after the fall of the master spirit 
there seemed to be no head, and Hill, I know, was both- 
ered and amazed with countermanding orders." 

Johnston, in his official report, criticised Huger for 
not making the flank attack on the left. This was based 
on the official report of Longstreet, who was in immedi- 
ate command, and whose report the commander in chief 



148 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

would naturally adopt unless shown to be incorrect. 
Huger, thinking that injustice had been done him, took 
exception to this statement, and the result was a corre- 
spondence which is printed in full in vol. xi, part i, 
page 935 et seq. of the Official War Records. Huger 
contends that if his division did not go into action it was 
because Longstreet, who was in chief command there, 
did not order them forward. Whatever the merits of 
this issue may be as between Huger and Longstreet, the 
orders of Johnston to Huger, published in this corre- 
spondence, show that his wishes were plain enough. 
The first, after designating the route which Huger was 
to take — the Charles City road — concludes : 

" Be ready, if an action should be begun on your left, 
to fall upon the enemy's right flank." 

The second, evidently dictated by the idea that per- 
haps the first had not allowed as much discretion as a 
division commander might expect, simply modified the 
first to the extent of saying that this movement against 
the Federal left should not be undertaken in the face of 
too strong an opposing force. It concluded : 

*' If you find no strong body in your front, it will be 
v/ell to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve 
should be retained to cover our right." 

These orders indicate that it was Johnston's inten- 
tion that Huger should turn the Federal left, taking all 
proper precautions against being turned himself. If it 
was not done, whether Longstreet or Huger was the 
party in fault, Johnston's plan was certainly not car- 
ried out. In this battle the entire Confederate army, 
engaged and unengaged, numbered, according to John- 
ston's estimate, 73,928.* 

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. ii, p. 209. The 
Northern army on the same date numbered 98,008. 



SEVEN PINES. 



149 



The three Federal corps engaged numbered, accord- 
ing to their return of May 31, 1862, 51,543 present for 
duty. The four Confederate divisions engaged were 
those of Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Huger. Ac- 
cording to the return of May 21, 1862, the strength of 
Smith was 10,592, that of Longstreet 13,816, and that 
of D. H. Hill (deducting Crump's brigade and Ward's 
command detached) was 9,474. The strength of Huger, 
according to Johnston's estimate, was about 7,000. 
Hence the combined strength of the Confederate troops 
engaged was 40,882. 

According to the tables in the Official War Records, 
the Confederate loss in the battle was 6,134, and the 
Northern loss was 5,031. But there has always been 
something peculiar about the losses in this battle. Since 
the war the Confederate loss has been constantly grow- 
ing and the Federal loss diminishing. Although the lat- 
ter has now been reduced to 5,031, McClellan originally 
reported it at 5,739. On June 4th he wrote to the 
President : 

" I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in the 
late battle will probably exceed five thousand. I have 
not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might 
have on our own men and the enemy, I request that you 
will regard this information as confidential for a few 
days."* 

On the same day he wrote to the Secretary of War : 

"The losses in the battle of the 31st and ist will 
amount to seven thousand. Regard this as confidential 
for the present." f 

On the other hand, there has been some mystery 
about the Confederate returns of loss. In the original 
report of Longstreet, as made to Johnston, the loss of 

* McClellan's Own Story, p. 386. f Ibid., p. 386. 



150 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the troops under him is stated at about three thousand, 
which was after the report of Dr. Cullen, his surgeon in 
chief, had been filed, for that report is mentioned in 
Longstreet's report. After the original was sent to 
Johnston a summary of the loss seems to have been 
added to the copy retained, it nowhere appears by 
whom. The loss on the left was twelve hundred and 
eighty-three.* 

Even if the Confederate loss was the greater, it was 
not as much greater as in the Seven Days' battles, which 
McClellan alone considers a Northern triumph. The 
contemporaneous telegrams to Sumner, allaying his 
fears of an attack, and the testimony of Heintzelman, 
showing that Sumner, the leader of the relief force, was 
himself calling for aid, do not indicate any very great 
elation. The elation was only manifested when the 
Southern troops had withdrawn to their camps in con- 
sequence of the wounding of the commander, and free 
from pursuit. It is true that General Hooker in his 
report graphically describes a bayonet charge by his 
troops, when " the enemy were thrown into wild confu- 
sion, throwing away their arms, hats, and coats, and 
broke through the forest in the direction of Richmond." 
It is also true that General Sickles in his report claims 
to have picked up Enfield rifles marked "Tower, 1862," 
and muskets marked "Virginia," and other stores. But 
when the reports of these two officers are read, the 
Chancellorsville campaign and their dispatches then ir- 
resistibly rise to the mind. After that great disaster 
Hooker did not hesitate to issue an address to his army 
congratulating it on a victory ; and during the operations 

* On the subject of this alteration of the original report of Long- 
street, see General Johnston's letter, published in vol. iv, p. 42, of the 
Southern Historical Society Papers. 



SEVEN PINES. 151 

he telegraphed to Sedgwick that the Confederates were 
" flying, trying to save their trains," and on that occa- 
sion also it was Sickles who was "among them,"* 

The experience of these officers at Seven Pines no 
more justifies such statements than their exploits at 
Chancellorsville, If Sickles picked up any small arms 
at Seven Pines, they must have been inferior arms ex- 
changed during the fight by the Confederates for the 
better muskets of their foes, and could not have been 
very numerous, for D. H. Hill had already gleaned the 
field. Sickles, at all events, did not pick up ten pieces 
of artillery and four regimental colors. 

The mere loss of men is no indication of the result 
of a battle. The victors may lose the greater number 
and still be entitled to the palm of victory. When Marl- 
borough gained the fight at Malplaquet, capturing the 
French intrenchments, no one denied him the honors of 
success because his loss was greater. Those are the 
victors who capture the field and hold it till they retire 
of their own volition. A defending army is the victor 
when it stops the advance of its foe. After Seven Pines 
McClellan did not once jeopardize Richmond by any 
forward movement. After it few additional troops of 
his ever crossed the Chickahominy. Seven Pines made 
the Seven Days possible. 

Seven Pines and Shiloh may well be considered coun- 
terparts. The one was the first great contest in the 
East, the other in the West. In each a Johnston boldly 
changed to the offensive and moved forward to drive his 
foe back upon a difficult river. In each the Southern 
chief was struck down at the head of his men, and their 
successors failed to follow up the plans of their prede- 
cessors. In each the fighting on both sides was worthy 

* Swinton's Army of the Potomac, p. 284. 



152 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

of veterans, and the losses such as even veterans are not 
supposed to be capable of enduring. In each the result, 
was to restore confidence to the Confederates and to 
convince them of their final triumph, despite the disas- 
ters of Donelson and New Orleans. The young nation, 
buoyant with hope, could again look the world in the 
face, confiding in the prowess of her troops and the gal- 
lantry of generals who led the van and taught their un- 
disciplined soldiery by personal example how to charge, 
and, if need be, how to die. 



CHAPTER XI. 



TENNESSEE. 



When Johnston was struck by the shell, the severity 
of the blow deprived him of consciousness, which did 
not return till he was placed upon a stretcher ; and the 
first thing he observed was that his sword and pistols 
were missing. It was his father's Revolutionary sword, 
which he greatly prized, and he valued the pistols scarce- 
ly less, for they had been a present to him from Colonel 
Colt, their inventor. On his expressing deep regret at 
their loss, several of his soldiers volunteered to hunt 
them up on the field. They were found by Drury L. 
Armistead, one of his couriers, at much personal risk. 
In appreciation of such devotion one of the pistols was 
presented to him. 

The day after his injury Johnston was borne to the 
house of Mr. Crenshaw, on Church Hill, in Richmond, 
followed by the anxious prayers of his army and the 
entire South. His wound was exceptionally painful, the 
fragment of shell having broken several ribs, inducing a 
constant tendency of his lungs to adhere to his side, and 
continually threatening pleurisy. During the exciting 
period of the Seven Days' battles he was within hearing 
of the sound of the conflict, chafing, a second Ivanhoe 
in the besieged castle, at lying like a bedridden monk, 
while the game that gave him freedom or death was 
being played by the hand of others. The many kind 



154 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

messages and visits of his friends and admirers, and the 
cheering news of the advantages each day won by the 
gallant army to whose formation he had devoted so 
much of his wonderful genius for organization, and 
which he hoped in no distant future to lead again to 
victory, enabled him to endure his sufferings with even 
more than the constancy to which previous experiences 
of the same nature had educated him. To friends who 
bore intelligence of re-enforcements which the Govern- 
ment was at length hurrying to Richmond, he expressed 
gratification at being wounded ; for, said he, Lee had 
been enabled to make them do what they would not 
do for him. Only in that providential way did it 
seem possible to carry out the policy of concentra- 
tion which he himself had so often and so strenuously 
urged. 

Among the many kind expressions of concern at his 
wound, the following, couched in the terms of modesty 
which the great leader of the Army of Northern Virginia 
invariably used in underestimating his own talents, was 
specially gratifying : 

" Near Richmond, June 2, 1862. 
" My dear Mrs. Johnston : I am so grieved at the 
general's wound, on his account, yours, and the coun- 
try's. I heard of it on the field, but he was carried from 
it before I could get to him. I called at his quarters on 
my way back to the city at night, afterward sent to the 
Spottswood, but I could hear nothing of him. I was 
very glad yesterday to hear Dr. Gibson's report of him, 
and trust he may only suffer temporary inconvenience. 
You must soon cure him. In the meantime the President 
has thought it necessary that I should take his place. I 
wish I was able, or that his mantle had fallen on an abler 
man. Remember me kindly to him, and tell him he has 



TENNESSEE. 1 55 

my sincere sympathy. Please, when you can, let me 
know how he recovers. 

" Very truly and faithfully yours, 

"R. E. Lee."* 



The convalescence was very gradual. He was not 
able to ride on horseback until November. In a private 
letter written on November 7th he says : " For the past 
week I have been taking regular exercise on horseback. 
My other occupation is blistering myself, to which habit 
hasn't yet reconciled me." 

As soon as he reached this stage of improvement he 
reported again for duty, though scarcely fit for service. 
His natural desire was to be placed again at the head 
of the old army, to which he was greatly attached, and 
where he might carry out his original plans for the pro- 

* The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, by Jefferson 
Davis, quotations from his writings in the Memoir recently published 
by his widow, and indeed all of his productions since the war, have 
abounded in criticisms of General Johnston. Every operation with 
which the latter was connected, from the evacuation of Harper's Ferry 
to the end of the war, is either directly criticised or " damned with 
faint praise." That this unfavorable estimate is due to prejudices aris- 
ing from subsequent differences, and was not the real opinion of the 
President at the time, is manifest from a private letter to his wife writ- 
ten June 23, 1862, and published in vol. ii, p. 314, of her Memoir. In 
it Mr. Davis says: "General J. E. Johnston is steadily and rapidly 
improving. I wish he were able to take the field. Despite the critics, 
who know military affairs by instinct, he is a good soldier, never brags 
of what he did do, and could at this time render most valuable service." 

If he had then thought that Johnston was in fault for not pursuing 
after Manassas, or for abandoning stores in the retreat from Centre- 
ville, or for loss of supplies at Yorktown, or for bad manoeuvring pre- 
vious to and at Seven Pines, or for numerous other matters censured 
in these late productions, he would not have written thus. That con- 
temporaneous letter gives his real private opinion of Johnston, and is 
an effectual reply to his subsequent strictures. 



156 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

tection of his native State from invasion. This he was 
encouraged to expect from the language of Lee's first 
assignment to the command of that arm.y, which was ex- 
pressly spoken of as temporary. Nor did it occur to him 
that the reward of a leader's gallantry for being felled 
by hostile shot at the head of his advancing forces would 
be a deprivation of command. That Lee himself ex- 
pected Johnston's restoration to the command in Vir- 
ginia, and would have been the last man in the South to 
oppose it, or to stand between him and his old army if 
the Government had contemplated such a restoration, is 
evident from the letter of June 2d, given supra, and also 
from the following, written when Johnston had so far 
recovered that it was known he would soon be ready for 
duty : 

" Camp near Culpeper Court House, A^ovember 11, 1862. 

" My dear General : I have regretted so much my 
inability to visit you when in Richmond that I can not 
refrain from expressing it. I wished to see you on many 
accounts ; first, in the hope of satisfying myself of your 
comfort and improvement in health, and next to consult 
with you as to the condition of this army and its opera- 
tions for the winter. I wish you were again able to take 
the field, for I do not think it could be in better hands 
than yours. . . . 

" With high esteem and respect, I remain, dear Gen- 
eral, very truly yours, R. E. Lee." 

But during his retirement the army, v^hose. perso?mel 
had been largely changed by the heavy re-enforcements 
brought up to repair its losses and to swell its numbers, 
had under I^ee emblazoned on its banners the victories 
of the Seven Days and second Manassas, had invaded 
Maryland, held in check its old Peninsular antagonists, 



TENNESSEE. 



157 



and still faced them in northern Virginia; and the senti- 
ment of the country was unfavorable to the change ; but 
from the West and South the universal cry was that the 
Valley of the Mississippi should be defended by Joseph 
E. Johnston. What might have been the historical re- 
sult if he had been retained in Virginia, and if Lee had 
been sent to the West, each sustained by the Govern- 
ment, as Lee was always sustained and as Johnston never 
was, it is idle now to speculate. It does not detract 
from General Lee's great renown to assert that the ca- 
reer of that gallant army under Johnston would not 
have been less brilliant, and that its noble rank and 
file would have followed him as devotedly as it followed 
Lee. It is yet more certain that with Lee in charge of 
the Western armies, supported by the moral power of 
the Government, the inferior men who under Johnston 
were sustained and encouraged in their insubordination 
would have been influenced to do their duty, and the 
disasters which sundered and eventually overthrew the 
Confederacy might have been averted. With Johnston 
in Virginia, there might have been no Gettysburg ; with 
Lee in Mississippi, there might have been no Vicksburg. 

General Johnston was assigned to the Western com- 
mand by Special Order No. 275, dated November 24, 
1862. Its material portions are as follows : 

** General J. E. Johnston, C. S. Army, is hereby as- 
signed to the following geographical command, to wit : 
Commencing w^ith the Blue Ridge range of mountains 
running through the western portion of North Carolina, 
and following the line of said mountains through the 
northern part of Georgia to the railroad south from 
Chattanooga ; thence by that road to West Point, and 
down the west or right bank of the Chattahoochee River 
to the boundary of Alabama and Florida ; following that 
boundary west to the Choctawhatchee River, and down 



158 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

that river to Choctawhatchee Bay (including the waters 
of that bay) to the Gulf of Mexico. 

" General Johnston will, for the purpose of corre- 
spondence and reports, establish his headquarters at 
Chattanooga, or such other place as in his judgment 
will best secure facilities for ready communication with 
the troops within the limits of his command, and will 
repair in person to any part of said command whenever 
his presence may for the time be necessary or desirable." 

A perusal of this order indicates that it was well 
termed a *' geographical command." It did not assign 
him to the leadership of any specific army, but to an 
immense domain, containing different armies with dif- 
ferent objects, his only power being to detach troops 
from one to the other — a useless authority, since each 
was outnumbered by its own foe, and all were too far 
separated to render it practicable to detach thus in time 
to afford mutual succor. Nor could he take command 
of one of these armies without the unpleasantness of 
superseding its immediate commander — an act which 
generosity to his subordinates forbade. The two largest 
of these armies were commanded by Generals Bragg and 
Pemberton, both well-known proteges of the President, 
the former always quarreling with his inferior generals, 
the latter a man who had been raised to the next high- 
est grade in the Confederate service without having 
participated in any signal achievement, and without 
having made any impression at any place to which his 
previous assignments had called him. Johnston's posi- 
tion, in brief, was simply that of a scapegoat, on whom 
the delinquencies of the President's favorites might be 
placed in case of disaster.* 

* That Pemberton had not won the confidence of the people is 
evident from the letter of Hon. James Phelan to Mr. Davis, dated 



TENNESSEE. 



159 



His own opinion of the difficulties of the situation 
was well expressed in a letter to a near relative, written 
at the time, in which he says : " Never was a general in 
a more unsatisfactory position than that assigned to me. 
A sort of supervisory command of three departments, 
each too weak to take care of itself; of course, there- 
fore, they can not help each other, being all pressed or 
threatened by greatly superior numbers. Each depart- 
ment has its peculiar commander. The object of the 
Government was to have some one at hand to unite the 
forces in Mississippi and Tennessee, in whichever might 
be first attacked. To transfer any body of troops of 
useful number would require at least a month ; yet the 
Government seems to have intended to operate in Napo- 
leon's manner without considering the difference be- 
tween the extent of front upon which he manoeuvred 
and the distance from Tullahoma to Vicksburg. Yet 
the President had a lesson in December which should 
have taught something. When Pemberton was falling 

December 9, 1862, and published in vol, xvii, pt. 2, p, 788, of the Offi- 
cial War Records, In it he says : 

" Pemberton has not impressed himself either upon the people or 
the army ; while the flank movement from , Friar's Point, by which 
his retreat was forced, and which, it is declared, might have been pre- 
vented, has dealt a staggering blow upon those who desired to brace 
him with the public confidence." 

He was so conscious of the secret support of the President against 
his superior that he never treated Johnston with the consideration 
which was his due. As late as April, Colonel W. P. Johnston, in his 
written rpport to the President of the result of a tour of inspection, 
says : *' General Johnston wished your attention called to the fact that 
the limits of his department embraced two armies that could not co- 
operate ; and that he receives no intelligence from General Pemberton, 
who ignores his authority, is mortified at his command over him, and 
receives his suggestions with coldness or opposition. The distance 
prevents his giving orders," — Official War Records, vol. xxiii, pt. 2, 
p. 761. 



l6o GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

back in Mississippi, he transferred three brigades to his 
army from Bragg's. They arrived in Mississippi after 
Grant had been compelled to fall back by our cavalry 
operating in his rear. But, while they were on the way, 
Rosecrans attacked Bragg at Murfreesboro. So these 
troops left Tennessee too soon, and reached Mississippi 
too late — a sort of thing that may always happen when 
it is expected that armies a month apart shall re-enforce 
each other on emergencies." 

Johnston had been informed of his proposed assign- 
ment before the actual issue of the order. Being invited 
to a conference with the Secretary of War, Mr. Randolph, 
he proposed that, as the defense of the Mississippi Valley 
was an object common to the Southern armies on both 
sides of the river, they ought to be under the same di- 
rection. The army under Holmes, in Arkansas, was 
represented as very numerous, and then was threatened 
with no foe. He suggested that these troops be trans- 
ferred to the East and joined to those of Pemberton, 
thus forming an army superior to Grant. This junc- 
tion might enable them to destroy the latter, and then, 
uniting with Bragg, in Tennessee, overwhelm Rosecrans. 
The Secretary, in response to this, showed him a letter 
to Holmes, giving these identical orders, and then a 
letter from the President countermanding them. Mr. 
Randolph resigned a few days afterward, and Mr. Seddon 
succeeded him. Receiving the order of assignment on 
the day of its date, Johnston repeated the suggestion 
in the following letter, which thus early in the campaign 
sounded a warning note of the peril to Vicksburg : 

" Sir : I had the honor this afternoon to receive 
Special Orders No. 275, of this date. 

"If I have been correctly informed, the forces which 
it places under my command are greatly inferior in 
number to those of the enemy opposed to them, while 



TENNESSEE. l6i 

in the Trans-Mississippi Department our army is very 
much larger than that of the United States. Our two 
armies on this side of the Mississippi have the further 
disadvantage of being separated by the Tennessee, and 
a Federal army (that of Major-General Grant) larger 
probably than either of them. Under such circum- 
stances it seems to me that our best course would be 
to fall upon Major-General Grant with the troops of 
Lieutenant-Generals Holmes and Pemberton, united for 
the purpose, those of General Bragg co-operating if 
practicable. 

** The defeat of Major-General Grant would enable 
us to hold the Mississippi, and permit Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral Holmes to move into Missouri. As our troops are 
now distributed Vicksburg is in danger." 

This idea of combining the action of the forces in 
the river valley for the attainment of their common ob- 
ject is repeatedly referred to during the winter and 
spring by Johnston ; it resulted in nothing but sugges- 
tions to Holmes, never in positive orders. The Govern- 
ment could not be induced to order any forces across 
the Mississippi, the acme of its strategy being to detach 
troops from Bragg and send them to Pemberton, or vice 
versa, in spite of their distance apart and the impossi- 
bility of acting together. 

Johnston started at once for his new department, but 
on account of the poor management of Southern rail- 
roads he did not reach Chattanooga till December 4th. 
There he found a telegram from General Cooper in- 
forming him that the enemy had begun to move upon 
Pemberton, who was falling back before them, and sug- 
gesting that Bragg should be ordered to re-enforce 
Pemberton. To this he replied that the retrograde of 
Pemberton was daily facilitating a junction with Holmes 
and impeding one with Bragg, the latter being, more- 



l62 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

over, separated from Pemberton by the enemy, and that, 
of the two, Holmes could be more certainly counted upon. 
It would seem very clear that if Grant could not over- 
take Pemberton, Bragg, far behind him, could not. On 
the following day, having reached Bragg's headquarters 
and received information as to forces, position, and plans, 
as to which he was till then ignorant, he again wrote, ad- 
vising that the effect of any large detachment from 
Bragg would be to give up Tennessee and possibly dis- 
organize his army, enabling Rosecrans to move into 
Virginia or to join Grant. 

While at Bragg's headquarters he was called by tele- 
gram to Chattanooga to meet the President, who had 
decided that nothing would set matters straight in the 
West but his own presence. On his consulting Johnston 
as to the expediency of withdrawing troops from the 
Army of Tennessee, the latter repeated his advice 
against it ; but the President, not satisfied with this, pro- 
ceeded to Bragg's headquarters and ordered the detach- 
ment to Mississippi of about nine thousand men, con- 
sisting of Stevenson's division and a part of McCown's. 
Long before that detachment reached its destination the 
movement of Grant, which it was to aid in repelling, had 
come to grief. Van Dorn had reached the Federal rear 
and destroyed all their supplies at Holly Springs, neces- 
sitating an expeditious retreat. 

The President and Johnston proceeded together to 
Mississippi, visiting Jackson and then Vicksburg. After 
an inspection of the fortifications and the delivery of an 
oration or two, the President returned to Richmond, but 
not before Johnston had again, both orally and in writ- 
ing, urged him to unite Holmes and Pemberton, and not 
to weaken Bragg. 

The result of the President's strategy was soon ap- 
parent. It has been seen that the detachment from 



TENNESSEE. 163 

Bragg did not reach Pemberton in time to assist in re- 
pelling Grant. It had taken three weeks to reach Mis- 
sissippi even without its stores and artillery, and by that 
time the need for it had passed. But its departure at 
once brought on a crisis in Tennessee, for Rosecranshad 
no sooner heard of it than he advanced upon Bragg, and 
the result was the battle of Murfreesboro, or Stone 
River. 

This battle was fought on the first two days of the 
year 1863. The Federal strength was about forty-three 
thousand actually engaged, and that of the Confederates 
about thirty-seven thousand. In the outset the latter 
were successful, overwhelming the Federal right and 
capturing many prisoners and trophies. 

On the second day the attempt to follow up the suc- 
cess by the assault of Breckinridge, though splendid in 
its gallantry, was met with equal valor and repulsed with 
heavy loss. The Confederates held their ground all the 
third day, when Bragg, having reason to believe that 
Rosecrans was receiving large- re-enforcements, with- 
drew to Tullahoma. The total Confederate loss, accord- 
ing to the official returns, was 9,865, and the total Fed- 
eral loss 13,249. 

The Confederates captured thirty pieces of artillery, 
losing three of their own in Breckinridge's repulse, and 
many thousand small arms, in addition to large numbers 
of wagons and other military stores. Thus, even with 
their diminished forces, they at least were not defeated. 
Had the troops sent to Mississippi been retained with 
Bragg, as Johnston advised, their presence on the field 
might have insured a decisive victory. The only effect 
of this act of the President in transferring this large 
body from Bragg to Pemberton, despite the remon- 
strances of Johnston, was eventually to swell the num- 
ber of the Vicksburg prisoners. 



164 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

This act of the President in weakening Bragg's army 
when it needed aid, and in strengthening Pemberton's 
when strengthening was unnecessary, was not only in the 
teeth of Johnston's protest, but of Bragg's as well. In 
a letter to Johnston, dated January 11, 1863, and pub- 
lished in volume xx, part 2, pages 492, 493, of the Offi- 
cial War Records, Bragg says, inter alia : 

" The unfortunate withdrawal of my troops when 
they were not absolutely necessary elsewhere has saved 
Rosecrans from destruction. Five thousand fresh troops 
as a reserve on the first day's battle would have finished 
the glorious work. I told the President, Grant's cam- 
paign would be broken up by our cavalry expeditions in 
his rear before Stevenson's command could meet him in 
front; but he was inexorable, and reduced me to the de- 
fensive, or, as he expressed it, * Fight if you can, and fall 
back beyond the Tennessee.* " 

After the battle of Murfreesboro, Bragg, who had 
heard of the feelmg of his subordinates toward him, ad- 
dressed them a circular letter which elicited replies from 
Breckinridge, Hardee, Polk, and Cleburne, all frankly 
and unequivocally telling him that in their judgment 
he had lost the confidence of the army. These letters 
were forwarded to Richmond, and Polk added a private 
letter to the President, advising him to transfer Bragg 
to some other field, which concluded thus: 

" I think, too, that the best thing to be done in sup- 
plying his place would be to give his command to General 
Joseph E. Johnston. He will cure all discontent, and in- 
spire the army with new life and confidence. He is here 
on the spot, and I am sure will be content to take it. If 
General Lee can command the principal army in his de- 
partment in person, there is no reason why General John- 
ston should not. I have therefore, as a general officer 
of this army speaking in behalf of my associates, to ask 



TENNESSEE. 



165 



respectfully that this appointment be made ; and 1 beg 
to be permitted to do this urgently. The state of this 
army demands immediate attention, and its position be- 
fore the enemy, as well as the mind of its troops and 
commanders, could find relief in no way so readily as by 
the appointment of General Joseph E. Johnston." 

On hearing of this discontent Mr. Davis telegraphed 
to Johnston, who was then at Mobile inspecting its de- 
fenses, to proceed to Bragg's headquarters, where he 
would find a letter of explanation. On arrival there he 
found a letter from the President, dated January 22d, 
informing him of this feeling against Bragg, but express- 
ing unabated confidence in that officer, and desiring him 
to decide what the best interests of the service required, 
and say whal was best to be done. Without directly 
ordering or requesting him to assume command, but ap- 
parently intending to throw on Johnston himself the re- 
sponsibility for such a step if taken, the letter concluded 
by reminding him that he had the right under his original 
assignment to direct its operations. 

The President could not have adopted a more effec- 
tual method of preventing Johnston from taking com- 
mand of the Army of Tennessee, and of indefinitely 
securing his favorite's retention. Such a suggestion 
implied that Johnston was capable of removing a com- 
mander from the head of his army in order to make a 
place for himself. It assumed that he would be willing 
to act as a judge, and to render judgment in his own 
favor. It had the further effect of placing Johnston in 
a situation where he would be practically compelled to 
sustain Bragg; for, though every one knew that he was 
above electing himself to the command of an army, and 
that he would never assume it of his own motion, the 
whole country was loudly demanding of the Government 
that he should be assigned to that army; and the ^rmy 



1 66 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

itself desired it. To have reported adversely to Bragg 
would have exposed himself to the charge of indirectly- 
encouraging this feeling, with the hope of rising on the 
ruined reputation of a brother soldier. General John- 
ston was incapable of such a motive. His first letter to 
the President, after having made inquiries as to the con- 
dition and spirits of the troops, commended Bragg for 
his recent operations in generous terms, and concluded: 

"After seeing all the troops I shall write again. I 
respectfully suggest that, should it then appear to you 
necessary to remove General Bragg, no one in this army 
or engaged in this investigation ought to be his suc- 
cessor." 

About a week after this letter, having heard that 
Polk and Hardee had advised the President to place him 
in immediate charge of Bragg's army, he writes again : 

"I have been told by Lieutenant-Generals Polk and 
Hardee that they have advised you to remove General 
Bragg and place me in command of this army. I am 
sure that you will agree with me that the part that I 
have borne in this investigation would render it incon- 
sistent with my personal honor to occupy that position." 

He bestowed nearly a month on this inquiry, and 
concluded it by advising against the removal of Bragg, 
and by crediting to him the fine condition in which he 
found the army. At the time his action in the matter 
was highly appreciated by Bragg, who expressed his 
obligations in grateful terms. In a letter to Colonel B. 
S. Ewell, of General Johnston's staff, written from Tul- 
lahoma on February 27, 1863, Bragg attributed the feel- 
ing against him to a " few disappointed generals," and 
added : " They have failed, mainly owing to the discrimi- 
nation and just conception of your noble chief, who saw 
at a glance the whole bearing." 

After the close of this inquiry into the condition of 



TENNESSEE. 167 

the army and the capacity of its commander, Johnston 
resumed the supervision of his extensive department, 
having failed in the request to be assigned to differ- 
ent duty.* 

The only military operations of note during this period 

* Nothing can better illustrate Johnston's generosity toward his 
subordinates than the following letter written to Davis just after the 
return of the latter from his Mississippi trip to Richmond, in which 
he endeavors to secure an assignment of a different character from that 
under which he was then chafing : 

" You were so beset while in Jackson that I had no opportunity to 
speak to you fully of my military position. 

" The distance between the two theatres of operation, and the dif- 
ferent objects of the two armies in my command, make it impossible 
for me to exercise any general control. I must either take the imme- 
diate direction of one of these armies, thus for a time superseding its 
proper commander — which, I believe, was not intended — or be idle, 
except on the rare occasions when it might be expedient to transfer 
troops from one army to the other. In the first contingency I should 
deprive an officer in whom you have confidence of the command for 
which you have selected him, which I believe was not intended, which 
would produce a discontent that would interfere with the cordial co- 
operation so necessary with probability of corresponding. In the sec- 
ond, I should generally be a distant spectator of the services of my 
comrades — a position which would inevitably disgrace me. I have 
already lost much time from service, and therefore can ill afford to be 
inactive at any time during the remainder of the war. I am anxious to 
earn by labor at least some part of the confidence you and the people 
of Mississippi repose in me. 

" With these views I respectfully and earnestly beg some other posi- 
tion which may give me better opportunity to render such service as I 
may be capable of. 

" Lieutenant-General Pemberton certainly conducted operations at 
Vicksburg with skill and vigor — the enemy was repulsed with four 
times our loss. Prisoners report that F. P. Blair's brigade suffered 
specially. 

" This might be attended with greater injustice— it might give me 
the fruits due to the capacity of the local commanders." 

In a letter to the President, written March 2, 1863, in reply to one 



l68 GExNERAL JOHNSTON. 

were cavalry affairs. The most remarkable of these was 
Wheeler's raid, in February, which played havoc with the 
Federal communications and supplies near Nashville. 
This expedition even surrounded and captured a gun- 
boat, thus surpassing the exploits of the French cavalry 

from the President of February 19, 1863 (the President's letter is pub- 
lished in vol. xxiii, pt. 2, p. 640, O. W. R., but Johnston's reply does 
not seem to be), on the subject of superseding Bragg, he says : 

" I fear that it would be difficult to find a successor to General Bragg 
equal to him in all respects — especially now, when the season for active 
operations is so near that the successor might not be allowed time to 
learn well the theatre of operations before the enemy's attack, and 
therefore regret very much that you thmk that the impaired confidence 
of the superior ofiEicers in his fitness to command makes his removal 
necessary. I can not think that troops who seem so full of spirit, and 
who, their superior officers say, are full of confidence, can much doubt 
the capacity of their general. Besides a strong belief in his capacity, 
the injustice he endures from the country impels me to wish that you 
may find it expedient not to remove General Bragg. Should you do 
so, however, he will confirm the opinion you express of his disinterested 
patriotism. 

" I apprehend from some passages of your letter that I have not 
fully understood my position here. I thought that it was not intended 
that I should assume immediate command at any time of either of the 
three departments ; and having so expressed myself in writing to you 
early in January without being corrected, I was thus confirmed in my 
belief. It seems to me that the exercise of such authority, except in 
rare cases, would operate badly, unless the officer exercising it should 
be greatly superior to those commanding the departments. Those 
officers, having studied and kept up with all the military circumstances, 
would be more competent to command at an important juncture than 
one just arrived. They could not be expected to serve with full zeal or 
interest if liable to be deprived, by my arrival at the last moment, of the 
fruits of long labor. The injustice to the department commanders was 
suggested to me by your objection to the bill creating the office of 
General in Chief, which empowered that officer to take command of 
any of our armies whenever he thought proper. This you thought 
would be unjust to the officer so superseded. The distance between 
these armies is so great, and each so near the enemy, that we can not 



TENNESSEE. 



169 



in capturing the Dutch fleet in 1795 *> ^^^ ^^e French had 
firm ice on which to approach their prey — an advantage 
which was denied to Wheeler. 

On March 9th, while Johnston was at Mobile com- 
pleting the labors which had been interrupted by his 
long sojourn with Bragg's army, he received the follow- 
ing telegram from the Secretary of War : 

" Order General Bragg to report to the War Depart- 
ment here for conference. Assume yourself direct charge 
of the army in middle Tennessee." 

Replying from Mobile, he again advised against at- 
tempting to transfer troops from Mississippi to Tennes- 
see on account of the time required, adding very forci- 
bly that these departments were more distant from each 
other in time than eastern Virginia and middle Tennes- 
see ; and reiterated his views against detaching from 
Bragg's army, which was then too weak to confidently 
oppose Its adversary, and might be compromised by 
further detachments. He at once repaired to Tennes- 
see, arriving at TuUahoma on the i8th, and found Bragg 
closely occupied with his wife, who was critically ill ; 
whereupon he telegraphed the fact to the Secretary of 
War, and stated that on that account he would not at 
once communicate the Secretary's order to him, or an- 
nounce himself as in direct command. But he assumed 
the duties of commander during the time that Bragg was 



learn where the need is greatest until it is past. I could not have 
reached Murfreesboro in time for the battle if I had attempted to do so 
after the enemy advanced ; but if I had, it would have been a great 
hazard for me to have taken the command from General Bragg, who 
had studied and learned the situation." 

A perusal of the official correspondence, as now published, will 
show that during this entire campaign Johnston never mentioned 
either Bragg or Pemberton except in terms of compliment, and never 
superseded either of his own motion. 



i;70 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

kept at the bedside of his wife, though in that interreg- 
num no active operations were in progress. 

At this time his own health became very precarious, 
rendering it necessary that he should put himself in 
charge of a surgeon, for his wound was again troubling 
him; and it was almost impossible to bear the motion of 
a horse, the only manner in which generals could attend 
to their duties in the South. History tells of a Saxe 
campaigning in a carriage, and of a Massena directing 
the movements of the French left at Wagram from a 
coach ; but if they had attempted such locomotion over 
a Southern road in winter and early spring, their cam- 
paigns would soon have come to an abrupt termi- 
nation. 

On account of continued ill-health he found it neces- 
sary, on April loth, to write to Richmond reporting his 
disability and requesting that Bragg be allowed to re- 
main in Tennessee. 

As Pemberton's telegrams up to this time had rather 
indicated that Grant's operations against Vicksburg were 
not meeting with much success, and that the latter was 
even about to re-enforce Rosecrans, Johnston remained 
in Tennessee, as the most probable scene of important 
operations, and repeatedly urged that Bragg should be 
strengthened as much as possible. In fact, the positive 
orders of the Government sending him in the first in- 
stance to investigate Bragg, and in the next place to 
temporarily supersede him, left him no choice but to re- 
main in Tennessee, if he had desired to go to Mississippi. 
But in the latter part of April Grant made the transfer to 
the south of Vicksburg, from which he subsequently oper- 
ated, fought the battle of Fort Gibson, and commenced 
his manoeuvres for surrounding Pemberton. The latter 
at once began calling for re-enforcements, and Johnston 
reported his calls to the War Department, with repeated 



TENNESSEE. 



71 



warnings that they could not be sent from Bragg with- 
out giving up Tennessee. 

The Government, moved by Pemberton's alarming 
dispatches, and justly considering that the crisis was now 
transferred from Tennessee to Mississippi, wired John- 
ston (May 9th) to proceed at once to Mississippi and as- 
sume the chief command, taking with him three thousand 
good troops of Bragg's army. In the same telegram he 
was informed that re-enforcements from Beauregard's de- 
partment had already been ordered, and that more might 
be expected. Johnston at once replied that he would go 
immediately, though unfit for field service. Till then he 
had remained in Tennessee for the reasons above men- 
tioned; though in his anomalous position it was in any 
event a mere choice of evils whether to remain there or 
in Mississippi, for he did not claim to be able to com- 
mand two remote armies. Under this order he repaired 
at once to Mississippi. 



CHAPTER XII. 

INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 

Grant's operations against Vicksburg may be said 
to have commenced on November 2, 1862, when he tele 
graphed to his Government that he had commenced a 
movement on Grand Junction with troops from Corinth 
and Bolivar, and that, if practicable, he would go to 
Holly Springs, and possibly to Grenada. At that time 
his force was distributed along the Mobile and Ohio, 
Mississippi Central, and Memphis and Charleston Rail- 
roads in northern Mississippi and southwestern Tennes- 
see, and Pemberton was facing him along the line of the 
Tallahatchee. He soon reached Holly Springs, which 
he made his base of supplies. His Government, sus- 
taining him with all its resources and doing for him 
what the Southern Government would not do for John- 
ston, organized an expedition from the Federal troops 
in Arkansas to co-operate with him, which reached the 
railroad in Pemberton's rear, doing it some damage, and 
causing Pemberton to fall back to the line of the Yala- 
busha. These manoeuvres consumed the month of No- 
vember, which was before Johnston had reached the West. 

As part of his scheme. Grant organized an expedition 
under Sherman to descend the Mississippi and endeavor 
to slip into Vicksburg while he himself detained Pem- 
berton on the Yalabusha. It was not his intention to 
drive Pemberton back if he could help it, since that would 
have defeated the object of Sherman's journey. 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 1^73 

This plan was frustrated by Van Dorn, who succeeded 
in reaching Grant's rear, destroyed his supplies at Holly 
Springs, captured its garrison, and cut off all communi- 
cation between him and the North for several days, 
which necessitated a retrograde movement. Owing to 
the break in his communications, Grant was unable to 
countermand Sherman's orders, and the latter went for- 
ward with a force of over thirty thousand men and 
landed at Chickasaw Bluffs on the Yazoo. Meanwhile 
Pemberton had been able to strengthen the small Con- 
federate force at Vicksburg, so that the brigades of S. D. 
Lee, Vaughn, Barton, and Gregg held the very strong 
position which Sherman would be obliged to carry be- 
fore he could attain his object. These four brigades 
aggregated about eight thousand men, but their formi- 
dable position multiplied their strength.* 

On December 29th Sherman assaulted, but was re- 
pulsed with a loss of seventeen hundred and seventy- 
six, the Confederates losing only two hundred and 
seven. Thus ended this threatening move upon Vicks- 
burg. 

The result of the failure was that Grant took per- 
sonal charge of the river operations, and decided to 
adopt that line for his future approaches. He secured 
the formal assignment to his command of the troops on 
the west side of the river, thus utilizing against Vicks- 

* The strength of Vaughn, Gregg, and Barton, taken from the re- 
turn of January 2, 1863, given in vol. xvii, pt. 2, p. 824, of the Official 
War Records, with that of Lee taken from the return of January g, 
1863, and published on p. 831 of the same volume, will aggregate not 
quite eight thousand men. It is difficult to get the strength of Lee 
from the return on p. 825, it not being clear which organizations be- 
longed to his brigade. If everything is included as belonging to his 
brigade down to the name of General Gregg, it was over five thousand 
strong — nearly double the strength given on January 9th, only a week 
afterward. 



ly^ GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

burg the forces opposing those which Johnston so 
often and vainly tried to have sent to aid in its de- 
fense. 

Grant arrived at Young's Point, above Vicksburg, 
about the end of January, and transferred his army to 
encampments along the river north of the city and as 
near together as the condition of the country would ad- 
mit. He then resorted to the spade, endeavoring to cut 
a canal across the bend in the river, so as to run by the 
guns of Vicksburg. Thereupon the Confederates estab- 
lished a battery so placed as to sweep the canal ; and 
this, with a freshet, which broke his dams, caused a fail- 
ure of this project. 

During this experiment he sent McPherson to open, 
if possible, a navigable route by way of Lake Providence 
and connecting bayous to the Red River, hoping thus to 
dispense with that portion of the Mississippi near Vicks- 
burg; but this attempt was also abandoned. He under- 
took, in addition, to approach Vicksburg by Moon Lake 
down the Tallahatchee and Yazoo, endeavoring to estab- 
lish a base of supplies on the Yazoo that might be safe 
from Van Dorn and his troublesome dragoons; and he 
sent a strong force down the Tallahatchee for this pur- 
pose, which reached Fort Pemberton, located where the 
Tallahatchee and Yalabusha unite to form the Yazoo ; 
but there its progress was arrested. 

Nothing daunted by his failures, he next attempted 
to render navigable a route from the Mississippi, by way 
of Steel's bayou, into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton, 
but found too many Confederate sharpshooters along its 
course, and its channel too narrow and tortuous to ren- 
der it practicable; and thus ended the attempt, as great 
a Jiasco as the others. These geographical explorations 
occupied him until April. Their only result was to en- 
able him to kill time and avoid the demoralization con- 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 175 

sequent upon a withdrawal. They also demonstrated 
that he could not evade the difficulties inherent to his 
task ; so he was compelled to act upon the maxim of 
Sir Boyle Roche, that " the only way to avoid danger is 
to meet it plump." In fact, General Grant states in his 
Memoirs that he did not expect these attempts to be 
successful, and that they were mainly undertaken " to 
consume time and to divert the attention of the enemy, 
the troops, and the public generally." 

Convinced of this at last, and rendered but the more 
tenacious of purpose, he concentrated his troops at 
Milliken's Bend, prepared to inaugurate the transfer of 
operations to a point on the river below Vicksburg. For 
this purpose he would be forced to march his army down 
the river on the west side opposite the nearest practi- 
cable landing, and then to ferry it across. To accom- 
plish this he would require the co-operation of the navy, 
which, with his transports, would be obliged to run the 
long gauntlet of the Vicksburg batteries before reach- 
ing this point. He easily persuaded Admiral Porter, 
whose support of Grant was cordial and effective, to at- 
tempt this perilous voyage. On the night of April i6th 
the fleet got under way and succeeded in passing with- 
out serious damage. By the 27th of April two of his 
three corps — McClernand's and McPherson's — were in the 
neighborhood of Hard Times, not far from Grand Gulf. 
On the 22d another successful attempt to run the bat- 
teries had been devised and executed. On the 29th the 
Federal army endeavored to reduce the batteries at 
Grand Gulf, but without success, and a landing there 
became impracticable. Navy, transports, and barges 
then waited till night, ran the Grand Gulf batteries 
without injury, and on the morning of April 30th as- 
sisted in ferrying McClernand's corps and part of 
McPherson's across the river at Bruinsburg, and at last 



i;r6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

established the Federal army on the same side of the 
river as Vicksburg. 

While Grant himself was operating thus with two 
thirds of his army, he ordered Sherman, whose corps 
was still up the river, to make a demonstration on the 
Yazoo, his object being, as he says in his Memoirs, to 
induce Pemberton to keep as much force as possible 
about Vicksburg, and not to interfere with his landing. 
Sherman carried out these orders with intelligence, and 
with such success that Grant's debarkation was unop- 
posed. In spite of the passage of a large fleet under 
his eyes, which could have but one object; in spite of 
the fact that Grant for a month had been gradually 
working southward along the west side of the river, 
which, with the hazardous attempt of the fleet, indicated 
beyond question what was the real design — Pemberton 
held his force in the immediate vicinity of Vicksburg, 
instead of meeting Grant with a concentrated army at 
the landing and driving him into the river. At first 
Grant had only twenty thousand men across, so that 
the story of Ball's Bluff might have been repeated on a 
grand scale had an Evans commanded the Southern 
troops. This undisturbed landing of Grant was the in- 
auguration of the movement which crowned the Federal 
campaign against Vicksburg with success. 

During the entire period Johnston was in Tennessee, 
occupied and necessarily kept there by the various 
duties imposed upon him by the Department, vainly 
protesting that he could not command two armies so 
far apart, and led to suppose from Pemberton's meager 
dispatches that Grant's operations, one after another, 
were proving failures, and that troops were to be sent 
from Mississippi to Rosecrans. From the time of his 
first assignment he had been communicating with Pem- 
berton frequently, urging him to furnish full information 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. ijy 

as to contemplated plans, but not with much success, 
judging from his letter of January, 1863, to Pemberton, 
and that of February 12, 1863, to Davis, in which he 
complains that " General Pemberton is not communica- 
tive." The absence of exciting reports from Pemberton, 
the critical appearance of affairs in Tennessee, and the 
necessity of placing himself under the care of a surgeon, 
rendered it impossible to repair to Mississippi, even if it 
had not apparently been useless. 

The first care of Grant after landing was to compel 
the evacuation of Grand Gulf. With this view he ad- 
vanced upon Port Gibson, which commanded the bridges 
across the Bayou Pierre, having with him McClernand's 
corps and part of McPherson's — in all probably twenty 
thousand men. Bowen met him about five miles west of 
Port Gibson, with a force slightly in excess of five thou- 
sand men, and on May ist the battle of Port Gibson was 
fought. Bowen, though short of ammunition, resisted 
this strong force all day long, frequently repulsing their 
onslaughts and occasionally attacking himself, but was 
driven back about sundown, destroying the bridges. 
The Federal loss, according to official returns, was eight 
hundred and seventy-five, and the Confederate loss 
amounted to eight hundred and thirty-two; still the 
result of the action was to cause the evacuation of 
Grand Gulf, and to give Grant a secure point at which 
to land and debouch. 

While this action was in progress Pemberton tele- 
graphed Johnston : *' A furious battle has been going on 
since daylight just below Port Gibson. . . . Enemy can 
cross all his army from Hard Times to Bruinsburg. . . . 
Enemy's success in passing our batteries has completely 
changed character of defense." 

Johnston immediately replied : " If General Grant's 
army lands on this side of the river the safety of the 



1^8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you 
should unite your whole force." And again on the next 
day he telegraphed : *' If Grant's army crosses, unite all 
your troops here to beat him ; success will give you back 
what was abandoned to win it." 

These two telegrams are models of military corre- 
spondence, and express in a word Johnston's entire 
theory of war — the theory of concentration for decisive 
blows, regardless of temporary danger to fixed points. 
In this case the operation recommended was so palpable 
that the only wonder is why Pemberton had not adopted 
it without waiting for suggestions. It is manifest, from 
Bowen's official report of the fight at Port Gibson, that 
as early as April 20th (four days after the passage of the 
batteries by the boats) Grant's plan was patent to him, 
and that he had communicated it to Pemberton. When 
Grant landed his original twenty thousand men they 
were on low ground at Bruinsburg, two miles from the 
bluff, which they would be forced to carry before they 
could debouch. If Pemberton had acted on Bowen's^ 
warning and met this fraction of Grant's army at Port 
Gibson with his entire force, leaving but a small garri- 
son at Vicksburg, he would have outnumbered it, and 
the destruction of this body would have been decisive of 
the fate of the others. But Pemberton's only strategy 
seemed to consist in hugging the immediate vicinity of 
Vicksburg, motionless and passive, while his foe was 
hemming him in. Grant, thus unmolested, transferred 
his base to Grand Gulf, which he occupied on May 3d, 
and commenced his march to the interior, practically 
without any base at all, as his troops lived on the coun- 
try, and the trains took with them littlebesides ammuni- 
tion. According to his return of April 30th, his total 
force then operating against Vicksburg was 2,730 officers 
and 44,422 men present for duty, and consisted of the 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 



79 



Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Corps; but of 
these only the Thirteenth and Seventeenth Corps were 
on the east side of the river. They were not joined by 
Sherman with his corps until the 8th. Grant's object 
was now to move around Vicksburg, to isolate it from 
the rest of the Confederacy, and to open a base for his 
future operations on the Yazoo, using the subsistence of 
the neighborhood in the meanwhile. He advanced up 
the east side of the Big Black by parallel roads. Mc- 
Pherson moved on the road to Raymond, and Sherman 
and McClernand moved to the north, nearer the Big 
Black and nearer the railroad. These operations ex- 
tended over several days, during which Pemberton did 
nothing to interfere with them, and did not even report 
them by telegraph or otherwise to Johnston. In that 
way he kept his chief in the dark as to the size and in- 
tentions of the Northern force. 

Johnston went to Mississippi on the first train after 
the receipt of the telegram ordering him there. He did 
i:iot reach Jackson till the 13th. That day, while en 
route, he received a dispatch from Pemberton informing 
him that the enemy was moving in heavy force on Ed- 
wards' Depot, where the battlefield would be, and that 
he was hurrying forward his troops to that point, leav- 
ing heavy detachments to secure Vicksburg and its 
flanks. The previous day Gregg's Brigade had fought 
with Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson the 
battle of Raymond, each side losing about five hundred 
men. As it was a fight of one brigade against two 
divisions, its necessary result was the retreat of Gregg. 
While falling back, the latter was joined by Walker's 
Brigade, which had just arrived from Beauregard's de- 
partment, and the two withdrew to Jackson, where 
Johnston found them on his arrival. They aggregated 
about six thousand men. Maxey's brigade from Port 
13 



l8o GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Hudson, and Gist's from South Carolina, were expected 
on the following day. Upon arrival, Johnston tele- 
graphed to Richmond : " I arrived this evening, finding 
the enemy in force between this place and General Pem- 
berton. I am too late." 

He at once set about solving the problem of uniting 
his troops and those of Pemberton, which was the first 
great object to accomplish. The obstacle to this was the 
corps of McPherson, which by this time had seized Clin- 
ton, on the railroad between Jackson and Vicksburg, and 
now held it, effectually destroying communication with 
Vicksburg. Promptly after arriving at Jackson, John- 
ston sent a dispatch to Pemberton to the effect that a 
Federal corps of four divisions was between them at 
Clinton, that it was important to restore communication 
at once, and he ordered Pemberton to come up on the 
rear of this corps. He concluded : 

''To beat such a detachment would be of immense 
value; the troops here could co-operate. All the 
strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. 
Time is all-important." 

This dispatch was received by Pemberton on the 
morning of the 14th, at which time his forces were at 
Edwards' Depot and his headquarters at Bovina. His 
first impulse was to obey, and he replied as follows: 

"I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your 
communication. I move at once with whole available 
force (about sixteen thousand) from Edwards' Depot, 
leaving Vaughn's Brigade (about fifteen hundred) at Big 
Black Bridge. Tilghman's Brigade (fifteen hundred), 
now at Baldwin's Ferry, I have ordered to bring up the 
rear of my column ; he will be, however, from fifteen to 
twenty miles behind it. Baldwin's Ferry will be left 
necessarily unprotected. To hold Vicksburg are Smith's 
and Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mill to 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. i8l 

Warrenton, numbering seventy-five hundred effective 
men. The men have been marching several days, are 
much fatigued, and, I fear, will straggle very much. In 
directing this move 1 do not think you fully comprehend 
the position that Vicksburg will be left in, but I comply 
at once with your order." * 

But by the time he reached his army at Edwards' 
Depot his purpose to obey this order was changed. 
Reflection had raised up multitudes of foes threatening 
his flank and rear, all ready to march behind him into 
Vicksburg. Therefore he called a council of war com- 
posed of his general officers, laid his orders from John- 
ston before them, and asked them to help him solve his 
difficulty. A majority expressed themselves favorable 
to the march ordered by Johnston. Others suggested a 
movement by which the Federal supplies might be cut 
off from the river — a veritable wild-goose chase, as 
Grant had abandoned his communications and was liv- 
ing on the country. Pemberton himself did not approve 
either of these plans. His idea of preventing the be- 
leaguerment of Vicksburg was not to strike at isolated 
bodies of his adversary as they stretched their line 
around him, but to back up against its fortifications, 
and there supinely await the completion of the invest- 
ment and the inevitable result of a blockade. He might 
be surrounded and eventually starved out, it is true, but 
he would at least have the consolation of knowing that 
his flanks would not be turned and his rear would be safe. 
Had he followed the example of his illustrious oppo- 
nent, and thought less about his base and more about 

* This dispatch shows that Pemberton, even after the losses at Port 
Gibson and any straggling incident to his previous aimless marching, 
had in hand twenty-six thousand five hundred effectives who could 
have been "united to beat " Grant at Port Gibson. Instead of this, 
Bowen fought that battle with five thousand men. 



1 82 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

manoeuvring to protect it, the story of Vicksburg might 
have been different. Both these schemes were disap- 
proved by him because he thought they took him too 
far from the ramparts of Vicksburg; but the last ap- 
peared the best, as it contemplated no very distant 
march. Forgetting that the first duty of the soldier is 
obedience to the orders of a superior, disregarding the 
views of a majority of his council, and distrustful even 
of his own opinion, he set aside the movement directed 
by Johnston, and decided to threaten Grant's imaginary 
communications with the expectation of forcing the lat- 
ter to attack him. Accordingly he sent the following 
communication to Johnston : 

*' Edwards' Depot, May 14, i86j. 
*' I shall move as early to-morrow morning as prac- 
ticable with a column of seventeen thousand men to 
Dillon's, situated on the main road leading from Ray- 
mond to Port Gibson, seven and a half miles below Ray- 
mond and nine and a half miles from Edwards' Depot. 
The object is to cut the enemy's communications and 
to force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force 
sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position, or 
to attempt to cut my way into Jackson. At this point your 
nearest communication would be through Raymond. I 
wish very much I could join my re-enforcements. Whether 
it will be most practicable for the re-enforcements to come 
by Raymond (leaving it to the right if the march can not 
be made through Raymond), or to move them west along 
the line of railroad (leaving it to the left and south of 
the line of march) to Bolton Depot or some other point 
west of it, you must determine. In either movement I 
should be advised as to the time and road, so that co- 
operation may be had to enable the re-enforcements to 
come through. . . ." 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 183 

While Pemberton and his advisers were evolving this 
plan, Grant decided to expel the Confederates from Jack- 
son, hoping to render their junction more difficult. On 
the morning of the 14th he directed McPherson with his 
corps from Clinton, and Sherman with his corps from 
Raymond, to march upon Jackson. Then he sent one 
division of his other corps — McClernand's — to Clinton, 
one to the neighborhood of Mississippi Springs, and the 
third to Raymond. Thus Pemberton would have found 
a division instead of a corps at Clinton had he obeyed 
his orders. 

It was idle for the two weak brigades under Johnston 
to attempt to fight two corps of Grant's army. Jackson 
was therefore held only until everything of value that 
was portable was removed, when the Confederates re- 
tired skirmishing. The loss was trifling on each side, 
being, according to the official returns, three hundred on 
the Northern side and one hundred and ninety-eight on 
the Southern. The direction of retreat was the Canton 
road to the north, since that was the best situation from 
which to join Pemberton if he had moved to Clinton, 
and Johnston did not then know that his orders had been 
ignored. Obedience to those orders by Pemberton might 
have brought about a junction on the field of battle, and 
the greeting of the generals might have been amid the 
flying squadrons of the enemy, like Ney and Richepanse 
at Hohenlinden. 

But Pemberton was neither Ney nor Richepanse. All 
day of the 14th, despite Johnston's admonition that " time 
is all-important," his army was motionless at Edwards' 
Depot, and so remained until the morning of the 15th, when 
it started on its march against Grant's supposed commu- 
nications. Johnston's order contemplated a march to 
the east, and he himself, on being pressed by Grant, had 
marched to the north, so as to be in the best position to 



1 34 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

march westwardly around Grant for the all-important 
junction; but this plan of Pemberton took him away 
from Johnston, on a march to the south — nearly an op- 
posite direction — and put a union of their forces out of 
the question. 

While Johnston was at Calhoun Station, to the north 
of Jackson, he received Pemberton's dispatch announc- 
ing the disobedience of orders and the march to Dillon's. 
He did not receive the first dispatch agreeing to obey 
the order till the next day, and then he knew, from hav- 
ing received the second, that this intention had been 
changed. On the receipt of the second dispatch he re- 
plied as follows : 

"Canton Road, Ten Miles from Jackson, 
May /J-, j86j, 8.30 A. m. 

'' Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your 
plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can 
unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, informing 
me, that we may move to that point with about six 
thousand troops. I have no means of estimating ene- 
my's force at Jackson. The principal officers here differ 
very widely, and I fear he will fortify if time is left him. 
Let me hear from you immediately. General Maxey 
was ordered back to Brookhaven. You probably have 
time to make him join you. Do so before he has time 
to move away." 

This dispatch was received by Pemberton about 6.30 
A. M. of the 1 6th, when he was about four miles south of 
Edwards' Depot on his march to Dillon's. He ordered 
a countermarch, and sent Johnston the following reply : 

"... It [the order] found the army on the middle 
road to Raymond. The order of countermarch has been 
issued. Owing to the destruction of a bridge on Baker's 
Creek, which runs for some distance parallel with the 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 



185 



railroad and south of it, our marcli will be on the road 
leading from Edwards' Depot in the direction of Browns- 
ville. This road runs nearly parallel with the railroad. 
In going to Clinton, we shall leave Bolton Depot four 
miles to the right. I am thus particular, so that you 
may be able to make a junction with this army. Heavy 
skirmishing is now going on in my front." 

Meanwhile the Dillon excursion had given Grant suf- 
ficient time to return from Jackson and advance upon 
Pemberton. He directed his army upon Bolton's Depot, 
and by the night of the 15th McClernand's and McPher- 
son's Corps were in motion for the battlefield. If the 
object of Pemberton's move toward Dillon's was a fight, 
he was soon to be accommodated. There was one slight 
difference between his chances in this fight and the one 
which Johnston advised; it was simply this: that his 
plan brought an army down on him, while Johnston's 
plan contemplated a joint attack on a single corps. On 
the morning of the i6th skirmishing commenced between 
him and the Federal van, whereupon, instead of continu- 
ing his march under the protection of a strong rear 
guard, he took up a position on Champion's Hill and 
awaited events. Hovey's division was his only foe till 
near midday, for Grant did not till about that time com- 
plete the concentration of his forces. Pemberton clung 
to the defensive until Grant, on the arrival of his other 
divisions, supported Hovey with additional troops, car- 
ried the Confederate lines, and sent them flying in con- 
fusion toward Vicksburg with the loss of large quanti- 
ties of their artillery, and a total of 3,839 men killed, 
wounded, and missing. The Federal loss was 2,441, but 
it was paying cheaply for the result achieved; it was de- 
cisive in frustrating Pemberton's march by Clinton, and 
it sealed the fate of Vicksburg. Thus the movement to 
cut Grant's communications had resulted in nothing but 



1 86 GENERAL JOIINSTOX. 

the loss of precious time which should have been util- 
ized in joining Johnston, the loss of lives yet more pre- 
cious than time, and the pressing of Pemberton behind 
the Big Black. No wonder that, when too late, he said 
to Johnston, in a letter written after he had reached the 
haven of Vicksburg: 

*' I greatly regret that I felt compelled to make the 
advance beyond the Big Black, which has proved so dis- 
astrous in its consequences." 

The above dispatches show that he was not " com- 
pelled " to make any such move by Johnston. He was 
beyond the Big Black before the arrival of the latter in 
the Department, and had written that Edwards' Depot 
would be the battle ground before Johnston had sent 
him a message. Johnston's orders were to march to the 
east to attack a corps. He moved to the south and en- 
tangled himself with an army. 

On the i6th, Johnston with his small force was sta- 
tionary, they taking the rest which their labors rendered 
desirable, while he was awaiting a reply to his last dis- 
patch to Pemberton, by means of which he might direct 
his march for a junction. On the afternoon of that day 
he received the note announcing the issuance of the 
order for a countermarch, and describing the road. 
The next day he marched to the westward via Living- 
ston, about fifteen miles, hoping that it was not yet too 
late for his subordinate, by obeying the instructions, to 
unite with him. That night, after his two little brigades 
had gone into camp, he received a dispatch which dashed 
his hopes to the earth and foreshadowed the inevitable 
fate of Vicksburg. In it Pemberton, writing from Bo- 
vina, recapitulated the circumstances under which he had 
decided upon the move to Dillon's, described the battle 
of Baker's Creek or Champion's Hill and its unfortu- 
nate result, and stated that he was then in position be- 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 187 

hind the Big Black, but feared that he would be turned 
and forced to withdraw, which would render the position 
at Snyder's Mill untenable, but that he had provisions 
for about sixty days. He naively added, " I respect- 
fully await your orders." 

Before Johnston received this letter Grant had at- 
tacked Pemberton in the remarkable position in which 
he had placed his army, partly on each side of the Big 
Black, and carried it, with a heavy loss to the Confeder- 
ates, and he hurled them into the works around Vicks- 
burg. Then he occupied the position at Snyder's Mill 
or Haynes' Bluff, where Sherman had been disastrously 
repulsed in the previous December, and thus, after living 
on the country for over a week, he at last had on the 
Yazoo a regular base. This was the result of his own abili- 
ties and the zealous support of his subordinates, which 
formed so striking a contrast to Pemberton's actions. 

It is now time to inquire as to the purpose for which 
Pemberton awaited orders. It was certainly not with 
any idea of heeding them. On receipt of this last note 
Johnston saw that all hope of saving Vicksburg was 
lost. There was but one result in case Grant resorted 
to siege operations. The larger the number of men 
cooped up in its lines, the quicker that result would be 
brought about and the more disastrous it would be. He 
knew, from the tardiness which had been shown in re- 
enforcing him, that Pemberton's army was worth more 
to the Southern cause than a dozen Vicksburgs, and 
that the loss of so large a body of men would be irrep- 
arable. Hence his reply : 

" Camp between Livingston and Brownsville, 

May Ji, i86j. 
" Lieutenant-General Pemberton : Your dispatch 
of to-day by Captain Henderson was received. If Haynes' 
Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and can not 



l38 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, 
you must ultimately surrender. Under such circum- 
stances, instead of losing both troops and place, we 
must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, 
evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march to 
the northeast." 

Pemberton did not obey this order. His first impulse 
was to again consult his council of war. He assembled 
it on the i8th and laid the order before it, at the same 
time strenuously arguing against obedience. The coun- 
cil on this ex parte showing decided against compliance 
with the order, and Pemberton replied as follows: 

"Vicksburg, May i8, i86j. 
*' General Joseph E. Johnston. 

" General : I have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your communication in reply to mine, by the 
hands of Captain Henderson. In a subsequent letter of 
same date as this latter I informed you that the men 
had failed to hold the trenches at Big Black Bridge, and 
that, as a consequence, Snyder's Mill was directed to be 
abandoned. On the receipt of your communication I 
immediately assembled a council of war of the general 
officers of this command, and, having laid your instruc- 
tions before them, asked the free expression of their 
opinions as to the practicability of carrying them out. 
The opinion was unanimously expressed that it was im- 
possible to withdraw the army from this position with 
such morale and material as to be of further service to 
the Confederacy. While the council of war was assem- 
bled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works, and it 
was at the same time reported that they were crossing 
the Yazoo River at Brandon's Ferry, above Snyder's 
Mill. I have decided to hold Vicksburg as long as pos- 
sible, with the firm hope that the Government may yet 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 



89 



be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the 
free navigation of the Mississippi River. I still con- 
ceive it to be the most important point in the Confed- 
eracy." In his official report he attempts to fortify his 
disobedience in the following language : 

"The evacuation of Vicksburg! It meant the loss 
of the valuable stores and munitions of war collected 
for its defense ; the fall of Port Hudson ; the surrender 
of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Con- 
federacy. These were mighty interests, which, had I 
deemed the evacuation practicable in the sense in which 
I interpreted General Johnston's instructions, might 
well have made me hesitate to execute them. I believed 
it to be in my power to hold Vicksburg. I knew and 
appreciated the earnest desire of the Government and 
people that it should be held. I knew, perhaps better 
than any other individual, under all the circumstances, 
its capacity for defense. As long ago as February 17th 
last, in a letter addressed to his excellency the President, 
I had suggested the possibility of the investment of 
Vicksburg by land and water, and for that reason the 
necessity of ample supplies of ammunition as well as of 
subsistence to stand a siege. My application met his 
favorable consideration, and additional ammunition was 
ordered. With proper economy of subsistence and ord- 
nance stores I knew that I could stand a siege. I had 
a firm reliance on the desire of the President and of 
General Johnston to do all that could be done to raise a 
siege. Lfelt that every effort would be made, and I be- 
lieved it would be successful." 

It would seem to be clear, notwithstanding the opin- 
ion of the council, that the evacuation was practicable. 
Pemberton had seventy-five hundred men in Vicksburg, 
and Vaughn's Brigade of fifteen hundred men who had 
not been engaged at Baker's Creek. The only thing to 



IQO GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

demoralize them would be want of confidence in their 
commander. The subsequent behavior of his troops in 
the assault upon them, and their patience under the long 
siege which followed, refute the charge that their gal- 
lantry was impaired. They would probably have been 
more energetic in evading an investment than in resist- 
ing one after it was completed. The high authority of 
Grant himself establishes that the place could have been 
evacuated. In vol. ii, p. 522, of his Memoirs he says: 

"We were now assured of our position between John- 
ston and Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction 
of their forces. Pemberton might have made a night 
march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there, and, 
by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and 
finally returned to Johnston. But this would have given 
us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper move, 
however, and the one Johnston would have made had 
he been in Pemberton's place. In fact, it would have 
been in conformity with Johnston's orders to Pember- 
ton." 

Pemberton's rhapsody over the importance of Vicks- 
burg was as erroneous as his erratic operations. Its 
only value to the South was in preventing the naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi. If it and Port Hudson could be 
made two ligatures upon that artery, then indeed their 
importance was inestimable. But their inability to do 
this had been demonstrated. Twice in a week the ter- 
rors of the Vicksburg batteries had been met, not by 
ironclads alone, but by unarmored transports and pro- 
vision-laden barges as well ; and Grant had been seen to 
transfer his army from the north to the south of the 
town. The strongest Federal armament on the river 
was now in the very portion which Pemberton, blind to 
what was passing under his eyes, persisted in consider- 
ing blocked by his guns, and sacrificed an army to hold. 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 



191 



After this it may have appeared '' the most important 
point in the Confederacy" to him, but not to any one 
else. 

It is due to Pemberton to state that he was not solely 
responsible for the state to which his army was now 
reduced. Here, too, the President of the Confederacy 
interfered between him and Johnston, his immediate 
superior, as he had done with disastrous results in Ten- 
nessee in weakening Bragg, and with an effect still 
more unfortunate. The report of Pemberton, as quoted 
above, shows how the latter vouched the views of the 
President for his disobedience of the order to evacuate. 
His supplemental report gives the true explanation of 
his disobedience of Johnston's instructions to move to 
Clinton and form a junction. In it he justifies his raid 
on Grant's communications by publishing the following 
letter, written him by Mr. Davis on May 7th, two days 
before Johnston was ordered to Mississippi : 

" I am anxiously expecting intelligence of your further 
active operations. Want of transportation of supplies 
must compel the enemy to seek a junction with their fleet 
after a few days' absence from it. To hold both Vicks- 
burg and Port Hudson is necessary to a connection with 
trans-Mississippi. You may expect whatever is in my 
power to do." 

So that his movement to Dillon's was an inspiration 
of the Confederate President. Pemberton, feeling sure 
of his support, deliberately set aside Johnston's orders 
for concentration and evacuation, and brought about 
the usual consequences which ensue from executive in- 
terference in the conduct of distant operations. 

And yet Mr. Davis had approved Johnston's plan 
when he was seizing a fancied opportunity of making a 
point against him. On May i6th Johnston had tele- 
graphed to Secretary Seddon that a Federal army v/as 



1^2 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

at Clinton, that he had evacuated Jackson and moved to 
Calhoun, and that Pemberton was marching on Dillon's. 
When this was shown to the President, he, evidently 
ignorant of Johnston's orders to Pemberton, supposed 
the former to be responsible for the wide separation of 
the two forces, and indorsed the telegram thus : 

" Read and returned to the Secretary of War. Do not 
perceive why a junction was not attempted, which would 
have made our force nearly equal in number to the esti- 
mated strength of the enemy, and might have resulted 
in his total defeat under circumstances which rendered 
retreat or re-enforcement to him scarcely practicable." 

Johnston received, on the day after it was written, 
the dispatch from Pemberton stating that he would not 
obey the order of evacuation. His letter of the 17th, 
describing the battle of Baker's Creek, had rung the 
knell of Vicksburg. That of the 19th foretold the 
doom of the gallant army which was now shut up in it. 
Hoping against hope that he might yet collect a force 
to relieve him, Johnston at once replied : 

"Lieutenant-General Pemberton: Can you not 
get rid of your teams? It would be better to kill than 
feed them. I am trying to gather a force which may at- 
tempt to relieve you. Hold out. I have just heard from 
Loring, at Crystal Springs." 

On that day Grant completed his investment, Sher- 
man being on the right, McPherson in the center, and 
McClernand on the left. As there was no immediate 
hope of junction with Pemberton, nothing was left 
Johnston but to return to the railroad, in order to 
facilitate his union with re-enforcements and form a 
relieving army. He returned at once and united with 
Loring, who had eluded the enemy at Baker's Creek 
and marched east, and with Gist, Ector, McNair, and 



INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG. 



193 



Maxey as they successively arrived. Thus the opera- 
tions of this pregnant week resulted in the opening of a 
new base on the Yazoo by the Union army, the defeat 
of the Confederates in several battles, their retreat into 
Vicksburg, and their close investment. Such might 
have been expected from the fact, unprecedented in 
military annals, that during this short campaign not a 
single order of the superior to the subordinate was 
obeyed. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

FALL OF VICKSBURG. 

The adage that an ounce of prevention is worth 
a pound of cure is nowhere more forcibly illustrated 
than in attempting to relieve a beleaguered city after 
all efforts to prevent its investment have failed. If the 
Confederate Government was too weak to prevent a 
siege of Vicksburg, it was certainly too weak to raise 
one. The same re-enforcements which were given 
Johnston to aid in breaking up the siege might, if sent 
in April and placed under a competent commander as 
early as then, have hindered an investment and crushed 
the army attempting it. But the President would not 
yield them until it was too late to accomplish the object 
for which they were sent. Hence it was that Johnston, 
even as late as the fall of Vicksburg, did not have what 
might be called an army under his command. The suc- 
cessive detachments as they arrived had to be organized 
into divisions, were mainly strangers to each other and 
to their commanders, and had no transportation. The 
little artillery which they had was deficient in horses and 
equipments; supplies also were scarce, and difficult to 
procure. The region in which they were operating had 
been already drained to supply the armies of Grant and 
Pemberton ; and the collection of additional horses ne- 
cessary for field pieces, and of supplies for the troops, 
with the transportation that was essential before the 
army could be mobilized for active operations away 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 



95 



from the immediate proximity of the railroad, was a 
slow and discouraging task. 

When Johnston moved to join Pemberton he had 
but two brigades — Gregg's and Walker's — their aggre- 
gate strength being six thousand men ; and that was his 
army until the return to Canton. Here he was joined, 
on the 2oth and 21st of May, by Gist from Beauregard, 
and Ector and McNair from Bragg. At the same time 
Loring's division, happily separated from Pemberton 
during the rout of Baker's Creek, entered Jackson, hav- 
ing lost all its artillery, wagons, and cooking utensils. 
These organizations, with Jackson's cavalry, numbered 
about seventeen thousand. They constituted the whole 
force till June 3d, when they were joined by Evans' 
Brigade of nineteen hundred men, and by Breckinridge's 
division from Bragg's army, which had fifty-two hundred 
effectives.* 

It seemed Johnston's fate to be always placed on 
posts of duty where extended efforts were necessarily 
devoted to organizing armies. Until that work was 
consummated there could be no fair opportunity for 
winning laurels. Previous chapters have indicated how 
much labor and time were applied to this purpose at 
Harper's Ferry, Manassas, and the Peninsula — a tame 
but essential service, which in the subsequent history of 
the army contributed to swell the glory of his succes- 



* Johnston's telegram of May 31, 1863, to the President (Official 
War Records, vol. xxiv, pt. i, p. 194) gives an aggregate strength for 
his army of twenty-five thousand. This included Breckinridge, esti- 
mated at fifty-eight hundred., and Evans, who had not arrived. Tak- 
ing Evans's strength at nineteen hundred from Loring's return of May 
30th (Official War Records, vol. xxiv, pt. 3» P- 936), and deducting 
these two bodies, and the aggregate remaining is seventeen thousand 
three hundred. The real strength of Breckinridge on his arrival was 
fifty-two hundred, and not fifty-eight hundred, as estimated by John- 
ston (Official War Records, vol. xxiv, pt. 3, p. 942). 
14 



Iq6 general JOHNSTON. 

sors. Similar efforts were equally necessary in Georgia 
and North Carolina. The Vicksburg campaign was no 
exception to the rule; it was probably the most difficult 
task of all, on account of the exhaustion of the country. 
Johnston applied himself to this work with his custom- 
ary energy ; his dispatches to the Government teem 
with suggestions as to the best means of raising to the 
highest degree the efficiency and mobility of his force. 
These occupations, necessary though they be, are un- 
appreciated by the general public, which, impatient of 
details, gives the glory of a great battle won to the 
general in command at the time, and thinks not of the 
man who formed such an army as to render it capable 
of victory — the man who smooths the path by which 
others ride to fame. 

One of Johnston's principal troubles was the con- 
tinuous fault-finding of the Richmond Government. 
He had construed the order sending him to Mississippi 
as limiting his authority to transfer troops from Bragg's 
command. Whether he was right in so considering it 
or not, he had repeatedly advised against weakening 
Bragg, and had warned the Government that such action 
would involve the loss of Tennessee; so that he would 
not have transferred any troops even if he thought his 
authority to do so perfectly clear. The misunderstand- 
ing, if such it was, affected his military course in no 
way ; yet the President could find no employment more 
congenial than agitating this moot question, making it 
the subject of many telegrams, and subsequently of a 
long, ill-natured letter of censure. He was determined to 
raise some side issue to divert the public mind from the 
mischief which he had done, and he could find no better 
one than this. 

While Johnston was engaged in bettering his army 
and replying to the President's telegrams, the Federal 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 



197 



army was not idle, nor was its strength at a standstill. 
Its numbers, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, 
were about forty-seven thousand men on April 30th. 
The return of May 31st shows a total of over fifty thou- 
sand men present for duty operating against Vicksburg, 
re-enforcements having more than supplied all losses. 
On June 30th, according to the return of that date, its 
strength was over seventy-five thousand present for 
duty. As its losses during the siege and campaign were 
about nine thousand, this indicates that it had been re- 
enforced by nearly forty thousand men, and proves the 
correctness of Johnston's estimate, made in a telegram 
of June 19th to the Secretary of War, that its re-en- 
forcements alone equaled his entire force. 

While he was thus forming an army out of the het- 
erogeneous material gradually sent him, Grant was oc- 
cupied in protecting himself against the Vicksburg 
garrison and against any possible advance of a reliev- 
ing force. To adopt the language of his Memoirs, he 
made his lines as strong against the Confederates in 
Vicksburg as theirs were against him, in order to hold 
them with a small portion of his troops. To meet John- 
ston, he placed more than half his army in a line facing 
east, which extended from Haynes Bluff on the Yazoo 
to the railroad bridge on the Big Black, being thus 
guarded on each flank by a river. This position, natu- 
rally strong, was fortified to derive all possible addi- 
ditional strength from art, and possessed the double 
advantage of being practically impregnable against at- 
tack, while exposing an assaulting force to certain dis- 
aster in the event of failure, since the Big Black must 
be crossed before these lines could be approached, and 
it would intercept retreat in case of a repulse. South 
of the railroad bridge the ferries were guarded by strong 
detachments. Offensive operations against that part of 



198 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the line were yet more hazardous, as they necessarily 
exposed the communications of the attacking army. 
All roads were blocked which led from the east toward 
the Federal position ; and Johnston's numbers prior to 
June 3d, at which time his last re-enforcements joined 
him, w^ere so insignificant that it would be madness to 
attack, even if the organization and equipment were 
complete. Subsequent to that date the risk would have 
been greater still, for Grant's re-enforcements were many 
times more numerous than his own, the fortified lines 
were daily growing in strength, and by that time had 
become another Torres Vedras. 

The published correspondence shows the earnestness 
with which he devoted himself to the task of forming an 
army and of giving it mobility under the difficulties he 
met. At the same time he was constantly reminding 
the Government of the hopelessness of such an enter- 
prise without a larger force. His efforts were without 
avail, except to elicit from Secretary Seddon words of 
cheer and confidence which formed a strong contrast to 
the communications from President Davis. He stated 
his difficulties, in a letter dated June 5th, to the Secre- 
tary, who on May 23d had written him in the following 
gratifying terms : 

*' I have no official communications or instructions 
to send you, but can not omit the opportunity afforded 
by a courier going to you to offer the encouragement 
of my full confidence and best wishes in the trying 
circumstances in which you are placed. I regretted 
deeply, when I received the telegram announcing your 
arrival at Jackson [in which Johnston had stated that 
he was too late], that you had not been ordered to that 
vital field of operations at an earlier period ; but I could 
not think or feel that you were too late. Indeed, events 
since have made your presence of even greater moment 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 



199 



than I had anticipated ; and now, to retrieve our great 
disasters, and save, if practicable, the all-important com- 
mand of the Mississippi River, is felt to be dependent 
on the presence and inspiration of your military genius. 
. . . I can only assure you of my full appreciation and 
confidence, and cheer myself under the darkening aspect 
of our late reverses by unabated reliance on your zeal, 
fertility of resource, and generalship. ..." 

Johnston replied, June 5th, to this as follows : 
" I thank you cordially for your kind letter, but al- 
most regret that you feel such confidence in me as is 
expressed in it. From the present condition of affairs 
I fear that confidence dooms you to disappointment. 
Every day gives some new intelligence of the enemy's 
strength, of re-enforcements on the way to him. My 
first intention, on learning that Lieutenant-General Pem- 
berton was in Vicksburg, was to form an army to succor 
him, I suppose, from my telegraphic correspondence 
with the Government, that all the troops to be hoped 
for have arrived. Our resources seem so small, and 
those of the enemy so great, that the relief of Vicksburg 
is beginning to appear impossible to me. Pemberton 
will undoubtedly make a gallant and obstinate defense ; 
but, unless we assemble a force strong enough to break 
Grant's line of investment, the surrender of the place 
will be a mere question of time. General Grant is re- 
ceiving re-enforcements almost daily. His force, accord- 
ing to the last information to be had, is more than treble 
that which I command. Our scouts say, too, that he 
has constructed lines of circumvallation, and has blocked 
up all roads leading to his position. The enterprise of 
forcing the enemy's lines would be a difficult one to a 
force double that at my disposal. ... I beg you to con- 
sider, in connection with affairs in this Department, that 
I have had not only to organize but to provide means 



200 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

of transportation and supplies for an army. The artil- 
lery is not yet equipped. All of Lieutenant-General 
Pemberton's supplies were, of course, with his troops 
about Vicksburg and Port Hudson, I found myself, 
therefore, without subsistence stores, ammunition, or 
the means of conveying these indispensables. It has 
proved more difficult to collect wagons and provisions 
than I expected. We have not yet the means of oper- 
ating for more than four days away from the railroads." 

Secretary Seddon, alive to the importance of saving 
Vicksburg, or at least its garrison, but unwilling to send 
troops from Virginia despite the victory of Chancellors- 
ville, became desperate at the outlook, and urged John- 
ston to attack, with or without concert with the garrison, 
by day or by night, manfully offering to take the respon- 
sibility. But it was not with the latter a question of re- 
sponsibility. He was not willing to squander the lives 
of his men in wild adventures predestined to failure ; he 
could not so far forget his duty to them. He declined 
to assault, reiterating the strength of Grant's position, 
the impossibility of combining his operations with the 
Vicksburg troops on account of uncertain communica- 
tion and the certainty that the destruction of his army 
would expose Mississippi and Alabama to be overrun. 
In his telegram of June 23d he repeats his difficulties 
thus : 

" There has been no voluntary inaction. When I 
came, all military materials of the Department were in 
Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Artillery had to be 
brought from the East; horses for it and all field trans- 
portation procured in an exhausted country — much from 
Georgia, brought over wretched railroads — and provi- 
sions collected. I have not had the means of moving." 

He was in the meanwhile keeping up as full a cor- 
respondence with the commanders of the beleaguered 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 



20 1 



fortresses as the hostile environment would permit. 
On May 19th, when he realized that the investment of 
Vicksburg was complete, he sent a message to General 
Gardner, the commander at Port Hudson, informing 
him of Pemberton's defeat at Baker's Creek and retreat 
to Vicksburg, impressing on him the importance of con- 
centration, and ordering him to evacuate Port Hudson 
and to bring as much artillery with him as possible, in 
order to replace that which had changed owners at 
Baker's Creek, and to move to Jackson. On the 23d, 
in reply to a dispatch from Gardner asking re-enforce- 
ments, he repeated his order, urging him not to allow 
himself to be invested, but to save the troops in any 
event. This last communication never reached Port 
Hudson, as its blockade was complete before the ar- 
rival of the courier. Too weak to aid him, Johnston 
endeavored to induce the commanders in the trans- 
Mississippi Department to relieve Port Hudson ; and 
movements were made by the forces of Kirby Smith 
and Richard Taylor with that object in view, but noth- 
ing beneficial resulted. 

Communication with Pemberton, while difficult and 
slow, was more frequent. Until the first part of June 
the Federal investment was not very close on the south- 
ern side of the city, and messengers slipped through 
each way under cover of night. The first dispatches 
from Vicksburg were received on May 24th ; they were 
written on the 20th and 21st, and urged the necessity of 
prompt action for relief. Those of the 21st reported 
the men as fighting in good spirits and with unimpaired 
organization. To this Johnston replied, notifying him 
that he was sending musket caps, which were the great 
need, and inquiring as to the best route of approach, the 
position and force of the enemy. On the 29th he again 
wrote, informing Pemberton that he was too weak to 



202 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

save Vicksburg ; that he could only attempt to extricate 
the garrison ; that it could not be done without co- 
operation, and he asked Pemberton's plans. 

Meanwhile Grant, thinking perhaps that Pemberton's 
army was demoralized by its reverses, decided to essay 
an assault, and, if possible, save the long siege that 
otherwise was before him. On May 22d he gave orders 
for a general assault along the lines, and his men moved 
forward with great gallantry, but were sadly undeceived 
as to the condition of the Southern troops. They re- 
ceived their assailants with a murderous fire, and re- 
pulsed them at every point, inflicting a loss of over three 
thousand men and suffering little themselves. In the 
first attack of the 19th the Federal loss was nearly one 
thousand. 

At this time Pemberton's effective strength was eight- 
een thousand men, subject to daily diminution from the 
drain of the siege. On the 7th, Pemberton reported his 
command as still in good spirits, and his subsistence as 
sufficient for twenty days ; and Johnston wrote him the 
same day, before receiving his note, urging the necessity 
of co-operation, and inquiring as to the best route by 
which he might approach. The remaining correspond- 
ence between them was devoted to the discussion of this 
question ; it continued at irregular intervals throughout 
the greater part of June. The last dispatch from Pem- 
berton which came through the lines was dated June 
22d, and suggested that Johnston should make proposals 
to Grant for the surrender of the place, but not of the 
garrison, which Johnston declined to do, since it would 
be construed as a confession of weakness ; but he au- 
thorized Pemberton to make terms if it should become 
necessary. The communication was never received by 
Pemberton, and when the time came he made terms on 
his own responsibility. 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 203 

While these letters were being exchanged Johnston 
was unremitting in his labor of collecting as rapidly as 
possible the transportation and supplies needed for an 
advance. This occupied him till the 29th, on which day 
he decided to begin his march to relieve Vicksburg. 
His effective strength of all arms was only twenty-eight 
thousand one hundred and fifty -four. Grant's army 
then was over seventy-five thousand men; and, adopting 
the statement of his Memoirs, more than half the entire 
force was under Sherman, and faced east to meet John- 
ston, supported by the divisions of Herron and A. J. 
Smith. As these aggregated over seven thousand, Sher- 
man had over forty-four thousand men with which to 
meet Johnston, who was advancing to attack him in an im- 
pregnable position, and with but little over half his num- 
bers. On the evening of July ist the Confederate army 
encamped between Brownsville and the Big Black, and 
the next three days were devoted to reconnoissances in- 
tended to ascertain the most eligible point at which to 
try the enemy's lines. On the night of the 3d a mes- 
sage was sent to Pemberton to the effect that an attempt 
to relieve him would be made about the 7th, that his co- 
operation was necessary, that he must decide upon the 
most convenient point at which to endeavor to break 
through, and that the firing would indicate where the 
attack would be made. Pemberton did not receive this 
message before his surrender. 

The reconnoissances conclusively established that 
north of the railroad failure was inevitable. They re- 
vealed fortifications strongly manned, extending from 
the railroad bridge over the Big Black to the Yazoo, 
with all approaches obstructed by abatis. Johnston 
decided not to slaughter his men by desperately throw- 
ing them upon an invulnerable enemy, and extended his 
investigations south of the railroad in the hope of turn- 



204 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

ing these fortifications and forcing a passage of the 
river lower down. While engaged in the necessary ex- 
aminations they were abruptly terminated, and the ob- 
ject of his advance frustrated, by information of the 
surrender of Vicksburg, which took place on the 4th of 
July.* 

This event not only put an end to the expedition, 
but necessitated an immediate return to Jackson, as the 
capture of Vicksburg released Grant's mighty host of 
seventy -five thousand men for a movement against 
Johnston's army. The latter at once fell back to Jack- 
son, and not a moment too soon ; for, without awaiting 
the completion of all details of the surrender, Grant, on 
the evening of the 4th, ordered Sherman to advance upon 
Johnston, and placed under his command for the purpose 
the Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Corps, with two addi- 
tional divisions, making a body of about fifty thousand 
men. These moved upon Jackson, arriving in front of its 
works on the morning of the 9th, and found Johnston's 
men awaiting them. These works, slight and badly 
located, extended from a point north of the town a 

* Johnston has the weighty authority of Grant to sustain him in his 
decision not to attempt the Federal lines to the north of the railroad, 
where they had been made so strong. In vol. ii, p. 549, of his Mem- 
oirs, Grant says : ''We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, 
while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected 
siege by Johnston ; but as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were 
as substantially protected as they were against us. Where we were 
looking east and north we were strongly fortified and on the defensive. 
Johnston evidently took in the situation, and wisely, I think, abstained 
from making an assault on us, because it would simply have inflicted 
loss on both sides, without accomplishing any result. We were strong 
enough to have taken the offensive against him ; but I did not feel dis- 
posed to take any risk of losing our hold on Pemberton's army, while 
I would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against 
an attack by Johnston." 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 



205 



little east of the Canton road, to a point south within 
a short distance of Pearl River. Loring was on the 
right, Walker and French in the center, and Breckin- 
ridge on the left. Owing to reports of scarcity of water, 
Johnston hoped that Sherman would assault ; and he 
awaited it with eagerness, confident, from the high spirit 
which his troops manifested, that it would be severely 
punished if attempted. But Sherman, instead of attack- 
ing, took to the spade himself, and placed his powerful 
artillery in positions to sweep the town with cross-fires. 
On the 1 2th a slight attack was made upon the skirmish 
line of Breckinridge, composed of the First, Third, and 
Fourth Florida and Forty-seventh Georgia Regiments. 
These repelled it with heavy loss to the enemy in killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, capturing also some colors, 
which were presented to Johnston by their captors as 
a testimonial of their devotion. He accepted them in 
the following terms : 

''''Major-General Breckinridge. 

" General : I have learned with high satisfaction 
the success of your troops this morning ; it increases 
my confidence in your gallant division. Do me the 
kindness also to express to the First and Third Florida, 
Forty-seventh Georgia, and Fourth Florida Regiments, 
the pride and pleasure with which I have accepted the 
splendid trophies they have presented me. Assure them 
that I equally appreciate the soldierly courage and kindly 
feelings to myself which have gained me these noble 
compliments." 

The Federal superiority in artillery showed the place 
to be untenable, though the lack of necessary supplies 
would have compelled its evacuation in any event ; and 
information of the approach of a large ordnance train 
from Vicksburg — evidently to enable Sherman to com- 



2o6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

mence his bombardment — induced Johnston to withdraw 
before his troops were exposed to heavy loss from a 
cannonade. It was therefore evacuated on the night 
of the i6th, everything of value being taken away. In 
this siege the Southern loss, according to the official 
reports, was seventy-one killed, five hundred and four 
wounded, and about twenty-five missing. The Federal 
loss was one hundred and twenty-nine killed, seven hun- 
dred and sixty-two wounded, and two hundred and 
thirty-one missing. The retreat was in the direction of 
Meridian, and was continued till the neighborhood of 
Morton was reached. It was free from any pursuit wor- 
thy of the name. 

While at Jackson, Johnston received information of 
the fall of Port Hudson, which took place on the 9th. 
Its defenders held out until their provisions were ex- 
hausted and until intelligence of the surrender of Vicks- 
burg reached them, when they capitulated. 

The Vicksburg campaign gave rise to much contro- 
versy among Southern officers. President Davis, blind 
to the story told by written orders, was against John- 
ston, and endeavored to put on him the responsibility 
for the delinquencies and tardiness of himself and 
his favorite. Evidently for the purpose of making a 
record, he wrote to Johnston from Richmond on July 
15th an elaborate letter harshly reviewing his connec- 
tion with the campaign. Johnston defended himself in 
a reply dated August 8th, which, both in tone and sub- 
stance, forms a strong contrast to the President's letter, 
and which completely refuted every charge brought 
against him.* 

* These letters are too long for insertion. Those who are curious 
to compare the temper of the two communications will find both let- 
ters in Johnston's Narrative, pp. 230-252. A sense of justice prompted 
him to publish both. Mrs. Davis does not seem to feel a similar obli- 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 20/ 

Not content with this, the President telegraphed 
Pemberton on July 27th, suggesting to him that his 
report of the siege should be made " promptly and 
fully." Pemberton acted on the hint, and on August 
25th forwarded to Richmond direct a report so "full" 
as to take up, with its exhibits, seventy pages of the 
Official War Records. In addition the Secretary of 
War, ''at the suggestion of the President," wrote to 
Pemberton, who in the meantime had repaired to Rich- 
mond, pointing out certain weak points and asking him 
to elucidate them, which Pemberton endeavored to do 
in his letter of November loth. In these composi- 
tions Pemberton, knowing the way to the President's 
heart, sought to exonerate himself by attacking John- 
ston. The latter, after having with difficulty obtained 
a copy of Pemberton's report, which should in the first 
instance have been sent through him, replied in an of- 
ficial report, which was dated November loth, and was 
only ten pages in length. Up to that time he had never 
mentioned Pemberton except in complimentary language, 
and even this paper, though defending its author from 
an unjust and ungrateful attack, concludes in these re- 
gretful terms : 

" In this report I have been compelled to enter into 
many details, and to make some animadversion upon 
the conduct of General Pemberton. The one was no 
pleasant task, the other a most painful duty. Both have 
been forced upon me by the official report of General 
Pemberton, made to the War Department instead of to 
me, to whom it was due. 

"A proper regard for the good opinion of my Gov- 

gation. In her Memoir she publishes the President's letter, but not 
General Johnston's reply. The President's letter will also be found in 
vol. xxiv, pt. I, p. 202, of the Official War Records, and General 
Johnston's reply on p. 209 of the same volume. 



2o8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

ernment has compelled me, therefore, to throw aside 
that delicacy which I would gladly have observed toward 
a brother officer suffering much undeserved obloquy, and 
to show that in his short campaign General Pemberton 
made not a single movement in obedience to my orders, 
and regarded none of my instructions; and, finally, did 
not embrace the only opportunity to save his army — that 
given by my order to abandon Vicksburg."* 

Early in August President Davis directed that a 
court of inquiry, composed of Generals Robert Ran- 
som, Jr., Howell Cobb, and John Echols, should assem- 
ble at Montgomery to " inquire into the events of the 
campaigns of Mississippi and eastern Louisiana during 
the months of May, June, and July last, and especially 
as to the surrender of Vicksburg, of Port Hudson, and 
the evacuation of Jackson," This order, in its scope, 
was practically an investigation of Johnston ; but he re- 
ceived no notice of it till after the court was to meet. 
On his application he was authorized to attend, placing 
Hardee in command. Nothing came of the court of in- 
quiry. It was first adjourned over, and then directed to 



* The reports of Johnston and Pemberton will be found in vol. 
xxiv, pt. I, pp. 238-331, of the Official War Records. The Depart- 
ment allowed Pemberton, after he had seen Johnston's official report, 
to file an additional paper, which, far from communicating anything 
new, was merely another attack on Johnston. Johnston was not al- 
lowed to see these last two papers, or to have any opportunity of com- 
ment. Pcmberton's subsequent connection with the war is given in 
vol. ii, p. 526, of President Davis' Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government. After his Vicksburg campaign no troops could be in- 
duced to receive him, but it was thought that he might be intrusted 
with a mortar. He was with Lee's army ; and when his old antago- 
nist, Grant, was crossing James River in the summer of 1864, Pem- 
berton placed his mortar where it harassed the Union army in crossing. 
Thereupon Grant sent some troops, who repeated the Vicksburg ex- 
perience and captured the mortar. Pemberton escaped. 



FALL OF VICKSBURG. 



209 



"suspend its sessions till further orders." The letter of 
Johnston (of August 8th), the increasing light which 
was being shed on the campaign, the fact that Johnston 
was present to defend himself, and the high character of 
the gentlemen composing the court, showed where the 
blame would be placed, and the court was allowed to 
sink into oblivion. Late in July Johnston was relieved 
from the command of the Department of Tennessee, in 
accordance with the requests repeatedly made by him. 
There were no military operations of importance in his 
Department of the Mississippi ; and he was reduced to 
inactivity by the re-enforcements which he sent to 
Bragg, and which comprised nearly all his infantry. He 
patriotically urged that they should be sent to take part 
in the great battle. He remained inactive till the rout 
of Missionary Ridge. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

DALTON. 

Bragg's Tennessee campaign culminated in the great 
battle of Chickamauga, in which the infantry sent by 
Johnston bore a conspicuous part. It was another of 
the fruitless victories which were won by the Confed- 
erate army of Tennessee at heavy cost. The Confed- 
erate commander did not so utilize it as to derive any 
considerable advantage, but devoted himself to the 
more congenial occupation of quarreling with his sub- 
ordinates. Buckner, D. H. Hill, and Polk fell under his 
special displeasure ; and Longstreet was so impressed 
with his incapacity, that, in a letter of September 26th 
to Secretary Seddon, he said : "To express my convic- 
tions in a few words, our chief has done but one thing 
that he ought to have done since I joined his army : 
that was, to order the attack on the 20th. All other 
things that he has done he ought not to have done. I 
am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can 
save us or help us as long as we have our present com- 
mander." 

These differences became so notorious and so mis- 
chievous in their tendency that Mr. Davis repaired 
to Bragg's army himself, under the idea that his pres- 
ence would settle all discontent and silence all com- 
plaints against his favorite. He took Pemberton along 
with him, expecting to make him heir to one of the corps 
whose commanders he and Bragg were to displace. In 



DALTON. 211 

spite of the Vicksburg campaign and the universal hos- 
tility to Pemberton in the army, he still enjoyed the 
confidence of the President. 

Upon arriving at Bragg's headquarters and inquiring 
into affairs, President Davis sustained the latter against 
his generals, the most prominent of whom, despite their 
well-earned glory on previous fields, were sent to other 
points or practically relegated to retirement, and left 
him in command of the army. Pemberton, however, did 
not succeed in obtaining command of a corps. A double 
infliction of Bragg and Pemberton was more than even 
the long-suffering Army of Tennessee could endure ; and 
Pemberton was relegated to retirement.* 

The result of Bragg's retention, and of the departure 
of the generals in whom the troops reposed their con- 
fidence, was the greatest defeat which the Confederates 
sustained during the war. After Chickamauga the Fed- 
erals directed their principal efforts to that theatre of 
operations. Every department from Virginia westward 
was laid under contribution to re-enforce their army, 

* The authority for these statements as to Pemberton is the letter 
of Cooper to Bragg, dated October 4, 1863, asking whether he could 
be assigned to a corps, and stating that he " still possessed the con- 
fidence of the Executive " ; a letter to General Beauregard from his 
brother, dated October 10, 1863, and stating that " General Pemberton 
with his staff and baggage had accompanied the President, expecting 
to be the successor of General Polk, but abandoned his pretensions 
upon learning the opposition raised by the troops " ; and a letter from 
General W. W. Mackall to General Johnston, saying : *' Pemberton 
consulted ,me about staying here in command of a corps. I told him 
that there was not a division in this army that would be willing to 
receive him ; that I was sorry to be obliged to tell him so unpleas- 
ant a truth, but so it was. He told me B. [Bragg] wanted him to 
stay. I told him that B. ought to understand the temper of his army 
better than I did, but that we did not always agree upon the point. 
He goes away, however." These letters will be found in vol. xxx, 
pt. 4, pp. 727, 734, and 742, of the Official War Records. 
15 



212 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

which was huddled together at Chattanooga under the 
distant fire of the Southern artillery, and with a line of 
communication so difficult that supplies in sufficient 
quantities could not be obtained. Their best generals, 
Grant and Sherman, were sent to direct the manoeuvres 
for relief, and the immense resources of the North were 
devoted to its rehabilitation. Bragg, who from his lofty 
perch could look down upon these mighty preparations, 
and must have known that they were inevitably destined 
to be used in an offensive blow at him, proceeded to pre- 
pare for their reception by detaching Longstreet, with a 
third of his army, on an expedition against Knoxville, 
thus inviting disaster. It soon came, in the shape of an 
advance of Grant upon him with a force far stronger than 
that diminished army which under Bragg held the heights 
of Missionary Ridge. On November 26th Grant's troops 
gallantly stormed the strong Confederate lines and car- 
ried them, inflicting a loss of nearly seven thousand men 
in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and capturmg forty 
pieces of artillery. The resistance was not what might 
have been expected. Bragg, in his official report, states 
that *' no satisfactory excuse " could be given for it ; and 
there is none, except the impaired morale resulting from 
the dissensions among the officers and the lack of con- 
fidence in the commander. The Federals pursued to 
Ringgold, where the heroic Cleburne, with the rear 
guard, checked their pursuit, and enabled the Southern 
army to retire without further molestation to Dalton, 
where it halted — decimated, disheartened, and almost in 
process of dissolution. 

After this overwhelming reverse the President dared 
no longer to retain Bragg in command of the army in 
the field, though he could not entirely forego his so- 
ciety or dispense with his counsel. He therefore called 
him to Richmond and made him a sort of military di- 



DALTON. 



213 



rector, under General Orders No. 23, dated February 24, 
1864, as follows: ''General Braxton Bragg is assigned 
to duty at the seat of Government, and, under the 
direction of the President, is charged with the conduct 
of military operations in the armies of the Confed- 
eracy." 

This was the high position which Lee had occupied 
till called to the field after Johnston's disabling wound 
at Seven Pines, and which the President now conferred 
upon Bragg. In this position he had the right, " under 
the direction of the President," to supervise both Lee 
and Johnston in the coming campaign. 

His departure at once caused all eyes to be turned 
to Johnston as his proper successor. The army itself 
had been clamoring for him from the time of his 
assignment to the West, and now press and people co- 
alesced in urging his appointment. The President first 
offered the place to Hardee, who was one of the most 
earnest supporters of Johnston, and would only consent 
to fill it temporarily. At length, on December i6th, the 
President yielded to the universal demand, and sent 
Johnston the following order : 

" Richmond, December 16, j86j. 
"General J. E. Johnston: You will turn over 
the immediate command of the Army of Mississippi to 
Lieutenant-General Polk, and proceed to Dalton and 
assume command of the Army of Tennessee. ... A let- 
ter of instruction will be sent you at Dalton. 

" Jefferson Davis." 

In obedience to this order he at once repaired to 
Dalton and assumed command, issuing the following 
simple order to that effect : 



214 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

•* Dalton, Ga., December 21, iS6j. 
" In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the 
President, the undersigned has the honor to assume 
command of the Army of Tennessee. 

"J. E. Johnston, General.'' 

On his arrival he found a letter from Secretary Sed- 
don, dated December i8th, which contained instructions 
as to his future operations. It mainly was devoted to 
impressing on him what he might have been assumed to 
know — the importance of restoring the discipline, con- 
fidence, and prestige of the army ; and he was also in- 
formed that he should assume the offensive. In the 
reply, written on the 28th, Johnston explained that the 
army was far from being in condition to undertake an 
offensive campaign, being deficient in numbers, arms, 
subsistence stores, and field transportation. It would 
seem to be self-evident that an army which had just 
been routed could not assume the offensive against its 
victorious opponent without large re-enforcements ; but 
the President inaugurated an elaborate correspondence 
personally, and also through his Secretary of War and 
military adviser, urging an aggressive policy upon John- 
ston. He began this intervention by a letter dated De- 
cember 23d, which was mainly devoted to informing 
Johnston of the condition of his army — as if a civilian 
at Richmond could give any information of an army to 
a general who was among them and of them. The let- 
ter painted its condition in such roseate hues as were 
necessarily inconsistent with the terrible experience of 
Missionary Ridge, and expatiated upon the army's as- 
suming the offensive, as if all that was necessary for 
such a movement was a suggestion from Richmond. 
This correspondence, together with a similar one be- 
tween Jolinston and Bragg, extended through the winter 



DALTON. 



215 



and spring, and up to the very time that the forward 
march of the Northern army rendered offensive opera- 
tions impossible. Without attempting to recapitulate it, 
suffice it to say that Johnston desired to take the offen- 
sive, provided his army should be re-enforced and fitted 
with the supplies necessary for such an operation. The 
difference between him and his correspondents was 
merely as to the plan. The Richmond council wished 
him to advance with his inadequate force to the Tennes- 
see River, near Kingston, and to attempt its crossing ; 
and that Longstreet, who was in east Tennessee, should 
move around Knoxville and attempt a junction with 
Johnston, in which way it was hoped to separate the 
Northern forces at Knoxville and Chattanooga. To this 
scheme of the Aulic Council Johnston objected that, 
as the armies of Longstreet and himself were separated, 
with the enemy exactly between them, it might easily 
be frustrated by the Federals, who were free to attack 
either of the two Confederate bodies while in motion. 
He urged that re-enforcements intended to act with him 
should be sent to Dalton and joined to the army there, 
so as to render their junction independent of the enemy. 
His expectation was, that by the time his re-enforce- 
ments joined him the enemy would advance. Thus 
with his re-enforcements he might defeat his adversary 
at a distance from his base, and assume the offensive by 
pursuing him in the event of such a success. But the 
Richmond strategists could see no merit in any plan 
not their own, and notified Johnston that he could only 
obtain the re-enforcements for an offensive movement, 
quietly assuming, despite his repeated assurances, that 
he would not consent to an aggressive campaign. His 
letters and telegrams giving this assurance being ig- 
nored, Colonel B. S. Ewell, a member of his staff, who 
enjoyed his full confidence, was sent to Richmond to 



2i6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

explain his views to the Department, and his readiness 
to advance the moment his army was put in condition 
for such an enterprise. Colonel Ewell executed his 
commission, but with no better success than had at- 
tended Johnston's communications. Nothing could be 
done unless the Davis-Bragg conception of an attempt- 
ed junction in face of a foe superior in strength to the 
combined armies, and midway between them, was first 
accepted. Thus did Bragg, though ostensibly removed, 
continue to control the operations of his old army.* 

* Colonel Ewell's written report of his mission will be found in vol. 
xxxii, pt. 3, p. 839, of the Official War Records. Bragg's letters on 
the subject will be found in the same volume, on pp. 584, 592, and 614. 
Johnston's replies will be found in the same volume, on pp. 613, 636, 
649, 653, and 666. Longstreet was clearly of opinion that the point 
of junction suggested by Johnston was the proper one. In his letter 
of March 16, 1864, to the President (pp. 637-641 of the same volume) he 
says : " The two armies are about two hundred miles apart, with the 
enemy holding all the country between us. As soon as either army 
starts to move the enemy must get advised of it. He, occupying the 
railroad, will have great facilities for concentrating his forces against 
one or the other of these armies, and he would cripple the one that he 
might encounter so badly as to prevent the further progress of the 
campaign. This we must assume that he will do at all hazards, as 
there are no supplies in the country through which our armies would 
pass. ... It occurs to me that a better plan for making a campaign 
into middle Tennessee would be to re-enforce General Johnston in his 
present position by throwing the Mississippi troops and those of Gen- 
eral Beauregard's department and my own to that point." 

A Northern writer says, on the subject of this proposed aggressive : 
" In the light of subsequent events, it is plain that in failing to give 
adequate re-enforcements to Johnston, while General Grant's armies 
were widely separated and weakened by the temporary absence of 
veteran regiments, the Confederate authorities at Richmond rendered 
impossible the aggression for which they subsequently clamored. In 
December previous General Beauregard suggested as the only hope of 
success that Richmond and other important points should be fortified 
and garrisoned for defense, and that an immense army should be con- 



DALTON. 



217 



While this discussion was dragging its slow length 
along, Johnston assiduously applied himself to the im- 
provement of his army. Its effective strength, accord- 
ing to its field return of December 26, 1863, was only 
thirty-six thousand and seventeen, and it was dispirited 
and destitute, the infantry barefoot and half naked, the 
cavalry dismounted on account of the poor condition of 
their horses, and the artillery incapable of rapid move- 
ments from the same cause. Indeed, the resources of 



centrated against Grant at Chattanooga, or thrown in bold offense from 
Knoxville. Later, General Johnston's suggestions were somewhat 
similar, but were unheeded by Mr. Davis and his advisers. The 
Western army remained in diffusion until concentration as a necessity 
of defense, rather than a condition of aggression, was hurriedly effected. 
Longstreet's army was sent to General Lee, and from all the troops 
that so long menaced Knoxville only Martin's division of cavalry joined 
General Johnston, while almost all the national troops that wintered in 
east Tennessee were free to join the combination against him. The 
impracticable President had entertained visions of successful aggres- 
sion from Dalton, but had been, from choice or necessity, so sparing 
in provision for such enterprise that the thought of it, except in wildest 
vagary, could not be entertained. To require Johnston to advance 
with less than fifty thousand men against a combination of armies 
which in defense would greatly exceed one hundred thousand was to 
exact defeat. The fact that the Confederate President did not discern 
this revealed his incapacity as a revolutionary leader ; and his subse- 
quent criticisms of his ablest general for the nonaccomplishment of a 
palpable impossibility manifested the inveteracy of his self-conceit 
and his utter misapprehension of the situation in Georgia. His gen- 
eral had no choice of methods, but was confined to the defense of his 
position, between his enemy and the campaign region south of Resaca. 
Had he been able to assume the offensive, he could not have reached 
any vital point in the rear of Chattanooga without a long detour, in 
dependence for supplies upon a devastated country, or on wagon trans- 
portation from a remote base." — Van Home's Army of the Cumber- 
land, vol. ii, pp. 26, 27. (This work was written at the request and 
partly under the direction of General George H. Thomas, and from his 
military papers.) 



2i8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the Department were far too meager to furnish the sup- 
plies, transportation, and horses necessary to give it mo- 
bility, much less to take the offensive. In the infantry 
there was a deficiency of six thousand small arms; much 
of the artillery was of such light caliber and short range 
that it only exposed the gunners, and the armament of 
the cavalry was equally deficient. Johnston's efforts 
during the period of quiet allowed by the season were 
applied to removing these difficulties. He found it prac- 
tically necessary to reform and recreate an army, as he 
had so often done in previous stages of the conflict. So 
far as they depended on his exertions this was done. 
His first desire as to the army was to divide it into 
three corps, for he believed that such an arrangement 
would facilitate its handling in battle. He needed a 
lieutenant general, and asked for Whiting, whom he had 
known well and favorably in Virginia. Hardee was 
then his only lieutenant general. The application for 
Whiting being denied, he asked for the assignment of 
Major-General Lovell, in a letter to Cooper of January 
i6th, and at the same time repeated his desire for an 
organization of the army into three corps, saying, sadly, 
that in his difficult and responsible position he had not 
possessed such advantages as his predecessor, who as- 
sisted in the nomination of many of the principal officers 
of his army. The President, however, had no idea of 
losing this opportunity for advancing a favorite ; and, 
having failed after Chickamauga in saddling Pemberton 
upon the army, he seized this occasion to begin the fatal 
connection of John B. Hood with its fortunes. Even 
this assignment gave but two corps, and a third was not 
formed till the junction with Polk after the opening of 
the campaign. The good effects of these efforts toward 
increasing the comfort and discipline of the troops were 
soon apparent ; their spirits returned, laggards rejoined 



DALTON. 



219 



their commands, and by the beginning of active opera- 
tions, despite the transfer of Quarles' and Baldwin's 
brigades, which more than offset any re-enforcements, 
the army had increased to an effective total of 43,887, 
while its moral force had grown immeasurably. 

The special source of weakness was the artillery. A 
large proportion of the correspondence was devoted to 
this defect. It resulted, about the end of March, in a 
visit of General W. N. Pendleton for the purpose of an 
inspection. According to his report to Cooper, it then 
consisted of one hundred and eleven pieces, of which 
fifteen were six-pounders. In Pendleton's opinion they 
were worse than useless ; they only exposed valuable 
men and animals to hostile cannon, and even to mus- 
ketry which they could not silence. Twenty-seven were 
twelve-pounder howitzers, which, according to Pendle- 
ton, were scarcely more valuable. He recommended 
the addition of a number of guns of heavy caliber and 
of rifles, and the assignment there of officers from Vir- 
ginia to aid in perfecting its organization. The condi- 
tion of the horses was so feeble that they could not 
draw the guns in action, and they were necessarily kept 
some distance in the rear, where they might the more 
easily obtain food. These endeavors to improve all 
three arms were unremitting, and continued till active 
operations turned attention to much more important 
matters. 

During their progress the enemy was not entirely 
idle. Early in February Sherman set out on an expe- 
dition against Meridian, and Johnston was ordered from 
Richmond to detach enough infantry to Polk to enable 
him to defeat this operation. He obeyed the order, and 
sent Hardee with his corps of about seventeen thousand 
men, predicting at the time that he would be too late, 
which proved to be the fact ; for Sherman reached Me- 



220 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

riclian, destroyed it, and then returned before Polk and 
Hardee could overtake him. 

Information that Hardee had been detached reached 
Thomas at Chattanooga, and he was ordered by Grant 
to advance, with the object, as stated in his official re- 
port, " to gain possession of Dalton and as far south as 
possible." He sent on this expedition the Fourteenth 
Corps, Cruft's division of the Fourth, and Sixth Regi- 
ments of cavalry or mounted infantry, aggregating 
about twenty -seven thousand men. They marched 
upon Dalton, partly by way of Tunnel Hill to the west 
of Rocky Face, and partly through Crow Valley. After 
skirmishing with the Confederates to no result, they 
returned without accomplishing their object. On the 
return, Thomas in an official report stated that he with- 
drew, as he was convinced that the rebel army at Dal- 
ton largely outnumbered his force, and as the move- 
ment was a complete success, since it had caused the 
recalling of re-enforcements sent to oppose Sherman. 
He did not capture Dalton, which was his first object ; 
and he certainly did not cause the recall of Hardee, 
since Sherman's return from Meridian began on Feb- 
ruary 2ist, and Hardee was ordered to return on the 
23d, before information of the movement of Thomas 
had reached the Confederate commander. The opera- 
tions, involving a loss of but a few hundred on each 
side, were not positive enough to cause the absence of 
Hardee to be felt. In fact, one of his brigades (Gran- 
berry's) had returned in time to take part, recapturing 
Dug Gap on the 26th. 

General Thomas is also in error in supposing himself 
to have been outnumbered. Cruft's official report gives 
the strength of his division at 5,643. The February re- 
turn puts the strength of the Fourteenth Corps at 17,623. 
These aggregated 23,266, to which must be added six 



DALTON. 



221 



regiments and four detachments of cavalry, probably 
about 3,000 men. According to the return of February 
20th, Johnston's army, weakened by the absence of Har- 
dee, aggregated 20,516 effectives, of which many were 
in the rear for the purpose of subsisting. 

Nothing noteworthy transpired after this tentative 
affair until active operations. In his labors of prepara- 
tion Johnston was much relieved by his excellent staff. 
The chief was General W. W. Mackall, whom he had 
known intimately as a gentleman of the highest char- 
acter and attainments, and as an officer of talent and 
experience. Even Bragg bore testimony to his worth. 
His services were inestimable, and his cordial relations 
with Johnston continued throughout their long lives, 
which were nearly co-extensive. Hardly less useful in 
their respective spheres were the other members. 



CHAPTER XV. 

TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 

The great disasters which befell the Southern cause 
in 1863 raised the confidence of the North to the high- 
est pitch, and they hoped to see an early termination of 
the war. To insure it, immense preparations were made 
and expeditions organized which were to move simul- 
taneously under the general direction of their new com- 
mander m chief against the depleted armies of the Con- 
federacy, with the object of so pressing each one that it 
could not re-enforce any other, and of finally smothering 
them with superior strength. Nothing was omitted 
which could be accomplished by organization or inven- 
tion. The mechanical genius of the North, backed by 
its unbounded resources and earnest patriotism, was 
taxed to its utmost to equip and arm its soldiers and 
minister to their comfort. Recruits and new levies 
raised their numerical strength to its maximum, and, 
under the intelligent guidance of a single head, they 
pressed forward in concert to the attainment of a com- 
mon object. Concentration and advance were the or- 
der of the day, as Banks moved against Taylor, Sigel 
against Breckinridge, Sherman against Johnston, and 
Grant against Lee. 

It is an error to suppose that geographical points 
were the Northern objectives. However much the 
course of subsequent events may have tended to con- 
firm this idea, the fact is that Grant's objective was not 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



223 



Richmond, but Lee ; Sherman's was not Atlanta, but 
Johnston. When Grant, as directing the entire opera- 
tions of the national armies, came to mature his scheme 
for the approaching campaign, he reasoned well and 
wisely that as long as the Southern array of tattered 
uniforms and bright muskets was intact, his task would 
be incomplete, no matter how much territory he might 
overrun ; and that the essential step in crushing resist- 
ance was the destruction of the military power of the 
South, upon which alone it depended. That accom- 
plished, submission would follow as a necessary conse- 
quence. In his memoirs he says that his general plan 
was " to concentrate all the force possible against the 
Confederate armies in the field " ; and General Sherman 
has well explained his part of the intended programme 
when he says in his autobiography : " Neither Atlanta, 
nor Augusta, nor Savannah was the objective, but the 
army of Joseph Johnston, go where it might." 

In his letter of April 4th to Sherman, recapitulating 
his plans, Grant defined the work assigned to his trusted 
lieutenant in the following language : " You I propose 
to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to 
get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as 
you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their 
war resources." Until that army was crippled, the ad- 
vance of Sherman into the interior was but the more 
hazardous as it progressed, and the " March to the Sea " 
the dream of an enthusiast. 

In carrying out this plan, the two main objects were 
the armies of Lee and Johnston, which, thinned though 
they were from the heavy losses of the preceding year 
and the inability of the South to re-enforce them, were 
the two strongest of the Confederacy. Despite the un- 
wearied efforts of their chiefs, they had increased but 
slightly in strength ; and in outfit and armament they 



224 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

formed a striking contrast to their foes. Hopeless of 
any considerable re-enforcements after the opening of 
the campaign, nothing remained for them but to meet 
their adversaries with the tenacity which had so far dis- 
tinguished them, with the expectation of prolonging the 
struggle until the patience of the North should be ex- 
hausted. 

The forces assigned to the accomplishment of the 
task of subjugation were commensurate with its magni- 
tude. General Sherman had in his departments three 
large armies subject to his orders. Out of these he 
formed his active army, intending to maintain it at 
about 100,000 men during the campaign. The difficul- 
ties of supplies made it easier to handle a force of this 
size constantly strengthened from the rear than a larger 
one. When he moved forward, his force actually con- 
sisted of 98,797 men and 254 guns, exclusive of three 
divisions of cavalry, which made his total strength at 
that time number 110,123, of which 93,131 were infantry, 
12,455 cavalry, and 4,537 artillery. Each of these was 
selected from the best available. The 254 guns of the 
artillery were the pick of the 530 pieces belonging to the 
three armies whose aggregate strength was before Sher- 
man for selection. The number of calibers was reduced 
more than half, nothing under a ten-pounder was al- 
lowed, and the supply of ammunition was unstinted. 
The infantry were the veterans who had in the previous 
campaigns driven their antagonists out of Kentucky, 
northern Mississippi, and Tennessee ; unlike their com- 
panions of the East, they were buoyant with the pride 
and confidence of constant progression. Again facing 
the same men who had fled before them in wild panic from 
the difficult heights of Missionary Ridge, and led by the 
favorite chiefs who had scaled those heights at their head, 
they hoped to make short work of their decimated enemy. 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCPIEE. 



225 



The army of Johnston, which was their selected foe, 
was in every respect far inferior. Its effective strength 
was, according to its return of April 30, 1864, 43,887 men, 
to which should be added the Thirty-seventh Mississippi 
and Sixty-third Georgia, whose strength was 1,214, mak- 
ing a total of 45,101. This comprised Cantey's Brigade, 
which (including the Thirty-seventh Mississippi) had an 
effective strength of 1,795 infantry and 148 artillery, and 
which was at Rome. 

Of this number, 39,374 were infantry, 2,812 artillery, 
and 2,419 cavalry. The number of guns, according to 
the return, was 144 ; but this included the thirty-six 
pieces of the reserve (as the above total of 2,812 includes 
817 men of the reserve). It also included eighteen pieces 
belonging to the cavalry, which was in the rear, recruit- 
ing horses. 

The artillery was as inferior to that of Sherman in 
caliber, range, and equipment as m number. In the 
previous chapter allusion has been made to its deficien- 
cies, and it had been out of the power of General John- 
ston to obviate them. There was still a large number 
of the six-pounders and the twelve-pound howitzers con- 
demned by General Pendleton ; and the condition of the 
horses was far from satisfactory.* 

* The artillery was as follows : 

Ten-pound Parrotts 7 

Twenty-pound Parrotts i 

Three-inch rifles 5 

Twelve-pound light Napoleons 54 

Six- pound guns 20 

Twelve-pound howitzers. 25 

Total 112 

This shows only thirteen rifled pieces out of the total of 112. Though 
data exhibiting the exact composition of Sherman's artillery are not ac- 
cessible to the author, it is evident, from the report of ammunition ex- 



226 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

But the serious defect was the meager supply of am- 
munition, which compelled the artillerists to endure the 
incessant pounding of their rivals with rare replies, 
and to reserve their ammunition for charges and con- 
siderable engagements. This continued throughout the 
subsequent operations; and General Johnson well ex- 
presses the inconvenience to which it gave rise when, in 
an article on the campaign published in 1887, he says 
that he would gladly have given all the mountains, 
woods, ravines, and rivers of Georgia for such a supply 
of artillery ammunition proportionately as General Sher- 
man had. 

On the 5th of May the advance of the consolidated 
armies of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee 
commenced, each being under a separate commander, 
subordinate to Sherman, the leader of the whole. These 
subordinates were themselves towers of strength, and 
only inferior to Sherman in the qualities which make the 
successful general. At the head of the Army of the 
Cumberland marched Thomas, the " Stonewall " of 
Chickamauga, who from Mill Spring to Nashville added 
to his reputation in every fight. The Army of the Ten- 
nessee followed McPherson, Grant's trusted lieutenant 
in his Western campaigns, and enjoying his trust as fully 
as Sherman himself. The Army of the Ohio was led by 
Schofield, whose services, great as they had previously 
been, were to be conspicuous in the fall of that year 
against Hood. 

In this advance Thomas was moved upon Tunnel 
Hill, Schofield upon Varnell's Station, inclining to the 
right, and McPherson upon Villanow and Snake Creek 
Gap, with orders to seize the railroad between Resaca 
and Tilton, and, after breaking it, to withdraw to Snake 

pended. that a large proportion were rifled, and that these were given 
a prominent share of the work of the campaign. 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 2^7 



Creek Gap and be prepared to strike the Confederatt 
flank in the act of retreat. As Johnston's army was 
Sherman's objective, it was the policy of the latter to 
force a decisive battle as quickly as possible, while he 
was near his own base and the Confederates were far 
from theirs. This was Sherman's own opinion at the 
outset, as is manifest from his letter of May 5th to 
McPherson, in which he says : *' Do not fail in that 
event to make the most of the opportunity by the most 
vigorous attack possible, as it may save us from what 
we have most reason to apprehend — a slow pursuit, in 
which he gains strength as we lose it." 

From the direction of Sherman's columns it was ap- 
parent that he did not intend to fight east of Rocky 
Face, which extends to the west of Dalton in a north- 
erly direction and terminates but a few miles to the 
north of that place, but that he would use this ridge as 
a protection to a flanking movement, while also endeav- 
oring to force its various gaps. But on their approach 
the Southern army was formed to meet an advance by 
either line, with Stewart's and Bate's divisions guard- 
ing Mill Creek Gap, Cheatham on Stewart's right along 
the crest, Stevenson across Crow Valley joining Stew- 
art's right, Hindman on Stevenson's right, Cleburne in 
front of Dalton, and Walker in reserve. Dug Gap, far- 
ther south, was held by a small force of Arkansas and 
Kentucky troops. 

On the 8th the Confederates were vigorously at- 
tacked at Dug Gap, at Mill Creek Gap, and on each side 
of the latter. The weak force at Dug Gap gallantly 
held its ground till re-enforced by Cranberry's Texans 
under the personal direction of Hardee, which, with the 
strength of their position, enabled them to repulse re- 
peated assaults and inflict a loss much disproportionate 
to their own. 
16 



228 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

The attacks in the vicinity of Mill Creek Gap, made 
in larger force and meeting larger force, were also re- 
pulsed with great loss. The story of the other assaults 
was the same, the Confederates being under cover and 
suffering far less than their assailants. 

During these operations McPherson had debouched 
from Snake Creek Gap upon Resaca, which was held by 
two brigades under Cantey. They were on their way 
from Polk's army, and had been halted here to defend 
this important point. By aid of their fortifications 
they held the place against McPherson's efforts until 
the divisions of Cleburne, Walker, and Hindman, under 
the command of Hood, were sent down from Dalton. 
McPherson, fearing for his own force, withdrew to the 
Gap and fortified it. This move, and a successful recon- 
noissance by Wheeler around Rocky Face, indicated that 
Sherman, abandoning his attempts against Mill Creek 
and Dug Gaps, was following McPherson with his main 
army. This necessitated on the part of the Confeder- 
ates a withdrawal from Dalton to Resaca, to prevent 
Sherman from interposing between them and Atlanta. 
The movement was therefore made, Resaca being held 
by the constantly arriving troops of Polk's army until 
the main army arrived and took position. On the 13th 
the two arjnies confronted each other around this point, 
Polk forming the Confederate left from the Oostenaula, 
Hardee the center, and Hood the right, extending to 
the Connesauga. Polk's arrival had added about twelve 
thousand men to the Southern numbers. 

In this position fighting ensued along the lines, the 
Confederates holding their ground and assuming the of- 
fensive on their right with some success. But on the 
left a portion of Polk's troops was driven by an impetu- 
ous charge from a hill commanding the railroad bridge ; 
and information was also received that the Federal 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



229 



forces, protected in their flanking movement by the 
Oostenaula, were crossing the river some distance be- 
low. This menace, being a repetition of the Snake 
Creek Gap manoeuvre, and equally threatening to the 
Southern line of retreat, necessarily suspended the 
proposed attack by Hood upon the enemy's left, and 
caused the dispatch of Walker to meet it. A pontoon 
bridge a mile up the river and a road constructed to it 
during the night by the intelligent energy of Colonel 
Pressman, prevented any inconvenience from the loss of 
the position by Polk's troops. 

The next day (the 15th), upon information that the 
rumored crossing of the Oostenaula was untrue, the idea 
of an attack by Hood was recurred to, and Stevenson 
resumed the position which he had occupied. Here he 
placed a battery of four guns in front of his line of bat- 
tle, which provoked a gallant charge upon it by the ene- 
my under Colonel Benjamin Harrison.* His regiment 
was a new one, and this was its first engagement. 

It signalized its baptism of fire by this charge, cap- 
turing the guns, but being too weak to bring them off. 
The guns lay between the two armies equally com- 
manded by the fire of both till night, when, on the with- 
drawal of the Confederates, they fell into the hands of 
their gallant captors, whose valor was established by the 
loss of one hundred and seventy-three men from that 
regiment alone. But, despite their bloody price, they 
had the satisfaction of capturing the only artillery which 
was lost by Johnston in battle during the campaign, for 
he lost no other guns than these. 

Just as Hood was about to resume his advance the 
crossing of the Oostenaula by the Federals was con- 
firmed, and this again suspended it ; though the failure 

* Late President of the United States. 



230 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

of General Stewart to receive the suspending order 
in time involved him in an unsupported attack and a 
bloody repulse. 

This extension of the Federal right, requiring on the 
part of the Southern army a line parallel to its direction 
of retreat, and therefore very hazardous, necessitated 
the abandonment of Resaca, which was safely accom- 
plished on the night of the 15th, the troops marching 
southward by parallel roads. Thus the close of this 
stage of the campaign found the two antagonists south 
of the Oostenaula, the Confederates having been forced 
back, not by direct assault but by two skilful flanking 
movements, the first protected by Rocky Face and the 
second by the Oostenaula. So far Johnston's army was 
intact, and the slow pursuit which Sherman most appre- 
hended was the course which the campaign was taking. 

Discussing in later writings this initial portion of the 
campaign, General Sherman has said that it was his 
plan merely to feign at Dalton until McPherson had 
planted himself on the Confederate line of retreat, and 
has commented unfavorably upon the action of the lat- 
ter in withdrawing to the Gap, instead of placing him- 
self astride the railroad north of Resaca and fighting 
all comers. If this was his plan, it is strange that out 
of an army of one hundred and ten thousand men he 
gave McPherson only twenty-four thousand and reserved 
the balance for the feint. McPherson's movement was 
not a surprise to Johnston. He knew of it on the 8th, 
and he also knew that there was sufficient force at Re- 
saca to hold the place until he could comer to its rescue 
over roads prepared beforehand. He would have asked 
nothing better than to have McPherson leave the Gap 
and take a position across the railroad. A strong force 
thrown around McPherson's left would have cut off his 
retreat, while the main army, nearly double his numbers, 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



231 



would have turned upon him from Dalton and driven 
him back upon the garrison at Resaca to certain de- 
struction.* .Vandamme's experience after the battle of 
Dresden illustrates the peril to a force that entangles 
itself with a retreating foe. 

After these operations the Confederates continued 
their southward march, finding no position contracted 
enough to hold with their numbers. Hardee moved by 
the western road, holding the enemy off by skirmishing, 
and Hood and Polk by the eastern. The retrograde 
was leisurely, and was continued to Adairsville, where 
Johnston had expected to find a good position, but was 
disappointed. On the way the army received a.welcome 
addition in Jackson's cavalry division of Polk's corps, 
about thirty-nine hundred strong. 

At Adairsville the road to the south divides, one fork 
following the railroad to Kingston, where it turns east 
to Cassville, while the other runs due south from Adairs- 
ville to the same point. In the hope that the Federal 
army would separate, with one column on each road, 
Johnston ordered Hardee, on the western, to hold in 
check the western hostile column at Kingston, placed 
Polk just north of Cassville in position to engage the 
column advancing on the direct road from Adairsville, 
and moved Hood upon a parallel road east of the 
Adairsville road to a position from which he was to 
assail the left flank of the force engaged with Polk. 

* In a conversation with the author a few years ago General 
Johnston -expressed himself thus on this subject : 

" I would have given all the money I had, and all I ever expected 
to have, if McPherson had given me such a chance. I could easily 
have stolen a night march upon Sherman and fallen upon McPherson 
with such superior force as to crush him. The fact that I transferred 
Hood's three divisions on the night of the gth proves its feasibility. I 
have always thought that McPherson acted exactly as he should have 
done." 



232 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Instead of doing this, Hood, acting upon a report that 
the enemy was approaching from the direction of Can- 
ton, or due east (although they had for days been in 
constant observation from the other direction), aban- 
doned his movement without reporting his act, and thus 
lost the time necessary for the execution of the plan, 
which was only possible while the Federal forces were 
separated by the greatest interval and dependent on 
poor cross-roads for communication. Thus this op- 
portunity passed, and nothing remained but to aban- 
don the scheme. Thereupon the army withdrew to the 
ridge south of Cassville, which was occupied by John- 
ston in force, with the intention of here making a stand. 
He regarded the position as an admirable one, and 
ranged Hood's corps upon the right, Polk in the center, 
and Hardee upon the left. Fully resolved to fight here, 
he issued the following battle order: 

** Soldiers of the Army of Tennessee: You have dis- 
played the highest quality of the soldier — firmness in 
combat, patience under toil. By your courage and skill 
you have repulsed every assault of the enemy. By 
marches by day and by marches by night you have 
defeated every attempt upon your communications. 
Your communications are secured. You will now turn 
and march to meet his advancing columns. Fully con- 
fiding in the conduct of the officers, the courage of the 
soldiers, I lead you to battle. We may confidently trust 
that the Almighty Father will still reward the patriots' 
toils and bless the patriots' banners. Cheered by the 
success of our brothers in Virginia and beyond the 
Mississippi, our efforts will equal theirs. Strengthened 
by his support, those efforts will be crowned with the 
like glories." The reception of the order by the troops 
proved that they were ready for combat, and encour- 
aged their commander in his decision. 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



233 



While watching the formation of the men, General 
Johnston was approached by General Shoup, his chief 
of artillery, and warned that a part of the line would be 
enfiladed by cannon placed on a distant hill in front of 
the right. He gave directions to guard against this 
contingency by the construction of traverses, and by sug- 
gesting to the officer commanding there that he might 
occupy some ravines which would shelter his troops, 
ready to resume his place in the line in the event of an 
assault. That night he met Generals Hood and Polk 
by invitation at the headquarters of the latter, when 
they united in urging him to abandon the position, and 
asserted that they would not be able to hold their lines, 
as they would be rendered untenable by the enemy's 
artillery placed on this hill. After a long discussion 
Johnston reluctantly yielded, from the fear that this 
opinion of the corps commanders might tend to cause 
the inability which they expressed. Hardee, on hearing 
of the decision, remonstrated, and expressed confidence 
in his power to hold his post, though his corps had 
little or no advantage of ground. But the decision was 
adhered to, and before daybreak the next morning the 
army silently withdrew and took up its march to the 
Etowah — a step which, as Johnston said in his official 
report, he always had regretted. The Etowah was 
crossed about noon on the 20th. 

At this stage both armies paused for a couple of 
days, Johnston to give his men rest, and Sherman to 
repair his railroad and make ready for his next move. 
The direct line of retreat for the Confederates was along 
the railroad, which would give them the strong position 
of AUatoona Pass wherein to hold their pursuers at bay. 
Sherman, when a young lieutenant, had ridden through 
this part of the country, and noted well its topography. 
In the light of this knowledge he decided not to move 



234 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

upon this position direct, but to compel its relinquish- 
ment by marching on Dallas. The effect of this able 
manoeuvre would be to force the Confederates to con- 
front him there, far to the southwest of Allatoona, 
which would enable him, by a gradual extension of his 
left under cover of the flying breastworks, in the con- 
struction of which his men were so adept, to reach the 
railroad to the south of Allatoona. He issued orders 
for this movement to commence on the 23d, sending 
Thomas, the center, by Euharlee and Stilesborough ; 
Schofield, the left, on Burnt Hickory by roads to the 
east of Thomas ; and McPherson, his right, toward Dal- 
las by roads farthest to the west. 

Meanwhile the Southern commander sent the enter- 
prising Wheeler across the Etowah, with a strong body 
of cavalry, to see what was going on in the army of his 
enemy. Wheeler crossed the Etowah on the 22d at a 
point some distance above the railroad bridge and 
penetrated to the enemy's rear as far as Cassville, where, 
on the 24th, he defeated the guard of a supply train, 
inflicting heavy loss; and after destroying such of the 
wagons as he could not secure, he brought into the lines 
as a welcome prize a large number of wagons and a 
larger number of teams, with his prisoners. The infor- 
mation gained in this reconnoissance, together with the 
reports from Jackson's Cavalry down the river, enabled 
Johnston to detect his adversary's design. To meet 
him upon this new line, he at once sent Hardee's and 
Polk's corps to throw themselves across the road lead- 
ing from Dallas to Atlanta, following them up with 
Hood's corps, which was to form upon their right. By 
the 25th the army was in position across the path of 
their advancing enemy, Hardee constituting the left, 
Polk the center, and Hood the right, the center of the 
latter being near New Hope Church. The Federal 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



235 



line extended from Dallas in the direction of Alla- 
toona. 

That afternoon Hood's center division (A. P. Stew- 
art's) was assailed by Hooker's corps, advancing in deep 
order. Two of the brigades had some protection from 
logs which they had barely had time to throw into the 
form of a rough rampart. The attack was of the most 
determined and gallant character, only pausing when 
within fifty paces of the Southern line, and the Federal 
loss was commensurate with the courage of the assault. 
So heavy was the fighting in this vicinity that the peace- 
ful name of *' New Hope Church " no longer suited the 
invaders, and they called it " Hell-Hole," as conveying 
a better idea of their experience at the spot. 

After this fight Sherman recurred to the tactics of 
extending his left, which necessitated the transfer of 
Polk to the right of Hood, Hardee closing upon Hood's 
left. This race of flying breastworks occupied two days 
without serious fighting; but on the morning of the 27th, 
in the vicinity of Pickett's Mill, Cleburne's division was 
furiously assailed by Howard's corps. Here, too, the at- 
tack was of the most fearless nature, attaining a point 
less than twenty paces from the Confederate lines ; but 
the coolness of Cleburne's men and their well-directed 
fire repulsed it with great slaughter. After the Fed- 
erals had withdrawn discomfited, Cleburne advanced 
and captured a number of prisoners who had taken 
shelter in a friendly ravine. 

It was in this action that, after three soldiers had 
been successively killed in trying to save a Federal 
standard which was in danger of falling into the hands 
of the Confederates, a fourth, braving the fate of his 
companions, succeeded in bearing it away. The Fed- 
erals had an opportunity the next morning to partially 
avenge this repulse. Bate's division assailed their 



236 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

right, under the wrong impression that it had been much 
weakened, but was repulsed with a loss of several hun- 
dred men. 

The next morning it was intended to attack the Fed- 
eral left at daybreak, Hood to commence the movement 
and the other corps to join successively. Long after 
the appointed time a message was received from him to 
the effect that he had found a division of the Federal 
left thrown back and intrenched. As the loss of time 
rendered the attempt inexpedient, even if it had not been 
so originally, the plan was abandoned. Nothing but 
cavalry affairs and skirmishing occupied the next few 
days. By the 4th of June Sherman had reached the 
railroad, holding it as far south as Big Shanty, thus 
reapmg the fruits of his masterly manoeuvre, and press- 
ing the Confederates back to a position extending from 
Lost Mountain by Gilgal Church to the railroad, which 
covered all roads leading from Marietta. For several 
days no fighting of consequence took place, Sherman 
being engaged in repairing his railroad, and Johnston in 
strengthening the positions where he expected the next 
fighting to occur. He was compelled to fortify his po- 
sitions beforehand, for the great scarcity of intrenching 
tools in his army, and the fact that Sherman had a large 
pioneer corps to work while his soldiers slept, rendered 
it impossible to keep pace with their foes in field for- 
tifying. At this time General Sherman was re-enforced 
by the Seventeenth Corps, numbering nine thousand ef- 
fectives. 

The constantly increasing length of Sherman's com- 
munications rendered his situation critical if they could 
be seized by a strong force in his rear and permanent 
injury inflicted on his railroad, already severely taxed 
to supply his needs. Any lengthy interruption in the 
receipt of his daily supplies of ammunition and provi- 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



237 



sions would have compelled him to attack on his adver- 
sary's terms or to retreat. 

Johnston, alive to this, had from the outset endeav- 
ored to secure the organization of such an expedition. 
As early as May 7th, before Polk had joined, he had 
asked him by telegraph whether he could not throw a 
cavalry force into middle Tennessee ; and on May loth 
he repeated the suggestion to Polk, and to S. D. Lee, his 
successor in Mississippi. On June 3d, in telegrams to 
Bragg and S. D. Lee, he renewed the request, claiming 
that such a step, if successful in breaking Sherman's 
communications, might produce great results. He re- 
newed the recommendation on the nth, 12th, 13th, 
i6th, and 26th. On the latter date Bragg replied for 
the first time, saying briefly that there was no force 
available for the purpose. It was not until July nth 
that President Davis communicated to Johnston his 
ideas on the subject. They were, that a strong cavalry 
detachment should be sent from his own army and 
charged with that duty. As Johnston needed all his 
cavalry, not only to protect his own communications 
but also to hold portions of his lines against the supe- 
rior numbers of his foe, this did not meet the approval 
of his judgment. General Hood, when in command later 
in the campaign, thought better of it. He adopted the 
President's strategy, sent off his cavalry, and at once 
Sherman's cavalry were upon his communications and 
Atlanta fell. 

Had, Johnston's suggestion been acted upon, and a 
strong body of horse under the gifted Forrest been sent 
upon such an expedition, the story of that campaign 
might have been reversed. In the view of the Adminis- 
tration, the protection of Mississippi and Alabama from 
raids was of more importance than the defeat of this in- 
vasion. It was but another phase of the old question 



238 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

on which President Davis and General Johnston had dif- 
fered from the outbreak of the war, each with equal sin- 
cerity and positiveness — the question of the relative 
wisdom of concentration for decisive operations or dif- 
fusion to protect territory. 

It was the 14th before the Union army again com- 
menced to press the Confederates in their new position. 
Here Pine Mountain was in advance of the main line, 
and was held by Bate's division of Hardee's corps. As 
Hardee apprehended that from its advanced station it 
was liable to be cut off, Johnston, in company with him 
and Polk, visited the hill to examine it. The group at- 
tracted the fire of a Federal battery, one of whose shots 
killed General Polk. His corps was assigned temporarily 
to Loring. 

The abandonment of Pine Mountain — which was de- 
cided upon after this inspection — caused a withdrawal, 
first to a line behind Mud Creek, which was found to be 
partly enfiladed ; and hence the army withdrew to yet 
another position, part of which included Kenesaw Moun- 
tain. This was occupied on the 19th, Hardee being on 
the left, across the road from Lost Mountain to Ma- 
rietta, Loring being in the center, of which Kenesaw 
was part, and Hood on the right. Noye's Creek was in 
front, but it was swollen by recent rains, and Sherman 
availed himself of this to extend his right and intrench. 
This necessitated the transfer of Hood to Hardee's left. 
Hence the Confederate position was parallel to its line 
of communication, which rendered it very perilous. 

On the 22d occurred the affair of Gulp's Farm, which 
was a serious check to the Confederates. This was upon 
the Confederate left, and was between Hood on one side 
and Hooker and Schofield on the other. Hood, after 
repulsing an attack, assumed the offensive and attempted 
to capture some artillery strongly posted on a hill and 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



239 



gallantly defended. The result was a disastrous repulse, 
with a loss of about one thousand men. These opera- 
tions were the prelude to the great battle of Kenesaw 
Mountain. Till then Sherman had abstained from direct 
assaults, and had wisely used his superior strength to 
the best advantage by taking position near his antago- 
nist, intrenching a portion of his army, and flanking his 
adversary with the remainder. Such a movement here 
would involve leaving his railroad and taking supplies 
with him. He resolved to risk the chance of an assault, 
hoping to find a weak spot at which he might break 
through. He reasoned that the immense results of suc- 
cess, if achieved, would justify the attempt, for it would 
probably mean the destruction of the Army of Tennes- 
see and a speedy termination of the war. His lieuten- 
ants agreed with him, and the 27th of June was chosen 
as the day for the battle. The Southern army was still 
in the Kenesaw lines. With great difficulty a few guns 
had been dragged by hand to the summit of Little Kene- 
saw, which gave a fine position from which to play upon 
the Federals below. There was space for but few pieces, 
however. The Northern army concentrated a large num- 
ber against them, and for some days before the grand 
assault the artillery duel had been progressing. Though 
Kenesaw was a mountain in name, it was hardly so in 
fact ; for the Federal artillerists were not only able to 
attain its summit with their projectiles, but even to 
shoot entirely over it, and create consternation among 
the Confederate teamsters on the other side. 

The points selected by Sherman for his principal ef- 
forts were Featherston's right and French's left, of Lor- 
ing's corps ; and Cheatham's right and Cleburne's left, 
of Hardee's. Logan was to move against Featherston, 
Howard against French, and Palmer against Cheatham 
and Cleburne. Each was to be strongly supported. The 



240 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

selected points of attack nearest the railroad were on 
high ground ; the other was south of the mountain on 
rolling ground, and was in some places not protected by 
abatis and head logs. Preparatory to the assault, 
skirmishing and artillery fire commenced along the 
whole line of the two armies, and the assailants formed 
for the advance in deep columns with narrow fronts. 

The story of the three assaults was the same. Noth- 
ing could surpass the gallantry w^hich the assailants dis- 
played ; but it was in vain, for everywhere they were 
met with equal courage, and were in no case able to 
break the lines of the defenders. 

Logan's attack first struck the Twelfth Louisiana, 
which was some distance in advance, deployed as skir- 
mishers. They held their ground until the Federal line 
was almost upon them, and then retired to the main 
line. Logan's troops impetuously followed, receiving a 
destructive fire not only from Scott's Infantry in front, 
but from enfilading artillery. No troops could with- 
stand it, yet they advanced till they reached a point 
near the Confederate works, where they protected them- 
selves as best they could and obstinately refused to 
withdraw. 

Howard's attack fell upon Cockrell's Brigade of 
French's division and a part of Walker's division. Its 
determination was equally conspicuous and equally fu- 
tile, and many of the dead fell upon the very slope of 
the Confederate intrenchments. After losing the chival- 
rous Harker, and many others less distinguished perhaps 
but equally courageous, it was also arrested. 

But the heaviest assault fell upon Cheatham, and, 
despite the appalling loss inflicted upon them, the Union 
men reached a point so near the Confederate lines that 
it was safer to remain than to withdraw. At one time 
the aspect of affairs was so threatening that only a 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



241 



prompt advance of part of Cheatham's reserve prevented 
a penetration of the Confederate works. This point in 
the line was named by the troops the " Dead angle," 
from the number of Federal dead counted there after 
the fight was over. 

In Cleburne's front occurred one of the prettiest epi- 
sodes of the civil war. In the heat of the conflict the 
undergrowth and dry wood of the forest was set on fire 
by the artillery, and the Federal wounded were threat- 
ened with a death more awful than that which they had 
already braved v/ith such fortitude. The Confederates, 
observing this, called to their foes to come and remove 
their disabled comrades. By common consent a truce was 
declared for the purpose, many of the Southern troops 
assisted in the task, and the men who a few moments 
before had been contending in a death struggle now 
vied with each other in the humane work of carrying 
their helpless fellow-creatures from this dangerous local- 
ity. When the chivalrous duty was accomplished the 
truce was declared at an end, and they again became 
enemies. 

In this battle the Federal loss was about twenty-five 
hundred, and the Confederate about five hundred, ac- 
cording to the official reports. Its unsuccessful issue 
convinced Sherman that he could gain nothing by direct 
onslaughts, and induced him to resort once more to the 
flank extensions by means of which he had so far in the 
campaign forced Johnston out of his successive selected 
positions. Pausing for a short time to make arrange- 
ments for this manoeuvre, which involved leaving the 
railroad for a time, by the collection of the supplies 
necessary to insure its success, Sherman commenced it 
on July 2d by transferring McPherson to his right, to 
strengthen Schofield, and by threatening with his cavalry 
a crossing of the Chattahoochee near Sandtown, several 



2^2 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

miles below the railroad bridge, the river below the 
bridge being guarded only by some Georgia militia un- 
der General Gustavus W. Smith. This brought the 
Union right as near to Atlanta as the Southern left, 
forcing the latter to fall back or hold a long line paral- 
lel to their railroad. In consequence the Kenesaw 
position was abandoned, and the Confederates withdrew 
to a position several miles south, which crossed the rail- 
road at Smyrna and on its left curved southwardly, pro- 
tected in front by Nickajack Creek. The position had 
been prepared beforehand in anticipation of this con- 
tingency. 

Sherman detected the relinquishment of Kenesaw 
at once, and started his army in hot pursuit, hoping to 
catch his enemy at a disadvantage in the confusion of 
retreat, believing that there would be no pause north of 
the Chattahoochee, and eager to strike a decisive blow 
at a receding foe while astride a difficult stream. Im- 
pressing these views upon his lieutenants by urgent 
communications to them on the 3d of July, he pushed 
Thomas forward along the railroad, and McPherson to 
his right toward Schofield. On the 4th the armies again 
came in contact, and the Confederates were found in 
their position across the railroad. An attempt of one of 
McPherson's divisions to force them was repulsed with 
loss, but the strengthening of the Federal right, necessi- 
tating a corresponding policy on the Confederate left, 
caused the Southern army to withdraw to the lines near- 
est the Chattahoochee, which better covered the princi- 
pal roads to Atlanta; and the Federals closed upon 
them in their new position. Here again there was a 
pause on both sides, Sherman utilizing the time to im- 
prove his railway and to study out the best thing to do 
next, and Johnston to fortify Atlanta and the approaches 
by which he expected his opponent to advance. Jack- 



TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 



243 



son's Cavalry watched the lower part of the river, and 
Wheeler's the part above the bridge.* 

* Sherman's disappointment at his failure to damage Johnston on 
the retreat from Kenesavv is evinced by his note of July 5th to Stone- 
man, in which he says : "We ought to have caught Johnston on his 
retreat, but he had prepared the way too well." 



CHAPTER XVI. 

ATLANTA. 

The problem now was, by which side Sherman would 
approach Atlanta to commence the operations which 
were to be the crisis of the campaign. Though the 
defense on the westward would be more difficult, since 
the streams there, being perpendicular to the defenses, 
would render a continuous line impossible, other con- 
siderations were conclusive in favor of the approach on 
the eastward. Above the bridge the river was fordable, 
which not only facilitated a crossing by Sherman, but 
exposed his communications to the Confederate cavalry 
if he selected the other approach. In addition, a move- 
ment by this flank threatened the communications with 
Richmond, which Sherman was the more anxious to 
break as he had just heard from Grant that the Con- 
federate troops, which had been threatening Washing- 
ton from the Valley of Virginia, and which were esti- 
mated at twenty-five thousand, would probably be sent 
to re-enforce Johnston. Despite the fact that on this 
side the ground was more favorable for defense, Sher- 
man, impelled by these reasons, decided to approach 
from this direction. 

Johnston correctly divined that Sherman would come 
to this conclusion, satisfied that the first of the above 
reasons would cause so skillful an opponent to adopt 
this line of approach. But the Southern commander 
decided that he could not defend the river line itself 



ATLANTA. 245 

with his force. Besides being fordable in many places, 
its form was concave, thus rendering the line of a de- 
fender necessarily weak. But its large tributary, Peach 
Tree Creek, which joins it a short distance above the 
railroad bridge and is nearly as difficult of passage as 
the river itself, presented a convex line, and the heights 
on its side next to Atlanta a good position. Hence he 
decided not to seriously contest the passage of the Chat- 
tahoochee, but to await the enemy's approach behind 
Peach Tree Creek, hoping there for an opportunity to 
strike an isolated fraction of his enemy's force. In addi- 
tion to this, Atlanta was strongly fortified ; and being 
so near his base, he felt that the constant flank exten- 
sions with which his enemy had manoeuvred him skill- 
fully out of successive positions by threats of interpos- 
ing between him and his base, would necessarily cease. 
He did not believe that Sherman could break his com- 
munications without exposing his own, though this was 
the latter's plan, and he was as confident as Johnston. 
The upper part of the Chattahoochee was closely 
watched by Wheeler; and Johnston resolved to place 
his army in its chosen position as soon as the move- 
ments of his adversary rendered it expedient. 

By July 7th Sherman had completed his railway and 
decided upon his direction of approach, which, as ex- 
pected, was across the upper part of the river. He had 
already secured a crossing at Roswell, but this was far 
up stream, and it was important to effect a passage 
lower down. On the 8th this was accomplished near 
the mouth of Soap Creek by the division of Cox, and a 
position on the south bank fortified, thus insuring a 
good debouche for the national army. 

While this was being done, menaces and demonstra- 
tions were kept up by Sherman far down the river to 
distract attention. But on the night of the 9th, Johnston, 



246 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

fully advised by Wheeler of the operations above, with- 
drew from his works on the north side of the river, 
prepared to take position along the Peach Tree Creek 
line, which extended from the Western and Atlantic Rail- 
road to the Georgia Railway between Atlanta and Deca- 
tur. Sherman promptly crossed his whole army, moving 
McPherson far to his left to strike the latter railway 
between Decatur and Stone Mountain, Schofield by 
Cross Keys toward Decatur, and Thomas direct on At- 
lanta by the roads from Pace's and Phillips's ferries and 
Buckhead. This would bring Thomas across Peach 
Tree Creek where Johnston expected, and cause the 
separation of the Federal right and center, by which he 
hoped to profit. These changes occupied a week, and 
the approach of the Federal forces to the Confederate 
lines was not before the i8th. 

But Johnston was not to carry out the plans which 
he had devised. On the 13th General Bragg arrived at 
Atlanta, and, before seeing Johnston, wired the Presi- 
dent that indications seemed to favor an evacuation. 
Soon afterward he saw Johnston, who invited him to 
make full inquiries into the state of affairs, and offered 
to send for the corps commanders, that he might have 
the best facilities for information. Bragg, in reply, as- 
sured him that his visit was entirely unofficial ; that he 
would be glad to see the corps commanders as friends, 
but in no other way ; that he was on his way to obtain 
re-enforcements from the trans-Mississippi. So far as 
the documentary evidence discloses, he saw but one 
corps commander, and that was General Hood. He bore 
back with him to Richmond, to which he immediately 
returned, a letter from Hood, dated July 14th, in which 
Hood did not hesitate to state that the army during the 
campaign had had several chances to strike a decisive 
blow; that it had failed to take advantage of them; that 



ATLANTA. 



547 



it was of great importance that the army should attack 
Sherman ; that he had so often urged that they should 
force the enemy to give battle as to be almost regarded 
as reckless by the officers high in rank in the army, since 
their views had been opposite to his ; and that he re- 
garded it as a great misfortune that they had failed to 
give battle to the enemy many miles north of the po- 
sition which they then held ; and he concluded by assur- 
ing the President that he would do his duty cheerfully 
and faithfully. The letter made no reference to the 
lost opportunity of Cassville or the butchery of Gulp's 
Farm.. 

The motive which prompted General Hood, while 
still a subordinate of Johnston, to write thus secretly and 
disloyally of his chief and ungenerously of his brother 
officers, can only be judged by the event. 

And the act of Bragg in thus visiting Johnston and 
returning to Richmond to urge his removal, after his 
generous treatment by Johnston under circumstances 
somewhat similar in the spring of 1863, is one of the 
antitheses of history. 

On the night of the 17th, while Johnston was making 
his preparations to fall upon the enemy while they were 
engaged in the passage of Peach Tree Greek, he was 
arrested in their midst by the receipt of the following 
telegram : 

" General J. E. Johnston : Lieutenant-General J. B. 
Hood has been commissioned to the temporary rank of 
general under the late law of Gongress. I am directed 
by the Secretary of War to inform you that, as you have 
failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the immedi- 
ate vicinity of Atlanta far in the interior of Georgia, 
and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel 
him, you are hereby relieved from the command of the 



248 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Army and Department of Tennessee, which you will 
immediately turn over to General Hood. 

"S Cooper, Adjuta?it and I?ispector General,'* 

To this unexpected reward for his labors he replied 
as follows : 

" General S. Cooper, Richmond : Your dispatch of 
yesterday received and obeyed. Command of the Army 
and Department of Tennessee has been transferred to 
General Hood. As to the alleged cause of my removal, 
I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger com- 
pared with that of Tennessee, than Grant's compared 
with that of northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been 
compelled to advance much more slowly to the vicinity 
of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, 
and has penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into 
Georgia. Confident language by a military commander 
is not usually regarded as evidence of competency. 

" J. E. Johnston." 

But he allowed no resentment to interfere with the 
cause to which he had devoted his talents. He con- 
gratulated his successor upon his preferment, and, at 
the hitter's request, unfolded the plans under which he 
had intended to be governed. He explained his scheme 
of falling upon a divided column of his foe with his main 
force while they were separated by Peach Tree Creek, 
whicli would be decisive if successful, as it would back 
the enemy against a part of the river where there were 
no fords; while if unsuccessful, he had a safe refuge in 
Atlanta, whence, no longer in danger of being flanked, 
he might hope to obtain fair opportunities to sally forth 
with his concentrated forces against an adversary ex- 
tended by the necessities of investment. At the request 
of Hood, he gave orders the next day which arranged 



ATLANTA. 249 

the troops in the selected positions, and did everything 
to insure the successful execution of his plan by his 
successor. 

A distinguished Northern soldier and writer who par- 
ticipated in these operations shows that Johnston's an- 
ticipation of the Federal movement was verified by the 
fact. He says : " Just at this time, much to our com- 
fort and to his surprise, Johnston was removed, and 
Hood placed in command of the Confederate army. 
Johnston had planned to attack Sherman at Peach Tree 
Creek, expecting just such a division between our wings 
as we made." * 

Despite the dismay which pervaded the army when 
the news of Johnston's removal was communicated, and 
of which the Southern executive was made aware, it per- 
sisted in its action, and Johnston took leave of his sol- 
diers in the following order : 

" In obedience to orders of the War Department, I 
turn over to General Hood the command of the Army 
and Department of Tennessee. I can not leave this 
noble army without expressing my admiration of the 
high military qualities it has displayed. A long and 
arduous campaign has made conspicuous every soldierly 
virtue, endurance of toil, obedience to orders, brilliant 
courage. The enemy has never attacked but to be re- 
pulsed and severely punished. You, soldiers, have never 
argued but from your courage, and never counted your 
foes. No longer your leader, I will still watch your 
career, .and will rejoice in your victories. To one and 
all I offer assurances of my friendship, and bid an affec- 
tionate farewell. J. E. Johnston, Gefieral." 

The men did not hesitate to evince their disapproval 

* General O. O. Howard in The Struggle for Atlanta, vol. iv, p. 313, 
of the Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 



250 GENERAL JOilXSTON. 

of the removal by cheering as they passed General John- 
ston's headquarters, and by proclaiming in every way 
consistent with discipline their trust in him. The fol- 
lowing account of the feeling of his brigade by one of 
the brigade commanders, quoted from a letter to John- 
ston, may be taken as an expression of the feeling in the 
army : 

" For myself I do not believe that the devotion of 
any army in the world to its commander was ever truer 
than that of the Army of Tennessee to you ; and that 
devotion was never deeper than on the disastrous day 
when the overwhelming and incredible announcement 
burst upon us that you had been removed. I well re- 
member that day and how its dismal tidings stunned and 
shocked us all. I shall never forget it. I wish I could. 
The news first came into my brigade about an hour by 
sun on the morning of the i8th of July, in the shape of 
a horrid rumor. Officers hurried to my headquarters 
with consternation in their faces to inquire of its truth. 
I did not hesitate to denounce it as an invention of the 
enemy, to disturb us on the eve of battle. Presently, 
to my delight, there came from division headquarters an 
order to me stating that a false and injurious rumor 
was passing through my camp to the effect that General 
Johnston had been removed, directing me to contradict 
it, and cause the arrest and punishment of the author of 
the mischievous report. In a moment there was an out- 
burst of joy all over the brigade, and the men went 
hunting about for the person who started the tale, swear- 
ing they would lynch him. In a short time, however, I 
saw an officer from division headquarters approaching me 
on foot. He beckoned me aside and informed me that 
the report of General Johnston's removal was unfortu- 
nately true, and that he desired me to put the best face 
upon the matter in my power and prepare the men for 




NOTE. 

The Line of Intrcnchmcnts from Atlanta 
to East Point was made by Gen. Hood. 

Scale of Miles 

■■ .-I 



ATLANTA AND VICINITY. 



ATLANTA. 



251 



the announcement as well as I could. I did so in good 
faith, but the terrible revulsion of feeling only revealed 
how powerful was your hold upon the affections of that 
army." 

The only rejoicing at his removal outside of those 
who were responsible for it was among his opponents. 
His great antagonist has since (in his article on The 
Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the War, published 
in vol. iv, p. 253, of the Battles and Leaders of the Civil 
War) written of it as follows : " At this critical moment 
the Confederate Government rendered us most valuable 
service. Being dissatisfied with the Fabian policy of 
General Johnston, it relieved him, and General Hood 
was substituted to command the Confederate army." 

And General Jacob D. Cox, who was an actor in the 
operations, speaks thus of the removal in his monograph 
on the Atlanta campaign : " It is certain that the change 
of Confederate commanders was learned with satisfac- 
tion by every officer and man in the national army. 
The patient skill and watchful intelligence and courage 
with which Johnston had always confronted them with 
impregnable fortifications had been exasperating. They 
had found no weak joints in the harness, and no wish 
was so common or so often expressed as that he would 
only try our works as we were trying his." 

Thus ended his association with this memorable cam- 
paign, in which he had taken a beaten army, galvanized 
it into life, faced with it a superior force of the best sol- 
diers of the North under a leader worthy of the men he 
commanded, and conducted a retreat without loss of 
material or spirit for a hundred miles to his chosen 
ground of combat. Here, with his army intact and full 
of trust, he was suddenly removed from its head. 

It has been asserted that General Lee was consulted 
before this action was taken by the Confederate Govern- 



252 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

ment, and the weighty authority of his name has been 
cited to sustain it. The contrary is the fact. That 
General Lee advised against it is placed beyond ques- 
tion by the statement to that effect of Colonel Walter H. 
Taylor, of his staff (on p. 139 of his work entitled Four 
Years with General Lee), by a letter to the same effect 
from Colonel Charles Marshall, of his staff, and by the 
letter from General Wade Hampton to General John- 
ston which is published in vol. iv, p. 277, of the Battles 
and Leaders of the Civil War. 

No account of this campaign is complete without a 
statement of the strength and losses of the two armies. 
Yet nothing is more difificult to state with accuracy. 

General Sherman, in his Memoirs, states his " effective 
strength for offensive purposes" to have been at the 
outset 98,797 men and 254 guns, exclusive of three di- 
visions of cavalry, which must have been about 12,000 
strong, since his force, as given in the War Records, was 
110,123 on April 30th. On May 31st it was 112,819, ^^^ 
on June 30th 106,970, his re-enforcements having nearly 
supplied his losses. 

No means of ascertaining the number of his re-en- 
forcements are accessible. Blair brought him. nine thou- 
sand men in one body, and the notes to the organization 
of his army, as published in the War Records, show that 
the Twenty-fifth Illinois, Eighth Kansas, Sixty-ninth 
Ohio, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, Tenth Michigan, 
Fourteenth Michigan, Twenty-third Missouri, Twenty- 
second Michigan, Second Cavalry Brigade Df Garrard's 
Division (three regiments). Fifty-fifth Illinois, Thirtieth 
Ohio, Thirty-seventh Ohio, Fortieth Illinois, Seventh 
Illinois, Forty-first Illinois, Forty-fifth Ohio, Third Bri- 
gade of Judah's or Hascall's Cavalry (four regiments). 
One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois, Sixty-fifth Illinois, and 
Third Brigade of Stoneman (two regiments and a .squad- 



ATLANTA. 



253 



ron), or twenty-six regiments in all, joined his army 
during the time Johnston was opposed to him. And 
these organized bodies were exclusive of the large num- 
ber of recruits and furloughed men who joined individu- 
ally during his advance. Though from these data it is 
impossible to give accurate figures, it is evident that the 
Northern re-enforcements were large. As he had 230,- 
000 men present for duty in his departments, so skillful a 
leader would certainly bring up sufficient re-enforce- 
ments to preserve his preponderance of strength. 

The only means of hazarding even an approximate 
estimate of his re-enforcements is afforded by a passage 
in General Sherman's official report, in which he says 
(after stating his numbers at the outset) : " About these 
figures have been maintained during the campaign, the 
number of men joining from furlough and hospitals 
about compensating for the loss in battle and from sick- 
ness." As his losses in battle alone aggregated 37,081, 
his re-enforcements must have been at least that num- 
ber. 

The Federal losses up to the time of Johnston's re- 
moval are yet more difficult to fix with certainty. The 
Army of the Cumberland is the only one of the three 
which gave its losses by monthly statements. Its total 
losses to September ist were 22,807, c>f which 14,521 
were incurred prior to July ist, or about two thirds. 
The loss of the Army of the Ohio during the campaign 
was 3,969, and that of the Army of the Tennessee dur- 
ing the campaign was 10,314. Assuming that this same 
proportion of two thirds prevailed in these two armies, 
then their loss prior to July ist would be 9,522, making 
a grand aggregate to that date of 24,043. It is probably 
far within bounds to suppose that Sherman's loss in his 
entire army during the first eighteen days of July was 
1,000 ; and hence it maybe assumed that of his total 



254 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

loss, at least 25,000 — if not more — were incurred while 
opposing Johnston. 

That this is a fair estimate may be verified in another 
way. General Sherman, in his Grand Strategy of the 
Last Year of the War, previously cited, states that his 
losses on July 20th were 1,710, on July 22d 3,641, and 
on July 29th 700, or a total of 6,051 in those three en- 
gagements, which were the only heavy ones after July 
i8th. Add to this the casualties of the Army of the 
Cumberland after September ist, which were 2,567, and 
deduct the aggregate from the total loss of 37,081, and 
the remainder is 28,363. It is probably an overestimate 
to assume the Federal loss after July i8th to be as high 
as 3,363, exclusive of those engagements ; so that this 
also would indicate a loss of at least 25,000 prior to that 
date. The number of dead counted by the Confederates 
on the numerous occasions when their gallantry had 
brought them near enough to be counted, and the silent 
testimony of the Federal city of the dead near Marietta, 
caused the Confederates to estimate the Federal loss as 
very much greater than this figure. 

The effective total of Johnston's force at the begin- 
ning was 45,101, as has been seen. On May 2d Mercer 
joined with 1,400 effectives. In a few days Loring's 
and Cantey's divisions of Polk's corps joined the army. 
Loring, according to the return of May loth, had 4,652 
effectives. Cantey's Brigade has already been included. 
It numbered 1,943. Deduct this from his divisional 
strength of 4,150, as shown by his return of June loth, 
and the remainder of 2,207 should be counted as re- 
enforcements. At Kingston the division of French came 
up. Its return of May loth gives it 3,975 effectives. At 
New Hope Church, Quarles' Brigade joined from Mo- 
bile with an effective strength of about 2,200. At Resaca, 
Martin's cavalry division brought 3,500 effectives to the 



ATLANTA. 



255 



army ; and Jackson's cavalry of Polk's corps joined 
near Adairsville with 4,537 effectives, adopting its return 
of June loth. On July 3d the Fifth and Forty-seventh 
Georgia Regiments were taken from the army and sent 
to Savannah. Their aggregate strength was about 600 
effectives. This made a total force throughout the cam- 
paign of 66,972. The greatest strength of the army at 
any one time was probably on June loth, when, accord- 
ing to its return of that date, it numbered 60,564 ef- 
fectives. On June 30th its effective total was 54,085, 
and on July loth 50,932, which was about its strength 
when Johnston relinquished command. 

The losses of the army in killed and wounded, while 
led by Johnston, were 9,972, according to the reports of 
its medical director. This does not include the cavalry 
or the loss in prisoners. It is impossible to state these 
with accuracy, for the cavalry made no report, except 
Wheeler, for the month of May, during which he states 
his loss in killed, wounded, and captured at eighty-one. 
Assuming this as an average per month, and his loss in 
the campaign would be about three hundred. Jackson's 
division was weaker than Wheeler in numbers, and did 
not have as much fighting, so that his loss was probably 
less. If it was the same, the total cavalry loss did not 
exceed six hundred. This is also evident from the fact 
that the reported strength of cavalry in the returns of 
June loth and 30th and July loth is about the same, the 
decrease being in the other two arms. 

The character of the operations was such that neither 
side lost heavily in prisoners, for there was but little op- 
portunity to make them. Outposts and skirmishers were 
occasionally picked up, but, as the Confederate line was 
never broken, the number of prisoners must have been 
insignificant. The prisoners constituted about thirteen 
per cent of Sherman's loss, and there is no reason to 



256 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

suppose that the percentage was higher in Johnston's 
army, whose cavc^lry had on more than one occasion 
brought in large captures. If it was the same, they 
would number about fourteen hundred, which would 
make the total Confederate loss under Johnston to be 
about twelve thousand from all causes — an estimate 
probably over the fact.* 

Some writers have made the Southern army larger 
than the above figures by taking from its returns every- 
thing included under the ''present for duty," instead of 
the column of effective total. By this means the South- 
ern army is made to appear but little inferior to Sher- 
man's — a startling discovery, at war with the universally 
accepted ideas at the time. No higher authority on this 
subject can be quoted than General Sherman himself. 
In his Memoirs he takes the Confederate statement of 
"effective total," and quotes it as representing his ad- 
versary's strength for the purpose of comparing it with 
his own. And in the same work he says that he always 
estimated his strength as double Johnston's, and knew 
that he could afford to lose two to one without disturb- 
ing their relative strength. 

The same unimpeachable authority may also be cited 
to show that the figures of his own army quoted above 
represent its fighting force. In his Memoirs, after de- 
scribing the intelligent means adopted by him to reduce 
his transportation (and hence the necessity for details) 
to a minimum, he speaks of the numbers given as his 

* General Sherman, in his Memoirs, in stating Johnston's loss for 
different periods, takes the total captures made by him during the 
campaign and averages them over the whole period, thus making his 
captures for May and June as large as for the subsequent months. 
This manifestly could not have been in accordance with the facts, for 
in his great victories over Hood he probably made more captures in a 
day than Johnston lost in a month. 



ATLANTA. 



257 



force " present for battle." In his official report he 
speaks of them as his *' effective strength for offensive 
purposes." The returns themselves, as published in the 
War Records, purport to give the " effective strength " 
of his army; and in his Memoirs he states that the only- 
reports called for were the ordinary trimonthly returns 
of "effective strength." 

In addition to this, he organized a pioneer detach- 
ment of two hundred freedmen to each division (there 
were twenty-two divisions), who relieved the soldiers in 
the work of intrenchment, and obviated the necessity of 
details for that and other purposes. Hence the com- 
parison of the "effective total" of Johnston with the 
" effective strength " of Sherman must be a reasonable 
approximation to the fact, adopted as it is by both the 
generals in their military calculations then and their 
military writings since. Both Sherman and Johnston 
were noted for their candor, and their statement on such 
a subject ought to be conclusive.* 

* A notable article on the subject of Johnston's strength is that of 
Major E. C. Dawes, published in vol. iv, p. 281, of the Battles and 
Leaders of the Civil War. "Whether he is right or not in his conten- 
tion that all the " present for duty " should be taken instead of the 
"effective total," there are certainly some mistakes in his figures. He 
states Johnston's artillery at the outset to have been 144 pieces, taking 
it from the return of April 30th. This includes the 36 pieces of the 
reserve. The report of W. F. Barry shows that Sherman's reserve 
artillery was not included in his 254 pieces. He had 530 guns in all 
in his departments. Out of the surplus of 276 pieces a reserve of 18 
batteries was organized, which was constantly drawn upon in the cam- 
paign. Major Dawes states Sherman's strength at the outset to have 
been 104,000. The official returns published in the War Records give 
it as 110,123. He states the strength of Mercer's Brigade at 2,800. It 
was 1,400 (Johnston's Narrative, p. 302). He adds Cantey's entire 
division to the return of April 30th, although that return already in- 
cluded one brigade ; thus he counts that brigade twice. He estimates 
the Georgia militia — which the wonderful energy and zealous co-opera- 



258 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

But mere numbers are not the only index of the com- 
parative efficiency of armies. In this respect Johnston 
was at a striking disadvantage as compared with Lee. 
The latter commanded an army which had held its own 
for three years, the former an army which had been 
chased out of two States. And conversely, the adver- 
sary of Lee was an army which did not have the con- 
fidence springing from previous steady advance, like the 
army of Sherman. 

Sherman's army was, in addition to this, a better 
army than Grant's. It was the pick of three armies, 
each of which was veteran. Its material was from the 
young States of the West — men who from their youth 
had been accustomed to danger and manly sports. It 
had but little of the mercenary element in its ranks, but 
was actuated by that spirit of patriotism which gave 
additional force to their bravery. Its officers were se- 
lected from those who had already gained their trust, and 
this confidence between officers and men was reciprocal. 
It was an army of which the most warlike nation known 
to history might well have been proud. 

Mr. John C. Ropes, in an article on The War as we 
See it Now, published in Scribner's Magazine for June, 
1891, after showing that the armies of Grant, Lee, and 
Johnston had seen their best days, and noticing the fact 
that most of the Western States had kept up their old 
regiments by recruits, instead of organizing new regi- 
ments of raw troops, says : 

" It may have been noticed that the Federal army of 
the West was not included in the foregoing estimate. 
We are disposed to think that, unlike the armies of 

tion of Hon. Joseph E. Brown, the great war Governor of Georgia, had 
brought into the field under General Gustavus W, Smith — at 5,000. 
That officer, in his official report, states their force prior to July 22d 
as 2,000. 



ATLANTA. 



259 



Johnston, Lee, and Grant, the army commanded by 
Sherman entered upon the campaign of 1864 in better 
condition in every respect than it ever was in before. 
It had had ample time to repair the losses of Chicka- 
mauga ; it had not been weakened, as had its antagonist, 
by the withdrawal of a part of its force for service else- 
where ; its losses at Missionary Ridge had not been 
large, and its success there had been of the most strik- 
ing and brilliant kind. It was composed in the main of 
Western regiments that had enlisted in 1861, and had, to 
a great extent at least, been kept up to a fair average of 
strength by the wiser and more military policy which the 
Western States generally adopted in the matter of re- 
cruiting their contingents, of which we have spoken 
above. Hence General Sherman's army reaped the full 
benefit of all the most favorable military conditions 
that can effect the efficiency of an army. Its unity had 
been strictly preserved ; it had not been depleted by 
losses or by detachments ; it had not been * watered ' by 
the addition of raw troops. It was under a commander 
who was the idol of his men, whose great abilities were 
universally and cheerfully acknowledged, and who pos- 
sessed the entire confidence of the general in chief and 
the Government at Washington." 

Considering his paucity of resources, his lack of sup- 
port from the Confederate Government, the ability of 
his opponent, the valor and numbers of the host which 
was pressing upon him, this retreat will, to adopt the 
language of one of the most distinguished Federal 
soldiers— General Hooker — who spoke from his own 
observation, long be regarded "as the most prominent 
feature of the war, and a useful lesson for study for all 
persons who may hereafter elect for their calling the 
profession of arms." 



i3 



CHAPTER XVII. 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



After the removal of Johnston in front of Atlanta 
he was assigned to no command, and the Administration- 
proceeded to carry out its strategic plans in its own 
fashion. Having shattered his magnificent army in 
wild assaults upon Sherman, and given it the coup de 
grace at Nashville, Hood also sought the obscurity of 
private life, but with very different reflections from 
those in which Johnston could justly indulge. The 
blood of thousands of gallant soldiers uselessly sacri- 
ficed cried aloud from the battlefields of Georgia and 
Tennessee ; the spectral chimneys and heaps of ashes 
by which the track of the desolating " March to the 
Sea" could be traced were silent monuments to the 
consequences of the action which by the removal of 
Johnston had rendered such things possible. 

During these gloomy days he was in retirement, de- 
nied all opportunity of defending his country. He so 
remained until February of 1865, and was convinced 
that his military service was at an end, though from all 
parts of the South the demand for his restoration was 
unceasing.* 

* As late as February 13, 1865, General Johnston, in a letter to his 
brother Beverly, alluding to a debate in the Confederate Congress, 
says: "If I had not believed it before, Mr. Semmes* late speech 
would convince me that my military service in this war is terminated." 



NORTH CAROLINA. 261 

But in the early part of that month the Confederate 
Congress established the office of commander in chief, 
to which Lee was appointed, and General Breckinridge 
was made Secretary of War. One of the first acts of 
the new commander in chief was to send the following 
telegram to Johnston, which was received at Lincolnton, 
N. C, on the 23d : 

" General J. E. Johnston. 

*' Assume command of the Army of Tennessee and 
all troops in the Department of South Carolina, Florida, 
and Georgia. Assign General Beauregard to duty under 
you as you may select. Concentrate all available forces 
and drive back Sherman. R. E. Lee." 

Considerate to the last, his first step was to ascertain 
from Beauregard whether this assignment was agreeable 
to him. Ascertaining that it was, he at once addressed 
himself to the task of trying to form an army out of the 
scanty and scattered material at his disposal. 

After having seen Beauregard on the 23d, he tele- 
graphed to Lee stating that Hardee was moving by 
Florence and Cheraw with about 11,000 men, and Cheat- 
ham and Stewart by Newberry — the last two having 
3,200 of the Army of Tennessee — while in front of Sher- 
man was S. D. Lee with 3,000 of the Army of Tennessee 
and the cavalry, the latter estimated at 6,000. These 
numbers were estimates, and subsequently proved to be 
excessive. Many of Hardee's men were South Carolina 
militia, who soon left him. At this time Sherman was 
at or near Cheraw, with a force of 53,275 infantry and 
artillery and 4,391 cavalry, adopting the return of 
March ist, published in his Memoirs. His army was 
moving in two columns, the Fourteenth and Twentieth 
Corps, with the cavalry, forming the left wing, and the 



262 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps forming the right wing. 
His objective was not manifested, Raleigh and Golds- 
boro being equally threatened. In addition to Sher- 
man's movement, Schofield, with a force which alone 
outnumbered the Confederate army even if concen- 
trated, was approaching from Wilmington. 

The first problem for Johnston was to unite his wide- 
ly dispersed troops in such a locality as to be enabled to 
interpose them in front of the vastly superior Federal 
host. This was no easy task, as Sherman was between 
the small Confederate forces, and by rapid marching 
could keep them separated. Johnston also suggested 
in the above telegram that Bragg be ordered to report 
to him with his command, and Lee at once adopted the 
suggestion. Bragg's troops consisted of Hoke's divi- 
sion, numbering 4,775 infantry and 782 artillerists. His 
batteries were the only artillery which Johnston had. 
Hood had lost most of it in his Tennessee campaign. 
Johnston fixed Smithfield as the rendezvous for the dif- 
ferent bodies which were to make up his army, and sent 
them orders to hasten their march to that point. It was 
about midway between Goldsboro and Raleigh, and was 
well selected as a position from which the Confederates 
might be thrown in front of Sherman, whether he moved 
toward Raleigh or Goldsboro. These orders, arrange- 
ments for the transportation of which the army was 
almost destitute, and the collection of necessary informa- 
tion as to the whereabouts both of friends and foes, con- 
sumed many days. On March 4th Johnston transferred 
his headquarters to Fayetteville, whence he could better 
issue instructions, and not far from which he hoped 
that the union of his forces would be consummated. 

On the 6th Bragg reported from Goldsboro that Cox 
was approaching Kinston. Johnston at once instructed 
the troops at Smithfield, about two thousand in number^ 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



263 



to re-enforce Bragg. They were under the command of 
D. H. Hill, one of the generals with whom Bragg had 
quarreled after Chickamauga. In the message to join 
Bragg, Johnston said to him, "I beg you to forget the 
past in this emergency " ; as he was himself forgetting 
it. Hill was not the man to resist such an appeal. He 
zealously co-operated with Bragg, and the result was 
that at Kinston Cox's column was checked with great 
loss, the Confederates suffering comparatively little.* 

Meanwhile Hardee, accompanied by Hampton's cav- 
alry, was slowly falling back toward Fayetteville. The 
only fighting before reaching that point was between 
the cavalry ; in the aggregate it was in favor of the 
Confederates. In the most important of these affairs 
Hampton surprised Kilpatrick and captured his camp, 
holding it some time and bringing off many prisoners, 
besides releasing the Confederates whom Kilpatrick had 
captured. 

As it was patent that Sherman's northward march 
was with the object of joining Grant in an attack upon 
Lee, it was necessarily the duty of Lee and Johnston at 

* The editors of the Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iv, 
pp. 698 and 700, place the Federal loss at Kinston at 1,257, of which 
57 were killed, 265 wounded, and 935 were captured or missing ; and 
the Confederate loss at 134. These figures are doubtless taken from 
the official reports. In that publication they frequently annex the 
statements of Northern officers in relation to Confederate losses to 
the Confederate official reports. It is to be regretted that they do not 
adopt the same course in reference to Confederate statements of North- 
ern losses. The Kinston affair shows how this would sometimes work. 
The day after the battle Johnston telegraphed to Lee that Colonel 
Sale reported one thousand prisoners at Goldsboro, and five hundred 
more on the way. This report of Colonel Sale, made for the purpose 
of arranging transportation at a time when the condition of Southern 
roads forbade any exaggeration, is certainly worthy of credit if the 
official reports on either side are to be questioned at all. 



264 GENERAL JOHNSTON, 

the proper time to avail of their interior lines, so as to 
combine against one or the other of their antagonists. 
In the desperate state to which the Southern cause was 
now reduced this offered the only possible chance of 
success, since the Confederate armies were each hope- 
lessly outnumbered. Hence the correspondence between 
the two commanders shows what was in the mind of 
each. On March ist, replying to a letter from Lee, 
written the day after Johnston's restoration to com- 
mand, the latter suggested : " Would it be possible to 
hold Richmond itself with half your army while the 
other half joined us near the Roanoke to crush Sher- 
man ? We might then turn upon Grant." 

This same idea is repeated in a letter to Lee of 
March nth. Had Lee had his own way, and been al- 
lowed to withdraw seasonably from the Petersburg lines 
instead of waiting till they were forced, the junction of 
two such bodies under two such leaders might well have 
rendered an Appomattox impossible. 

Johnston, while taking every precaution to meet 
Sherman on either line which he might adopt, was satis- 
fied that his real design was to take the eastern route by 
Goldsboro, since that would keep him in communication 
with the coast, insure a junction with Schofield, and 
facilitate the eventual union with Grant. Though John- 
ston's orders for the concentration of his detached forces 
had been promptly given, poor railway service, lack of 
transportation, and the dispersed condition of the troops 
rendered their junction slow. In the meantime nothing 
was left him but to practice patience, and to urge Har- 
dee and Hampton to impede the Federal march as much 
as possible. They seconded his views with the intelli- 
gence, courage, and ability which they always displayed, 
and enabled many fragmentary organizations and indi- 
viduals of the Army of Tennessee to reach their trusted 



NORTH CAROLINA. 265 

leader, whose restoration again kindled their expiring 
hopes. 

On March nth Sherman occupied Fayetteville, Har- 
dee withdrawing in the direction of Averysboro, until he 
reached a point about four miles from that place, where 
he stopped, threw up intrenchments, and determined to 
make a stand. Here he was in front of the Federal left 
wing, consisting of two corps. These attacked him on 
the morning of the i6th, and after a sharp contest flanked 
him out of his first position and forced him to fall back 
a short distance to a stronger one, which he held till 
night, repulsing every assault. Before morning, after 
all fighting had ceased, he retired, in consequence of 
information that the enemy were crossing Black River 
to the east. In this affair Hardee's loss, as reported by 
him, was four hundred and fifty in all. The Federal loss, 
as reported, was five hundred and fifty-four, which in- 
cluded no prisoners, although the Confederates had 
ocular demonstration that they had made captures. 
They reported a smaller number of killed than the Con- 
federates, although the latter acted on the defensive and 
under cover. After the commencement of the retrograde 
movement Hardee withdrew to Elevation. 

A sufficient number of the Confederate detachments 
•was now in supporting distance to enable Johnston to 
attempt something of greater magnitude than skirmish- 
ing. Weak as he still was, he determined to attack the 
Federal left wing, in the hope that the line of march 
separated it sufficiently from the other to render pos- 
sible the delivery of a severe blow, which, if not great 
in direct results, might at least lighten the despondency 
which weighed heavily on Southern hearts. He judged 
from General Hampton's description of the country that 
Bentonville would be a point favorable for his purpose, 
for the reason that the route of the Federal left was 



266 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

there some distance from the parallel road by which the 
other wing was moving. On Hampton's intelligent de- 
scription of the ground, it was decided to make he 
attack from a position near Bentonville, and orders 
were issued for the concentration of the little army. 
Hampton with great daring and ability held the chosen 
ground all day of the iSth with his cavalry, and was 
joined at dark by Johnston with a part of the infantry. 
On account of deceptive maps Hardee had a greater 
distance to march than was supposed, and did not come 
up till next day. That night Johnston telegraphed Lee 
as follows: "The troops will be united to-day except 
two divisions. Cheatham's corps not arrived. Effective 
totals, infantry and artillery : Bragg, 6,500 ; Hardee, 
7,500 ; Army of Tennessee, 4,000. . . . Hardee's loss 
on 1 6th was 450." 

These numbers were mere estimates, including some 
troops not up, and were greater than the fact. Accord- 
ing to the return of March 17th, the infantry and artil- 
lery, exclusive of Hardee, numbered 9,513 effectives. 
Hardee's strength on the 23d was 5,528 effectives, 
which, with his loss of 516 in the coming battle, would 
make his numbers before it 6,042. The cavalry, accord- 
ing to its return of March 25th, did not exceed 4,000. 
Johnston's army, therefore, exclusive of cavalry, num- 
bered about 15,000 men. The Federal left wing, against 
which the attack was to be aimed, numbered about 28,000 
men exclusive of Kilpatrick's cavalry, which was about 
4,500 strong. 

On the morning of the 19th the troops were formed 
for battle. Bragg was ranged across the road, and the 
Army of Tennessee, under A. P. Stewart, was drawn up 
farther to the right, with its own right thrown forward. 
The gap between the two, to be filled by Hardee on his 
arrival, was temporarily held by the only artillery which 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



267 



the army had. Before Hardee's deployment, and just 
as his troops arrived, a strong attack was made upon 
Bragg, who called for re-enforcements. Johnston sent 
the first division of Hardee, under McLaws, to his aid, 
and the other, under Taliaferro, to the right. But by 
the time McLaws arrived Bragg's troops, under the in- 
telligent guidance of Hoke, their gallant division com- 
mander, had completely repulsed the Federal attack. 
An assault upon Stewart was likewise repelled. 

On account of the delay in the arrival of Hardee, and 
the time taken in deploying through difficult thickets, the 
Confederate attack was not made till three o'clock in 
the afternoon, by which time the Federals had been able 
to erect some slight intrenchments. It was commenced 
by Hardee on the right, the other troops joining in the 
movement successively. The thrilling sight of John- 
ston, their old commander, and Hardee, one of their old 
lieutenants, after long separation personally leading them, 
revived the hopes and the courage of the Army of Ten- 
nessee ; and their charge, worthily emulated by repre- 
sentatives of other armies, was irresistible. The Fed- 
erals were driven back upon their troops in the rear and 
into a dense growth of young pines, protected on the 
right by a swamp and by intrenchments. The disorder 
produced in the Confederate advance by the difficult na- 
ture of the country necessitated great delay in reform- 
ing, and the lateness of the hour enabled the Federals 
to keep this position till dark. The Confederates, how- 
ever, held the field, bringing off their own wounded and 
som-e of the Federal, with three pieces of captured artil- 
lery ; and at night they withdrew to their first position, 
which was fortified as much as possible with the limited 
implements at their disposal. 

On hearing the sound and receiving intelligence of 
this action, Sherman at once turned his right wing in the 



268 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

direction of the firing, hoping to come upon the South- 
ern rear while they were facing their foes on the other 
side. Johnston, ascertaining their approach, faced Hoke's 
division toward them, parallel to the road, and length- 
ened the line with his cavalry to Mill Creek. On account 
of his feeble numbers it was hazardous and thinly held ; 
and the bridge over Mill Creek, in the direction of the 
Confederate retreat, was in great danger if a strong 
effort to break through this array, which was hardly 
more than a picket line, had been made. On the 20th, 
Sherman's entire army was concentrated against the 
Southern army, and several attacks were made upon it 
which were not very pronounced ; and they were uni- 
formly repulsed — so completely, in fact, that the Confed- 
erates brought in many of the Federals who were wounded 
in them. That evening Johnston transferred McLaws to 
the left of Hoke to strengthen his own left, which was 
the critical point. No further attempt was made to 
force the Confederate defenses till the evening of the 
21st, when Mower's division moved against the extreme 
Confederate left, broke through the mere skirmish line, 
and was advancing on the road to Mill Creek bridge. 
Hardee and Hampton met this movement by a counter- 
charge of Cumming's Georgia Brigade upon the van, 
while a small body of Texas cavalry fell upon the right 
of the Federals, and Allen's Alabamians, directed by 
Wheeler, assailed their left. Under the combined at- 
tack of these small bodies, together constituting but a 
few hundred men, the Federals withdrew. Hardee, in 
the advance, had the grief of seeing his gallant son, only 
sixteen years old, fall in this charge. The Confederates 
held their position till night, when they withdrew unmo- 
lested. According to General Johnston's contempora- 
neous memoranda, the total Confederate loss at Benton- 
ville was two hundred and twenty-four killed, fourteen 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



269 



hundred and seventy wounded, and six hundred and 
fifty-five missing among the infantry ; and fifteen killed, 
eighty wounded, and eighteen missing among the cav- 
alry, making a grand total of twenty-four hundred and 
sixty-two. Most of the prisoners were captured by los- 
ing their way in the thickets on the first day. Some of 
those reported as missing afterward rejoined their com- 
mands. General Sherman, in his official report, gives his 
total loss as sixteen hundred and forty-three, of whom 
two hundred and eighty-seven were prisoners. In it he 
also states that Slocum, who commanded the left wing, 
which did nearly all the fighting and suffered three 
fourths of his reported loss, claims to have captured 
three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners; while Howard, 
who commanded the right wing — which, according to Sher- 
man's Memoirs, only skirmished and was held back from 
any vigorous aggressive, and according to the Confed- 
erate accounts was repulsed in every attempt which was 
made — claims to have taken twelve hundred and eighty- 
seven prisoners. Slocum's statement as to the number 
captured by. his wing is probably correct. Howard's 
must be a mistake, for he had no opportunity to make 
any such captures. Johnston's memorandum, made at 
the time, shows that he lost only six hundred and fifty- 
five prisoners. Another memorandum in his military 
papers shows that he captured nine hundred and three 
prisoners, of whom one hundred and fourteen were taken 
by Hardee's troops, four hundred and seventeen by the 
Army of Tennessee, and three hundred and seventy-two 
by "the cavalry. Sherman, however, reports only two 
hundred and eighty-seven prisoners among his losses. 
As the Confederates acted generally on the defensive, 
and repulsed all attacks made upon them, the presump- 
tion certainly would seem to be that they inflicted a 
heavier loss than they suffered. Sherman apparently 



2;70 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

thought so at the time, for in. his official report he pru- 
dently observes : " I am well satisfied that the enemy 
lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the left 
wing during the afternoon of the 19th, but as I have no 
data save his dead and wounded left in our hands, I pre- 
fer to make no comparisons,"* Whatever the compara- 
tive losses, the battle was in its results highly beneficial. 
The confidence of the army was restored, for it had met 
its old antagonist, repulsed his attacks, and retired with 
captured cannon and prisoners. Its perils and privations 
could now be forgotten, and under its trusted leaders 
North Carolina might yet cause Tennessee to be erased 
from their memories. When Johnston proudly tele- 
graphed to Lee, after the battle, that the "troops of 
Tennessee Army have fully disproved slanders that have 
been published against them," his gratification at being 
able to say this of the remnant of his old command can 
be better imagined than described. 

After the withdrawal the army retired in the direction 
of Smithfield, and Sherman marched to Goldsboro, where 
he effected a junction with Schofield, which increased the 
strength of his army to nearly 90,000 men of the three 
arms. Johnston, re-enforced by the arrival of some ad- 
ditional troops of the Army of Tennessee, had, accord- 
ing to his return of March 27th, 13,635 infantry, 1,033 
artillery, and 4,093 cavalry. With these odds against 

* This may partially explain the discrepancy between Johnston's 
report of his missing and the Federal claims. Many of the Confeder- 
ate wounded were left in the retreat on account of the want of ambu- 
lances and the severe character of their injuries. The Federals may 
have counted these as prisoners, whereas Johnston in his report counted 
them as wounded. But even this would not entirely account for the 
discrepancy, as Johnston brought off most of his wounded. These 
variant estimates show the uncertainty of going behind the oflficial 
returns, and of taking the statements of one as to the losses of the 
other. 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



271 



him he could but telegraph Lee, when discussing their 
proposed junction: "Sherman's course cannot be hin- 
dered by the small force I have. I can do no more than 
annoy him. I respectfully suggest that it is no longer 
a question whether you leave, present position ; you have 
only to decide where to meet Sherman. I will be near 
him." 

The battle was followed by a period of comparative 
inaction. Sherman visited Grant at City Point, to con- 
fer as to combining their operations, and allowed his 
men the repose which they had well earned. Johnston 
devoted himself to improving the outfit and armament 
of his improvised force, and closely observed the enemy 
with his cavalry. On April 5th he heard of the evacua- 
tion of Richmond, though without any details, and for 
these he telegraphed to Secretary Breckinridge at Dan- 
ville. The telegram was answered by President Davis, 
who could not give any information. 

On the morning of the loth Sherman commenced his 
march from Goldsboro, moving in the direction of Ra- 
leigh. The Confederates moved in the same direction, 
having a start of about a day's march. Hardee, with a 
portion of the cavalry, kept on the north side of the 
Neuse ; and the remainder of the army, accompanied by 
Johnston in person, proceeded by the road which crossed 
the river at Battle's Bridge, near which he encamped for 
the night. While here he heard from President Davis 
that Lee was reported to have surrendered. On the 
1 2th, in obedience to a telegram from the President, he 
rep^iired to Greensboro, the army continuing its march 
in the meanwhile ; and that morning Beauregard and 
he had an interview with the President and with three 
members of his Cabinet, Reagan, Benjamin, and Mallory. 
Breckinridge was expected that night. The President, 
in the interview, devoted himself to drawing roseate 



2^2 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

pictures of the hosts which he expected to raise by his 
eloquence, oblivious of the fact that such appeals had 
failed in less desperate circumstances, and could scarcely 
be expected to have any effect in such a crisis, and ig- 
noring the fact that there were not muskets enough to 
arm all the veterans of Johnston's army alone. The 
aimless interview ended without result. That night Sec- 
retary Breckinridge, on his arrival, confirmed the report 
of Lee's surrender. This intelligence convinced John- 
ston that further prosecution of the war was hope- 
less, and that nothing was left but to make peace. In 
conversations with Breckinridge, Mallory, Reagan, and 
Beauregard, he found that their views coincided with his 
own. He was designated by the others as the proper per- 
son to make the announcement to the President, though 
he strenuously objected to acting as spokesman, and 
urged that one of President Davis's constitutional advis- 
ers could undertake the task with more propriety than 
himself. 

The next morning Johnston and Beauregard were 
summoned to attend the Cabinet meeting. Johnston, 
on being asked for his opinion, called attention to the 
weakness of his small army, which could be overwhelmed 
by the multitudes of Grant, Sherman, and Canby, and to 
the lack of provisions, repair shops, ammunition, and 
other necessaries. He insisted that it would be a crime 
against humanity to continue the war, throwing away 
valuable lives, and further devastating the South by 
drawing after him the Federal armies. His views were 
seconded by every one except Benjamin, who was ap- 
parently as unsubdued as ever. The President, with 
great reluctance, consented that Johnston should dis- 
patch a letter to Sherman, proposing an armistice, in 
order to allow the civil authorities to make peace. The 
letter was at once drawn, and was as follows : 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



273 



" The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have 
changed the relative military condition of the belliger- 
ents. I am therefore induced to address you in this 
form the inquiry whether, in order to stop the further 
effusion of blood and devastation of property, you are 
willing to make a temporary suspension of active opera- 
tions, and to communicate to General Grant, command- 
ing the armies of the United States, the request that he 
will take like action in regard to other armies, the object 
being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the 
needful operations to terminate the existing war." 

This was sent to Sherman by Hampton, and was re- 
ceived by him the next day (the 14th). He at once as- 
sented to an interview, stopped the movements of his 
forces, and showed an ardent desire to save the South 
from further desolation. A meeting was arranged mid- 
way between the lines on the Raleigh road. It took 
place on the 17th, at the house of Mr. Bennett. It was 
the first time that the two generals had met, though both 
had been in the old arm}^, and they had confronted each 
other at almost every stage of the war, from Manassas 
to Bentonville. As soon as they were alone, Sherman 
produced a telegram announcing the assassination of 
Lincoln — a piece of intelligence which greatly grieved 
Johnston, as he saw at once the evil effect it would 
have, and the greater harshness it would entail upon 
the Southern people. Proceeding to the object of their 
meeting, Sherman proposed that Johnston should sur- 
render on the terms which had been granted to Lee. 
This Johnston declined, on the ground that his army 
was not surrounded, as Lee's had been ; but he pro- 
posed that they should make permanent terms of peace, 
and use their influence with their respective govern- 
ments to obtain a confirmation of their action. This 
suggestion was approved by Sherman ; and they agreed 



2^4 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

upon most of the details, but without reducing them to 
writing. It was also agreed that they would meet the 
next day at the same place. When they met, according 
to appointment, Johnston was accompanied by Breckin- 
ridge, who attended as a major general, since Sherman 
would admit none of the civil authorities. After an in- 
terchange of views, the following terms were agreed to: 

" I. The contending armies now in the field to main- 
tain the statu quo until notice is given by the command- 
ing general of any one to its opponent, and reasonable 
time — say forty-eight hours — allowed. 

" 2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be 
disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, 
there to deposit their arms and public property in the 
State arsenal ; and each officer and man to execute and 
file an agreement to cease from all acts of war, and to 
abide the action of the State and Federal authority. 
The number of arms and munitions of war to be re- 
ported to the Chief of Ordnance of Washington City, 
subject to the future action of the Congress of the 
United States, and in the meantime to be used solely to 
maintain peace and order within the borders of the 
States respectively. 

" 3. The recognition by the Executive of the United 
States of the several State governments, on their officers 
and legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Con- 
stitution of the United States; and where conflicting 
State governments have resulted from the war, the 
legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 

*'4. The re-establishment of all the Federal courts in 
the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitu- 
tion of the United States and of the States respectively. 

" 5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to 
be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their polit- 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



275 



ical rights and franchises, as well as their rights of per- 
son and property, as defined by the Constitution of the 
United States and of the States respectively. 

" 6. The Executive authority of the Government of 
the United States not to disturb any of the people by 
reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and 
quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the 
laws in existence at the place of their residence. 

" In general terms, the war to cease ; a general am- 
nesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can 
command, on condition of the disbandment of the Con- 
federate armies, the distribution of the arms, and the 
resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and men 
hitherto composing said armies. Not being fully em- 
powered by our respective principals to fulfil these 
terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to 
promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry 
out the above programme." 

As soon as these terms were agreed upon, copies 
were sent to the civil authorities of each side for ratifi- 
cation, it being known that several days would neces- 
sarily elapse before they could be returned. 

During this interregnum Johnston received from 
President Davis a note authorizing him to obtain from 
Mr. J. N. Hendren, treasury agent, thirty-nine thousand 
dollars in silver, and at the same time a later note 
ordering him to send it to Mr. Davis at Charlotte. Gen- 
eral Johnston thought that the state of affairs justified 
him in refusing to obey the second order ; and therefore 
he collected the money and divided it among his troops, 
officers and privates sharing alike. At the same time he 
wrote the following : 

" Greensboro, N. C, April 21, 186^- 
" Sir : I have heard from several respectable persons 
that the Government has a large sum of gold in its posses- 
19 



2;6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

sion. I respectfully and earnestly urge the appropriation 
of a portion of that sum to the payment of the army as 
a matter of policy and justice. It is needless to remind 
you that the troops now in service have fully earned 
everything that the Government can give them, and have 
stood by their colors with a constancy unsurpassed — a 
constancy which enables us to be now negotiating with 
a reasonable hope of peace on favorable terms. 

" I beg your favorable consideration of this applica- 
tion. 

" Most respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"J. E. Johnston, General. 
''Major-General J. C. Breckinridge, Secretary of Wary 

Arrearages of pay for many months were then due 
the troops, and it would certainly seem that some of the 
Confederate treasure should have been paid them. But 
with the exception of the small sum of silver above men- 
tioned, which gave them only one dollar and twenty-five 
cents apiece, they received nothing.* 

* An experience which General Johnston had just after his final 
capitulation indicates the affection which his soldiers entertained for 
him. After the disbandment a ragged private called him aside, ex- 
pressing a desire to speak to him. "When they were alone he took 
from his pocket the very money which he had received in the distri- 
bution and offered it to Johnston, urging him to accept it by saying 
that he could go back to work, but that he knew Johnston must have 
been left straitened by the result of the struggle. The latter was much 
affected by the offer, but of course declined it. General Duke, in his 
Last Days of the Confederacy, vol. iv, p. 762, Battles and Leaders of 
the Civil War, states that the silver coin of the Confederate treas- 
ury was divided among the troops composing the escort of Mr. Davis 
at the Savannah River, each man receiving about thirty-two dollars. 
They were more fortunate than Johnston's men, though not more de- 
serving. The remainder of the treasure was probably captured by 
stragglers and plunderers on the way. President Davis had little or 
none with him when he was made prisoner. 



NORTH CAROLINA. 277 

On the 24th, notice was given by Sherman that the 
terms previously agreed upon were rejected by his Gov- 
ernment, a result mainly due to the exasperation caused 
by the assassination of Lincoln. Upon communicating 
this fact to the Confederate Executive, Johnston was di- 
rected by it, in case he could not hold the infantry and 
artillery together, to bring all the cavalry and such of 
the other arms as wished to join the cavalry and could 
be mounted, and with them to join Mr. Davis. To this 
Johnston objected that it ignored the duty which he owed 
to the army and people, and provided only for the pro- 
tection of the President ; since a force of such size would 
drag in its pursuit large bodies of Northern forces, with 
all the horrors attendant upon a second " March to the 
Sea." He therefore again proposed a meeting to Sher- 
man with a view of ending the war. The latter readily 
assented, and they met on the 26th at the same place as 
before — the house of Mr. Bennett. They soon agreed 
upon the following terms : 

" I. All acts of war on the part of the troops under 
General Johnston's command to cease from this date. 

" 2. All arms and public property to be deposited at 
Greensboro, and delivered to an ordnance officer of the 
United States Army. 

" 3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in 
duplicate, one copy to be retained by the commander 
of the troops and the other to be given to an officer to 
be designated by General Sherman ; each officer and 
man to give his individual obligation in writing not to 
take up arms against the Government of the United 
States until properly released from this obligation. 

" 4. The side arms of officers and their private horses 
and baggage to be retained by them. 

" 5. This being done, all the officers and men will be 
permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed 



2;8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

by the United States authorities so long as they observe 
their obligation and the laws in force where they may 
reside." 

A few days afterward the following supplemental 
terms were agreed to by General Schofield on behalf of 
General Sherman. An important object attained by them 
was to place all the horses of the army, whether private 
or public, at the disposal of the soldiers in their return 
to their homes and subsequent industrial pursuits, thus 
greatly relieving their necessities : 

"supplemental terms. 

" I. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops 
for their march to their homes and for subsequent use in 
their industrial pursuits. Artillery horses may be used 
in field transportation if necessary. 

" 2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a num- 
ber of arms equal to one seventh of its effective strength, 
which, when the troops reach the capitals of their States, 
will be disposed of as the general commanding the de- 
partment may direct. 

*' 3. Private horses and other private property of both 
officers and men to be retained by them. 

" 4. The commanding general of the Military Division 
of West Mississippi, Major-General Canby, will be re- 
quested to give transportation by water from Mobile or 
New Orleans to the troops from Arkansas and Texas. 

" 5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be 
signed by their immediate commanders. 

" 6. Naval forces within the limits of General John- 
ston's command to be included in the terms of this con- 
vention." 

By these arrangements, and through the generosity 
of Sherman, who furnished them a large amount of ra- 
tions, the return of the troops to their homes was made 



NORTH CAROLINA. 



279 



comparatively comfortable, considering the state of the 
country at the time. On the 30th of April Johnston an- 
nounced the result of his negotiations to the governors 
of Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida in the following 
telegram : 

^' The disaster in Virginia, the capture by the enemy 
of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition 
and repairing arms, the impossibility of recruiting our 
little army, opposed by more than ten times its numbers, 
or of supplying it except by robbing our own citizens, 
destroyed all hope of successful war. I have therefore 
made a military convention with General Sherman to ter- 
minate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, 
and Florida. I made this convention to spare the blood 
of the gallant little army committed to me, to prevent 
further suffering of our people by the devastation and 
ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and 
to avoid the crime of waging hopeless war." 

This, with a proclamation to his army exhorting them 
to be good citizens, expressing his admiration of their 
constancy and devotion, his gratification at their treat- 
ment of himself, and his wishes for a prosperous future 
to them, ended his military career ; and he returned to 
private life the pacificator of the South, with the crown- 
ing glory of having saved the property and lives of its 
citizens, and conferred upon it the blessings of peace.* 

* Johnston's course in terminating the war, which was practically 
accomplished by his convention, has always been approved by the mass 
of those who were in position to judge of its necessity. No one has 
ev6r questioned its propriety except Mr. Davis in his writings. By 
grossly exaggerating Johnston's force and resources, he has endeavored 
to create the impression that this capitulation was unnecessary. It has 
been seen that all his Cabinet, except Mr. Benjamin, realized its neces- 
sity. Johnston's army, insignificant in numbers at the outset, was melt- 
ing away by desertion, for the hopelessness of further resistance was 
patent to every private soldier in the ranks. Mr. Davis had approved 



28o GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the initial negotiations for reasons which applied with equal force to 
the final ones. On learning of the rejection of the first convention, he 
directed Johnston to disband the infantry and artillery and send him 
simply the cavalry — a convincing proof that he had given up the cause 
as lost ; for he could not have intended to continue the war with a 
handful of cavalry and no infantry. The following letter, written by 
him to his wife at the time, and since published in the Sun of February 
14, 1886, shows what he thought of the question then : 

" Charlotte, N. C, April 23, 1865. 

" My dear Winnie : I have been detained here longer than was 
expected when the last telegram was sent you. . . . 

" The dispersion of Lee's army and the surrender of the remnant 
which remained with him destroyed the hopes I entertained when we 
parted. Had that army held together, I am now confident that we 
could have successfully executed the plan which I sketched to you, and 
would have been to-day on the high road to independence. Even after 
that disaster, if the men who straggled, say thirty or forty thousand in 
number, had come back with their arms and with a disposition to fight, 
we might have repaired the damage ; but all was sadly the reverse of 
that. They threw away theirs, and were uncontrollably resolved to go 
home. The small guards along the road have sometimes been unable 
to prevent the pillaging of trains and depots. Panic has seized the 
country. . . . 

" The loss of arms has been so great that, should the spirit of the 
people rise to the occasion, it would not be at this time possible ade- 
quately to supply them with the weapons of war," 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

A PRIVATE CITIZEN. 

The mere military hero, after the conclusion of the 
conflicts which have called his talents forth, bears with 
impatience the quiet of peace, and rusts away, longing 
for the exciting scenes which once aroused him. Not 
so the citizen soldier, called to the field by a sense of 
duty, and sheathing his sword with the consciousness of 
duty performed to the best of the ability with which 
Providence has endowed him. Such a character no longer 
pines to lead his squadrons in sanguinary onslaught on 
a foe ; but by example he remains as much their leader 
as before, and teaches them that the highest triumph of 
the citizen soldiery is to resume the pursuits of peace, 
obedient to law, and contented with their lot. Of such 
a life, quietly and unobtrusively pursuing the even tenor 
of its way, there is little to relate ; for it may truthfully 
be said of men as of nations, " Happy those who have 
no history." 

Such is eminently true of Johnston. In his last gen- 
eral orders to that faithful band which had clustered 
around its standards to the last he had said : 

" In terminating our official relations, I earnestly 
exhort you to observe faithfully the terms of pacifica- 
tion agreed upon, and to discharge the obligations of 
good and peaceable citizens as well as you have per- 
formed the duties of thorough soldiers in the field. By 
such a course you will best secure the comfort of your 



282 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

families and kindred, and restore tranquillity to our 
country." 

In his own conduct he set the example of acquies- 
cence in the war. No fear of his victors drove him in 
voluntary exile to foreign lands, but he resolved to 
share for weal or woe the fate of the people whom he 
had defended and for whom he had shed his blood. 
The grandest lesson of the civil war is the quiet dignity 
with which Lee and Johnston, the great leaders of the 
Southern armies, bore the result, thus powerfully con- 
tributing to the pacification of their section, and retain- 
ing the respect and friendship not only of their own fol- 
lowers, but of those who so long had faced them in 
battle and knew from experience the powers of their 
genius. It was Johnston's privilege to count among his 
firmest friends and greatest admirers Grant and Sher- 
man, who of all men were best qualified to estimate his 
military and personal traits at their true value. 

When the conflict closed, it was neither in accordance 
with Johnston's tastes nor compatible with his means to 
remain idle; and his first care was to engage in some 
occupation which would gain him a livelihood. De- 
clining with gratitude but firmness all offers of aid from 
his admirers, and asking but a place which would enable 
him to render an equivalent for what he should receive, 
his first experiment was with a railroad, his second with 
an express company. These were brief and far from 
satisfactory ; and he then engaged in the insurance 
business, making his home in Savannah, which was full 
of his friends. Here he remained for near a decade, 
giving to his business the same conscientious and thor- 
ough watchfulness which had marked his military duties. 

In 1873, while in Savannah, he had an opportunity to 
aid in raising funds for the monument to be placed at 
Lexington over his old friend and comrade in arms, 



A PRIVATE CITIZEN. 283 

Lee; and his activity and success were such as to secure 
a large contribution and elicit a handsome resolution of 
thanks for his efforts from the Memorial Association. 

The next year he published an account of his mili- 
tary operations during the war, under the name of 
Johnston's Narrative.* This book, while in its style 
as simple and unaffected as its author, is a powerful 
reply to the strictures upon him as a general which had 
been circulated by his enemies, and is based on evidence 
which would seem to leave no room for discussion. 
These strictures had been freely circulated during the 
war by the Administration, and by the coterie who 
knew no better way of ingratiating themselves than by 
taking sides against Johnston. With a self-sacrifice 
which elicited universal commendation, he had refrained 
from any reply as long as there was a possibility of its 
injuring the cause to which he had devoted his military 
talents ; but in this publication, no longer hampered by 
such restraint, he gave free expression to his sense of 
the injustice done him, and showed in vigorous though 
parliamentary terms the difficulties under which he had 
labored, and'the lack of support which characterized the 
demeanor of the Administration toward him. The book 
obtained a large circulation among the soldiers of both 
sides and the students of the military art across the 
ocean, and is an acknowledged authority. From the 
time of his return to civil life Johnston had intended to 
return to his native State whenever his business would 
permit. In 1877 he carried out this intention, and re- 

* He had an uncle who was taken prisoner by the Indians, and who 
on his return from captivity published an interesting account of his 
adventures under the title of A Narrative. The book is scarce, and 
little known. General Johnston was a great admirer of this little book, 
and frequently talked of it when with his relations. He adopted its 
title as thq title for his work. 



284 GENERAL JOHNSTON. *? 

moved from Savannah to Richmond. He was not al- 
lowed here to remain long in retirement. In the fall of 
1878 a strong sentiment in favor of his nomination to 
Congress by the Democratic party was developed, and 
he was triumphantly elected, serving for one term as a ;' 

member of the House of Representatives, and gaining 
the esteem of both parties by the liberality of his views. 
He was not gifted with eloquence, and hence took no * 

part in debate; but was earnest and attentive to the 
committee work which devolved upon him, and was 
specially interested in everything which tended to in- 
crease the efficiency of the army. 

On the expiration of his term he retained his resi- 
dence in Washington, and was appointed Commissioner of 
Railroads during the administration of President Cleve- 
land — an office which annually took him on an inspec- 
tion tour across the continent. While in Portland, Ore- * 
gon, on one of these occasions, in August, 1885, he was 
requested to act as a pall-bearer of General Grant, who 
since the war had been one of his warmest friends 
among the Northern officers, and had given many grati- 
fying evidences of his esteem. He hastened to New 
York to attend the obsequies, and joined the North in 
paying tribute to the illustrious dead. 

Soon after his return to Virginia he was elected a 
member of the Board of Visitors of the old College of 
William and Mary, at Williamsburg, of which his friend 
and former staff officer, Colonel B. S. Ewell, was presi- 
dent. Such men as George Washington and Henry Lee 
had preceded him on this board, which, during its exist- 
ence of nearly two centuries, has numbered the greatest 
names of Virginia on its roll. The meetings of this 
body were during the final exercises of the college, on 
the 4th of July of each year. The reunions with his 
old friends and the enthusiastic reception with which he 



A PRIVATE CITIZEN. 



285 



was always welcomed made these meetings exceedingly 
pleasant and gratifying. 

On February 22, 1887, he received a crushing blow in 
the death of the helpmate to whom he had been married 
for over forty years. For a long time before her death 
Mrs. Johnston had been a martyr to suffering, and the 
devoted attentions of her husband were as unremitting 
as those of a youthful lover. She died suddenly at their 
residence in Washington, and left him a lonely old man, 
bereft of all which made life dear. No language can 
describe the extent of his loss. He could never after- 
ward trust himself to mention her name, and his house 
remained from the time of her death exactly as she had 
left it. 

In the spring of 1890 Johnston yielded to the urgent 
invitations of his old comrades, and went to Atlanta to 
attend the memorial exercises. If any evidence was 
needed to show him that he had not been forgotten, and 
that his fame was still fresh in the city whose foes he 
had once held at bay, it was here furnished him in abun- 
dance. Amid the throng he was the central figure, 
and his visit was a continual ovation. One of the many 
pleasant incidents of his stay is thus described in one of 
the Atlanta journals : 

" As the first carriage drove away, the Governor's 
Horse Guard came up the street, forty strong, under 
command of Captain Miller. The company was an 
escort to the hero of the day. With the Governor's 
Horse Guard came a carriage drawn by two black 
horses. In that carriage was General Joseph E. John- 
ston. The old hero sat upon the rear seat, and beside 
him was General Kirby Smith. . . . The carriage was 
covered with flowers. ' That's Johnston ! that's Joe John- 
ston ! ' yelled some one. Instantly the Governor's Horse 
Guard, horses and men, were displaced by the old battle- 



286 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

scarred veterans. The men who fought under the hero 
surrounded the carriage. They raised it off the paved 
street, and they yelled themselves hoarse. Words of 
love, praise, and admiration were wafted to the hero's 
ears. Hands pushed through the sides of the carriage 
and grasped the hands of the man who defended At- 
lanta. The crowd grew and thickened. Captain Ellis 
tried to disperse it, but could not. Then the police 
tried; but the love of the old veterans was greater than 
the strength of both Captain Ellis and Atlanta's police 
force. For ten minutes the carriage stood still ; then, 
as it began to move, some one called out, ' Take them 
horses away ! ' Almost instantly both horses were un- 
hitched, and old veterans fought for their places in the 
traces. Then the carriage began to move. Men who 
loved the old soldier were pulling it. Up Marietta 
Street it went to the Customhouse, then it was turned, 
and back toward the opera house it rolled. The rattle 
of the drum and the roll of the music were drowned by 
the yell of the old soldiers ; they were wild, mad with 
joy; their long pent-up love for the old soldier had 
broken loose. Just before the carriage reached the 
opera house door a tall, bearded veteran on a horse 
rode to the side. Shoving his hand through the open 
curtain, he grasped the hand of General Johnston just 
as a veteran turned it loose. The general looked up. 
'General Johnston!' cried the veteran. General John- 
ston continued to look up. His face showed a struggle. 
He knew the horseman, but he could not call his name. 
'Don't you know me, General — don't you know me?* 
exclaimed the horseman. In his voice there was almost 
agony. ' General Anderson, General,' said Mrs. Mil- 
ledge. General Johnston heard the words, and, rising 
almost from his seat, exclaimed, ' Old Tige ! Old Tige ! 
Old Tige!' The two men shook hands warmly. Tears 



A PRIVATE CITIZEN. 



287 



were flowing down the cheeks of each. ' Yes, Old Tige 
it is, General,' said General Anderson; 'and he loves 
you as much now as ever.' The scene was witnessed by- 
hundreds. The ladies in the carriage cried. General 
Smith turned his face away. . . . The carriage stopped 
in front of the stage door to the opera house. The gen- 
eral and his escort were assisted to the ground. Old 
veterans tried to lift him to their shoulders, but were 
warned that his health would not allow it. Meekly they 
drew away. In it the same love was apparent which 
characterized their greeting. Mrs. Milledge took the 
old hero by the arm, and, followed by General Smith 
and Mrs. Chevalier, started for the stairway. The crowd 
fell back silently, making a pathway for them. It was a 
pathway strewn with love and not with flowers. As 
they started up the steps an old veteran touched the 
general, saying : * Mars' Joe, let me touch your garment. 
I fought through the war, and have traveled two hun- 
dred miles to see you.' The old general stopped and 
grasped the old man's hand. A minute later he disap- 
peared in the opera house." 

Equally gratifying was his reception this same year 
in Richmond, on the occasion of the unveiling of the 
equestrian statue of Lee. The reunion of soldiers from 
all parts of the South enabled him to see again multi- 
tudes of his old army associates; and his exhilaration at 
meeting them was enhanced by the privilege of pay- 
ing a tribute to his friend and old companion, R. E. 
Lee. In the ceremonies the duty was assigned to him 
of pulling the cord which released the drapery and ex- 
posed to the world the form and features of his noble 
successor in the command of the Army of Northern 
Virginia. 

From the time of the death of Mrs. Johnston he had 
been gradually becoming weaker. His gait was as 



288 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Steady and his head as erect as ever, but his vital powers 
were g-radually on the wane, and his advanced age pre- 
cluded all hope of recuperation. On the death of his 
great antagonist, Sherman, he was selected as one of the 
pall-bearers, a call which he felt that he could not re- 
fuse; for Sherman had always lavished evidences of 
friendship and admiration upon him. Though unusually 
feeble at the time, Johnston attended the obsequies; 
and the bad weather which prevailed gave him a cold, 
which greatly enfeebled him. From the time of his 
return he was confined to his house, and his strength 
gradually failed him, until, on the night of March 21, 
1891, he peacefully passed away in his residence, No. 
1023 Connecticut Avenue. The immediate cause of his 
death was heart failure. No delirium evoked fancied 
hosts from the shadowy past, or aroused him to utter in 
a last effort ringing orders of battle; but the vital en- 
gine simply stopped the performance of its functions, 
and he fell asleep as quietly as if there w^as to be a 
waking. No one was with him save his brother-in-law, 
the friend of his youth, Robert M. McLane, who had 
seen him bleeding from his first wound received in the 
fight with the Florida Indians, and who now closed the 
eyes that were to open no more. 

The funeral, at his expressed desire, was as unosten- 
tatious as his life. It was that of a private citizen, not 
of a soldier. No martial music followed him to the 
grave; no military salute pealed its volleys over the 
frame which had so often breasted the deadly fire of 
battle, and which still bore within its texture the foe- 
man's lead. He was laid to rest in Greenmount Ceme- 
tery, Baltimore, which contained the ashes of the two 
whom he had loved best in life — his noble wife, w^ho 
rested beside him, and his gallant nephew, Preston John- 
ston, whose remains had been brought back by him from 



A PRIVATE CITIZEN. 



289 



Mexico. Nothing marks his last resting place but this 
simple inscription, selected by himself : 

JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, 

SON OF 

Judge Peter & Mary Johnston, of Va., 

BORN AT 

LoNGWooD, Prince Edward Co., Va., 

February 3, 1S07. 

Died March 21, 1891. 

Brigadier General, U. S. A. 

General, C. S. A. 

Honors were lavished upon him throughout the 
South on receipt of intelligence of his death. Resolu- 
tions were passed in countless numbers by organizations 
of veterans, and minute guns were fired in every place 
of importance. Nor were these confined to the South ; 
not a few among the soldiers of the North paid tributes 
of respect to one whom they admired and whose great- 
ness they knew. Virginia, his native State, was foremost 
in doing him honor, and on the long roll of her mighty 
names is proud to class him with Washington, Jackson, 
and Lee, types of the highest manhood and noblest at- 
tainments, whether in the leadership of a successful 
revolution or in the more difficult task of heroically 
fighting against fate in behalf of a lost cause. On his 
death, well could his mother State sob amid her tears, 
in the words of her ancient motto, to the mighty trio of 
heroes who had preceded him : " En, dat Virginia quar- 
tum." 



CHAPTER XIX. 

CONCLUSION. 

A STRONG testimonial to Johnston's greatness as a 
commander is the fact that since the close of the civil 
war his reputation has been constantly increasing. The 
romance of a brilliant success, due possibly to accident, 
may, during the progress of a struggle, raise some Cleon 
or Gates to an altitude so lofty that their fall, when it 
comes, is but the more disastrous. But he only is the 
great leader whose campaigns stand the cold, impartial 
study of military students; with whom success counts 
for little, unless a review of surrounding circumstances 
and relative resources demonstrates that it was not due 
to chance. With the general public, during and since 
the war, the commander whose lot it was to organize 
armies for others and relinquish their leadership just as 
they became the veterans who could win Fredericksburgs 
and Chancellorsvilles, obtains but little credit. The pub- 
lic imagination must be inflamed by the brilliancy of ac- 
tual combat, and thinks little of the strategy which se- 
cures equal results without bloodshed, except to ridicule 
and condemn it. The renown which the great captain 
transmits to future ages must rest upon a more solid 
foundation. It must meet the approval of those experts 
in the profession of arms who are seeking in the annals 
of past conflicts exemplars for their guidance. Tested 
thus, Johnston's name passes into history with ever-grow- 
ing luster ; for the publication of records heretofore not 



CONCLUSION. 291 

accessible, and of military memoirs by leading partici- 
pants of the opposing sections, have cleared up the ob- 
scurity which partly veiled many of his campaigns, 
and have placed him in the clearer light which vin- 
dicates his operations, and which he, from patriotism, 
did not attempt during the struggle to shed upon 
his acts. 

But however much a certain faction at the South mis- 
represented and underestimated him, those who met him 
in the field placed a juster value upon his talents. Sher- 
man tells us in his Memoirs,* in connection with the siege 
of Vicksburg, that his abilities were recognized, and that 
General Grant then told him that' Johnston was about 
the only general on that side whom he feared. John 
Russell Young, in his account of General Grant's tour 
around the world, reports him as saying: 

'' The Southern army had many good generals. Lee, 
of course, was a good soldier, and so was Longstreet. I 
knew Longstreet in Mexico. He was a fine fellow, and 
one of the best of the young officers. I do not know 
that there was any better than Joe Johnston. I have 
had nearly all of the Southern generals in high command 
in front of me, and Joe Johnston gave me more anxiety 
than any of the others. I was never half so anxious 
about Lee. Take it all in all, the South, in my opinion, 
had no better soldier than Joe Johnston — none, at least, 
that gave me more trouble." f 

Sherman's estimate of him was equally high. In his 
article on ** The Grand Strategy of the Last Year of the 
War" he speaks of him as " equal in all the elements of 

* Vol. i, p. 328. 

f Around the World with General Grant, vol. ii, pp. 212, 213. It 
is to be regretted that General Grant here, as in some of his own writ- 
ings, allows himself to speak disparagingly of Lee. Even he can not 
afford to depreciate Lee's fame. 



292 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

generalship to Lee."* Colonel Chesney, the eminent 
English military writer, in an article entitled " Sherman 
and Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign," f says: 

"If men were to be judged of solely by the difficul- 
ties they overcome, independently of the direct results 
achieved, then General Johnston might fitly head the 
list of great American commanders; for on his side was 
neither the supreme military power wielded by Grant, 
nor the prestige which made Lee almost independent of 
those who nominally controlled him; much less the har- 
mony of thought and action with his superior which as- 
sisted Sherman from first to last. A dictatorial presi- 
dent, puffed up, as his dispatches show, with mistaken 
belief in his own military judgment, and advised by the 
very officer whom Johnston had superseded, was, from 
the moment of the latter's appointment, disposed to in- 
terfere with his arrangements and prescribe his strat- 
egy. . . . His men, to whom he came as a stranger, were 
neither attached personally to their chief, like the Army 
of Virginia, nor improved in discipline to the same de- 
gree as their adversaries. ... In all these points, there- 
fore, he was at a striking disadvantage as regarded his 
opponent ; yet, with these against him, and with but one 
half the number of the Federals, he contrived to hold 
them back, led though they were with such versatile skill 
and unwearied energy as the records of modern war can 
hardly match, for nearly two months and a half in the 
advance which an active pedestrian could have made in 
as many days. Surely this is of itself a sufficient testi- 
mony to his powers of leadership. One day of faltering 
when halted, one hour of hesitation when it became neces- 
sary to fall back, might have brought instant ruin to him 

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. iv, p. 252. 
f Fortnightly Review, November, 1S75. Republished in Eclectic 
Magazine, January, 1876. 



CONCLUSION. 293 

and to his army. . . . What he might have ventured had 
a rasher or less wary commander — such as Grant him- 
self, for instance — been before him, is as impossible to 
say as it would be to declare what would have been 
the result to Lee had Sherman taken the place of Grant 
in Virginia. As things actually were disposed, it is not 
too much to declare that Johnston's doing what he did 
with the limited means at his command is a feat that 
should leave his name in the annals of defensive war at 
least as high as that of Fabius, or Turenne, or Moreau." 
Lord Wolseley, in a review of the same campaign,* 
says : *' It has always struck me that Sherman's overcau- 
tious slowness of movement was here the result of the 
very high reputation as a leader generally accorded to 
Johnston, and acknowledged by all the regular officers 
in the United States army. During this early part of 
the campaign Sherman seemed rather to aim at the pro- 
tection of his army from some skilful counter-attack by 
his active and redoubtable enemy than at any bold, 
offensive operations of his own. In fact, he was deter- 
mined to afford Johnston no opportunity for any display 
of his well-known genius and enterprise. The result was 
a hesitating slowness of movement. Notwithstanding 
his great numerical superiority, he hesitated to adopt 
any vigorous offensive in front of so skilful a tactician. 
This illustrates very usefully and clearly the power and 
effect of one of the many moral influences always at 
work in war, not only upon the heart and soul of an 
army as a whole, but upon the brain, reasoning, and ac- 
tipns of individual commanders. The cautious nature 
of the policy to which Sherman here carefully restricted 
himself was apparently dictated by the dread that he 
might omit some precaution, and so give his clever an- 

* Published in the New York World of May 31, 1891. 



294 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

tagonist an opening of which he might be able to take 
advantage. How often is this the case at chess ! A 
man, perhaps a good player, destroys his play by over- 
caution, the result of the awe with which his antagonist, 
of great repute as a player, has inspired him." 

The above are but samples of his high repute among 
military critics. Citations of the same character might 
be multiplied indefinitely. If, despite executive oppo- 
sition and neglect, despite long periods of forced inac- 
tivity, he has left so high a reputation, how towering 
would it have been had everything been in his favor ! 

It has been the habit of superficial writers on the 
civil war, while rating Johnston highly as a defensive 
commander, to assert that he was not adapted to offen- 
sive operations, nor inclined by nature to undertake the 
conduct of an aggressive campaign. When this estimate 
is critically examined, the impartial student must con- 
clude that General Johnston did not have the opportu- 
nities which others possessed. The hostility of the 
Southern Administration never left him in command of 
an army long enough to raise it to the degree of perfec- 
tion and confidence in itself and its leader that was neces- 
sary for aggressive operations. It never placed him in 
charge of an army ready drilled and homogeneous or 
flushed with success. It was his fate to take masses of 
undisciplined troops and to make armies out of them; 
or to be placed in charge of soldiers demoralized and 
disorganized by disasters springing from the incapacity 
of others, and, in the face of superior numbers, to teach 
them to regain their self-respect and to extort respect 
from their foes. When he had accomplished this, and 
had made of his armies the finely tempered weapon which 
he could trust, and with which he could not only parry 
but strike, he was promptly superseded, and some one 
else was sent in his stead to profit by the work and to 



CONCLUSION. 



295 



reap the glory. A review of his career shows this be- 
yond question. 

The first year of his service is devoted to the organ- 
ization and instruction of the volunteers who in battle 
then showed but one attribute of the soldier — courage. 
He made of that mere throng the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia. Conscious at length of its discipline and morale^ 
he suddenly assumes the offensive at Seven Pines against 
odds much greater than those which faced his successor 
in the same campaign, and is struck down on the eve of 
a decisive success. Those who contend that he was 
great only on the defensive have not read the story of 
Seven Pines. 

His next service is in the West, in charge not of an 
army, but of a large territory. When the crisis comes 
at Vicksburg he is ordered to repair to that point and 
assume command ; and, on arrival in the vicinity, finds 
the enemy between him and his army, its commander 
disobedient, insubordinate, and sustained by the Admin- 
istration, which entails as a necessary consequence its 
confinement within the walls of Vicksburg. He finds 
himself in command of six thousand men destitute of 
all equipments for a campaign, and these are slowly 
raised to twenty -eight thousand. Brought together 
piecemeal from all quarters of the Confederacy, without 
artillery, transportation, or supplies, unacquainted with 
each other and with their commander, he makes of them 
in a few weeks an army of such self-confidence that he 
does not hesitate to advance to the attack of a vic- 
torious force seventy-five thousand strong, securely for- 
tified, and aiming to cut off his retreat over an unford- 
able river. But on the eve of an attack, while he is 
engaged in reconnoitering for the purpose, the garrison 
which he is attempting to relieve succumbs, and the ob- 
ject of his advance is frustrated. Those who say that 



296 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

he was great only on the defensive have surely never 
read the story of Vicksburg. 

Next he is placed in charge of Bragg's defeated and 
disheartened force. He takes that army, diminished in 
numbers, barefoot, half starved, almost in process of dis- 
solution. Confidence in him brings back the laggards 
to the ranks, and re-endows it with hope and daring. 
For months he fights its old foe, strongly re-enforced 
and constantly fed with recruits. He repulses it in 
every ass-ault, crosses in its presence large streams with- 
out loss of men or material, and is only prevented from 
striking back by the opposition and disobedience of the 
lieutenant who is to replace him — designing and pre- 
paring to turn upon his foe with a " Lockerbie lick " at 
the crossing of Peach Tree Creek, and only prevented 
by a stab in the back which paralyzes the arm upraised 
to strike. Those who say that he was great only on the 
defensive have never read the story of Atlanta. 

He is next called from his privacy by the despairing 
wail of the South in the closing act of the drama. For- 
getting his private wrongs, hearing only the call of duty, 
he collects a handful of his old soldiers, survivors of 
the butchery to which prejudice and incompetency had 
doomed so many of their comrades, and bursts upon the 
double numbers of Sherman's flank, himself foremost in 
the charge ; and the sun of the Southern Confederacy 
sets upon a contest which raises the drooping spirit and 
results in a convention unique in history. Those who 
say that he was great only as a defensive leader have 
never rightly read the story of Bentonville, the Mont- 
mirail of the Lost Cause. 

If he effected these results with such paucity of 
means, with improvised forces hardly formed when the 
time for action came, what might have been hoped had 
he, like Lee, been given an army ready formed and con- 



CONCLUSION. 297 

fident, and had he been allowed to retain it throughout 
the conflict ? With Lee commanding in Virginia from 
the outset, and Johnston in the West, can it be doubted 
that in the Mississippi Valley, as on the Atlantic slope, 
the Confederacy might have boasted a Chancellorsville 
and a Fredericksburg ; and that the Army of Tennessee, 
a worthy brother to the Army of Virginia, would never 
have had cause to blush at the name of Missionary 
Ridge and Nashville ? 

That general is the greatest who, careless of his own 
blood, spares the lives of his men ; who, despising the 
eclat of a bloody field, fights only when he has an object 
for battle and reasonable chances for victory. Measured 
by the meager resources available, by the indifference 
of his Government, by the character of the armies in- 
trusted to him, Joseph E. Johnston will be treated in 
history as equally great in the defense and in the aggres- 
sive — as much entitled to be called the sword of the Con- 
federacy as its shield. Invariably brought forward only 
in crises when all seemed lost, only when the fears of 
the Executive stifled for a time its prejudices, he never 
declined the leadership of a forlorn hope ; and it is un- 
just to ignore the difficulties which he never shrank from 
facing, and to join in the parrot cry of the uninformed 
that he was great only in defense. The Southern Beli- 
sarius, always the victim of court disfavor, yet always 
indispensable, his self-abnegation deserves fairer treat- 
ment.* 

* " It is not perhaps irrelevant nor an exaggeration to say that Gen- 
eral Johnston's career presents the most remarkable anomaly of mili- 
tary annals. From the beginning to the end he was distrusted and 
depreciated by the Confederate authorities, yet he held from first to 
last the confidence and admiration of armies and people ; and every 
effort of the several made to retire him to obscurity but strengthened 
him in popular esteem, and resulted in calling him to new exaltation 



298 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

But though Johnston was never allowed to retain 
command of one army long enough to achieve the great 
results which only flow from long association and per- 
fect mutual trust between general and soldier, he never 
failed to win the love of his men. They trusted him be- 
cause they knew that their blood would not be wasted. 
When he gave the order they did not hesitate to shed 
It, for they were certain that there was some object to 
accomplish and some hope of its accomplishment. They 
admired him because they knew that he would not ask 
them to go where he would not go himself. His order 
was " Follow," not ** Go." They had seen him at Manas- 
sas seize a regimental standard to bear in person, and 
only relinquish it to guide its gallant bearer to the 
spot in the van where it should be placed. No poet 
has handed down the incident in burning words, like a 
similar incident in the life of Lee; but the act was as 
daring and as effective as if a Tyrtaeus had accompanied 
it with a battle ode. At Seven Pines they had seen him 
unhorsed by a shell while leading the advance. Near 
Marietta they had seen the ball which struck down the 

of power, new display of genius and increase of fame. It seemed im- 
possible to dispense with him. The public outcry for his installation 
in responsible leadership was irresistible. His genius was openly de- 
cried and his administration condemned by his superiors, yet it was 
utterly in vain so far as the public confidence was concerned. The 
people stubbornly believed in him, and the soldiers clamored for his 
generalship and fought under it with an unshakable trust and a loving 
enthusiasm. And while he labored under a continuous censure from 
the Confederate rulers, he enjoyed a constant triumph of praise from 
the masses of the people. It certainly presents a strange incident of 
the war, this incongruity of Johnston's connection with the struggle. 
Another curious fatality of Johnston was, that his genius was conspicu- 
ously and most mournfully vindicated by the blundering failure of 
others, instead of the successes achievable by the enforcement of his 
counsels and plans." — Avery's History of Georgia, pp. 279, 280. 



CONCLUSION. 



299 



saintly Polk barely miss him. They saw him in the 
closing drama of Bentonville at the head of his charging 
line. They called him their Game Cock, because of his 
gallantry and martial bearing, and they strove to emu- 
late him in courage and coolness. 

But, much as they admired him, they loved him none 
the less. Despite his natural reserve, he soon won their 
devotion. They did not content themselves with the 
simple tribute of cheers. Their feeling was deeper than 
the effervescent excitement of the moment. One of 
them can best tell why : 

" Old Joe Johnston had taken command of the Army 
of Tennessee when it was crushed and broken, at a time 
when no other man on earth could have united it. He 
found them in rags and tatters, hungry and heart- 
broken, their morale gone, their pride a thing of the 
past. Through his instrumentality and skilful manipu- 
lations all these had been restored. We had been under 
his command nearly twelve months. He was more 
popular with his troops day by day. We had made a 
long and arduous campaign, lasting four months ; not 
one single day in that four months that did not find us 
engaged in battle with the enemy. History does not 
record a single incident of where one of his lines was 
ever broken — not a single rout. He had not lost a sin- 
gle piece of artillery, he had dealt the enemy heavy 
blows ; he was whipping them day by day, yet keeping 
his own men intact. His men were in as good spirits 
and as sure of victory at the end of four months as they 
were at the beginning. Instead of the army being de- 
pleted, it had grown in strength. 'Tis sure he had fallen 
back, but it was but to give his enemy the heavier blows. 
He brought all the powers of his army into play. Ever 
on the defensive, 'tis true, yet ever striking his enemy 
in his most vulnerable part. His face was always to the 



30O GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

foe. They could make no movement in which they were 
not anticipated. Such a man was Joseph E. Johnston, 
and such his record. Farewell, old fellow, we privates 
loved you because you made us love ourselves ! . . . 

" Chapter LXXIII. — General Hood takes Com- 
mand. — It came like a flash of electricity, staggering 
and blinding every one. It was like applying a lighted 
match to an immense magazine. It was like the suc- 
cessful gambler, flushed with continual winnings and 
success, staked his all and lost. It was like the end of 
the Southern Confederacy — things that were were not — 
it was the end. . . ." * 

As a strategist, the foundation principle of John- 
ston's theory of the art of war was a disregard of mere 
localities, and a conviction that the proper policy was 
concentration for decisive blows — reasoning that suc- 
cess thus achieved would regain all the territory lost to 
win it. In this he was always at issue with the Govern- 
ment, which could not withstand the pressure of local 
protests, and insisted on endeavoring to hold all points, 
gradually enabling the larger forces of the North to 
gain the mastery. It is the best vindication of his plans 
that in almost every instance they were forced upon the 
Administration by the current of events, after having 
been first rejected. After Manassas, he advised the con- 
centration there of an army sufficient to manoeuvre Mc- 
Clellan out of his position and force him to fight, asking 
sixty thousand men, though McClellan had treble that 
number under his orders. The reply of the Administra- 
tion was an offer to send enough recruits to take the 
surplus arms (about equivalent to a brigade), and a re- 
fusal to withdraw troops from the South for fear of 
losing some of the seaports. With his weak force he 

* From a History of Company H, Maury Grays, by S. R. Watkins. 



CONCLUSION. 301 

lay at the advanced position of Centreville, far in front 
of any afterward held in Virginia during a winter by the 
Confederates, confronting odds far greater than any sub- 
sequently opposed on that theatre of operations. At the 
beginning of the campaign the next spring he repeats 
his suggestion of concentration, this time to fall upon 
McClellan as he debouches on Richmond. The Admin- 
istration again declines, saying that the troops with- 
drawn to accomplish this would cause the evacuation 
of Norfolk and the possible loss of Charleston. And 
yet those very troops are afterward united with his 
army, but not till the enemy has prepared for himself 
a safe haven of refuge, thereby escaping with defeat 
when his fate might have been destruction. On going 
to the West he advises the transfer of troops from the 
trans-Mississippi to be joined to the army defending 
Vicksburg, and opposes any weakening of the Army of 
Tennessee. The Administration adopts exactly the op- 
posite course: Bragg is weakened, the trans-Mississippi 
troops are put in motion too late and in insufficient 
numbers, although at the very time the Northern leaders 
are drawing from their forces west of the Mississippi to 
re-enforce their Vicksburg army; and the result is the 
loss of Vicksburg and the loss of Tennessee. He ad- 
vises strengthening the army at Dalton by the troops of 
Polk and Longstreet for an offensive campaign. The 
Administration rejects his plan, unless he will consent 
to base it on a junction at a point near enough to the 
enemy for the latter to frustrate it. Longstreet never 
jojns him, Polk not until Sherman has begun to fight 
him ; and when that army, after his removal, takes the 
offensive under the guidance of the Administration and 
the selected exponent of its plans, its destruction follows 
as a necessary consequence. 

If the history of warfare in America teaches any- 



302 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

thing, it is that this country cannot be conquered by the 
mere capture of posts. He who holds otherwise is bhnd 
to the story of the Revolution and the War of 1812. 
Nothing could have suited the South better than an 
attempt of the North to seize and garrison its cities. 
Its great extent of territory would then have become its 
strength, the superior numbers of the enemy would have 
been dissipated in numerous garrisons, and the Southern 
armies, equal to any movable forces which its foe could 
have brought against them, might have faced them with 
confidence and destroyed them in detail. Under the 
strategy of President Davis the extent of Southern ter- 
ritory was a source of weakness; under Johnston's it 
would have been a bulwark of power. 

Great though he was as a captain, he was equally 
great as a man. Despite the repeated injuries which he 
suffered, no word of complaint escaped him ; he made no 
attempt to weaken the Administration which might crip- 
ple it in its struggle with the enemy. He lay quiescent 
under misrepresentation, took upon himself without a 
murmur the responsibility justly chargeable to others, 
and waited for the slow but certain vindication of time. 
When the crowning wrong was put upon him in front of 
Atlanta, he generously explained his plans to his suc- 
cessor and gave him the benefit of his matured study. 
When the army, on receiving intelligence of his removal, 
evinced ominous signs of excitement and rage, he threw 
his influence in the scale to aid in composing the discon- 
tent. And he had the noblest revenge that ever soldier 
took. Called back by the summons of Lee to command 
the fragments of the magnificent host whom he once 
had led, emerging from his modest retirement, not as an 
Achilles to avenge the slaughter of a friend, but as a 
Camillus to rescue his hard-pressed country, he counted 
not his foes, but struggled against destiny to repair the 



CONCLUSION. 303 

disasters of others. And, by the very irony of fate, he 
saw the man who for four years had heaped indignities 
upon him a suppliant for an escort to protect him in his 
flight. The most striking contrast of the civil war was 
Johnston, as the last representative of the Confederacy, 
making terms of peace, while Jefferson Davis was speed- 
ing toward the seacoast. 

A writer in the Land we Love, a periodical edited 
for a time after the war by General D. H. Hill, draws 
a comparison between Johnston and Washington. He 
says : " When Johnston fell under the Executive ban and 
a howl was raised against him by a partisan press, how 
sublimely great was the silence of the man ! It was 
necessary for the good of our cause that the Adminis- 
tration should be supported to the last, and his defense 
might weaken that support. It required no common 
exercise of self-denial to bear a positive wrong rather 
than inflict a possible harm upon the country ; but the 
patriotism of the great soldier was equal to the effort. 
Another act of self-abnegation on the part of General 
Johnston has won the admiration of the British people. 
When sent out after the battle of Murfreesboro to in- 
vestigate the cause of the alleged dissatisfaction with 
the Southern commander, and to take command himself 
if he found the grounds of complaint were real, he had 
the magnanimity as well as delicacy to decline his own 
advancement under these extraordinary conditions, and 
he did what he could to strengthen the hands of General 
Bragg. . . . 

" Here we would notice a remarkable resemblance 
between the military views of the Father of his Country 
and Johnston. It has been quite common of late years 
to deny to Washington the credit of being a great cap- 
tain. It has been often said that his campaigns were 
failures and his battles defeats. . . . 



304 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

" Now military genius is not exhibited merely in 
splendid achievements and wonderful victories. The 
genius of Napoleon never shone so brightly as on his 
last disastrous campaign. 

" But the great captain is the man who thoroughly 
understands his position, who thoroughly knows the 
temper and character of his own troops, the qualities of 
the troops opposed to him, and the capacity of their 
leader ; who knows how to husband his own resources 
and to destroy those of his enemy ; who knows when to 
fight and when to retreat ; who knows how to discrimi- 
nate between what is essential to secure eventual suc- 
cess, and what is only of transient and factitious impor- 
tance. . . . 

"Whatever opinion the world may have of Washing- 
ton as a military leader, it is sufficient, in our mind, to 
mark him as one of the great generals of history that 
he made no such dreadful mistakes as we poor rebels 
did about the value of positions. Now, General John- 
ston had precisely the same views on this subject. * Let 
the place go, and save the garrison,' was his motto from 
the beginnmg to the end of the war. He retreated from 
Harper's Ferry, but he kept his troops in hand to aid in 
striking a heavy blow at Manassas. He withdrew his 
army from the cul de sac at Yorktown, much to McClel- 
lan's chagrin and mortification ; but then he turned upon 
his pursuers with terrible effect at Williamsburg, at El- 
tham's Landing, and at Seven Pines. He had given the 
necessary order for a retreat from Vicksburg, but Pem- 
berton unfortunately thought that the position, and not 
the army, was the important thing, and Vicksburg fell 
and all the troops were captured. He retreated from Dal- 
ton ; but he inflicted day by day such heavy losses upon 
Sherman that the disparity between their numbers had 
almost ceased to exist. He was decried for his retreats, 



CONCLUSION. 



305 



just as Washington was for his. But time has already 
wrought a mighty change in men's opinions, and we be- 
lieve that all history will enroll the name of Joseph E. 
Johnston beside that of the man he so much resembled 
m mind and character." 

His generosity was as great as his magnanimity. He 
never attempted to reap the glory due to others, but 
was always glad to bestow compliments upon his lieu- 
tenants. In his official report of Manassas he spoke of 
Beauregard in terms of praise. In his report of Wil- 
liamsburg he gave the credit to Longstreet, gracefully 
saying that the clear head and brave heart of the latter 
reduced him to be a mere spectator. On going to the 
West, he said kind words of Bragg, and spoke in grati- 
fying terms of his operations. He repeatedly mentioned 
Pemberton in terms of commendation, refrained even 
from pointing out his disobedience of orders till forced 
to it by Pemberton's official report, and during the siege 
said more than once that he was convinced Pemberton 
would make a gallant and obstinate defense. Not until 
both Bragg and Pemberton had requited his generous 
treatment with insult and ingratitude did he retort, and 
then only in terms of sorrow rather than anger. Until 
the close of hostilities he never spoke of President Davis 
himself in harsh language ; although the latter, after re- 
moving him at Atlanta, did not hesitate to add to the 
anguish of the blow by publicly accusing him of dis- 
loyalty.* 

He was an utter stranger to that ambition which has 
actuated so many of the great soldiers of history. He 
had no ambition save to do right and to serve his coun- 
try to the best of his ability. The only renown which 
he coveted was the approval of his own conscience and 

* Grant's Memoirs, vol. ii, p. 345. 



3o6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the good opinion of his countrymen. He sought no op- 
portunity for mere military distinction apart from the 
good of his country. He sacrificed no human Hfe for 
mere glory. When a word from him might have raised 
such a protest from his army in Georgia that President 
Davis could not have disregarded it, he did not speak 
it. When he was urged at the last to continue the war, 
and might have done so without the responsibility for 
its continuance, and might have served as a rallying 
point for those who at least wished to die a glorious 
death, he took the ground that it would be the highest 
of human crimes to continue the contest, and relegated 
himself to private life by his own will as modestly and 
as nobly as Washington on surrendering his commission. 
How incomparably greater is the man who can act thus, 
than he whose fame is perpetuated by pyramids of human 
skulls and the ashes of burning cities! 

His personal character was not less admirable than 
his public career. Unselfishness was his rule of action. 
His own convenience was secondary to the comfort of 
the humblest creature whom chance threw in his way. 
While on his journey to Atlanta to assume command of 
the second army of the Confederacy, he excited univer- 
sal remark by having an ordinary box car assigned to 
himself and staff, instead of imitating the brigadiers of 
the time and taking possession of a passenger coach, to 
the discomfort of the women and invalid soldiers for whom 
the limited transportation of Southern railroads was in- 
sufficient. During that famous campaign he thought 
nothing of wrapping himself up in a blanket and sleeping 
on the ground, without even a tent to cover him. In the 
very last years of his life no woman, whatever her station, 
stood in a public conveyance while he sat. The lady with 
her furs and the seamstress with her bundle equally at- 
tracted his attentions and profited by his courtesy. 



CONCLUSION. 



307 



He was one of the most modest of men. Detesting 
ostentation in dress or manner, always holding back 
where others pushed forward, his magnificent mien yet 
made him the cynosure of all eyes; and his face would 
be suffused with blushes like those of a woman at the 
notice which he unconsciously attracted. 

He was one of the purest of men. His thought and 
conversation were as delicate and refined in all com- 
panies as if ladies were always present and listening to 
his every word. Had the suggestion of the heathen god 
been adopted and man had been made with a window 
in his breast, in order that the most secret thoughts 
might be revealed, the world might have viewed in crys- 
tal clearness and purity the inmost thoughts of Joseph 
E. Johnston, and found nothing that was not elevated 
and elevating. 

He was in his private transactions the soul of honor. 
None with whom he was thrown in business dealings 
would ever hesitate to accept his verbal assurances and 
to act upon them with perfect confidence. None would 
expect him to take any position which was not consistent 
with the highest principles of fairness and rectitude, and 
in which he was not wholly sincere. 

He was one of the most charitable of men. Despite 
his modest means, many an old comrade could tell how 
Johnston had contributed to relieve his wants, leaving 
its record in his bank book perhaps, but never in his 
ledger. 

He was one of the most courteous of men. Firm in 
his own opinions, he always listened with deference to the 
views of others. Wonderfully entertaining in conversa- 
tion, he never obtruded his thoughts, and it was only in 
response to overtures from others that he would, with 
the admirable brevity and terseness which were so forci- 
ble, enliven and elucidate the subject under discussion. 
21 



3o8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Reserved though he was, from that innate modesty 
which prevented his ever making the first advance, and 
which by strangers was often mistaken tor coldness, he 
was to those whom he knew and esteemed devoted in 
friendship. To them he was not cold, but greeted them 
with the hearty grasp of both hands, which bespoke a 
welcome more cordial than could be expressed by words. 

In domestic life his character was yet more beautiful. 
The feeble pen of his biographer, hopeless of doing him 
justice, can not venture upon an attempt to depict it. 
The interesting companion, the unwavering friend, the 
unselfish, devoted husband, the Christian gentleman, the 
ardent patriot, the great captain, he will live in history 
as one of its colossal names, as the able leader, worthily 
occupying a place in the front rank of the world's mili- 
tary chiefs, as the great man, great in those qualities 
which elevate him above the mere commander; just as 
the Chevalier Bayard stands on a higher pedestal than 
Napoleon, and Epaminondas than Alexander. 

He has joined the valiant lieutenants who have long 
been awaiting him ; and in his apotheosis is greeted by 
Jackson, Bee, and Stuart from his Eastern army ; by 
Hardee, Polk, and Cleburne from the Western. Insep- 
arably associated with those mighty chiefs, and encircled 
by the hosts whom they marshaled in defense of home 
and fireside, he descends to posterity with ever-brighten- 
ing fame. 



APPENDIX. 

ORATION OF LEIGH ROBINSON AT THE MEMORIAL 
EXERCISES IN WASHINGTON, D. C, ON MAY 12, 1891. 

" Death makes the brave my friends," was the great word 
of the great Crusader ; and though the outward empire of the 
chivalry he led has crumbled to dust, and " their swords are rust," 
the intrinsic nobleness thereof sunlves the first crusade and the 
last. Wherever nobleness has a house, there shall this gospel 
also be preached. Nor can it be said to be strictly bounded by 
the noble. The emulation of brave lives, and the preservation of 
their images, is the wise instinct of mankind. The path to im- 
mortality is fortitude. In every noble arena this is the crucial 
test. The corner stone of every fortress of man's power and 
man's honor is man's fortitude. Our inmost shrines are altars 
to this tutelary god. Deep in the heart is the sense of that in- 
eradicable royalty which makes the crown of thorns more than 
the crown of gold — martyr more than victor. It is the true-fixed, 
the constant quality, that hath no fellow in the firmament. Con- 
stancy is the pole on which the heavens turn. 

As one who wore this armor against fate, and walked erect 
beneath it till fourscore had been passed ; as one who in all rela- 
tions evinced the enduring fiber which sets the seal on every ex- 
cellence — Joseph E. Johnston is our theme. We are to consider 
the example of a life which by birth was martial. To the son of 
one of Lee's Legion, nourished by the breath of heroes, in the heroic 
prime, a soldier's life seemed the natural office of a soldier's son. 
A cadetship at West Point was the signal that the parade ground 
of his life was chosen, the tuition of his destiny begun, the Olym- 
pian battle joined. "Better," sings an ancient bard, " better is 
the grave than the life of him who sighs when the horns summon 



310 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

him to the squares of battle." So sighed not the young second 
lieutenant, who, graduating with honor in 1829, first won his spurs 
in the Florida War. 

The war itself must be acknowledged to be a part of that sad 
chapter which registers the uncontained avidity of a victor race. 
When, in July, 1821, Spain ceded the Floridas to the United 
States, the Indians were roaming unmolested over the Peninsula, 
and were the recognized possessors of broad and fertile acres in 
the heart of the country. The white man's remedy for this is the 
tangle of treaties, from whose network the Indian emerges a deso- 
lating savage. It is ever a perilous moment, when weakness is 
the guard of fertility and rapacity is strong. But it is when, in 
the sequel, devastation and havoc have been loosed, and tottering 
age, and infantile weakness, and woman's .sorrow are alike de- 
voured by infuriated murder, that the army appears upon the 
scene. Whatever was the primary right or wrong, our young 
second lieutenant was in the field not for outrage but to quell 
it. He was there to act a soldier's part in the school of a soldier's 
strife and duty. Right worthily he did it. For it fell to him to 
extricate from jeopardy the command in which he was himself 
but a subordinate — a jeopardy so great that it left him with the 
marks of five bullets on his person and clothing. On the anvil of 
an indomitable will he was already beating into polished bright- 
ness the fearless mettle of his soul. Henceforth his " baptism of 
fire " stands sponsor for him. His knighthood has been laid upon 
his shoulder. 

It is the track of the accomplished knight which we follow in 
the war with Mexico — that ardent nurse of heroes — where our 
second lieutenant has grown to be captain of engineers on the 
staff of Winfield Scott. When Vera Cruz yielded to bombard- 
ment, Captains Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston, of the 
general's staff, were appointed to arrange the terms of its sur- 
render. Worthier ambassadors of victory could not have been 
chosen. 

The army then moved along the great national road made by 
the old Spaniards to the ancient capital of Mexico. On April 12, 
1847, cannon shots from Cerro Gordo checked the cavalry ad- 
vance, and made it certain Santa Anna would give battle there. 
At the head of a pass winding its ascending way through a nar- 



APPENDIX. 



311 



row defile of mountains the enemy had fortified himself by a 
series of breastworks armed with cannon, which commanded the 
road and each other. It was easy to see that on the left the 
position could not be taken. Skilful reconnoissances, in which 
Johnston bore a conspicuous part, decided the plan of battle, 
which was an attack upon the right. At the beginning of the as- 
sault Johnston was ordered to make one more reconnoissance. 
The rattle of musketry had been heard but a few minutes, when 
he fell, severely wounded, at the head of his daring movement. 
Of such is the kingdom of victory ! There is the dangerous pass ; 
there the difficult height ; there the hero's place ; there he falls ! 
An army rushes over him to triumph. So the steep cone was car- 
ried — " the lofty and difficult height of Cerro Gordo," as the com- 
manding general called it. 

A soldier's wounds are the rounds in his ladder. His letter 
of credit is written in his blood. His noble traffic is the safety of 
others in return for blows to himself. Johnston's wounds pointed 
to him as the fit man to be lieutenant colonel of the fine regiment 
of Voltigeurs. At their head he led the assault upon Chapulte- 
pec, and at their head he was again shot down. But his wounds 
could not impede him from entering the City of Mexico as com- 
mandant of the regiment he had so gallantly led. 

After the war he was for a time acting inspector general. 
Still later he was made lieutenant colonel of cavalry. Finally he 
was appointed quartermaster, with the rank of brigadier, the high- 
est prize which was then accessible. 

Such was the prologue to the more stupendous drama upon 
which the curtain was now to rise. On one side of that curtain 
hung ever^' ambitious hope, the fruition whereof might now be 
counted sure ; on the other the strain of an unequal and untried 
power against the odds of number and organized resource. To 
choose the latter was to plunge into an angry flood which might 
prove the dark abyss. It was the leap from sure eminence into 
the storm and roar of the elements. To Johnston there was no 
alternative. His choice w^as the hero's choice, where the sacrifice 
was all that was certain. The forlorn hope had ever been his 
hope. He forsook the assured eminence for the earthquake of 
revolution ; to stand or fall with the soil it rocked. It was the 
peril of everything, only to be justified if principle was at stake. 



312 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

Johnston's justification can be given in no words better than his 
own. I believed, he says, " that apart from any right of seces- 
sion, the revolution begun was justified by the maxims so often 
repeated by Americans, that free government is founded on the 
consent of the governed, and that every community strong enough 
to establish and maintain its independence has a right to assert 
it. Having been educated in such opinions, I naturally deter- 
mined to return to the State of which I was a native, join the 
people among whom I was born, and live with my kindred, and, 
if necessary, fight in their defense." 

It was but little more than a decade since Johnston had freely 
shed his blood in a war which grew out of our very willing vindi- 
cation of the right of Texas to secede from Mexico and accede to 
the Union. The United States somewhat loudly proclaimed to 
the world that this was right. A President had been elected for 
triumphing in that cause. It was natural for Johnston to believe 
that a right which had been so exultingly attributed to a province 
of Mexico, colonized under her laws, was necessarily annexed to 
that Commonwealth of Virginia, which was the first free State of 
this New World. Indeed, it will be always difficult to explain 
why Texas herself did not have at least as much legal right to go 
as to come. 

But for Johnston, as for destiny, there was but one tribunal to 
which the issue was referred, and that was visibly confronting 
him. It was for the sword to write the record. The gauge of bat- 
tle was thrown down, and by Johnston lifted with a knight's good 
conscience. What followed is written in letters of flame, and in 
this crude summary is only referred to as illustrative of character ; 
for the first word and act of Johnston when he drew his sword 
on the side he so unreservedly espoused, prefigures his quality — 
the judgment as unswerving as it was intrepid, the faculty to be 
bold or cautious as the emergency demanded. His sure eye 
quickly saw that the triangle formed by the Potomac, the Shen- 
andoah, and Furnace Ridge was untenable by any force not 
strong enough to hold Maryland Heights, which swept eveiy part 
of it by enfilade and reverse fires ; and that, moreover, it was 
twenty miles out of position to defend against Patterson's ex- 
pected advance, or to prevent McClellan's junction with him. 
His soldierly sense informed him that Winchester was the strata- 



APPENDIX. 



313 



gic point for every purpose. There the practicable roads from 
west and northwest, as well as from Manassas, meet the route 
from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Thither, on the 15th of June, 
he moved his meager force from the funnel of Harper's Ferry. 
On the next day Patterson crossed the Potomac. The skill with 
which, one month later, he eluded Patterson's army of more than 
thirty thousand, and hurled his own from the mountains upon 
McDowell, was the master stroke of Manassas — Johnston's rear 
column, under Kirby Smith, coming upon the field just as Bar- 
nard Bee was falling, and Jackson's Stonewall the last Gibraltar. 
Just when the South Carolina Brigade was hardest pressed, an 
aid or courier of Bee, meeting Johnston, asked, " Where are your 
Virginians.''" "In the thickest of the fight," was the Spartan 
answer. It was a victory won by an army which itself barely 
grazed defeat, and one, therefore, difficult to pursue. But in this 
cursory glance one thing can not be omitted — the full credit which 
Johnston everywhere gives Beauregard. 

The bold design submitted by the military officers, in a coun- 
cil of war at Manassas, in September, 1861, to concentrate at 
that point the strength of the Confederacy, even at the cost of 
leaving bare of defense points more remote, so that there might 
be taken an aggressive which would be decisiv^e, is a matter of 
history. It is expressive of a brave but well-balanced judgment, 
heedful and comprehensive, which sought to exchange risk where 
victory was not vital for where it was. It is true weighty reasons 
were given for overruling it. An army of sixty thousand soldiers 
was the force deemed essential to such a movement. Troops to 
increase the army to this number could only be furnished by 
taking them from other positions then threatened. This seemed 
to the Executive unreasonable. New troops could not be fur- 
nished because there were no arms save those which were borne 
by the troops then in the field. Arms were expected from abroad, 
but had not come, and the manufacture was still undeveloped. 
By this council of war a light is thrown on the military condi- 
tions, which for succeeding months were defensive only. In the 
penury of men and arms thereby revealed excessive forwardness 
was not obhgatory. But the defensive was one which, whenever 
assaulted, as at Leesburg, displayed an undismayed and impene- 
trable front. 



314 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

At the close of the winter and opening of the spring of 1861 
the time had come for Johnston to embrace in his vision and prep- 
aration the four routes whereby McClellan might advance — the 
one chosen the previous July ; another by Fredericksburg ; the 
third and fourth by the lower Rappahannock, or the Peninsula 
between the York and James. The choice of the second route 
(joined to movements which by the aid of the river it was easy 
to conceal) would place McClellan at least two days nearer Rich- 
mond than was Johnston at Bull Run. Face to face with these 
conditions, the Confederate General, between the 5th and the nth 
of March, placed his entire army on the south bank of the Rap- 
pahannock, where with equal readiness he could resist his antago- 
nist advancing from Manassas, or meet him at Fredericksburg, 
and at the same time be in a position to unite with others, should 
he move from Fortress Monroe or by the lower Rappahannock. 
On the latter date McClellan occupied the works at Centreville 
and Manassas, which, except by Quaker guns, had been deserted 
since the evening of the 9th. Fortress Monroe was then chosen 
as the base of operations against Richmond. Soon perceiving 
the evidence of this, Johnston moved to the south of the Rapidan, 
whence he could still more effectually unite the forces of opposi- 
tion to the meditated movement. McClellan's plan w^as to cap- 
ture the force on the Peninsula, open the James, and press on 
to Richmond before re-enforcements could arrive. Two things 
baffled his purpose — first, Magruder's inflexible intrenchments ; 
second, Johnston's alertness. On the day McClellan began his 
movement from Fortress Monroe, Johnston began the movement 
to swell Magruder's handful. It was on the 5th of April that 
McClellan w^as brought to a halt in front of Yorktown and the 
supporting fortifications. As the conclusion from the artillery 
duel of this day, which was protracted until dusk, it was deemed 
inexpedient to carry these positions by assault. It was an army 
of a hundred thousand against twelve. With such forces against 
such forts, it had been ascertained that the ground in front of 
those frowning heights and forbidding swamps was swept by 
guns which could not be silenced. Accordingly, parallels were 
started to bring Yorktown to terms by a more gradual procedure. 
There is, however, no parallel to the confession extorted from 
McClellan by Magruder. 



APPENDIX. 



315 



From the final parallel it was thought siege batteries would 
be ready to open on the 6th of May. Johnston's computation 
coinciding with McClellan's, Yorl<town was evacuated on the 
night of the 3d. On the morning of the 4th empty works again 
capitulated to the conqueror. 

It was at the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton Roads, 
at about half-past five on the morning of the 5th, that Hooker's 
sharpshooters, leading the pursuit, drove in the Confederate 
picket. It was in front of Fort Magruder, one of a cordon of 
redoubts thirteen in number, which Magruder's forethought had 
constructed. It was just two miles from the venerable shades 
and spires of Williamsburg. Within two miles of Hooker at the 
time were thirty thousand troops ; within twelve miles the bulk 
of the Army of the Potomac. He therefore made his disposi- 
tions to attack, so that if he did not capture the army before him 
he would at least hold it until others could, Williamsburg was a 
well-fought field, where Hancock leaped to fame, and where none 
can be reproached with want of valor. But the army in front of 
Hooker was neither captured nor held. The well-calculated blow 
of Johnston was fierce and stunning, and his very deliberate re- 
treat was no more interrupted. What most interests us to-night 
is the magnanimous grace with which Johnston refers to the offi- 
cer in command of the troops engaged. "About three o'clock," 
he says, " I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be 
a mere spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave 
heart left me no apology for interference." 

Meantime McClellan was bending every energy to the active 
shipment of troops by water to the west bank of the Pamunkey, 
opposite West Point. In vain did he seek there the unguarded 
spot. Just how to strike when blows were exigent, and how to 
hold up his buckler against surprise, in one instant to be shield 
and spear, was Johnston's secret. He had retired before over- 
whelming numbers with the step and gesture of a master. 

It was Johnston's theory of war that the time for blows to be 
efficient was not when his enemy was near his base and he dis- 
tant from his own, but under exactly reverse conditions. As 
early as April 15th Johnston proposed that McClellan's army 
should be attacked in front of Richmond by one as numerous, 
formed by uniting all the available forces of the Confederacy in 



3i6 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, with those at Nor- 
folk, on the Peninsula, and then near Richmond. Such an army 
surprising McClellan by an attack, when he was looking to the 
siege of Richmond, might be expected to defeat him ; and defeat 
a hundred miles from his then base of supplies would mean de- 
struction. On the 22d and 27th he reiterates this view. A month 
later the new vigor of twenty-five thousand soldiers, drawn from 
North Carolina and the South, added to the " red right arm " ot 
Jackson, and launched by the genius of Lee, was the thunderbolt 
to rive asunder McClellan's oak. Johnston's plan would have 
forestalled preparation by the unexpected before a change of 
base was feasible. 

Reasons having been presented in opposition to his original 
plan, Johnston's next design was to encourage an increasing in- 
terval between McClellan's troops as the latter approached the 
Chickahominy, and, when he was fairly astride the little river, to 
attack him. He must do this before McDowell, moving south- 
ward from Fredericksburg, could swell the tide of battle against 
Richmond. On the morning of May 30th reconnoissances showed 
that one entire corps, and a part if not the whole of another, were 
on the south side of the river. In point of fact, the corps of Heint- 
zelman and Keyes were across— the latter in advance. Heintzel- 
man was at White Oak and Bottom's bridges, with the nearest 
support to him some six miles distant, on the opposite side of the 
stream. The Chickahominy ran between the two wings of the 
army. Johnston now saw his opportunity, and to see it was to 
seize it. A violent rain storm which fell soon after, swelling the 
stream and perhaps making it impassable, convinced him that 
the hoped-for hour had struck. His orders were at once given. 
Written orders were dispatched to Hill, Huger, and G. W. Smith, 
and in writing acknowledged. Longstreet, being near headquar- 
ters, received his orders verbally. G. W. Smith was to take posi- 
tion on the left, to support the attack which the other divisions 
were to make upon the right. All were to move at daybreak. 

Seven Pines, which was to be the chief scene of encounter, is 
at the junction of the Nine Mile and Williamsburg roads. Casey's 
redoubt was a half mile nearer to Richmond. His division and 
artillery formed the first line to be attacked, the left resting upon 
White Oak Swamp, the right extending across the York River 



APPENDIX. 217 

Railroad. White Oak Swamp, the Williamsburg road, and the 
railroad are nearly parallel. Johnston expected the blow by his 
own right to be delivered before 8 A. M., and was confident that 
the effect of it would be a complete victory on the south side of 
the swollen Chickahominy. This opinion is fully shared by Gen- 
eral Keyes, and published by him in his Fifty Years' Observa- 
tions. 

Wherever the responsibility may be lodged for the failure to 
attack, not only at 8 A, M., but even as early as noon, the defect 
was not in Johnston's orders and timely preparations. For some 
reason never sufficiently explained, and still matter of controversy, 
the attack on the right did not begin until 2 o'clock in the after- 
noon. But even after the delay of all these hours, the rush of 
Hill and Longstreet had stormed and carried the intrenchments 
opposed to them, with the camp equipments, ordnance and stores 
belonging to the troops assailed, driving Casey in utter route back 
upon Couch, and Couch upon Heintzelman, when their onward 
movement was stopped by the falling night. Johnston had sta- 
tioned himself on the left to take part in the co-operating move- 
ment — where the force in front of Smith had been rescued from 
defeat by Sumner's opportune arrival — and had just ordered each 
regiment to sleep where it fought, to be ready to renew the battle 
at dawn, when he received a musket shot in the shoulder, and a 
moment after was unhorsed by a fragment of a shell which struck 
him in the breast. The reins of his steed and of his victory fell 
from his hands. The brightness of his sword shone for an in- 
stant, and then the darkness swallowed it. The sharpness of it 
slept when the night became its sheath. A hero was borne upon 
his shield fallen but undismayed. Beneath the smitten breast 
there lived a heart unsmitten. 

When Johnston was stricken down at Seven Pines he left an 
army which had been animated by him to a new consciousness 
of valor — the Army of Virginia, whose organization was the work 
of his hand. Doubtless one object of the blow was accom- 
plished in the check to McClellan's advance on the south side of 
the swamp. Nevertheless, as the strategy in the valley and the 
leap to Manassas was the shining image of the boldness and 
caution so happily mixed in him, so Seven Pines might be con- 
strued to be the malignant prophecy of that dark fate which 



3i8 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

seemed thereafter to rise in mutiny against him and be the inces- 
sant wound of victory. Rarely has the countenance of fate worn 
a look and spoken from a lip so cynical as in that chapter wherein, 
as it were, war's master was made his victim, his own edge turned 
against him. It was the superlative satire of events. Johnston's 
eminence was tried in the most fiery furnace in which such ener- 
gies could be constrained to walk. The field of victory spread be- 
fore him to be organized was, with recurring bitterness, snatched 
from him on the day the prizes were bestowed. We feel as if we 
were witnessing less the encounter of man with human circum- 
stance than the supernatural warfare of a Titan whose fight is 
with the skies. 

Johnston reported for duty on the 12th of November, and on 
the 24th received orders of that date assigning him to the com- 
mand of the Department of the West — a geographical depart- 
ment, including the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, 
and parts of Louisiana, Georgia, and North Carolina. Had the 
reality of this command been delivered to Johnston, it would have 
been the very arena for the employment of his large gifts. The 
vision which is competent to survey and manage the whole land- 
scape of war and direct the grand movements and general ar- 
rangements of campaigns is known as strategy. Of this great 
faculty Johnston was the master. 

The world's mad game is not played blindfold. The genius 
of war, like other genius, is not the mere gift of luck, but the con- 
summation of a profound attention to details and all the forces 
of supremacy. The game in which the greatest intellects are 
matched for the greatest stakes must be an intellectual game. 
The. successful general, who succeeds against disproportionate 
numbers and resources, is not a military gambler, but the closest 
of all close calculators. His greatness is that when he does stand 
upon reality he knows it, and is not to be terrified out of it or the 
daring which it justifies. This is the application of the great say- 
ing of the Roman orator, " A man of courage is also full of faith." 
Genius has its own way of dealing with the impossible, but it is 
not a senseless way, nor ever really reckless. 

Johnston went to the West not to do brilliant things for their 
own sake, but to win the cause of which he was the soldier. Ac- 
customed as he ever was to ride in the van of danger, his bruises 



APPENDIX. 



319 



of battle shining like stars upon him, he was the man of all others 
to be heeded when he counseled caution. His whole life was 
that glorious thing — fair combat through strife to victory. With 
an unshrinking devotion equal to any task, he proposed to his 
own courageous intellect that system of the offensive-defensive 
which once before in the world's annals was the salvation, and 
the sole salvation, of the bravest and most determined people on 
its face. The greatest of all warlike races rescued itself from de- 
struction, and the world's future empire from a rival, by slowly 
learning that victories may be won by avoiding no less than by 
seeking battle ; that a march or manoeuvre at the right time is 
more potent than a battle at the wrong time ; that to seize a po- 
sition which will threaten the adverse army the instant it does 
move, may far exceed the value of an attack upon it if it does 
not ; that the circuit of a large and politic strategy is wider and 
higher, and makes its demands upon an intellectual grasp more 
subtle and more vivid than the mere rapture of pitched battle. 
This was the instruction of which Fabius and Marcellus were the 
apt pupils, and Hannibal the schoolmaster. 

It is idle now to speculate as to what might have happened 
had Johnston been allowed to be the real mainspring of move- 
ments he was so fitted to direct — if the substance of his important 
command had been delivered to him. Fortune opposed him with 
an iron heart which no excellence could touch. He opposed for- 
tune with an iron will, which, unconquered and undismayed, has 
outlived fortune's worst and triumphed over it. His strife seems 
to be waged less with visible than with some inscrutable power, 
which baffled but never met him in authentic shape. It is his 
peculiar fame that no disappointment and no calamity has been 
able to deny and to dethrone his real supremacy. All noble 
strength partakes of the wrestler's agony. The thing which we 
honor is the unshrinking dedication of thews and sinews by man 
to his fellows, in the face of the frown of power and in the teeth 
of temporal scorn. That which makes the brave man, struggling 
in the storms of fate, a sight for gods and men, is the magna- 
nimity to rise from strain and overthrow with a rectitude of will 
untainted and unspent ; the uprightness which bows with bended 
knee before God's footstool, but not with bended neck under man's 
yoke, nor subjugated brow under life's oppression. The struggle 



320 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

of fate seemed to be to write the death warrant of all which to 
Johnston was most precious ; but the final victory was with John- 
ston. The moral self which was his charge to keep, the post of 
which he was God's sentry, was never once surprised, never once 
surrendered. What was then his lonely outpost is to-night his 
citadel. 

The ink was hardly dry upon the special order assigning John- 
ston to the Department of the West when he promptly made 
known the plan of campaign which commended itself to him. 
Inasmuch as the army of the trans-Mississippi was relatively 
strong and the army now proposed to be placed under him was 
relatively weak, and the latter subject to the further disadvantage 
of being divided by the Tennessee River, he urged that the united 
force of both departments be thrown at once on Grant. As the 
troops in Arkansas and those under Pemberton had the same 
great object — the defense of the Mississippi Valley — and both op- 
posed to troops having one object — the possession of the Missis- 
sippi — the main force of the latter operating on the east side ot 
the river, the more direct and immediate co-operation of the 
former was the thing advised. He significantly adds, " As our 
troops are now distributed, Vicksburg is in danger." He pro- 
posed, therefore, the union of the forces of Holmes and Pember- 
ton ; those of Bragg to co-operate if practicable. By the junction 
he could, as he believed, overwhelm Grant, then between the Talla- 
hatchee and Holly Springs, far from his base — the place for victory. 

No notice having been taken of this plan, and suggestions 
made by him respecting the commands of Bragg and Pemberton, 
as well as objections interposed by him to the diminution of the 
former force to augment the latter, failing also of approval, John- 
ston acquired the feeling that his wide command was little more 
than nominal. To be answerable for issues without authority to 
order or potently advise, is "a barren scepter " which none can 
grasp with use or honor. Upon the ground that armies with dif- 
ferent objects, like those of Mississippi and Tennessee, were too 
far apart for mutual dependence, and therefore could not be 
commanded properly by the same general, Johnston asked to 
have a different command assigned him. Ultimately a special 
order did so reassign him. Intermediately he received specific 
orders directing him where to go. 



APPENDIX. ^21 

It was on the 22d of January, 1863, while he was inspecting 
the defenses of Mobile, that he was ordered to go to the head- 
quarters of Bragg for the purpose of determining whether the 
latter had so far lost the confidence of his army as to make it ex- 
pedient to supersede him. If such was found to be the fact, John- 
ston was to be his successor. It was hardly fair thus to make a 
generous m.ind at once competitor and judge — to place him in a 
position where his merest word would exalt himself at the expense 
of the party judged. Johnston threw every doubt in favor of his 
companion in arms, and advised against Bragg's removal. His 
letter to the Confederate President upon this subject deserves to 
be known more widely than it is. " I respectfully suggest," he 
wrote, " that should it then appear to you necessary to remove 
General Bragg, none in this army or engaged in this investi- 
gation ought to be his successor." This is the voice of a true 
knight. It is the reflex of that grace of mind which is ever the 
noblest ornament to its greatness. When death has silenced him 
who wrote, it speaks to the hearts which survive like a trumpet 
in the stillness of the night. He had returned to Mobile, when, 
on the 1 2th of February, he was ordered to assume charge of the 
Army of Middle Tennessee. At the tjme the general of that army 
was bowed and broken by the illness of his wife, supposed to be 
at the point of death. With a natural chivalry Johnston post- 
poned the communication of the order, reporting to Richmond 
the reasons for so doing. Once more an act of noble grace ! 
These are the acts which write their bright light on the human 
sky. When the particular crisis had passed, Johnston's own de- 
bility was such that he could not assume command, and the order 
was indefinitely postponed. He had reported for duty all too soon, 
and too severely taxed the adamant which knew so little how to 
yield. It was not until the 12th of March that he was able to re- 
sume his duties in the field. 

Johnston had inspected Vicksburg during Christmas week, 
and even so early had decided, as he shortly afterward stated to 
General Maury, that it was a mistake to keep in an intrenched 
camp so large an army, whose true place was in the field ; that a 
heavy work should be constructed to command the river just above 
Vicksburg, "at the turn," with a year's supply for a good garri- 
son of three thousand men. Until April 14th Pemberton's tele- 



-22 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

grams indicated an effort against Bragg, in whose vicinity John- 
ston was, and not against Vicksburg. On the i6th of April the 
Union f^eet passed the batteries of Vicksburg. To the mind of 
Johnston it was clear that, when this could happen, Vicksburg 
ceased to be of any more importance than any other place on the 
river. On the 29th of April and 1st of May Perpberton an- 
nounced a movement upon Grand Gulf with a view to Vicks- 
burg. Johnston replied on the instant, telling Pemberton to unite 
all his troops from every quarter for the repulse of Grant while 
the latter was crossing the river, and to move at once for the pur- 
pose, adding, " Success will give you back what was abandoned 
to win it." On the 9th of May a dispatch was received by John- 
ston, at Tullahoma, in middle Tennessee, directing him to " pro- 
ceed at once to Mississippi to take chief command of the forces 
there." He replied : " I shall go immediately, although unfit for 
field service." From the shell which had unhorsed him at Seven 
Pines he had not yet so far rallied as to be able to ride into the 
field. But the orders he forthwith gave reflect the warrior grasp 
which nothing could relax. Three things were clear to Johnston : 
first, that the time to attack was when the enemy was divided in 
the passage of the river ; second, that the invading army must be 
defeated in the field, and that Vicksburg must fall if besieged ; 
third, that Vicksburg ceased to be of exceptional importance after 
the junction of the upper and lower fleet. In coincidence with 
these views were his orders to the officer in command at Vicks- 
burg : to leave the intrenchments there, and unite with himself 
in an attack upon the separate detachments of the opposing force ; 
but, in any event, to evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, 
and save the army, which could not escape if Vicksburg were be- 
sieged. 

When, from a failure to execute these instructions, Sherman, 
on the 13th of May, was able to interpose four divisions at Clin- 
ton, on the Southern Railroad, Johnston, then hurrying forward 
with his little army, at once ordered Pemberton to come up with 
all the strength he could assemble, in Sherman's rear, promising 
his own co-operation. Clinton was seventeen miles east of Pem- 
berton. As is well known, and doubtless because of the impor- 
tance ascribed to Vicksburg, Pemberton moved south instead of 
east with a part only of his force, and out of reach of the little 



APPENDIX. 



323 



band waiting to participate at Clinton. He marched to the dis- 
asters of Champion Hill and Baker's Creek. On being so in- 
formed, in terms which admitted of no mistake, Johnston ordered 
the immediate evacuation of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. 

It is not desirable to discuss the considerations which caused 
a sincerely patriotic soldier to so deviate from these orders as to 
invert, and, in effect, to annul them. Johnston's orders meant to 
him, as he states, " the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the 
Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy." Sav- 
ing that it was already severed, this was true. If, however, in- 
stead of deviation there had been execution, whether or not it 
would have made the difference between the disaster which was 
sustained by Pemberton at Baker's Creek, and victory at Clinton, 
it would certainly have made the difference between an army cap- 
tured in Vicksburg and an unconquered one outside of it. The 
investment of Vicksburg was completed on the 19th, and its sur- 
render was then but a matter of time. Mr. A. H. Stephens states 
that on the 23d of June he was informed at the War Department 
that the surrender of Vicksburg was inevitable. If the besieged 
could not escape the besieger at the beginning of the siege, still 
less at the end ; if the force within did not possess the power to 
unite with the force without before the siege began, how much 
less could it expect to effect such junction after forty days and 
forty nights of exhaustion were added to it ? If the stronger force 
within the citadel could not cut its way out, how much less could 
the weaker force without be expected to cut its way in .'* At the 
time Johnston had but two brigades. The race of collecting 
troops wherewith to relieve the besieged was run against those 
who could easily outstrip him. After five weeks of indefatigable 
exertion he could only say, on the 20th of June, " When all re- 
enforcements arrive I shall have about twenty-three thousand." 
A twice-beaten army inclosed in Vicksburg could not be saved 
by one not equal in strength to a third of the covering force. To 
have attempted it, against strong circumvallations, would have 
been to complete the capture of the army within by the wanton 
massacre of the army without — to fling a second catastrophe after 
the first. The fate of Vicksburg and Port Hudson was sealed, 
unless an army strong enough to carry Grant's intrenchments 
could be brought to the assault. 
22 



324 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

" He should have struck a blow," it is said. To strike a blow 
unwisely is one of the simplest of human actions. It is done daily 
with the smallest possible profit to mankind. It will ever be a 
narrow cockpit in which the tactics of Donnybrook Fair score 
their success. The shout of victory or death is irrelevant where 
death alone is possible. It is not even to court the hazard of a 
die to rush to sure destruction. Should the general then set his 
cause upon the cast, and rush into the battle merely to die there .'* 
The rush of despair proclaims as much fear as courage. John- 
ston was right. The place to defend Vicksburg was in the field. 
As a beleaguered city its defense was hopeless. Isolation was 
destruction. Vicksburg ceased to be of value when its bluffs 
could no longer close navigation to a hostile force nor keep it 
open to a friendly one. The army within was invaluable, and 
could not be replaced. To immure was to sacrifice. To shut in 
strength was to shut out strength. In the great game of danger 
he wins the day who really risks the least, however he may seem 
to hazard all. Courage and skill are shown in disregarding the 
imminent appearance, in the confidence of victory seen through 
the deadly imminence. But when to the unblenching eye of war's 
leader the peril is the only reality, and the victory beyond is the 
illusion, it is fatuity to strike. The perilous movement is victo- 
rious only when it places an adversary at a real disadvantage. 
Instead of a concentration of the weaker army, as ordered by 
Johnston, so as to be able to fall upon the stronger one in detail, 
by the deviations from his orders the weaker army was so dis- 
tributed as to be taken in detail by the concentrated stronger 
one. 

There are times in life's experience when the winds of fortune 
seem to sport with human actions ; when those we would unite 
with frustrate us, to their own cost and by their sacrifice ; times 
when it would look as if some sardonic deity had been unbound 
to baffle calculation, to poison the springs of action, to shake 
from their center faith and duty, to perplex reason and con- 
science, and to the death-call of a true endeavor be the mocking 
Mephistopheles. 

Something akin to this must have been present to Johnston 
when he saw the strength of the West hewed in two by move- 
ments which seemed to solicit the fortified line of the enemy to 



APPENDIX. 



325 



enter, like a wedge of steel, between Vicksburg and his own ex- 
terior force ; when he saw the relatively strong force retire behind 
works because of inability to meet the enemy in the open field, 
and then from their walls call upon the relatively weak force to 
storm that same enemy in his fortifications. In such catastrophe 
all that man can do is to oppose duty to dejection, make clear 
the record of responsibility, and follow with unfaltering step the 
light left in the sky. This done, the result is with the great Cap- 
tain of events, who makes and unmakes life and its aims. It was 
the destiny of Johnston to be the unhearkened Cassandra of his 
time, the sageness of whose counsel history will measure by the 
fatality of not receiving it. 

It is marvelous that after such a calamity as that at Vicksburg 
the small army which had been gathered by Johnston was pur- 
sued by no worse disaster. While Vicksburg and Port Hudson 
stood, and there was hope that either might be succored, Jack- 
son was essential to the manoeuvring army — the key to the posi- 
tion. When they fell, the military value of Jackson ended. Never- 
theless, Johnston drew up in front of it, inviting an assault, and 
only when his adversary showed he again intended to resort to 
the sure course of investment did he withdraw. I believe there 
is no dispute that Johnston's management here was one of signal 
ability. One of his officers, who in the later history of the war 
took sides with Hood, in speaking of Johnston's masterly manage- 
ment at this point, added this commentary: " I may say I never 
saw Johnston do anything which did not seem to me better done 
than any one else could do it. My only criticism is that there was 
not more of it." The faculty to do whatever is done better than 
any one else can do it is one which is never redundant, and there- 
fore one which a community struggling in the death-grips for ex- 
istence can ill afford to part with, and invite to do nothing. 

During the remainder of the year the operations of the Union 
army in Mississippi were limited to predatory expeditions. Noth- 
ing was captured which was in Johnston's custody, nothing de- 
feated which he led. 

During this summer Johnston received a letter from the Con- 
federate President criticising his conduct and conclusions in terms 
which were hardly those to win a hero's assent. To this John- 
ston replied with that invincible clearness of which, as of the art 



326 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

of war, he was the master. There would seem to be ground for 
the dilemma, afterward interposed by Johnston, that if the criti- 
cisms of him were deserved, the further retention of him in com- 
mand was indefensible. And his services were to be retained ! — 
unhappily, thereafter upon terms of mutual distrust between him 
and the authority to which he reported. 

It was on the i8th of December, 1863, that Johnston was or- 
dered to assume command of the Army of Tennessee. The in- 
structions which awaited him at Dalton advised him that he would 
probably find the army there disheartened by late events and de- 
prived of ordnance and materials; that it was hoped his presence 
would do much to re-establish hope, restore discipline, and inspire 
coniidence. 

Johnston succeeded to Bragg upon an unenviable throne. 
Whether justly or unjustly, the experiences of the preceding year 
had alienated the allegiance without which it was incoherent and 
discredited. The battle of Missionary Ridge was the greatest dis- 
aster sustained by the Confederate arms in pitched battle during 
the whole war. Nearly one half the guns, caissons, and muni- 
tions of the defeated army had been abandoned. Dalton had not 
been selected because of its defensive strength, but simply because 
the retreat from Missionary Ridge had ceased at that point. John- 
ston was sent to repair disaster. The army he now commanded 
was the same which under Bragg had been routed at Missionary 
Ridge. Sherman's army was the one which had routed it. The 
defeated army had been depleted since the battle. The success- 
ful one had been augmented. Johnston so reorganized and re- 
assured his dispirited force, that when the campaign opened in 
the spring the poorest regiment he had was superior in effective- 
ness and drill to the best when he took command. The change 
was swift and permanent. Thenceforth no army in the Confeder- 
acy excelled, if any equaled it, in drill and discipline. The whole 
army felt that a lofty gentleman was in command, animated by a 
noble and pervading justice which no favor could bias and no in- 
competence mislead. The genius for rapid organization could 
not be more splendidly evinced. Wherever his hand was laid a 
life of discipline sprang up. It was the same organizing skill 
which had laid the foundation of the Army of the East. It was a 
wonderful personal influence and mastery which thus diew to 



APPENDIX. 227 

him an army acquainted chiefly with disaster. If nothing else 
existed to reflect Ws excellence, the miracle which he wrought in 
this transformation, from complete rout to complete confidence, 
from fatal chaos and dismemberment into compact order, would 
of itself preserve for us the image of a great mind's authority and 
magnetism. As Johnston looked upon this work of his creative 
week he saw that it was good. 

When, on the 6th of May, 1S64, the duel between the two 
armies began, two things must be borne in mind : first, that on 
the preceding 4th of July one third of the strength of the Con- 
federacy had fallen, in the East and in the West, at Gettysburg 
and Vicksburg; second, that when the policy of wearing out by 
attrition was inaugurated, it was desirable for the weaker party 
to be economical of wear and tear. The time had surely come 
when the Confederacy could not be prodigal of life ; when it 
should take no step which was not calculated with disciplined 
precaution. It must make no mistake. The man for this su- 
preme emergency was then at Dalton — a man with that great 
attribute of a leader in convulsion, the capacity to see things as 
they are. As Vv'ith a merchant, so with a general, his first busi- 
ness is to know when to spend and when to spare. Johnston 
took into consideration the natural features of the country in 
front ; the susceptibility for defense, natural and artificial ; the 
importance of time without disaster to his own side ; the slight 
result of inconclusive defeat to his opponent. Only brilliant suc- 
cess could now be compensation for serious loss. All these were 
realities which he was not permitted to forget. He was now 
where previous adversity might be the background for the revela- 
tion of his skill — if only he was trusted ! Even the Divine Hero 
did not do his mighty work where faith was wanting. 

The chief criticism of Johnston's conduct of this campaign 
rests on his failure to attack Sherman at Rocky Face, three miles 
north of Dalton, when McPherson was detached to intercept 
Johnston's communications, by the movement through Snake 
Creek Gap. I believe no intelligent criticism imputes blame to 
him for a failure to attack at any other point. The disposition of 
the Confederate army about Dalton had been made in ihe hope 
that Sherman would attack with his whole force ; therefore 
Johnston's entire strength was concentrated there. For the mo- 



328 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

ment liis communications were unprotected. A mountain divided 
the opposing forces. The difficulty of the passes was as great to 
one side as the other. In these conditions to change from the 
defensive and yield the advantages of ground was a certain risk. 
On May 1st the effective strength of Johnston's army — infantry, 
artillery, and cavalry —was 42,856. On April 10, 1864, Sherman 
reported as presejii for duty i8o,coo men. Out of this force he 
proposed to form a compact army of exactly 100,000 men, for the 
purpose of his advance. The number above given is to be distin- 
guished from the number borne on his rolls, which amounted to 
upward of 340,000 men. Supposing the utmost, a victory by 
Johnston over the 100,000 picked men, Sherman had behind him 
the fortified gap at Ringgold, and behind that the fortress of 
Chattanooga. Nevertheless, a division of his adversary's force — 
that moment of division which is always the moment of weakness 
— was just the moment which Johnston was wont to seize, and 
he was about to seize this, when his reconnoissances assured him 
that it was the bulk of Sherman's army which, covered from 
exposure by the curtain of Rocky Face, was marching toward 
Resaca by Snake Creek Gap, and could without serious resist- 
ance cut his connections while he was engaged by the force in 
front. It was the infirmity of Johnston that he would not incur 
great risk without reconnoissance. He would not leap in the 
dark. He had the gift — as it proved to him, the fatal gift — of 
always knowing what he was about. Unless he at once inter- 
cepted Sherman the ruin to him was certain. Months afterward 
one of his officers ventured to ask why he did not attack at Rocky 
Face. The sententious reply was, " Napoleon once said, ' The 
general who suffers his communications to be cut deserves to be 
shot.' " 

He should have fought, his critics say, " as Lee and Jackson 
fought at Chancellorsville ; he should have thrown everything on 
the hazard of a die ; complete victory in front would have been 
followed by the rout of the force in the rear." Such critics forget 
that the victorious army at Chancellorsville was not one which, 
after complete defeat at Fredericksburg, had been delivered to a 
new commander, with a friendly caution as to the probable effect 
of such late tragedy upon spirit and organization. Chancellors- 
ville had been prepared by all the host of victories which fought 



APPENDIX. 



329 



for it like another army. That army was one which believed 
defeat to be impossible. The army at Dalton had never known 
what real victory meant. It was of incalculable importance that 
the engagement of the latter army, under their new leader, should 
be sharply discriminated from all which had preceded it. In 
mere braver}"^ the past could not be exceeded. It was the wise 
discerning stroke of the new regmie which it was essential to 
infallibly impart. 

Under any military conditions one might ask, Is it wholly 
reasonable to exact, as a matter of strict military right, that a 
general, on taking command of an army, shall at once, without 
more words, become a Robert E. Lee or Stonewall Jackson, at 
the highest pinnacle of their earthly achievement } One might 
conclude, from the inclination expressed by some to inaugurate 
the triumphs of Lee and Jackson, at the portal of the Georgia 
campaign, that such inauguration was a matter of election and 
pure preference by ambitious minds ; that one, whose heart was 
in the right place, might make a habit of the military marvel of 
the war. Alas ! the rarest and most fortunate displays of great- 
ness, Chancellorsvilles and Centrevilles, are not creatures of suf- 
frage ; and all who go forward on such disastrous hypotheses, in 
Georgia campaigns and elsev/here, are destined to discover that 
desire, aspiration even, is not synonymous with faculty. 

It was in this same month, after the terrible repulse of Spot- 
sylvania Court House, that Grant made a flank movement to the 
North Anna, not unlike that of Sherman to Resaca. The object 
of Grant was by a detour eastward around the point where the 
Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the North Anna, 
to cut Lee's communications. Did Lee strike the force left be- 
hind } No ; nor did he attempt to strike the force sent forward 
before re-enforcements could arrive ; but, by the most expeditious 
interior line, he moved his own army to Hanover Junction, where 
Hancock met it. Here the two parts of the Army of the Potomac 
were not only separated, but a river so ran between them, that to 
get from one of Grant's wings to the other that river would have 
to be crossed twice. On the other hand, Lee had concentrated 
his army between the Little River and the North Anna, not only 
in a strong position, but so situated that it could easily act in 
unity and concentrate upon either of the opposing wings. Some 



330 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

say Lee should have left a small part of his force to hold the in- 
trenchments of his left, and attacked Hancock with the rest of his 
army. 

Hancock's force did not exceed twenty-four thousand infantr>'. 
Leaving seven thousand to hold the west face of his intrenchments 
and the apex on the river, Lee might have attacked Hancock with 
possibly thirty-six thousand infantry. But, as an able officer sug- 
gests,* Hancock was intrenched, and Lee well knew the advantage 
that gave, and that he could not afford to suffer the inevitable loss. 
Those who would make the Atlanta campaign exactly like Chan- 
cellorsville should remember that, from the last day's fight at the 
Wilderness to Appomattox, Lee attacked no more ; that from this 
time on Lee fought only behind intrenchments ; that what could 
be done in 1863 could not necessarily be done in 1864. 

The whole criticism of Johnston strangely forgets that the 
victorious results at second Manassas and Chancellorsville were 
the consequences of Jackson's spring upon the rear of Pope and 
Hooker, and not because Jackson suffered himself to be in their 
predicament. The question presented to Johnston at Rocky Face 
was not whether he would do like Stonewall Jackson, but whether 
he would deliberately do like the generals whom Stonewall Jack- 
son defeated. 

Every man in authority is the shepherd of a trust ; but what 
so sacred as the general's ? — lives that will step to death at his 
bidding ! Of all fiduciaries, none has such account to render as 
he who is commissioned to wage the fight of a people. Human 
life is the talent laid in his hand, to be poured out like water, if 
unto him it seemeth good. Of all trusts and talents this is the 
one to be wisely used, and in no wise abused. The policy of 
Johnston was not the step forward which would slide three steps 
back, but the step back which would find the strength to stride 
trebly forward. It was the drawing back of the ram's foot to 
strike with the horns. 

The movement from Dalton began on the 12th of May. Polk's 
advance under Loring, and Polk himself, reached Resaca from 
Demopolis, Alabama, on the same day. French's division of the 
same army joined near Kingston several days later, and Quarles' 

* General A. A. Humphreys. 



APPENDIX. 



331 



Brigade at New Hope Church on the 26th. One may be per- 
mitted to believe that Johnston incurred as large risk as could be 
exacted of a soldier and a patriot when he left the whole pro- 
tection of his rear to the expected arrival of this much-hurried 
re-enforcement. The position taken at Resaca to meet the move- 
ment through Snake Creek Gap was made untenable, in conse- 
quence of a similar movement by Sherman toward Calhoun — the 
last movement being covered by a river as the former was by a 
mountain. But the ground in the neighborhood of Cassville seemed 
to Johnston favorable for attack, and, as there were two roads lead- 
ing southward to it, the probability was that Sherman would divide 
— a column following each road — and give Johnston his opportu- 
nity to defeat one column before it could receive aid from the 
other. He gave his orders accordingly for battle on the 19th of 
May. The order announcing that battle was about to be deliv- 
ered had been read to each regiment and received with exulta- 
tion. The Roman signal — the general's purple mantle lifted in 
front of the general's tent — may be said to have been given. But 
General Hood, owing to information received from one of his staff, 
deemed himself justified in not executing the order to himself, and 
the intended attack was for this cause abandoned. General W. 
W. Mackall was sent to Hood to ask why he did not attack as 
ordered. Hood sent word in reply that the enemy was then ad- 
vancing upon him by two roads, and he could only defend. John- 
ston then drew up his army on a ridge immediately south of Cass- 
ville to receive the attack of the now united columns ; but the 
conviction of both Polk and Hood of their inability to hold their 
positions against attack caused Johnston to yield his own. He 
did this upon the ground that he could not make the fight when 
two of the three corps commanders of his army were opposed to 
it. Hood said that, in the position in which he then was, he was 
willing to attack but not willing to defend. Johnston's view was 
that the time to attack v^'as when his enemy was divided, and the 
time to draw together and defend was when his enemy was united. 
But unless we are to reason that when Johnston was unwilling to 
fight, and some of his generals willing, Johnston must be wrong; 
and when Johnston was willing to fight, and his generals unwill- 
ing, the latter must be right ; it is hard to see why he should be 
blamed for Rocky Face, and they uncrilicised for Cassville. As- 



332 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

suredly in both instances the hesitation was the honest doubt of 
courageous men. Again, at New Hope Church, after Sherman's 
determined but vain assauh, Johnston made his own dispositions 
to attack. Hood was to assail Sherman's left at dawn on the 
29th of May, and Polk and Hardee to join in the battle succes- 
sively. At 10 A. M. Hood reported that he found the enemy in- 
trenched, and deemed it inexpedient to attack without fresh in- 
structions. The opportunity had passed. The proposition had 
originally come from Hood, and received the sanction of John- 
ston. Hood says the opportunity had passed, not because his 
views had changed but because the situation of the enemy had 
changed. Doubtless this was so. And might not the commander 
in chief of that army be permitted to assign the identical reason 
for his own change of plan at Rocky Face ,'* 

At New Hope Church, at Kenesaw Mountain, all that fierce 
attack could do was tried and found wanting. As the attack was 
resolute, so the repulse was bitter. If there was no such repulse, 
as at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor, it must 
have been owing to the fact that there was no such attack — per- 
sistent as Sherman's undoubtedly were. In Johnston's view, be- 
tween Dalton and the Chattahoochee, the 19th and 29th of May 
offered the only opportunities to give battle without attacking the 
preponderant force in intrenchments. But Cassville he considered 
his greatest opportunity. 

From Resaca to Atlanta might be called a siege in open field 
— daily approaches and resistances, daily battle, so received as 
to make the losses to the assailant more than treble those of the 
defensive forces. Sherman's progress was at the rate of a mile 
and a quarter a day. Every day was a warlike exercise. In the 
warfare of attrition, at this rate of progress, battle could ere long 
be given upon equal terms. 

The advancing army found, in the wake of that retreat, no 
deserters, no stragglers, no muskets, no material of war. Retreat 
resembles victory when it is the assailant who is chiefly worn by 
the advantageous battle of each day. Think for an instant of this 
single achievement, that in all the difficulty of the time, in the im- 
minent breach of daily battle, Johnston's troops did not miss a 
meal from Dalton to Atlanta; that the primitive prayer, "Give 
us this day our daily bread," was punctually answered out of the 



APPENDIX. 



333 



smoke and roar of unremitting war ; that, too, when not only the 
nutrition of life but the nutrition of death was scant ; when he had 
to be parsimonious of ammunition in his skirmishes in order to 
be sure of it for his general engagements. He swung his army 
upon its hinges with the smoothness of well-oiled machinery, 
which no more swerved from its appointed course than do the 
forces of Nature because a campaign of death reigns all around. 
We seem to touch the pulse of destiny itself as we accompany 
that regular throb of recoil and repulse, and that still flexure of 
sockets about a pinion of resolve that knew no turning. 

Johnston felt himself daily growing stronger against an adver- 
sary daily growing weaker. Tireless in his vigilant activity, clear 
in his purpose, every tactical, every strategic advantage was hourly 
on his side. No jeopardy stole upon him unawares. With a 
deadly precision he divined and repelled every adverse stroke. 
He handled his army as a man would the fingers of his own 
hand. As link by link he unwound his resource as of magic, 
and his determination as of steel, it was like the movement of the 
hand of time on the face of a clock — so imperturbable, so infalli- 
ble, so inflexible the external calm, the unhasting certainty. It 
was as if one fate had been found to confound another. The 
weak place in the joinings of his mail was nowhere found. Every 
blow had rebounded from him or was parried by him. Every ma- 
terial preponderance had been rebuked by a general's intuition 
and a hero's sword. We can almost see the lionlike glare of his 
warlike eye, and the menacing lash of his agile movement, as 
rampart by rampart he retired, his relative force rising with each 
withdrawal, and his united living wall making his earthen wall 
invincible. 

Missionary Ridge had made this Johnston's mission — to draw 
his adversary from his base, and thereby compel the reduction of 
the force in front, by the regular growth of that required to guard 
the rear of each remove ; to move back with such assured pre- 
caution as never once to be surprised or placed at disadvantage ; 
to skilfully dispute each foot of ground with the least expenditure 
of his own forces ; to thus more and more reduce the disparity 
existing, and, warily biding his time, to beckon his adversary for- 
ward until the field of his own choice was made the final arbiter 
between them. And now the justifying proportions and the coigne 



334 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



of vantage had been won. All that executive foresight could do 
had been achieved. Here he would meet his foe face to face on 
ground which would equalize numerical odds. At Dalton John- 
ston was a hundred miles from his base. At Atlanta it was 
Sherman who was so separated. The fortresses which, at Dal- 
ton, Sherman had in Ringgold and Chattanooga, Johnston now 
had in Atlanta— a place too strong to be taken by assault and too 
extensive to be invested. To this end Atlanta had been fortified 
and Johnston had manoeuvred. 

Now he would lay down the buckler and part the sword from 
its sheath. Now he would constrain fortune. Now, by his per- 
fect sinews, he would wrest the battle wreath which the cunning 
fiend had so long withheld by sinister touches on his thigh. 

From Dalton to Atlanta, Sherman, by force of numbers, had 
been able to follow every retreat of the Confederate forces devel- 
oped in their front, and then, with one or two corps, which he 
could afford to spare, make a flank movement imperiling their 
position. Three railroads then supplied Atlanta. To take At- 
lanta it would be necessary to take all three. On the 17th of 
July Johnston had planned to attack Sherman as the latter 
crossed Peach Tree Creek, expecting just such a division between 
his wings as Sherman actually made. He had occasion to say 
this, and did say it more than once, to his inspector general, 
Colonel Harvie. To thus successively engage the fractions of 
the hostile army with the bulk of his own had been the purpose 
of his every movement. Success here would be decisive, he 
thought, by driving the defeated army against the Chattahoochee, 
where there were no fords, or to the east away from their com- 
munications. On the precipitous banks of the Peach Tree the 
Confederate army awaited the hour of battle. The superb strat- 
egy of their commander and the superlative excellence of the 
position he had chosen stood revealed. Johnston himself, with 
his chief of engineers, Colonel Prestman, and his chief of staff. 
General \V. W. Mackall, was seated at a table examining the 
ground upon the map and maturing the plan of battle when the 
order was delivered relieving him from command. 

The goal had been reached, the victory organized ; to his own 
vision the foe delivered into his hand, when he was again struck 
down ; but this time not by a blow in the breast, which at At- 



APPENDIX. 



335 



lanta, as at Seven Pines, was turned to the enemy. With a com- 
manding grace in word and act, on the 17th of July he relin- 
quished his command of the army, for which he had wrought so 
wisely and so well, and turned it over, with his plan of battle, to 
his successor on that day appointed. 

I deem it just to give verbatim the instructions of Johnston to 
his strong, stanch hero, General A. P. Stewart. " Find," said John- 
ston to him, " the best position on our side of Peach Tree Creek for 
our army to occupy. Do not intrench. Find all the good artillery 
positions, and have them cleared of timber." He said that he 
expected Sherman would cross the Chattahoochee by the fords 
above the mouth of Peach Tree Creek and advance across the 
creek upon Atlanta. He added that Governor Brown, of Georgia, 
had promised to furnish him fifteen thousand State militia with 
which to hold Atlanta while he operated with his army in the 
field. He did not say that he would attack Sherman on the 
crossing of Peach Tree, " but," says Stewart, " his dispositions 
were evidently made with a view to so attack, and were incon- 
sistent with any other purpose." That evening Stewart rode to 
Johnston's headquarters to report that he had made the disposi- 
tions according to direction. He was met by Johnston with the 
order for the latter's removal. Stewart has since said : " I would 
cheerfully have suffered the loss of either of my own arms to have 
been able to retain Johnston in command." There could have 
been no purer ransom for his general's sentence than one of those 
stout arms. It was said by General Carter Stevenson that he had 
never seen any troops in such fine discipline and condition as 
Johnston's army on the day he was removed from command. 
Constancy, stanchness, erectness, governed by a true discern- 
ment, are the attributes that conquer men and events. All these 
attributes were with Johnston's army the day he was removed. 
Ill they recked who changed that steadfast camp for the meteor 
flash of mutability. The authorities who made this change would 
rather have been dismembered limb from limb than knowingly 
to have done aught injurious to their cause. The motives for 
their action could be honest only, and were urged by pressure 
from without, which I doubt not was sincere. But to Johnston, 
and as I believe to history, it was as if the soldier in his tent had 
been stabbed by his own guard. 



336 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

With wounds to the body Johnston was familiar ; but a 
wounded spirit who can bear? How did he receive this by far 
his severest wound ? What was the fashion of the metal which 
emerged from this searching crucible ? Did the equanimity which 
stood by him in every other turn of fortune desert him now ? No, 
this did not desert him. His own unquailing spirit was faithful 
to him. If in the soldier's great campaign "no unproportioned 
thought took shape in act," so now, in his unwished furlough, 
none took shape in word. It is one of the prerogatives of great- 
ness to know how not to be the sport of circumstance. Misfor- 
tune broke over him in vain. He broke misfortune by being 
unbroken by it. He was master of misfortune. The adversity 
which does not shake the mind itself is shaken. Nothing could 
be finer than Johnston's demeanor in this his unlooked-for and 
to him unjust overthrow. Nothing froward, nothing unseemly, 
shone in him or fell from him. He was one whom the external 
universe might break, but could not bend to an ignoble use. His 
tall branch stood, like the sap of Lebanon, rooted in the real. 
There it stands to-day, and will to-morrow. The forest of ap- 
pearance, that has no root falls to swift decay around it. 

I bestow no particular praise on one for following conviction, 
albeit without the place proportioned to desert. A mercenary 
hero is a solecism. No one wins eminence by disregard of selfish 
interest in an army where it is universal. Virtue is tried by finer 
measures in that history. No corrupt, no venal thing survives to 
tarnish it. But of all adversity, there could be none more ex- 
quisitely fitted to freeze a noble heart than that which befell the 
General of the West. How much easier to bear the most cruel 
blow of adversaries when on either side are sustaining arms, 
when the strength of sympathy invests the overthrown with a 
dignity almost divine — the might of that incalculable arm which 
we call sympathy ! But when, to his own view, his own strong- 
hold is his worst hostility, when there is no supporting elbow 
within touch, as he looks out upon the hopes which can only 
ripen in his ruin, how clear in conscience, how tenacious and 
erect in spiritual power and purpose, the dethroned must be to be 
unvanquished ! The day of Johnston's dethronement was his 
imperial day. It was the empire of a soul superior to eveiy 
weapon. 



APPENDIX. 



337 



The great campaign by which he will be forever judged is 
now beyond the wounds of the archers, beyond all slings and 
arrows, above and beyond outrageous fortune. From the dark 
defile of Rocky Face to the large prospect of Atlanta it will be 
not only a possession but a pattern for all time. Its rugged 
scenery is illuminated by the meaning with which the lines of 
greatness clothe the impassive and the obdurate. It has been 
made the mirror of a great mind. The map of it, the more it is 
studied, the more clearly will evince, in due expression and pro- 
portion and colors ineffaceable, the lineaments of a giant. It will 
be a canvas bringing to light that surpassing victory which can- 
cels adverse fate and shines over it and through it. 

It was upon a burning deck that Johnston was next summoned 
to the wheel. It was night when his star again began to burn. 
The Confederacy was in the article of death, when it once more 
sent for him whose hand nowhere appears in the drawing of that 
article. Johnston was sent for to repair the ruin which he at 
least did not prepare ; to take anew the shattered remnant of 
that army wrought into such firmness by him, shattered by 
others ; but which, though shattered, was still firm to him. The 
Confederacy lifted up its eyes and beheld all that was left of the 
Army of Tennessee, tossing and drifting like seaweed in the 
Carolinas, and a voice which no authority could subdue was 
heard crying: "All that is left to us is Thermopylae. Oh, for a 
Johnston to stand there ! " And a firm voice answered : " I will 
stand in the gap." The great gap he had to fill was the one 
which had been rent in his devoted files by futile battle. It was 
Thermopylae, not in the beginning, but at the end of warfare. 
With the portents of downfall all around him, his erectness was 
untouched ; his plume was still a banner ; his name a talisman. 
The moral and military force which had been lost in Johnston 
will be measured for all time by the events of the interval between 
his enforced abdication and patriotic resumption of command. 
The impending wreck of things rallied of its own accord upon the 
disinherited knight. The hopes of which his downfall had been 
the pedestal were now themselves a ruin. Out of the lime pit of 
their destruction, out of their crash and chaos, rose froni the re- 
jected stone the straightness of the Doric Column. 

At this time it was plainly Sherman's plan to march through 



338 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

the Carolinas to the rear of Lee. When the Western army went 
to pieces in hopeless wreck in front of Nashville, the one hope of 
the Confederacy was the defeat of Sherman by all the forces which 
could be assembled in the Carolinas united to those of Lee, when- 
ever the latter could most effectually withdraw from the lines at 
Petersburg. Everything depended upon the success of this move- 
ment and the subsequent union of the same forces against Grant. 
The task had sufficient elements of difficulty as originally pre- 
sented. Just at this time a new one was introduced. On the 
14th of January Schofield had been ordered from Clifton, on the 
Tennessee River, to Annapolis. From this point he had been 
carried by water to North Carolina, where he united to his own 
army the corps of Terry. 

From the time Sherman left Atlanta every wave of opposition 
had abated in his front. He could march to the sea or to the 
mountains as he pleased. The indications were that the mighty 
host which had marched through Georgia in such comfort would 
cross the Cape Fear at Fayetteville to be joined there by Schofield, 
when, on the 22d of February, 1865 — the day he was restored to 
command — Johnston was ordered "to concentrate all available 
forces and drive back Sherman." The order was one less diffi- 
cult to give than to execute. It was a question on the ist of 
March which would reach Johnston first, his own troops from 
Charleston or Sherman's army. Hardee did indeed cross the 
Pedee, at Cheraw, on the morning of the 3d, but his rear guard 
was so hard pressed that it had hardly time to destroy the bridge 
after passing over it. On the evening of the same day informa- 
tion was received that the broken columns of the Army of Ten- 
nessee had reached the railroad at Chester. Sherman's order of 
march encouraged the hope that the tatters of the Confederacy 
might be gathered up in time to engage one of his wings. It was, 
however, not only Sherman, but Schofield, then marching up the 
Neuse from New Berne, with whom conclusions must be tried. 

It was under such conditions that Johnston exposed to the 
world the electric force and vivid lightning of his arm. Here he 
gave the lofty answer he scorned to make in words to all who 
dared taunt him with want of daring. It should be some one 
not less seamed over with honorable scars who makes that charge. 
The battle-furrowed chieftnin might have said, " Put your fingers 



APPENDIX. 



339 



in my wounds, all ye who doubt." But the heroic answer ever is 
in deeds. So answered the captain, "who, careless of his own 
blood, was careful of that of his men ; who knew how to take them 
under fire and how to bring them out." * From first manoeuvre 
to final onset nothing can surpass the magnificent strategy he 
now displayed. It will have to blush before no other of the war 
or of the world. With decisiveness of command, which was met 
by celerity of execution, he at once ordered the movements which 
snatched from the very jaws of death the last Confederate vic- 
tory. In the thrilling game of chess which he now played, no 
pawn was taken without his leave, while he darted forward and 
backward upon the board, each time giving check to the king. 
That game was played with the coolness and consummate skill 
of a master hand which knew no pause, no tremor, no uncertainty, 
and only lacked the force of numbers, which genius could not 
create, to shine by the side of Austerlitz. It was the grand au- 
dacity of a conscious master whose nerve matched his skill, whose 
ministers were strength and swiftness. His first movement was 
with the troops of Bragg, then near Goldsboro, added to those of 
D. H. Hill, just arrived from Charlotte, to strike Schofield at 
Kinston. The blow was sufficient to scotch Schofield's advance. 

Bragg's troops and those of the Army of Tennessee were now 
ordered to Smithfield, midway between Raleigh and Goldsboro, 
it being at the moment uncertain through which of these places 
Sherman's route would be. Hardee was instructed to follow the 
road from Fayetteville to Raleigh, which for thirty miles is also 
that to Smithfield. On the 15th of March Hardee had reached 
Elevation on the road to Smithfield. On the i8th Hampton re- 
ported that Sherman was marching toward Goldsboro ; the right 
wing on the direct road from Fayetteville had crossed the Black 
Creek ; the left on the road from Averysboro had not reached that 
stream, and was more than a day's march from the point in its 
route opposite to the hamlet of Bentonville, where the two roads, 
according to the map of North Carolina, were twelve miles apart. 

Upon this Johnston prepared to attack the left column of Sher- 
man's army before the other could support it, by ordering the troops 

* Report of Louis P. Wigfall in the Senate of the Confederate 
States, March, 1SC5. 
23 



340 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

at Smithfield and at Elevation to march immediately to Benton- 
ville (where the road from Smithfield intersected that from Fay- 
etteville to Goldsboro) to be in time to attack the next morning. 
By the map the distance from Elevation to Bentonville was about 
twelve miles. In two important respects the premises of action 
proved incorrect. The distance between Sherman's forces was ex- 
aggerated, and between his own reduced from the truth. Thereby 
he was prevented from concentrating in time to fall on one wing 
while in column on the march. The sun was just rising on that 
beautiful Sabbath in March when all except Hardee had reached 
the point of rendezvous. The gap made by his absence was for 
the time filled by the batteries of Earle and Halsey. 

On the way to the attack, and just in time for battle, Johnston 
had met the shreds and patches of his old troops under the stanch 
A. P. Stewart. The best interpreter of a general's strength is the 
sentiment with which he animates his rank and file. The wild 
enthusiasm of these Western troops whenever they caught sight 
of their old chief was in itself an inspiration of success. It was 
evident that they were as confident under him as if they had never 
seen the days which tore them into strips. They felt they had a 
general whose life or whose fame was as dust in the balance where 
his duty weighed, under whom death itself was not in vain. The 
force which had been wedded to him by the campaign from Dal- 
ton to Atlanta had not been put asunder by the Tophet of Ten- 
nessee. At last the wayworn troops under Hardee, which had 
marched day and night to join battle, appeared upon the scene. 
The use for them was quickly revealed. All told, the torn rem- 
nants made an army of less than fifteen thousand men. At their 
head, Johnston burst upon Sherman's left wing with an electrical 
intensity which will live in mihtary annals as an object lesson to 
show how a wasted force is endowed by a general's fire. The 
battle of Bentonville is that marvel — that final battle of the Con- 
federacy which shed the last radiance on its arms as its candle 
llickered in the socket. 

The batteries which had held the gap were now told to follow 
the dark plume and bright courage of Walthall, who commanded 
all that was left of Polk's corps. Hardee led the charge of the 
right wing. With an annihilating fury the hurricane of war swept 
Sherman from his first and second line, and on the 19th of March 



APPENDIX. 



341 



night fell upon Johnston's victory. Had there been no other col- 
umn to reckon with, or had not the discrepancy existed between 
the map and the facts, the blow which staggered would have 
prostrated. The victor would then have turned to throw his 
whole army upon Schofield. As it was, on the 20th the right 
wing of the enemy came up. On the 21st Sherman's united army 
was in position on three sides of Johnston. To oppose the in- 
creasing coil the line of the latter was bent into a horseshoe shape, 
the heel being the point of the one bridge left— the bridge at Ben- 
tonville over Mill Creek. 

The time had come for the man of resource to make his exit. 
It was essential to make the road over that bridge as secure as a 
turnpike in time of peace. He knew well how to do it, not with 
fear but with confidence. Once more he looked to Hardee to deal 
the blow he wanted. That intrepid man, first kissing the pale 
lips of his dying boy, borne by him on the field, turned to the 
nearest cavalry command, and assuring them he had been cap- 
tain of dragoons himself and knew how to handle cavalry, ordered 
a charge. On his magnificent black steed he led them, and poured 
their torrent on the opposing front — running back the skirmish 
line on the line of battle, and the first line on the second. Vic- 
tory made the isthmus of contention safe. The nettle had been 
rifled of its danger. Then, with forces vastly more confident than 
when the fight began, Johnston withdrew, with the loss of a single 
caisson, from between the jaws of death by the one opening left. 
Like a whirlwind he came, and like an apparition departed. Under 
arduous conditions he had set upon a hill that most admired faculty 
of man — the faculty to seize and to use opportunity. At his side 
hung the weapon — dra\vn from a great general's arsenal — the ener- 
gy to fuse the fickle conditions of an instant into the bolt of victor}'. 

One may be permitted to believe that, with a natural sense of 
vindication, he had in this warrior fashion and with a warlike 
grace, inscribed upon the record of the time the quality of his 
arm ; and with it .the reasonable proof that, if the Johnston at 
Atlanta had not been removed, history would have engraved for 
him the epitaph : 

" Unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem." 
* Captain William E. Earle. 



342 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

One who saw him writes:* "As he listened to the receding 
fire of the foe, the brightness of his eye showed the satisfaction 
with which he lootced on the restored spirits of his old comrades 
in arms ; and I was touched by the affectionate manner in which 
he ministered to the comfort of, and the words of cheer which he 
gave to, a number of wounded men who were carried by. I could 
then well understand the affection which was demonstrated by 
them at every sight of him." 

In 1875 Sherman wrote : " With the knowledge now possessed 
of his small force, I, of course, committed an error in not over- 
whelming Johnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865." It was 
the ascendancy of the few over the many. In the last ditch John- 
ston's victory had been won — when there was little left beyond 
the field he had filled with his valor. His cynical fate poured all 
its craft into this last scoff, which left the truth illustrious when it 
could no more avail a perishing cause. It was as if his brow 
were torn with a mock crown at last. 

Sherman now moved on to Goldsboro and effected the junc- 
tion with Schofield, which could no longer be prevented. General 
Johnston marched to the vicinity of Raleigh and disposed his 
troops so that Sherman could not go forward to Virginia without 
exposing his flanks, while at the same time he placed himself 
so as to facilitate his junction with Lee, whenever the time should 
come to unite once more the two who rode into Vera Cruz to- 
gether, for their last salutation of devoted valor. The respect 
which these successive revelations of resource and energy excited 
is perhaps illustrated in the terms which, on the i8th of April, 
Sherman accorded to Johnston ; and which, had they been rati- 
fied, would have saved the South the sorrow, and the North the 
shame, of the Reconstruction Era. The current of events chose 
otherwise ; but once more Johnston did all that sagacity could 
do to stem the current. To the last there was no spot upon his 
breastplate which his adversary's steel had pierced ; none which 
there was undue eagerness to challenge. From crown to sole he 
blazed in complete proof. At the end, his line was an undefeated 
and unbroken line. When the Great Umpire threw down his 
warder, the defense of North Carolina, covered with dust and 
bloody sweat, was standing with firm- planted feet against assault. 
There it was standing when the edifice of the Confederacy fell — 



APPENDIX. 343 

the last wall of its strength. It was bearing aloft its ensigns, 
"torn but flying," when the earth under it opened. Doubtless it 
is the spectacle of deeds and energies like these which caused the 
eloquent Union soldier, Colonel Edginton, to declare that the 
force and vitality of Johnston's character was like the ocean wave 
— not to be measured in time of storm, nor to be fairly estimated 
until rivalries have ceased. 

With the return of peace Johnston was removed from the 
field of duty whefein he was best fitted to win renown, and where 
he had woven the texture of a character as fine as it was firm. 
For the most part his fine assemblage of endowments lay like a 
book within its clasp, or like a coal unkindled. Broken by inter- 
vals of important duty for a quarter of a century, Johnston found 
himself doomed to a life of comparative inaction. There have 
been few to whom it could be more trying to take off the chariot 
wheels of life's activity. Perhaps one of the hardest of the many 
trials of his patience was thus to loiter by compulsion on the way 
where he was wont to spur. To a breast ever thrilling with the 
impulses of action patience was made perfect by this last trial. 
Yet it were wrong to pass without a word the blessing Heaven 
did not deny him ; the meet partaker of his puissance and his 
pang, who drank of the same cup with him, exalting and exalted 
by it ; who gave him truth for truth, and, under all the blows of 
time, a constancy fixed in heaven — that blessing which, however 
the world might rock, was truer than the needle to the pole — the 
blessing of a wife's true heart. And when of this blessing too 
he was bereft, we all were witnesses to the chastening touch of a 
brave man's anguish ; how sorrow, falling upon a character of 
such strength and depth, did not harden, but melted to a tender 
glory ; how the snows of his last years were irradiated by a soft, 
benignant light, as of sunset on the Alps. This was the final 
forge in which the iron of his nature was softened to take a new 
existence and more exquisite temper. He was the picture of the 
veteran sitting in the evening before his tent, all unbroken by the 
years which are so wont to break. He was the even more splen- 
did picture of an elevation which was not fortuitous, nor depend- 
ent upon fortune, as he sat, still erect, amid the ruins of his heart 
and the storm of life and fate. 

So he lived among us his upright, straightforward, unaffected 



344 GENERAL JOHNSTON. 

life. So, as he lived and moved, the shadows of the dark reaper 
deepened round him, until at last we saw him standing on the 
confine of the great night. In his eighty-fifth year, there he 
stood, " worn, but unstooping." Nowhere could one see a coun- 
tenance and frame more worthy to declare — 

" The living will that shall endure 
When all that seems shall suffer shock." 

One who came within the circuit of this scepter of majestic 
age might well pause to speculate whether the iron sleep could 
steal upon the lids over which that iron will stood sentinel. He, 
too, could not be conquered until worn out by attrition. He could 
not be conquered then. The last foe of all he turned to meet in 
the old knightly fashion, and wrung from him the final victory, 
wherein he who conquers self is conqueror of death. Faithful 
son of the Church, he received his death wound, too, in the breast. 
Before the Universal Conqueror he fell upon his unsurrendered 
shield. He fell like a soldier. Closing his eyes to earth and open- 
ing them to heaven, he gave his soul 

" Unto his Captain, Christ, 
Under whose colors he had fought so long." 

To this last Captain, who heareth and absolveth, his last re- 
port is handed. " There," he said, on his deathbed, to Dabney 
Maury, "we shall surely meet." Ah, there ! In the light of that 
perfect eye which looks clean through appearance, and judges the 
real only — there is his great appeal ! In those upper fields, where 
the venom of this earth is slain, its serpent crushed, where no 
false balance is and no inadvertency, his clear spirit will join and 
be felt, where the mighty influences of time, purged of their 
dross, encounter, as the stars in their courses fight. On the 
bosom of the Infinite he, too, is a star. In that last bosom, 
where the revenges of time are folded, earth's scarred warrior 
hath cleft a way to peace. 



INDEX. 



Abercrombie, J. J., 48. 

Anderson, G. B., in battle of Sev- 
en Pines, 142 et seq. 

Anderson, J. R., 137, 138. 

Anderson, R. H., 126, 129, 286. 

Annandale, Scotland, connection 
with clan history of Johnstones, 

1-5- 

Armistead, D. L,, courier at Seven 

Pines, 153. 
Ashby, Turner, 45. 
Atlanta, operations around, 244 

et seq. 
Averill, W. W., 132. 
Avery, W., 297. 
Avery .boro, fight near, 265. 

Baker, E. D., killed in battle at 
Ball's Bluff, 95. 

Baker's Creek, battle of, 185. 

Ball's Bluff, battle of, 95, 96. 

Barton, S. M., 173. 

Bartow, F. S., 47, 55, 56, 60; 
killed at Manassas, 65 ; 68. 

Bate, W. B., 227, 235, 238. 

Beauregard, G. T., assumes com- 
mand at Manassas, 50 ; John- 
ston authorized to join, 51 ; 
proposes plan of junction, 55 ; 
arrangement of army at Manas- 



sas, 56 ; part in battle of, 56- 
68 ; views as to pursuing, 70, 
71 ; 74, 75, 79. 82, 83, 87, 88, 

91 ; participates in conference 
as to offensive after Manassas, 

92 ; 97 ; goes to the West, loi ; 
under Johnston in North Caro- 
lina, 261 ; views as to capitula- 
tion, 272 et seq. 

Bee, Barnard E., 47, 56, 57, 60 ; 
his part in Manassas, 62 et seq. ; 
killed there, 65 ; 68. 

Benjamin, J. P., interference in 
array, loi ; 271. 

Bentonville, battle of, 256 et seq. 

Blair, F. P., 167. 

Bonham, M, L., 50, 57, 61, 65, 66, 
69, 74. 

Bowen, J. S., at Port Gibson, 177, 
178; 181. 

Bragg, B., operations under John- 
ston in Tennessee, 158 et seq.\ 
generosity of Johnston toward, 
166, 167 ; 209 ; his differences 
with subordinates, 210 ; defeat- 
ed at Missionary Ridge, 212 ; or- 
dered to Richmond, 213 ; corre- 
spondence with Johnston as to 
aggressive, 214 et seq. ; 237 ; vis- 
its Johnston near Atlanta, his 



346 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



conduct, 246, 247 ; in North Caro- 
lina campaign, 262 et seq. ; 296. 

Branch, L. O'B., 137, 138. 

Breckinridge, J. C, at Murfrees- 
boro, 163 ; joins Johnston at 
Jackson, 195 ; at fight there, [ 
205 ; in North Carolina at ca- 
pitulation, I'll et seq. 

Breckinridge, Robert J., 9. 

Brown, J. E., 258. 

Buckner, S. B., 210. 

Burnside, A. E., 60. 

Butler, John, 5. 

Cadwalader, General, share of | 
his brigade in Mexican cam- 
paign, 24-32. 

Cameron, Simon, 72. 

Campbell, William, marries a sis- 
ter of Patrick Henry, 8 ; his 
descendants, 9 ; commands at 
King's Mountain, ii. 

Cantey, James, 225, 228. 

Carrington, E. C, 9. 

Casey, S., 130; in battle of Seven 
Pines, 141 et seq. 

Cash, E. B. C, 65. 

Champion's Hill, battle of, 185. 

Chapultepec, assault of, 30. 

Cheatham, B. F., 227 ; at Kene- 
saw Mountain, 239; in North 
Carolina campaign, 261. 

Chesney, Charles C, 292. 

Chickamauga, battle of, 210. 

Chickasaw Bluff, repulse of Sher- 
man at, 173. 

Cleburne, P. R., 164, 212, 227, 
228 ; repulses attack at Pickett's 
Mill, 235 ; at Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, 239. 

Cobb, Howell, Jr., 208. 



Cocke, P. S., 57, 65, 74, 91. 

Cockrell, F. M., 240. 

Colston, R. E., 129. 

Comte de Paris, 96, 106. 

Contreras, battle of, 27, 28. 

Cooper, Samuel, 39, 44, 71, 79, 80, 
83, 88, 89, 99, 161, 211, 218, 248. 

Couch, D. N., 126, 130 ; in battle 
of Seven Pines, 141 et seq. 

Cox, J. D., crosses Chattahoochee, 
245 ; opinion of Johnston's re- 
moval, 251 ; repulsed at Kin- 
ston, 262, 263. 

Crocker, M. M., 179. 

Gulp's Farm, battle of, 238. 

Dalton, operations near, 212 et 
seq. 

Davis, Jefferson, supports John- 
ston's confirmation as quarter- 
master general, 34 ; appoints 
Johnston brigadier general and 
sends him to Harper's Ferry, 
39, 40 ; 42, 43, 69 ; attitude as 
to pursuit after Manassas, 74 ; 
first estrangement from John- 
ston, 78 et seq. ; conference 
with generals as to offensive 
after Manassas, 92 ; mentioned, 
98 ; refuses to allow abandon- 
ment of Yorktown, 118 ; visits 
Johnston's department in the 
West, 162 ; effects of his strategy 
there, 162 et seq. ; sends John- 
ston to investigate Bragg, 165 ; 
letters of Johnston to, 167 ; in- 
terference in Vicksburg cam- 
paign, 191 ; treatment of John- 
ston after fall of Vicksburg, 
206 ; orders court of inquiry, 
but allows it to die, 208 ; sus- 



INDEX. 



347 



tains Bragg against his gener- 
als, 211 ; assigns Johnston to 
Amiy of Tennessee, 213 ; corre- 
spondence as to aggressive ac- 
tion, 214 et seq. ; sends Hood to 
command corps in Army of 
Tennessee, 218 ; declines to 
send cavalry against Sherman's 
communications, 237 ; removes 
Johnston near Atlanta, 247 et 
seq. ; interviews with Johnston 
as to capitulation, 271 et seq. ; 
views as to capitulation, 279 et 
seq. 

Dawes, E. C, views as to num- 
bers in Atlanta campaign re- 
viewed, 257. 

Devens, C, 126. 

Dranesville, affair of, 98. 

Drury's Bluff, fight between gun- 
boats and batteries, 135. 

Dryfe Sands, battle of, 4. 

Early, J. A., 57, 61, 65 ; views as j 
to pursuit after Manassas, 72 et 
seq. ; 106 ; in battle of Williams- 
burg, 1 28. 

Echols, J., 208. 

Ector, M. D., 192-195. 

Eltham, fight near, 134. 

Elzey, Arnold, 47, 56, 65. 

Emory, W. H., 132. 

Evans, N. G., his part in Manas- 
sas, 57 et seq. ; 91 ; commands 
at Ball's Bluff, 95; 106, 176, 195. 

Ewell, B. S., 166, 215, 216, 284. 

Ewell, R. S., 57, 66, 69, 106, 108, 
117. 

Falling Waters, combat of, 48. 
Featherston, W. S., at Kenesaw 
Mountain, 239. 



Floyd, John B., Buchanan's Sec- 
retary of War, 9 ; his wife, 9 ; 
urges Johnston for place of 
quartermaster general, 33. 

Forney, J. H., 180. 

Forrest, N. B., 237. 

French, S. G., 205 ; at Kenesaw 
Mountain, 239. 

Gardner, Franklin, commands at 
Port Hudson, 201. 

Garland, S., in battle of Seven 
Pines, 140 et seq. 

Gist, S. R., 63, 64, 180, 192, 195. 

Granberry, H. B., 227. 

Grant, U. S., 160-162 ; transfers 
army to south of Vicksburg, 
170 ; operations against Vicks- 
burg, 172-193 ; siege and cap- 
ture of Vicksburg, 194 et seq. ; 
wins at Missionary Ridge, 212 ; 
his plans for the spring, 222 et 
seq. ; 244, 258, 264, 271, 284 ; 
opinion of Johnston, 291 ; 305. 

Gregg, John, 173, 179, 195. 



Hampden Sidney College, 6. 

Hampton, Wade, his first wife, 9 ; 
58, 62, 106, 134 ; quoted, 252 ; 
commands cavalry in North 
Carolina campaign, 263 et seq. 

Hancock, W. S., in battle of Wil- 
liamsburg, 128 et seq. 

Hanover Court House, fight near, 
138. 

Hardee, W. J., 164, 208, 213, 218 ; 
part in operations from Dalton 
to the Chattahoochee, 231 et 
seq. ; in North Carolina cam- 
paign, 261 et seq. 



34S 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



Harker, C. G., killed at Kenesaw, 
240, 

Harper's Ferry, militaiy operations 
near, 40-46. 

Harrison, Benjamin, 229. 

Hcintzelman, S. P., 60 et seq., log, 
130, 132, 139 ; in battle of Seven 
Pines, 140 et scq. 

Hendren, J. N., 275. 

Henry, Lucy, sister of Patrick 
Henry, 8 ; grandmother of Jo- 
seph E. Johnston, 8. 

Henry, Patrick, 8, 36. 

Herron, F. J., 203. 

Hill, A. P., 45, 46, 91, 126, 129, 
138. 

Hill, D. H., succeeds Evans, 106 ; 
119 ; in battle of Williamsburg, 
125 ; in battle of Seven Pines, 
i^oet seq. ; 210 ; in North Caro- 
lina campaign, 263 et seq. ; 303. 

Hoke, R. F., in North Carolina 
campaign, 262 et seq. 

Holmes, T. H., 57, 61, 66, 97, 160, 
161. 

Hood, J. B., at Eltham, 134 ; sent 
to command corps in Army of 
Tennessee, 218 ; operations near 
Dalton, 227 et seq. ; near Cass- 
ville, 232 ; repulsed at Gulp's 
Farm, 238 ; his part in John- 
ston's removal, 246 ; succeeds 
Johnston, 247 ; 260, 299. 

Hooker, Joseph, in battle of Wil- 
liamsburg, 126 et seq.\ in battle 
of Seven Pines, 141 et seq. ; at 
New Hope Church, 235 ; at 
Gulp's Farm, 238 ; opinion of 
Atlanta campaign, 259. 

Hovey, A. P., 185. 

Howard, O. O., at Pickett's Mill, 



235 ; at Kenesaw Mountain, 

239 ; quoted, 249 ; 269. 
Huger, Benjamin, 116, 121, 136 ; 

in battle of Seven Pines, 140 et 

scq. 
Hughes, Robert W., 10. 
Hunter, David, 60 et seq. 

Imboden, J. D., 64. 

Jackson, Mississippi, evacuated by 
Johnston, 183. 

Jackson, Thomas J., superseded 
by Johnston at Harper's Ferry, 
40; placed in command of Stone- 
wall brigade, 47 ; fights at Fall- 
ing Waters, 48 ; 53-57 ; his part 
in Manassas, 63 et seq. ; recom- 
mended for promotion, 77, 91, 
92 ; assigned to Valley district, 
97 ; his Romney expedition, 99 ; 
resigns and afterward with- 
draws resignation, 99, lOO ; op- 
erations in Valley and fight at 
Kernstown, no, in ; Valley 
campaign, 136-138. 

Jackson, W. H,, joins Army of 
Tennessee near Adairsville, 231 ; 

234- 

Jesup, T. S., his experience in 
Florida War, 18, 19 ; quarter- 
master general, 33-83. 

Johnston, Albert Sidney, 33, 78, 
79, 82, 83, 88, 8g. 

Johnston, Algernon S., 10. 

Johnston, Beverly R., 10, 260. 

Johnston, Charles C, 9, 36. / 

Johnston, Edward W., 10. 1 

Johnstone, J. Preston, killed at j 
Contreras, 27, 28 ; 288. \ 

Johnston, John W., 9. 



INDEX. 



349 



Johnston, Joseph E., birth, lo ; 
youth, II et seq. ; his first wound, 
12; appointed a cadet, 14; his 
life at West Point, 15, 16; his 
favorite studies, 16 ; first mili- 
tary service, 16, 17 ; connection 
with Florida War, 17-21 ; gal- 
lantry in battle near Jupiter 
Inlet, 20, 21 ; his marriage, 22 ; 
joins the army in Mexico, 24 ; 
made lieutenant-colonel of Vol- 
tigeurs, 25 ; wounded at Cerro 
Gordo, 25 ; his part in battle of 
Molino del Rey, 30; of Chapul- 
tepec, 30, 31 ; appointed quar- 
termaster general, 33 ; resigns 
from old army and enters Vir- 
ginia service, 36, 37 ; made brig- 
adier general in Confederate 
service, 39; goes to Harper's 
Ferry, 40 ; his views of its strate- 
gic weakness, 43 ; operations in 
the Valley, 43-52 ; moves to 
Manassas, 53 ; part in battle of, 
56-68 ; reasons for not pursuing, 
69 et seq. ; first estrangement 
from Mr. Davis, 78 et seq. ; ef- 
forts at organization, c^\ et seq. ; 
conference as to offensive after 
Manassas, 92 et seq. ; made de- 
partment commander, 97 ; letter 
to Jackson urging him not to 
resign, 100 ; attempts to arrange 
for exchange of prisoners, loi ; 
plans for spring campaign, 102 
et seq. ; decides to withdraw 
from Centreville, 105 ; effect of 
withdrawal on McClellan's plans, 
105 ; part in Jackson's Valley 
campaign, no ; repairs to York- 
town and advises concentration 



at Richmond, 117, 120 ; evacu- 
ates Yorktown, 121 ; battle of 
Williamsburg, 123 et seq. ; with- 
draws up the Peninsula and 
takes position near Richmond, 
133 et seq. ; strength of army 
and movements before and at 
Seven Pines, 136 et seq. ; wound- 
ed, 144; convalescence, 153; 
sent to the West, 157 ; diffi- 
culties of position, 158 et seq. ; 
vainly urges transfer of trans- 
Mississippi troops, 160 ; meets 
President Davis at Chattanooga, 
162 ; ordered to investigate 
Bragg, 165 ; generosity in the 
investigation, 165 et seq. ; or- 
dered to Mississippi, 171 ; tele- 
grams to Pemberton while eti 
route ^ 177 ; arrives at Jackson, 
179 ; orders to Pemberton and 
movements during investment 
of Vicksburg, 180 et seq. ; efforts 
to form a relieving army, 194 et 
seq. ; moves to relieve Vicksburg, 
but retreats on hearing of sur- 
render, 203, 204; evacuates Jack- 
son, 204 ; court of inquiry, 208 ; 
assignment to Army of Tennes- 
see, 213 ; correspondence with 
Richmond as to aggressive, 214 
et seq. ; efforts to improve his 
army, 217 et seq. ; military opera- 
tions in winter and early spring, 
219 et seq. ; his numerical 
strength, 225 ; plan to attack 
near Cassville frustrated by 
Hood, 231 ; decides to fight at 
Cassville, but dissuaded by Hood 
and Polk, 232 et seq. ; vainly en- 
deavors to obtain from Richmond 



350 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



orders to throw cavalry on ene- 
my's communications, 22,()et seq.', 
operations north of Chattahoo- 
chee, 238 et seq. ; plan for de- 
fending Atlanta, 244 et seq. ; re- 
moved, 247 ; strength and losses, 
252 ei seq. ; restored to command 
in North Carolina, 261 ; efforts 
to unite and organize resistance, 
261 et seq. ; convention and final 
capitulation, 274 et seq. ; life 
after war, 281-288 ; death, 288 ; 
character, 290 et seq. 

Johnston, Peter, son of the emi- 
grant, 6 ; goes to Hampden Sid- 
ney, 7 ; joins Lee's legion, 7 ; 
Revolutionary services, 7, 8 ; 
studies law, 8 ; marries Mary 
Wood, 8 ; his children, 9, 10 ; 
removes to Abingdon, 10. 

Johnston, Peter, the emigrant, 5 ; 
moves to Prince Edward Coun- 
ty, 6. 

Johnston, Peter C, 9-35. 

Johnstone Clan, origin of name, 
2 ; history of, 2-5. 

Jones, D. R., 57, 61. 

Kearney, Philip, in battle of Wil- 
liamsburg, 126 et seq. ; in battle 
of Seven Pines, 142 et seq. 

Keim, W. H., 126. 

Kenesaw Mountain, battle of, 239. 

Kernstown, battle of, iii. 

Kershaw, J. B., 65, 125. 

Keyes, E. D., 61, 109, 139 ; in 
battle of Seven Pines, 140 et seq. 

Kilpatrick, J,, commands North- 
ern cavalry in North Carolina 
campaign, 263 et seq. 

Lee, Fitzhugh, 78. 



Lee, Robert E,, a cadet with J. E. 
Johnston, 15 ; informs Johnston 
of death of his nephew, 28 ; con- 
gratulates Johnston on his ap- 
pointment to quartermaster gen- 
eral, 34 ; 37, 38, 42, 43, 50, 79- 
83, 87, 88, 107, 116, 118, 120, 
136 ; letters to Johnston, 154, 
156; 213, 222, 223 ; opposed to 
Johnston's removal at Atlanta, 
251 ; restores Johnston to com- 
mand in North Carolina, 261 ; 
plans for uniting armies in Vir- 
ginia and North Carolina, 263 
et seq. ; 270, 271, 282, 283, 286, 
289, 291. 

Lee, S. D., repulses Sherman at 
Chickasaw Bluff, 173 ; 237. 

Letcher, John, 37, 39, 40. 

Lewinsville, affair of, 78. 

Lincoln, A., conferences with Mc- 
Clellan for spring campaign, 103 
et seq. ; remarks on McClellan's 
numbers, 115; 139; 273; 277. 

Logan, J. A., 179 ; at Kenesaw 
Mountain, 239. 

Longstreet, James, 57, 65, 91, 92, 
106, 118 ; in battle of Williams- 
burg, 125 ; in battle of Seven 
Pines, 141 et seq. ; opinion of 
Bragg, 2IO ; 216. 

Loring, W. W., 98, 99, 192, 195, 
205 ; temporarily succeeds Polk, 
238 ; his part in campaign, 238 
et seq. 

Lovell, Mansfield, 218. 

Mackall, W. W., 211, 221. 

Magruder, J. B., Peninsular cam- 
paign, 114 et seq. ; at Seven 
Pines, 143 et seq. 

Manassas, battle of, 53-68. 



INDEX. 



351 



Mansfield, J. K. F., 72, 74. 

Marshall, Charles, 252. 

Maurice, J. F., his article on war, 
16. 

Maxey, S. B., 179, 184, 193. 

Maxwells, their feuds with the 
Johnstones, 2-5. 

McClellan, George B., 43, 45, 50, 
52, 58, 72, 76, 91, 95 ; effect of 
Ball's Bluff on plans of, 96 ; suc- 
ceeds Scott, 98 ; his numbers at 
end of 1861, 99 ; his plans for 
spring campaign, 102 et seq. ; his 
Uruana scheme, 104-107 ; de- 
cides on advance up the Penin- 
sula, 109 ; his strength on reach- 
ing the Peninsula, 115 ; his march 
commences, 116; repulsed at 
Dam No. i, 119; pursuit from 
Yorktown up the Peninsula, 123 
et seq. ; manoeuvres preceding 
and at Seven Pines, 138 et seq. 

McClernand, J. A., in Vicksburg 
campaign, 175 et seq. 

McDowell, Irvin, commands ad- 
vance on Manassas, 51, 52 ; com- 
mands Northern force at Ma- 
nassas, 53-68 ; 71, 109, 136, 137. 

McDowell, James, 9. 

McLane, Robert M., 22, 288. 

McLaws, L., 125, 267, 268. 

McLean, E., 40. 

McNair, E., 192, 195. 

McPherson, J. B., in Vicksburg 
campaign, 174 et seq. ; com- 
mands Army of Tennessee, 226 
et seq. ; his move through Snake 
Creek Gap, 228 ; approaches 
Atlanta, 246. 

Merrimac, 114. 

Mexico, campaign against, 24-32. 



Miles, D. S., Co, 72. 
Missionary Ridge, battle of, 211. 
Molino del Rey, battle of, 29, 30. 
Mower, J. A., 268. 
Murfreesboro, battle of, 163. 

New Hope Church, battle of, 235. 

Ord, E. O. C, 99. 

Palmer, J. N., at Kenesaw Moun- 
tain, 239. 

Palmer, \V. R,, 126. 

Patterson, Robert, his Valley cam- 
paign, 41-52 ; 54. 

Peck, J. J., 126. 

Pemberton, J, C, under Johnston 
in the West, 158 ; lack of public 
confidence in his capacity, 159 ; 
operations in Mississippi, 160 et 
seq. ; operations preliminary to 
investment of Vicksburg and 
failure to follow Johnston's in- 
structions, 172 etseq.\ siege of 
Vicksburg, 194 et seq. ; his re- 
ports after Vicksburg, 207 ; sub- 
sequent connection with the 
war, 2o3 ; with President Davis 
in the West, 210, 211. 

Pendleton, W. N., 47, 55, 76, 219. 

Peninsula, spring campaign on, 
112, 152. 

Pickett, G. E., 129; at Seven 
Pines, 145 et seq. 

Pickett's Mill, battle of, 235. 

Pillow, G. J., Johnston's division 
commander in Mexican War, 
24-32. 

Polk, L., 164, 210, 218, 219; joins 
Army of Tennessee, 228 et seq. ; 
part in operations, 228 et seq. ; 
killed near Marietta, 238. 



35- 



GENERAL JOHNSTON. 



Port Gibson, battle of, 177. 
Porter, D. D., 175. 
Preston, R. T., 65. 
Preston, John S., 9. 
Preston, Thoma- L., 9, 40 ; recol- 
lections of Manassas, 62 ; 66. 
Preston, William C., 9. 
Pryor, R. A., 129, 147. 

Rains, G. J., at Seven Pines, 142 

et seq. 
Randolph, G. W., 118, 160. 
Ransom, R., Jr., 208. 
Raymond, battle of, 179. 
Reagan, J. H., 271-272. 
Richardson, I. B., 60, 72, 130, 

144. 
Riley, B., in Mexican campaign, 

28 et seq. 
Rodes, R. E., at Seven Pines, 140 

et seq. 
Rogers, Martha, wife of Peter 

Johnston, 5, 
Romney, Jackson's expedition to, 

99. 
Ropes, J. C., 258. 
Rosecrans, W. S., 160. 
Rosser, T. L., 78. 
Runyon, T., 72. 

Schofield, J. M., commands Army 
of the Ohio, 226 et seq. ; at 
Gulp's Farm, 238 ; approaches 
Atlanta, 246 ; in North Caro- 
lina, 262 et seq. 

Scott, T. M., 240. 

Scott, Winfield, Florida campaign, 
17-20; commands Vera Cruz 
expedition, 24 ; his plans against 
City of Mexico, 26 ; nomina- 



tions for quartermaster general, 
33 ; 37, 50, 52, 98- 

Seddon, J. A., Confederate Secre- 
tary of War, 160 ; letter to 
Johnston at Jackson, 198. 

Semmes, P. J., 125. 

Seven Pines, battle of, 136 et seq. 

Shacklett, A. R., reminiscences 
of Contreras, 28. 

Sherman, W. T., 61 ; in Vicks- 
burg campaign, 172-193 ; oper- 
ations against Johnston at Jack- 
son, 204 et seq. ; his Meridian 
expedition, 219 et seq. ; plan 
for spring campaign, 223 ; his 
strength, 224 ; operations around 
Dalton, 226 et seq. ; movement 
to flank Allatoona, 233 ; Kene- 
saw Mountain, 239 ; operations 
following, 241 et seq. ; plan for 
investing Atlanta, 244 et seq. ; 
opinion of Johnston's removal, 
251 ; strength and losses, 252 et 
seq. ; North Carolina campaign, 
261 et seq. ; 288 ; opinion of 
Johnston, 291, 292. 

Shields, James, repulses Jackson 
at Kernstown, iii. 

Slocum, H. W., 269. 

Smith, Andrew J., 203. 

Smith, Charles F., 33. 

Smith, E. Kirby, 40, 56, 65, 201, 
285. 

Smith, Gustavus W., 91 ; confer- 
ence as to offensive after Ma- 
nassas, 92, 106 ; as to abandon- 
ing Peninsula, 118 ; mentioned, 
125 ; at Eltham, 134 ; at Seven 
Pines, 141 et seq. ; commands 
militia near Atlanta, 242, 258. 

Smith, Morgan L., i3o. 



INDEX. 



353 



Smith, Persifer F., in Mexican 
campaign, 28 ct seq. 

Smith, William F., assault on 
Warwick river defenses, 119. 

Stanton, E. M., 115, 120. 

Stevenson, C. L., 227, 229. 

Stewart, A. P., 227, 230 ; repulses 
attack at New Hope Church, 
235 ; in North Carolina cam- 
paign, 261 et seq. 

Stone River, battle of, 163. 

Stuart, J. E. B., 45, 48, 51, 52, 55, 
65, 77, 78, 98, loS. 

Sumner, E. V., 33, 109, 128 ; at 
Seven Pines, 143 et seq. 

Swinton, W., view of battle of 
Williamsburg, 133. 

Taliaferro, W. B., 267. 

Taylor, Richard, 88, 201. 

Taylor, W. H., 252. 

Thomas, G. H., 48 ; expedition 
against Dalton, 220 et seq. ; 
commands Army of Cumber- 
land, 226 et seq. ; approaches 
Atlanta, 246. 

Tilghman, L., iSo. 

Twiggs, D. E., in Mexican War, 
25 <?/ seq. 

Tyler, Daniel, 59 et seq. ; 72. 

Van Dorn, Earl, 91, loi, 162, 173. 
Van Plorne, T. B., 216. 
Vaughn, J. C, 46, 173, 180, 189. 
Vera Cruz, 24 et seq. 



Vicksburg, operations against, and 
investment of, 172-193 ; fall of, 
194 et seq. 

Virginia, the Confederate iron- 
clad, 113, 121. 



Walker, \N. H. T., 179, 195, 205, 
227, 228. 

Watkins, S. R., 299. 

Webb, A. S., view of battle of 
W'illiamsburg, 133. 

Wheeler, J., raid near Nashville, 
168 ; operations near Dalton, 
228 ei seq. ; raid across the 
Etowah, 234 ; 245, 246, 268. 

Whiiing, W. H. C, 40, 54, 106; 
134 ; at Seven Pines, 143 et seq. , 
218. 

Wigfall, L. T., 106. 

Wilcox, C. M., 91, 126, 129. 

William and Mary College, 6, 284. 

Williamsburg, battle of, 123 et 
seq. 

Winchester, strategic value in Val- 
ley campaign, 43 et seq. 

Wolseley, Lord, 293. 

Wool, J. E., 115. 

Worth, W. J., ends Florida War, 
21, 22 ; in Mexican campaign, 
29. 

Yorktown, operations near, 112 et 

seq. 
Young, J. R., 291. 



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